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Abstract
This thesis describes the development in French intellectual 
' understanding of the nature of Islam in West Africa and 
analyses the policies adopted by successive colonial 
administrations towards Muslims in the French West African 
Federation. Three broad periods are identified and 
illustrated with a selection of case studies.
The first period (c.1900 - 1913) was one characterised by 
great uncertainty about the nature of Islam and by 
suspicion and fear of its power. French metropolitan 
political battles combined with the spirit of pre-war 
international diplomacy to create a climate which favoured 
conspiracy theories, and these were reflected in attitudes 
towards Islam.
The political dangers that had become apparent in this 
essentially hostile attitude and the loyalty of African 
Muslims to France at the outbreak of the First World War 
contributed to a reassessment of policy. This is 
described in the second part of the thesis covering the 
years 1914 — 1920 which saw major advances in French 
knowledge of Islam. Above all these advances were due to 
the work of Paul Marty, the Director of the Department 
of Muslim Affairs in French West Africa. His in-depth
studies of Muslim societies provided the administration 
with the information and the confidence necessary to 
construct alliances with a wide range of Muslim leaders.
At the same time the influence of Durkheimian theories of 
religion was reflected in an increasingly sophisticated 
perception of non-Muslim societies and in a view of 
African Islam which stressed its pre-Islamic foundations.
The third and final period (1920 - 1940) was one in which 
the Russian Revolution and the growth of nationalism in 
Africa and Asia caused a certain amount of anxiety about 
Islam but in which, nonetheless, French dependence upon 
a number of Muslim leaders was the most striking aspect of 
Franco-Islamic relations. The highly personalised nature 
of this relationship survived until the end of the 
colonial era.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This study is a contribution to the social, political 
and intellectual history of one of the largest colonial 
states in Africa - the Federation of French West Africa 
(AOF). The Federation grouped together the present-day 
states of Senegal, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, 
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Benin and Guinea. Between 
them they straddle all the major bands of climate and 
vegetation that are to be found in West Africa - and 
the indigenous population is correspondingly varied.
Yet this vast and varied area was for over fifty years 
treated as a single administrative unit presided over 
by an alien government based in the Federation's 
capital in Dakar. Muslims were to be found in all the 
colonies of the group - though the proportions varied 
from the exclusively Muslim society of Mauritania to 
the mainly animist and Christian societies in the 
southern coastal colonies of Dahomey and the Ivory 
Coast. By examining French attitudes and policies 
towards Islam it is possible to gain some insight into 
both the political nature and ideological underpinning 
of the colonial state of AOF. It is hoped that these
2insights will contribute to an understanding of the 
nature of French colonialism on the one hand and to the 
African, and, specifically, Muslim African, reactions 
to this experience on the other.
Methodology and themes
The need to come to terms not only with the importance 
but also with the complex and often contradictory 
nature of the colonial state seems unquestionable, and 
this constitutes the first of the major themes of this 
study. The capitalist penetration of Africa that took 
place during the colonial era, the creation of an 
infrastructure within the colonies designed to meet 
the needs of metropolitan capital and the determination 
of Africa's patently nonsensical boundaries have all had 
the profoundest of impacts on Africa's political, 
social and economic development. Claims that the 
colonial era represented no more than an 'interlude' in 
African history^ do little justice to the enormity 
of change that has taken place over the last century.
Yet at the same time it is necessary to add nuance to 
this 'enormity of change' for it is clear that there
(1) See E. Isichei A History of Nigeria London 1983 
for a recent example of such an approach.
3was much that colonialism did not change and much that 
the colonials never saw nor ever heard. Furthermore, 
'change' occurred in ways that the colonial 
administrators could not anticipate for Africans were 
not the dumb and passive subjects of colonial rule that 
was often imagined. They - if one may be permitted 
the generalisation - retained their own identity and 
took advantage of any opportunity the colonial 
situation offered. (1)
Nor were the colonials homogeneous and all-powerful - 
whatever illusion of control the maxim-gun may have 
afforded. Political intrigue and competition 
flourished within the small and isolated colonial 
societies. However much the rhetoric of 
colonialism may have stressed the altruism of the 
'civilising mission', Frenchmen by and large went to 
the colonies as a career in which they attempted to 
advance themselves as fast as they could up the complex 
hierarchy of bureaucratic promotion. As everybody 
knows, career-building is a vicious and fiercely 
competitive process and in the colonies it was no 
exception. However, at least for the early part of 
this study, Frenchmen not only had to look over their 
shoulders to keep an eye on their rivals but they also
(1) This is one of the main themes of J. Iliffe
A Modem History of Tanganyika Cambridge, 1979 
see esp. pp. 248-69.
4had to look out for a wide range of fatal diseases.
At the turn of the century medicine had advanced 
sufficiently to ensure that Europeans need not expect 
to die in the tropics. Nonetheless the death rate 
was still very high: in 1914 one in ten of the
graduates of the Ecole Coloniale, the training school 
for colonial administrators, would die within the 
first few years of serving in the colonies. ^
A parallel, though not a parallel that one would wish 
to push too far, to the relationship between the 
French administration and their colonial subjects can 
be seen in the social history of nineteenth-century 
Britain. The fear of the British ruling classes of 
the 'masses' (as they were both variously constituted 
throughout the century) was similar to the European's 
fear of Africans and, perhaps, the ignorance of each 
other's respective lifestyles was as near complete in 
both cases. The success with which the British ruling 
classes maintained social order with relatively few 
resources of coercive power is striking. This success 
has often been explained by recourse to theories of 
'social control' according to which the ruling class 
made up for its lack of coercive power by controlling 
the education, morality and leisure of the masses,
(1) According to M. Delafosse 'iidcole coloniale'
BCBCAF 3, 1914 pp. 137-46.
5thereby instilling them with respect for authority and 
encouraging them to pursue leisure activities that 
would take their minds off their economic exploitation. 
A similar argument could be applied to the colonial 
situation. However, the concept of 'social control' 
needs to be treated with care. The following remarks 
of the British social historian, F.M.L. Thomson, are 
important ones and deserve full quotation for they are 
very suggestive of the dangers of taking the 
relationship between rulers and ruled at face value.
Of Victorian Britain he writes:
Authority and the legalized use of force on 
which it ultimately rested were, as always, 
exerted in ways intended to uphold a social 
fabric congenial to the holders of power, 
and they were concerned to induce the people 
to accept as legitimate the ways in which 
authority was exercised. That was the aim 
of social control. It should not be accepted 
as the sole or even the most important, of 
the non-coercive agencies in the process of 
social conditioning, partly because of the 
often yawning gap between the aims of the 
social controllers and the actual achievements; 
partly because many improvers and reformers 
were socializers rather than controllers, 
peddling recipes for better survival in a 
changing environment rather than weaving webs 
of subordination; and partly because there 
was an independent spontaneous life in popular 
culture, and the working classes were a great 
deal more than puppets on the end of bourgeois 
strings. W
(1) F.M.L. Thcmpson 'Social Control in Victorian
Britain' Eoonanic History Review xxxiv (2) 1981 
pp. 189-208. This passage is fran p.207.
6I believe that this is also a useful way of looking at 
the colonial situation. It is an amoral view of 
history in that it takes for granted the wish of the 
ruling class to maintain its grip on authority but in 
its awareness of the importance of survival in a 
changing world and in the rich variety of response to 
authority it is also a reassuringly humanist 
perception of history.
The second general theme concerns the problem of 
'understanding' other societies and cultures. Studies 
of European perceptions of non-European societies^ 
all rightly highlight the Eurocentric and innately 
racist nature of these perceptions. This study will 
provide further examples of these characteristic 
perceptions but it is important to stress, as 
M. Rodinson has done in his critique of E.W. Said's 
Orientalism, that one should not be tempted into 
arguing that the perceptions of the western scholar or 
administrator are inevitably invalidated by his or 
her race and social class:
(1) For example, P. Curtin The Image of Africa: British 
Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 London, 1964; W.B. Cohen 
The French Encounter with Africans: White Response
to Blacks 1530-1886 Bloanington, 1980; J-J Waardenburg 
L'Islam dans le miroir de 1*Occident Paris & The Hague, 
1963; H.Djait L'Europe et 1'Islam Paris, 1978;
E.W. Said Orientalism Iondon 1978; M. Rodinson 
La fascination de _1'Islam Paris, 1980.
7It was entirely true that the conclusions of 
bourgeois scholars were partially, and to a 
greater or lesser extent according to the 
discipline, personality, conjuncture, and 
specific cases, influenced by their class 
situation. But that does not mean that their 
[conclusions^ were totally without 
relationship with what one has to call 
reality. (1)
As I hope this study will show, of the several people 
commentating on Islam in West Africa some were much more 
competent than others and it would be a mistake to group 
them all together under one label.
Nevertheless, it is hard to disagree with Said's basic 
theme that the Muslim Arab world was grossly distorted 
in western perceptions, and that these distortions were 
well-suited to western political d e s i g n s  .(2) Another 
point which Said stresses is the ahistorical nature of 
the western vision of the Arab world:
The Orientalist attitude ... shares with magic and 
mythology, the self-containing, self-reinforcing 
character of a closed system, in which objects are 
what they are because they are what they are, for 
once and for all time, for ontological reasons 
that no empirical material can either dislodge or 
alter. (3)
(1) Rodinson o p cit p. 15.
(2) 'Colonial rule was justified in advance by 
Orientalism' ... 'the essence of which lay
in the ineradicable distinction between Western 
superiority and Oriental inferiority' Said 
op cit pp. 39,42.
(3) ibid p. 70.
8Orientalism assumed an unchanging Orient, 
absolutely different from the West. And 
Orientalism, in its eighteenth-century 
form could never revise itself.(1)
This ahistorical vision was evident in many European 
accounts of the African past and was, as we shall see, 
an important factor in policy-formulation. However,
it is important to recognise that Europeans often 
regarded their own past through similarly ahistorical 
eyes. The eighteenth and nineteenth-century collectors 
and chroniclers of European popular culture, for 
example, likewise assumed an unchanging, undifferentiated 
and timeless bucolic past.^)
The third theme of this study is closely related to the 
second and concerns the contribution of the social 
sciences to colonial rule. The colonial era was 
characterised by, amongst other things, a relentless 
pursuit of facts and statistics. The reasons for this 
are clear enough. Firstly, at the end of the 
nineteenth century European powers found themselves in 
nominal governance of vast areas of land about which 
they knew very little. There was, therefore, a lot 
of ground to be made up. Secondly, the model of 
government in Europe with its increasingly bureaucratic
(1) ibid p.96.
(2) P. Burke Popular Culture in Early Modem Europe 
London, 1979. ch. 1 'The discovery of the past'.
9and interventionist states relied heavily on statistics. 
Social scientists made considerable claims for their 
discipline and at the turn of the century, a time when 
Durkheim wrote that 'Sociology is on everybody's lips' d) 
it was confidently predicted that government would soon 
be elevated to the status of a science.
However, the forward march of science was not without its 
obstacles. Not everybody had even heard of 'sociology' 
let alone agreed with its fundamental assumptions. A 
debate conducted in Africa, the journal of the 
International African Institute in 1929 between the 
anthropologist, Malinowski, and the future Governor of 
Kenya, Mitchell provides an excellent summary of the way 
in which the claims of 'Science' and the 'Practical Man' 
could sometimes conflict.d) Even with the best will in 
the world it is not clear that administrators would have 
been capable of making use of the insights of social 
scientists. R. Buell, an early American political 
scientist who made a major study of the 'native'
(1) Cited in S. Lukes Bnile Durkheim; his life and work,
Harnvondswprth, 1973 p. 396.
(2) See Africa, 2, 1929? Africa, 3, 1930 for Malinowski's 
and Mitchell's articles. Mitchell argued that the 
'Scientist' was incapable of reaching his conclusions 
with sufficient speed to be of any practical use and 
that he lacked the broad range of skills and knowledge 
that were essential to the 'Practical Man'. Malinowski 
contered that colonial rule urgently needed a base of 
scientific understanding if it was to be efficient and 
acceptable.
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policies of the various colonial powers reported that, 
'The French Colonial Office has an immense library and 
archives, but neither officials nor scholars can make 
use of them because of the lack of an adequate index or 
filing system. In 1925 the French budget appropriated 
4,900 francs for the Colonial Office Library - a sum 
which would not even pay for b ook-binding(D If this 
was the situation in Paris one would scarcely expect it 
to be any better in the colonies themselves, but it is, 
perhaps, as a symbol of the problem of using 'knowledge' 
in 'government' that Buell's anecdote is best 
remembered.
A final point related to this theme, and one which is 
much more specific to the question of French attitudes 
towards Islam, is to realise that the positivist social 
sciences cut in several ways as far as Islam was 
concerned. For whilst it is true, as Peter Clarke has 
pointed out, that the notion that Islam represented a 
step up from animism owes a great deal to the ideas of 
Comte (2) it should be remembered that in Durkheimian 
sociology (which belongs to the same positivist 
tradition as Comtean philosophy) Islam loses its 
favoured status. For when Durkheim argued that all 
religions are a means by which societies maintain cohesion
(1) R. Buell The Native Problem in Africa (2 vols) New York, 
1928 volume II p. 93.
(2) P. Clarke West Africa and Islam London, 1982 pp. 189-90
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and social order and that as a result 'There are no 
religions which are false1 and that 'The God is only 
a figurative expression of the society' (1) he 
undermined the 'superiority' of Islam over animism.
It was now possible to argue, indeed, that animism was 
a superior religion to Islam because it was better 
suited to the temperament and the way of life of 
African societies. This was to be a subject of 
considerable importance amongst certain influential 
circles of the French colonial administration.
The fourth theme of this study concerns the transposition 
by the French of their own metropolitan preoccupations 
and political battles to the colonies. Of particular 
significance were the Dreyfus affair and the battle over 
the Secularisation laws, which between them dominated 
French political life at the turn of the century, deeply 
divided France and highlighted a particular conspiratorial 
style of French politics. Conspiracy was as potent a 
myth as it was a reality. It provided a useful weapon 
with which to defame one's opponents and at the same 
time galvanise one's supporters into a show of solidarity 
against the threat of a well-organized, yet shadowy 
conspiracy. As a result a suspicion of conspiracy 
verging on paranoia came to be a characteristic of
(1) Cited in Lukes Durkheim pp. 460,461.
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French political thinking.(1) On an international 
level also politics in pre-First World War Europe were 
dominated by intrigue amongst statesmen, and the presence 
of numerous small anarchist groups not only added spice 
to political life but also represented, as Sarajevo 
proved, a significant factor in world politics.
Conspiracy should then be taken seriously and it will 
be very difficult to understand French perceptions of 
Islam in West Africa if one does not take account of its 
importance in metropolitan life.
The fifth theme is more specific. It concerns the 
attempt to identify the level at which colonial 'policy' 
in AOF operated. At one extreme AOF represented part 
of France's strategic interests elsewhere in the world.
It so happened that France's most important and oldest 
overseas possessions lay across on the other side of 
the Sahara desert from AOF and that the indigenous 
population there was overwhelmingly Muslim. France's 
'Muslim Empire' ‘was further increased after the First 
World War with the share out of the Ottoman Empire 
between France and Britain. At this level 'Islamic 
policy* was practically synonymous with 'imperial 
policy'. At the other extreme AOF represented a
(1) See M. Riberioux La Repuhlique radicale? 1898-1914 
Paris, 1975 for general background. A Gide's 
The Vatican Cellars (1914) is an amusing satire on 
French preoccupation with conspiracy theories.
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federation of parochial governments, isolated 'parish 
councils' whose perception of policy and strategic 
interest was necessarily limited and for whom the 
dictates of imperial bureaucrats in Paris may well have 
been quite meaningless. The federal government in 
Dakar was placed in between the parish politics of the 
cercle and the imperial politics of the Empire. This 
study attempts to cover the totality of this range. By 
focussing on particular case-studies it is hoped that 
it is possible to give some indication both of the 
diversity which existed within AOF and of the conflict 
of interests which was inherent in its position as half­
way house between parish pump (or, more appropriately, 
village well) and the Colonial Office in the rue 
Oudinot. (It should, however, be noted that the 
Colonial Office was a poorly organised one and that 
one must be wary of talking over-confidently of such a 
thing as an overall imperial strategy.) (1)
The final theme is the one around which the thesis is 
organised: the attempt to impose a sense of
periodisation on the events that were taking place and 
on the ideas that were taking shape. The periodisation
(1) See C.S. Andrew & A. Kanya Forstner France Overseas:
The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial
Expansion London, 1981; C-R. Ageron France coloniale 
ou Parti colonial? Baris 1978; R. Girardet L'ld^e 
coloniale en France Paris, 1971.
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offered here is one that begins: (i) with the years
in which administrators attempted to apply the 
knowledge gained by the French experience in Algeria and 
in which the growth of Arab nationalism and Germany's 
activities in Europe, Morocco and the Middle East 
preoccupied colonial minds and to a certain extent 
distorted their perception of local realities; that 
continues (ii) with the years in which a concerted 
effort was made to understand better the local realities, 
to play down the Algerian model and to establish a 
system of stable alliances and coalitions; and that 
finally (iii) ends with the years in which world events 
(notably the Russian Revolution) were allowed to re­
enter the stage but were not allowed, however, to 
disrupt the pattern of alliances that had now been 
established. These three periods fall approximately 
into the years c. 1900 - 1913, 1913 - 1920 and 
c. 1920 - 1940.
A note on the sources
The sources used in this study have been exclusively 
written sources and include a large number of 
published works. The main archival sources were 
those of the Federal Government of AOF which are kept 
in Dakar and of the Colonial Ministry kept in the 
rue Oudinot, Paris. Smaller collections of personal
15
papers in the rue Oudinot and in the Institut de France 
were also of particular interest as were the military 
archives kept in the Chateau de Vincennes. In the 
AOF archives the series 2G is well-known to all 
historians of the colonial era. It contains the 
monthly, quarterly and annual reports of all the 
cercles and colonies of AOF and is therefore a fund of
information. However, the series must be treated with 
care: carefully written reports tend by their very
nature to edit out confusion, to hide ignorance and, 
more seriously, to give little sense of the dynamic 
forces behind any particular event. I have, therefore, 
made more use of the series covering individual 
colonies and specific areas of administration (Education, 
Justice, Muslim Affairs etc.) which contain not only 
official enquiries but also all the correspondence.
They are not as easy to use as the monthly reports as 
one has to construct for oneself the sequence of events, 
but the effort is worthwhile as they allow us more 
easily 'to read between the lines'. My published 
sources have been the numerous monographs and articles 
written about Islam and West African societies early 
this century. Many of the authors were themselves 
administrators and their writings are full of 
fascinating insights and detail* They are all very 
revealing of the character and attitudes of the authors 
as well as being serious pieces of scholarship in their
16
own right. Inevitably some works were less scholarly 
than others, but this does not explain why the body 
of colonial scholarship as a whole was so ignored by 
the French academic establishment. The lack of 
interest of early French sociologists and 
anthropologists in the work produced in the West 
African colonies is a subject of French intellectual 
history worthy of a separate study and here we can only 
record the fact in passing. The lack of interest was 
certainly not mutual as it is clear that the scholar- 
administrators were well abreast of the latest theories 
of, for example, Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl. A closer 
study may even reveal that these theories were in some 
instances anticipated by the colonial studies. I have 
translated all the source material appearing in the 
body of the text. Some of the translations I know 
appear somewhat stilted and inelegant. This is due 
in part to the inadequacies of the translator but also 
owes much to the peculiar inelegance and long- 
windedness of much French administrative writing.
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Orthography
Sixty years ago T.E. Lawrence was able to dismiss 
the query of the copy-editor of Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom concerning the six different spellings he had 
given for the same Arab prince with the comment,
'Good egg. I call this really ingenious1. Today 
such attitudes are frowned upon, but each scholar 
continues to have his or her own personal system of 
transliteration based on a more or less intimate 
knowledge of the linguistic structures of Tamasheq, 
Fulfulde or Bambara.
This thesis covers a wide range of African languages 
and I can make no claim to scientific accuracy in 
the transliteration of any of them. I have simply 
aimed to be consistent as much as possible and to 
avoid the French use of -ou and dj- where -u, w-, 
aw- or j- would be more appropriate. Thus, the 
French spellings of 'ouali1, Fouta' and 'Oulad', for 
example/are spelt in this thesis as 'wali', 'Futa' 
and 'Awlad'. In quotations spellings are given 
as in the original French. Placenames are 
generally spelt as they appeared on the colonial map,
18
but where reference is made to the pre-colonial 
town the spelling may be altered. Thus Djenne (the 
colonial town) appears also as 'Jenne' (the 
pre-colonial town). An exception has been made 
in the case of 'Timbuktu' which is never spelt, 
except in quotations, in its French version of 
'Tombouctou'.
19
At this juncture it is appropriate to review some of 
the related secondary literature. A study of French 
relations with Islam can, it must be said, make little 
claim to originality. Scarcely had Africa been 
partitioned before French 'experts' were sent to 
investigate and report on Islam.^ By 1915 two
doctoral dissertations on the subject had been 
submitted to French universities.^) Throughout the 
colonial period successive administrators, scholars 
and interested spectators produced a constant stream 
of works on the problem of what policies should be 
adopted towards France's Muslim subjects.
The concern of scholars in the post-colonial era has, 
not surprisingly, shifted away from the administrative 
'problem' of Islam towards an attempt to understand 
its internal dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
analysing the huge increase in Islamic conversion 
over the last two centuries scholars have focussed 
their attention on such themes as Jihad and Islamic
(1) The first such mission was led by the Islamicist 
A. Le Chatelier in 1886.
(2) A Quellien La Politique musulmane dans l'Afrique 
occidentale francaise Paris, 1910; F. Carles 
La France et 1'Islam en Afrique occidentale 
Toulouse, 1915.
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reform ^ , the economic and social foundations of 
the expansion of I s l a m  C2)r the relationship between 
Islam and slavery in Africa &) f Islamic response to
(1) Hie literature on jihad is enormous. B.G. Martin 
Muslim Brotherhoods in the Nineteenth Century 
Cambridge, 1976 is one of the best introductions 
to the nineteenth-century movements. M. Last 
'Reform movements in West Africa' in new edition 
of J.F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds) History of West 
Africa, volume ii (forthcoming) is the best survey 
of recent scholarship. I am grateful to Dr. Last 
for allowing me to read this chapter before 
publication. See also J.R. Willis (ed) Studies 
in West African Islamic History volume i London, 
1979.
(2) See M. Johnson 'The economic foundations of an 
Islamic theocracy - the case of Masina' JAH xvii 
(4) 1976,pp.481-95; M. Klein 'Social and economic 
factors in the Muslim revolution of the Senegambia'
JAH xiii (3)1972, pp.419-40; C.C. Stewart
Islam and Social Order in Mauretania; a case study from 
the nineteenth century CKford, 1973; C.C. Stewart 
'Southern Saharan scholarship and the Bilad al-Sudan'
JAH xvii (1) 1976 pp. 73-93; L.O. Sanneh Ihe Jakhanke; 
the history of an Islamic clerical order of the 
Senegambia London, 1979; L.O. Sanneh 'Hie origins of 
clericalism in Vfest African Islam' JAH xvii (1) 1976 
pages 49-72; J.R. Willis "Hie Torodbe clerisy: a
social view' JAH xix (2) 1978 pp. 195-212.
(3) P. Love joy Transformations in Slavery; a history of 
slavery in Africa Cambridge, 1983.
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colonialism (1) and, finally, the political economy 
of Islam in the twentieth century, (2) At the same time 
scholars and Muslim leaders have been anxious to 
reintegrate African Islam - Islam noir as it is called 
by the French - into the mainstream of the Islamic 
world. This has been in response to the affirmation 
of many colonial 'experts' that African Muslims were 
not true Muslims because they practised a 'bastardised' 
form of Islam. Nonetheless the specificity of Islam in 
Africa retains its interest and the theological works 
of African Muslims are beginning to receive serious 
attention from western scholars. a  subject which
is likely to attract increasing attention is the study 
of the esoteric sciences in Islam which were dismissed
(1) M.A. Klein Islam and Imperialism in Senegal; 
Sine-Saloum 1847-1914 Edinburgh, 1968;
C.A. Quinn Mandingo Kingdans of the Senegambia: 
Traditionalism, Islam and Colonial Expansion 
Evanston, 1972; D. Robinson Chiefs and Clerics: 
Abdul Bokar Kan and Futa Toro, 1853-1891 Oxford, 
1975; A. Traore 'Contribution a l'dtude de 
l'islam: le mouvement Tijanien de Cheikh Hama
houllah' These de 3eme cycle, Dakar 1975 
(now published).
(2) D.C. Cruise O'Brien The Mourides of Senegal 
Oxford, 1971; Saints and Politicians; C. Coulon 
Le Marabout et le Prince Paris, 1982.
(3) See, for example, F. Dumont La Pens6e religieuse 
d'Amadou Bamba Dakar/Abidjan 1975.
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as charlatanism during the colonial era.^^ This 
bibliography (which makes no claims to being 
comprehensive) is essentially an Islamicist one.
Yet it cannot be regarded as being peripheral to the 
colonial historian. Islamic response to colonial 
rule and colonial reaction to an Islamic presence are, 
clearly, related subjects. Although many of the works 
cited above discuss at some stage the nature of European 
colonial policy towards Islam none make any claim to a 
systematic treatment of the subject. As their titles 
suggest their subject matter is limited to specific 
years, regions and, in some cases, personalities.
The one article which addressed itself specifically 
to the question of French policy towards Islam in 
West Africa is in reality an analysis of French policy 
towards Islam in S e n e g a l . ^ )  Donal Cruise O'Brien
outlined four stages of policy between 1854 and 1914:
(i) the period of military conquest (lasting up to the 
turn of the century) in which the French had no Islamic 
policy; (ii) the attempts by the civilian administration
(1) L. Brenner West African Sufi: the religious heritage
and spiritual search of Cerno Saalif Bokar Taal London, 
1983 has demonstrated the central importance of the 
subject.
(2) D.C. Cruise O'Brien Towards an "Islamic policy" in
French Vfest Africa, 1854-1914' JAH viii (2) 1967
pp. 303-16.
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in the first decade of the twentieth century to
requlate and document Islam in order to make use of it;
followed by (iii) a brief period of uncertainty and 
suspicion of the disruptive force of Islam throughout 
the world; before (iv) the evidence of Muslim loyalty 
during the First World War convinced the colonial 
adminstration that they had no interest in combatting 
Islam. This periodisation fits the situation in
Senegal very well but it is far from certain that it
can be seen as an accurate description of the policy 
changes in, for example, the Ivory Coast or the 
French Sudan. (1)
For a variety of reasons, which have as much to do with 
Senegal's liberal regime and its pleasant climate as 
with the intrinsic interest in Senegal's past, Senegal
i  has been investigated in considerably greater depth than
the other colonies of AOF. Whilst this is understand-
!
| able it has perhaps led to a confusion that equates
i
! Senegal with French West Africa and the Senegalese
sufi Muslim brotherhood, the Mourides, with West African
|
j Islam. This study will make use of a wider spread of
case-studies to illustrate French relations with a
(1) On these areas see respectively J-L Triaud 'La 
question musulmane en Cote d'Ivoire' RFHOM Ixi 
(225) 1974 pp. 542-71 and L. Harding 'Franzosische 
Religionspolitik in West Afrika "Soudan francjais" 
1895-1920' Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung des 
Grades einer Doktor der Philosophie der Freien 
Universitat Berlin, 1972.
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variety of Islamic communities throughout West Africa. 
The selection of data is inevitably a subjective 
exercise. The main criterion used in the selection 
of case-studies in this study is that the events were 
of sufficient importance to involve all layers of the 
administration from the cerc'le up to the Colonial 
Office. In practice this is a much more inclusive 
category than might be imagined as even apparently 
trivial events were capable of generating a voluminous 
official correspondence. However, I have attempted 
to select cases where the involvement between cercle 
and the Colonial Office in the rue Oudinot was rather 
more active and dynamic than a mere exchanae of letters. 
The case-studies are intended not so much to be 
'tvDical' of a certain era (though I hoDe thev are not 
untypical) as to be maior - decisive even - events.
The task of making the conceptual leap from incidents 
involving the Tuareg nomads of the Sahara to those 
involving the urban creole Muslims of coastal Dahomey 
is somewhat eased by concentrating also on the French 
personalities responsible for, or at least influential 
in, the administration of Islamic affairs. These 
personalities not only provide a unifying base from 
which to branch out to the corners of the vast French 
West African Federation but they are also worthy of 
attention in their own right.
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Finally, it is necessary to sketch a brief historical 
background to the events covered in this study.
Islam in West Africa to c. 1850
The history of the Islamic presence in West Africa is
Sahara in the second century AD had revolutionised 
transport and had made possible long distance trade 
across the deserts of North Africa. As a result it 
is probable that sub-Saharan Africa had some contact 
with the Muslim societies in Egypt and the Maghreb 
from the first days of these areas' respective
centuries Islam in West Africa was confined mainly 
to the royal courts and to the trading communities. 
Although centres of scholarship existed from an early 
date the type of Islam practised is generally regarded 
as being 'syncretic' - combining a good deal of 
pre-Islamic polytheism with the main tenets of Islamic
(1) For overall surveys see V. Monteil L'Islam noir 
(3rd edition) Paris, 1980; J.S. Trimingham 
A History of Islam in West Africa Oxford, 1962;
P. Clarke West Africa and Islam London, 1983;
M. Hiskett The Development of Islam in West Africa 
London, 1984. The following paragraphs are 
based on all of these.
a long one.(l) The introduction of the camel to the
Islamicisation. Until
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dogma.(1) The first major development took place in 
the eleventh century with the conversion of the rulers 
of the ancient Soninke empire of Ghana to Islam by the 
Berber Almoravids of southern Morocco. In the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the influence of 
Islam upon the rulers of the empire of Mali 'not only 
served to associate Islam with Sudanic kingship; it 
also drew the Sudan more closely into the world of
| international politics, diplomacy and trade.'
! Several of Mali's rulers, most notably Mansa Musa,
i
made spectacular pilgrimages to Mecca. The reputation
!
I
(1) See Lansine Kaba's description of the
operation of Islam in 16th century Songhay 
for example of the meaning of 'syncretic'
Islam in "Hie Pen, the Sword and the Crown:
Islam and Revolution in Songhay reconsidered, 
1464-1493' JAH xxv (3) 1984 pp. 241-56, 
especially p. 245. 'The Songhay cosmology 
appears to have had a two-tier structure, 
the first tier being that of the ancestral 
spirits and the second that of Islamic 
monotheism. Although the two did not blur 
into a unified new entity, they interacted 
on different planes, underpinning different 
processes, while the lesser spirits were 
viewed as forces deriving their power frcm 
a suprane being. This process indicates 
Islam's adaptiveness to different cultural 
systems. Gradually, the cultural change which 
brought about conversion could ultimately became 
an integral part of the life of the Islamic 
community and a distinctive, yet authentic, 
expression of the wider Muslim civilization.'
(2) Hiskett Development of Islam p.30
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of the learned ulema of Timbuktu was established during 
the sixteenth century in the Songhay empire under the 
askiya dynasty, surviving even the Moroccan conquest 
of Songhay in the late sixteenth century. In the 
Senegambia none of the smaller states that developed 
in the wake of the collapse of the Malian empire were 
ruled by Muslims until the seventeenth century, but 
through trade an Islamic influence was always present. 
In the Sudan, however, the empire of Kanem and later 
Borno, at the southern end of trade routes to Tripoli 
and Egypt were dominated by Muslim rulers. The 
Islamic presence in the various Hausa kingdoms dates 
back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries though 
none of the rulers accepted Islam before the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries.
From the end of the sixteenth century the nature of 
the Islamic presence in sub-Saharan Africa began to 
alter and to acquire a broader base and, in some cases, 
a more militant leadership. It was at this time that 
Sufi ideas started to penetrate West African society 
more deeply. The development of Sufism at this
stage is associated in particular with the Qadiriyya, 
a Sufi order (tariqa, pi. turua) that had been founded 
in Baghdad in the twelfth century AD and which had
(1) ibid ch. 15.
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spread rapidly to North Africa. During the fifteenth 
century it was introduced to the western Sudan by the 
Tuareg Kel es Suq and the Arab Kunta. The doctrines 
of the Qadiriyya underwent some modification during 
the sixteenth century as to the characteristic (and 
wholly orthodox) mystical Sufi practices was added a 
growing veneration of Qadiri holy men or saints (wali, 
pi. awliva). The saints were thought to be capable 
of interceding on the believer's behalf with God and 
the Prophet Muhammed on the last day of judgement.
The tombs of men, who might be local men, regarded as 
saints became centres of pilgrimage. As a result of 
the charismatic leadership of the saints whilst alive 
and the importance of their tombs after their deaths 
the Sufi turuq (at first the Qadiriyya but later also 
the Tijaniyya, Mourides (Muridiyya), Sanusiyya and 
several others) were able to attract a larger and 
more popular following than the early propagators of 
Islam had been capable of doing. Furthermore, the 
Sufi orders although tied into the wider Islamic 
world developed a stronger local identity.
At the same time as these developments were growing 
in momentum reform movements in Senegambia successfully 
created Islamic states in Bundu, Futa Toro and Futa 
Jallon. The leaders of the reform movements showed 
a willingness that had not hitherto existed to go out
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into the countryside to preach and convert 
agriculturalists. At the same time they showed a 
marked unwillingness to tolerate the syncretic form of 
Islam that was practised in many of the royal courts 
and urban centres.(D The most significant of the
reform movements was the one led by Usuman dan Fodio in 
the early nineteenth century in Hausaland which resulted 
in the creation of the Sokoto caliphate. The success 
of the jihadists or reformers greatly increased the 
numbers under Islamic rule and through a combination of 
violent coercion and more peaceful means many were 
persuaded to convert to Islam. The political and 
economic consequences were profound. (2)
The French conquest of Algeria
Shortly after the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate 
Europeans showed the first signs that their interest 
in Africa was becoming more active. Long established 
in trading posts on the coast Europeans now began
(1) Last ’Reform movements'
(2) Love joy Transformation of Slavery ch. 9 'Slavery 
in the savanna during the era of the jihads' 
gives one of the most important aspects of the 
political and economic consequences.
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tentatively to show a greater interest in the interior. 
Mungo Park became the first European to reach the Upper 
Niger in 1795 and in 1824 Rene Caillifi began his travels 
that were to take him to Timbuktu. However, the most 
significant developments were taking place north of the 
Sahara, in Algeria, where in 1830 a French force 
captured the town of A l g i e r s . F o r  ten years the 
French were content to allow the principal Algerian 
leader, Abd al-Qadir to build up a sphere of influence 
in the interior leaving the French in peace on the coast 
but the appointment of General Bugeaud in 1841 to the 
command of the French army was a signal of France's 
intention to pursue the conquest further inland.
Throught the 1840s Bugeaud led a brutal military 
campaign, particularly during the years 1841-2 when he 
initiated a scorched-earth policy that soon sapped the 
will of Abd al-Qadir's followers to resist. In April 
1845 Bugeaud justified his policy in language that was 
to become familiar later'south of the Sahara:
We have never obtained anything from these people 
except through force. In vain we have often 
tried means of persuasion. Either there was no 
response at all or they told us that we would 
first have to fight (bruler de la poudre) and 
that if we triumphed, then they would s u b m i t . (2)
(1) Following paragraph is based on C-A Julien 
Histoire de l'Algerie contanporaine Paris,
1964 and M. Mcrsy North Africa 1800-1900 
London, 1984.
(2) cited in Julien op cit p. 223
However, Bugeaud also recognised the need to have 
Algerian intermediaries but these, he urged, should 
be closely supervised by specialist officers from the 
newly-created bureaux arabes. A ministerial decree in 
1844, which served as the blueprint for the bureaux until 
reforms were introduced in 1867, stipulated that every 
administrative area in the military territory of Algeria 
should have a bureau that would be immediately subordinate 
to the commanding officer. In practice this was an 
extremely powerful position as the army was wholly 
dependent upon the bureaux for information and advice.
In their early days the bureaux were credited with being 
'a paternalist authority' taking a sympathetic interest 
in Arab affairs and as such were resented by the early 
colons who accused them of being arabophile.(1)
Bugeaud's career in Algeria ended in 1847 when he was 
asked to retire - a few months before Abd al-Qadir's 
eventual submission. The 1848 Revolution in France 
brought with it a new Republican Constitution in which 
the colony of Algeria was accorded the same status as 
a metropolitan departement. In the same year 13,500 
French colons were transported to Algeria which in 
this turbulent period of French politics had become a 
useful place to send political opponents. However,
(1) ibid pp.330-37
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the most dramatic increase in the European population 
took place in the 1860s with a rise of over 40% in 
under a decade. The Algerian policy of Emperor 
Napolean III who had seized power in 1852 was a 
paradoxical one. He shared the optimism of the Saint 
Simonians in the possibility of a planned and rational 
colonisation that as a result of providing the necessary 
infrastructure (particularly railways) to encourage 
industry would benefit the indigenous population and 
settler in equal measure. To the dismay of the 
settlers he encouraged the idea that Algeria was not 
so much a colony but an 'Arab kingdom' that was worthy 
of respect and protection. Examples of this paternalist 
attitude can be seen in the establishment and financing 
of several medersas - Muslim colleges named after 
the Arabic Madrassa, a school - where the French hoped 
to train an indigenous civil service and in a law or 
Senatus Consulte of 1863 which was intended specifically 
to protect Arab land rights. However, such paternalist 
liberalism merely antagonised the settlers who were 
able to find ways of interpreting the new law on land 
rights, for example, in such a way that Arab land was 
actually reduced. The Senatus Consulte of 1865, which 
was designed to enable Algerians to become full French 
citizens, was ironically to prove to be one of the 
corner stones of settler domination of the colony for 
its requirement that Muslims would have to forfeit
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their personal Muslim status in order to qualify for 
French citizenship was unacceptable to the vast majority 
of Muslims. As a result they were condemned to 
perpetual second-class citizenship. The bureaux 
arabes went into decline as the early idealism was 
tarnished by cases of cruelty and corruption and they 
became weighted down with paper work. In the end the 
bureaux arabes alienated both the indigenous and the 
settler population. The remarks of one long-serving 
officer in 1870 illustrate the disillusion that had set 
in about the wisdom of the philosophy behind the 
bureaux and again it was a sentiment that was to be 
expressed later in West Africa:
As a result of the experience I have gained 
I would say that the indigenous society is 
in a permanent state of conspiracy against 
us and that any organisation which is built 
on the native element rests on an unstable 
base. (1)
The reforms in 1867 and 1870 abolished the upper 
sections of the bureaux retaining only the local 
bureaux de cercle. However, the bureaux remained 
a distinct feature of colonial rule in Algeria and 
were to reappear under a new name ( SAS - Sections 
Administratives Specialisees) in the French fight
(1) cited in ibid p.341; see also C-R Ageron 
Les Algeriens musulmans et la France vol. i 
pp. 131-34 for decline of bureaux arabes.
against the Algerian nationalists in the 1950s.
The years 1830-70 were ones of great uncertainty in 
terms of French colonial policy in Algeria and although 
the increasing power of the settler population in the 
1860s provided some clues, what the exact nature of the 
colonial state was to be was far from clear. However, 
in the course of the two decades following the fall of 
Napolean in 1871 the confusion resulting from the dual 
tradition of a paternalistic military administration 
and an anti-Arab civilian administration was to be 
resolved very definitely in favour of the European 
settler population. (2)
The genesis of Algerie fran^aise does not directly 
concern us here, but two developments in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century should briefly be 
noted. The first concerns the attempt by the 
civilian administration to identify and separate 
distinct races in Algeria in order to counter the 
impression that indigenous Algerian society was 
uniformly Arab and Islamic. Their efforts were 
concentrated principally on the population of the 
mountainous region of Kabylia, the Kabyles who, it
(1) V. Monteil 'Les Bureaux arabes au Maghreb (1833-1961) 1 
Esprit Nov. 1961, pp. 575-600.
(2) Hie classic account is in C-R. Ageron Les Algeriens 
musulmans especially Pt. 1 'Vae Victis'.
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was claimed, shared along with the French and Berbers 
common Roman ancestors and whose attachment to Islam 
was of the most superficial nature. Because of these 
supposed shared cultural and racial characteristics it 
was confidently argued that the Kabyles could be 
assimilated with little difficulty to contemporary 
French culture. Attempts were made to introduce 
French food and to encourage intermarriage between 
French and Kabyles in order to rescue the latter from 
the 'decadence' caused by an over long contact with 
Arabs. It is also clear that such arguments were 
used by the civilian administration in order to 
discredit the military administration, particularly 
the bureaux arabes, whose system of government was
based on the presupposition of a more or less uniform 
Arab culture and which the civilians held responsible 
for 'Arabising' and 'Islamising' Algerian Berbers. 
These theories and policies which C-R. Ageron has 
labelled the 'Kabyle myth' and the 'Kabyle policy' 
were, as we shall see, to resurface elsewhere in 
Africa under only slightly different guises.
The second development concerns the attitudes of the 
Catholic Church towards Islam in Algeria. Until the
(1) Ageron Les Algeriens musulmans Pt. IV 'Le mythe
Kabyle' & Ageron Politiques coloniales au Maghreb 
Paris 1972 Pt II 'Mythes et politiques coloniales 
francaises1.
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late 1860s the church had confined its activities to 
the European population, but the elevation of 
Mgr. Lavigerie to the Archbishopric of Algiers in 1867 
signalled a change in policy. Lavigerie immediately 
embarked on a campaign to convert Muslims: during the
famine of 18 68-9 he adopted over 1700 Muslim orphans, 
baptised them and placed them in newly created Christian 
Arab villages. He, too, made use of the 'Kabyle myth' 
in order to justify his missionary zeal, claiming that 
he was merely reclaiming the souls that in the Fourth 
Century AD had belonged to the Augustinian Church in 
North Africa. The administrators - both civilian 
and military - soon developed serious doubts about 
Lavicrerie's eacrerness to evanqelise amongst the Muslims 
and attempted to restrain him. However, Lavigerie, 
with the full backing of Rome, went on to found two 
religious orders specifically for the task of converting 
Muslims. Of the two orders, the White Sisters worked 
mainly in the Christian orphanages but the White Fathers 
were sent south into the Sahara with hopes (that were 
never realised) of reaching Timbuktu from across the 
desert. Lavigerie stated explicitly that he regarded 
Algeria as a base from which to spread the Christian 
faith across the whole of Africa;
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Algeria is no more than a door opened by 
Providence to a barbarous continent of 
two hundred million souls. It is there 
above all that we must carry the work 
of the Catholic apostolate.il)
The fact that several missionaries were killed by 
hostile Tuareg nomads as they attempted to reach Timbuktu 
did not deter young idealistic Frenchmen from joining 
them. Lavigerie, who argued that if Islam was allowed 
to spread throughout Africa then 'All blacks would become 
slaves', benefitted in particular from the strong 
abolitionist current of opinion in late-nineteenth 
century E u r o p e L a v i g e r i e 's career illustrated many 
of the paradoxes in the relationship between the Church 
and the colonial state that were to become apparent later 
in AOF and which consisted chiefly of the fact that 
however well his charitable activities fitted with the 
rhetoric of the civilising mission of colonialism and 
however much his anti-slavery campaign fired the 
imagination of a metropolitan audience, the colonial 
authorities were, with good reason, fearful of the 
political consequences of allowing the missionaries a 
free hand in strongly Muslim areas.
(1) Cited in A. Prost Les Missions des Peres Blancs en 
Afrique occidentale avant 1934 Ouagadougou/Paris, 
n.d. p.5.
(2) See F. Renault Lavigerie, l'esclavage africain et 
1'Europe (2 vols) Paris, 1971. The Lavigerie 
quotation is frcm vol. II, p.369.
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French expansion in Senegal
The French experience in Algeria was to be of 
considerable influence in their colonisation south of 
the Sahara. Georges Hardy, one-time Inspector of 
Education in AOF and colonial historian, argued that:
It was Algeria that served as a testing ground 
for political and economic doctrines ...
Whether for good or for evil one can affirm 
that the mark of Algeria's colonisation is 
to be found in all parts of the French 
domain. (1)
It was certainly true that many of the French military 
personnel who served in Senegal had gained their first 
experience of Africa in the Algerian campaigns. The 
best known of these soldiers was General Faidherbe who 
'during his terms as Governor of Senegal in the mid­
nineteenth century committed the French to expansion 
into the interior. In October 1859 Faidherbe himself 
bluntly informed the Naval Minister (at that time 
responsible for the colonies) that:
The analogies between Algeria and Senegal are 
complete. Senegal must be assimilated to Algeria 
and not to the other colonies. Senegal should be 
no more than a sub-division of Algeria. (2)
(1) G. Hardy Histoire sociale de la colonisation 
francaise Paris, 1953, p. 108
(2) Cited in R. Pasquier 'L'influence de
l1 experience algerienne sur la politique de la 
France au Senegal, 1842-69' in Perspectives 
nouvelles sur le passe de l'Africrue noire: 
melanges offerts a Hubert Deschamps Paris,
1974 p.274.
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Faidherbe arrived in Senegal at a time when the trading 
community of St Louis (where a French presence had been 
established in 1637, almost two centuries before the 
invasion of Algiers) was becoming increasingly irritated 
with the insecurity of their position in their trading 
posts established along the banks of the river Senegal 
since the 1820s. In particular, the merchants 
regretted their inability to exercise any authority 
over their trading partners, the Moors of the Trarza 
region on the right bank of the Senegal. It was 
therefore with the encouragement of the local merchant 
lobby that first Governor Protet and then Faidherbe 
pursued an expansionist policy along the river Senegal 
in the 1850s.^ However, French expansion coincided 
with the rival imperialism of the Tijani leader, 
al Hajj Umar Tall, who, since his return from Mecca, 
had been building up a substantial following with the 
intention of waging a jihad in order to create an 
Islamic state in the western Sudan. By the 1850s his 
attention was focussed on Futa Toro, the land of his 
birth, on the left bank of the Senegal and this brought 
him into conflict with the French. After some early 
successes in 1857 he was eventually forced to withdraw 
from the Futa in 1860 and turn east to Segu and Masina.
(1) L.C. Barrows 'The merchants and General Faidherbe:
aspects of French expansion in Senegal in the 1850s1 
EFHQM 1974 pp. 236-88.
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He himself died in 1864 but his son, Ahmadu, maintained 
his empire intact until the final French conquest in 
the 1890s. By this time French expansionism had lost 
the support of the trading community who now feared the 
disruptive consequences of war. However, in the hands 
of the French military commanders and stimulated by 
rivalry with Britain, French imperialism had acquired 
a momentum of its own.(1) The French continued to come 
up against jihadist movements: notably with the
movements led by Maba Diakhou in the Gambia and 
Sine-Saloum (1861-7), Cheikh Ahmadu Ba in Jolof 
(1869-75), Mahmadu Lamine in Bundu (1885-7) and most 
dramatically of all with the movement of Samori Ture 
who commanded a vast shifting empire that under French 
pressure moved gradually eastwards from the edge of the 
Futa Jallon to the kingdoms of Gonja and Kong before 
finally being captured by the French in 1898. As we 
shall see the memories of all these conflicts were to 
stay with the French throughout the colonial period 
and were inevitably a major influence on French 
policies towards Islam. However, it must be noted that 
in none of these conflicts was the possibility of an 
alliance between the French and the jihadists out of 
the question. The political situation in the western
(1) A.S. Kanya Forstner The French Conquest of the 
Western Sudan: a study in French military
imperialism Cambridge, 1969.
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Sudan in the late-nineteenth century was so fragmented 
and involved so many conflicting interests that all 
sorts of permutations of alliances were possible. 
Indeed, all the jihadists appeared at some stage in 
their career to have actively sought an alliance with 
the French. However, Faidherbe was the only leader 
willing - as his treaty in 1860 with al Hajj Umar 
shows - to contemplate the existence of a centralised 
Islamic state in the interior.(1)
From this brief historical survey three themes need to 
be stressed. The first is the length of Islamic 
influence in West Africa; the second is the variety 
of types of Islamic influence and; the third is that 
the Europeans arrived at a very specific juncture in 
the development of West African Islam. All these 
facts may seem obvious today but there were not 
surprisingly less apparent to contemporary Europeans.
(1) For surtmaries of these various movements 
see appropriate chapters in M. Crowder 
(ed) West African Resistance London,
1971 and in Ajayi & Crowder (eds)
History of West Africa, vol. II, London,
1974; see also M. Hiskett Development 
of Islam ch. 14. D. Robinson Chiefs and 
Clerics is an excellent insight into the 
complexity of political alliances during 
these years.
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The ahistorical nature of the colonial understanding 
of Africa was in this respect of considerable 
significance: coinciding with the jihadists many
Europeans assumed that militant Islam was an 
unchanging and unchangeable characteristic of Islam 
in West Africa.
French attitudes to Islam in Senegal in the nineteenth 
century
In December 18 36 a report prepared by a Naval 
Commissioner for the Governor of Senegal gave full 
backing to a request by St Louis Muslims to build a 
new mosque. He rejected the argument that such a 
concession would encourage Muslim fanaticism suggesting 
instead that such official patronage of Muslims would 
combat the influence of unscrupulous marabouts who 
exploited the credulity of the population to the 
disadvantage of the French. Muslims, he concluded, 
were 'the indispensable auxiliaries of commerce' and 
the French should take care not to alienate them.
The Commissioner also believed that it would be a 
significant progress if Muslims became property-owners: 
'Property engenders patriotism amongst men ... and 
patriotism creates useful citizens upon whom the future 
of a country depends.' The report met with some
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criticism when discussed in a cabinet meeting of the 
Governor as some feared that it would harden religious 
sentiments amongst Muslims. The Governor shared these 
fears but by the time he reported back to Paris he had 
come to accept the inevitability of a strong Muslim 
presence and therefore accepted the need to encourage 
their loyalty. Nevertheless he was hopeful that 
schemes to convert young children to Catholicism might 
provide an alternative class of French allies in the 
future.(1) What became of the mosque, I do not know, 
but this incident highlighted, as it seemed to the 
French, the fundamental question concerning Muslim 
policy: whether to sponsor an 'official* Islam or
whether to attempt to exclude all Muslims from 
government and trade. It is important to recognise 
that such questions were being posed as early as 1836.
(1) Archives Nationales: Section Outre-Mer
(ANSCM) Senegal & Dependances (S & D) X, 
3 quat Carmissaire de la marine 'Rapport 
a M. le Gouvemeur* 16.12.1836;
Proces verbal du Conseil de Gouvemeur 
19.12.1836: Gov. Senegal p.i. to 
Ministre de la Marine et Colonies 
(Min. Mar. & Col.) 10.1.1837.
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Education was clearly a major hope in the development 
of a pro-French sentiment amongst Africans. The first 
French school was opened in 1817 by lay teachers.(1)
In 1838 missionaries took over responsibility for 
education and recruited Muslim pupils from amongst the 
slave population of St Louis. Two sets of missionaries - 
the Holy Ghost Fathers and the Ploermel Brothers - set up 
schools which operated to their mutual disadvantage.
With the official abolition of slavery in 1848 the 
schools could no longer recruit Muslim slaves and were, 
as a result, without any Muslim pupils at all. In 
1852 the Governor of Senegal regretted that 'the Muslims 
do not care to send their children to our establishments, 
they fear the religious influence of our teachers' - 
but he was not prepared to take the risk of introducing 
radical changes.(2) The end-of-year report of the 
school run by the Ploermel Brothers recommended two major 
reforms in order to attract 'the unfortunately over- 
numerous and neglected Muslim class which should also 
have a need to come and seek from the warmth of our 
religion and civilisation the warm air that will revive 
its heart extinguished by the chill winds of 
Mahommetanism'. With such reasoning it should not
(1) D. Bouche 'L'eoole francaise et les musulmans au 
Senegal de 1850 a 1920' EFHCM 1974 pp. 218-35;
D.H. Jones 'The Catholic mission and sane aspects 
of Assimilation in Senegal, 1817-1852' JAH xxi 
1980 pp. 321-40.
(2) ANSQM S' & D X 5a Gov. Sen. to Min. Mar. & Col.
18.10.1852.
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cause much surprise that the suggested reforms were 
not of the most liberal nature: they consisted of one
concession - the employment of an Arabic teacher - and 
one counter-attack - legislation to close down or 
subject to strict police supervision the competing 
Qur'anic schools. (1)
However, Faidherbe realised that the most serious 
obstacle to the recruitment of Muslim pupils was the 
overtly Christian nature of the education offered in 
the existing schools. He therefore urged the 
appointment of two secular teachers. He told the 
Minister in Paris that he would like to be able to 
consider Muslims as a mere 'anomaly in our small 
Senegalese society1 but that unfortunately this was 
unrealistic:
The Muslim element is here by far the most 
numerous and active and perhaps also the most 
useful: (I can tell you this in this letter
because there is nothing wrong with telling 
you the whole truth, but I would not make this 
admission in front of Muslims). On all sides 
we are surrounded by Islam. The war we are 
waging on the Lower River is nothing compared 
to the serious and endless dangers of the Holy 
War provoked and maintained with such vigour 
by Alhadji[i.e. al Hajj Umar Tall].
(1) ANSCM S & D X 5a 'Carmission superieur^ 
des etudes...' to Gov. Sen. 12.12.1854.
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And then, in a very revealing appraisal of the French 
position in Senegal, Faidherbe went on to asks
What is the class that is the most indispensable 
to us in Senegal? It is the admirable laptots 
of the river. They are all Muslims. ... If 
we need volunteers for war, whether it is a 
political war with the Trarza or whether even 
it is a Muslim war as with Alhadji, who is it 
that responds to our call? The Muslims. (1)
Faidherbe’s realism was not universally shared. A book 
published in 1854 entitled De la Senegambie francaise 
was violently anti-Islam and annoyed Faidherbe 
greatly ^^but it clearly reflected a widely held 
opinion that France should make no concession to Islam 
at all. The former Prefet apostolique of Senegal 
wrote to the Director of Colonies in May supporting the 
idea of secular teachers providing they were of 'sure 
morality' and met with the approval of the Superior of 
the Congregation of the Holy Spirit, but that he agreed 
also with M. Carrere (one of the authors of De la 
Senegambie francaise that 'Serious methods should be
employed to destroy the mosque, to reject for ever the 
proposal of a Muslim tribunal, to expel all foreign
marabouts and restrict the areas in which the marabouts
(1) ANSCM S & D X 15 bis Gov. Sen. to Min. Mar. & Col. 
11.4.1856.
(2) According to L.C. Barrows 'Faidherbe's Islamic policy 
in Senegal, 1845-64' French Colonial Studies, 1977 
pp. 34-53 (see p.41)
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of St Louis can teach to two districts of the town' .(1) 
Faidherbe, however, had his way. The first secular 
teacher was appointed in October 1856 and in November 
the following year Faidherbe reported that the school 
was doing well with a roll of over 200 p u p i l s . (2)
Apart from being an interesting insight into French 
attitudes to education the debate over the provision 
of secular teachers provided an early example of the 
importance of realpolitik in French dealings with 
Muslims. Faidherbe's recognition of the dominance 
of Islam in St Louis and of the strategic value of a 
Muslim alliance appeared to run counter to the 
prevailing anti-Islamic ideology both of the missions 
and of the merchants - but neither group were able to 
prevent Faidherbe.
The question of the application of Muslim laws to 
Muslims provoked a debate that was in many ways 
similar to the education i s s u e .  (3) In 1832 St Louis 
Muslims petitioned the Governor to complain about the 
application of French Civil Law that had been 
introduced in 1830. However, nothing came of this
(1) ANSCM S & D X 15 bis M. Barbieu to Directeur des
Colonies 23.5.1856.
(2) ANSCM S' & D X 15 bis Min. Mar. & Col. to Gov. Sen.
11.10.1856; Gov. Sen. to Min. Mar. & Col. 16.11.1857.
(3) B. Schnapper 'Les Tribunaux musulmans et la politique
coloniale au Senegal (1830-1914)1 Revue Historique de 
Droit francpais et etranger 1, 1961 pp. 90-128 is an 
excellent summary of issues. I am grateful to Jean- 
Louis Ttiaud (Paris Vll) for this reference.
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petition.(1) Following further petitions in the 1840s 
a plan was drawn up in 1848 for the creation of Muslim 
tribunals with jurisdiction in certain civil matters 
affecting Muslims but, despite reaching an advanced 
stage, the plans were not put into p r a c t i c e . (2) Whilst 
in Paris in September 1856 Faidherbe wrote to the Naval 
Minister concerning the need for a Muslim tribunal:
It seems to me that one can scarcely ... refuse 
to the Muslims of St Louis who are sincerely 
devoted to us ... and whose support is essential 
to us ... what the French government has granted 
with such good grace to the Muslims of Algeria 
who are hostile from the depths of their hearts 
and on whom we could have imposed our rule (i.e. 
without granting such a concession).
\ Faidherbe stressed nonetheless,that he regretted 'that
we have to make this necessary concession to a religion 
which offends us by its intolerance'. Back in Senegal
i
! Faidherbe wrote in March 1857 emphasising the urgency
1
! of acting upon his recommendation as he had promised
a Muslim tribunal and feared the consequences if he
i
! was unable to keep his promise to the Muslims. He did
not have to wait long and in May a Muslim tribunal was 
created in St Louis by decree. (3)
(1) ANSCM S & D VIII 4 bis Gov. Sen. to Min. Mar. & Col. 
12.10.1832.
(2) ANSCM S & D Viii 4 bis Gov. Sen to Citoyen Ministre 
Mar. & Col. 16.10.1848; same to same 25.10.1848.
(3) ANSCM S & D VIII 14 bis Faidherbe to Min. Mar. & Col. 
13.9.1856; Directeur des colonies to Min. Mar. & Col. 
5.3.1857; Faidherbe to Min. Mar. & Col. 10.3.1857; 
Decree 20.5.1857.
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However, this tribunal did not satisfy Muslims as the 
judge (cadi) was not allowed to settle inheritances 
and to act as ward to fatherless orphans despite the 
fact that under Qur'anic law these were included 
amongst the duties of the cadi. In 1865 the Governor 
was asked to extend the powers of the cadi.(1)
M. Carrere, who was head of the Judiciary Service, was 
predictably unimpressed by such demands, ascribing 
ulterior motives to them and arguing that the French 
had a duty to spread French ideas and culture. He 
concluded that if in the metropole adherents of all 
religions had to obey the code Napoleon then he saw no 
reason why the same rule should not apply in the 
colonies. Pinet Laprade, the new Governor of
Senegal, did not agree:
It would be impolitic to restrict the duties 
of the cadi so soon after the struggles that 
we have had to undergo with Alhadj and Maba, 
when the religious passions which in part 
provoked these struggles have not yet died down. 
But I hasten to add that the duties should not be 
extended but that it will be sufficient to define 
them clearly in order to give satisfaction to the 
Muslims of St Louis, the majority of whom, we 
must acknowledge, have never refused us help 
against the enemies of the c o l o n y . (3)
(1) ANSCM S & D VIII 23 bis 'Petition' 28.4.1865.
(2) ANSCM S & D VIII 23 bis Chef du Service judiciaire 
to Gov. Sen. 22.2.1866.
(3) ANSCM S & D VIII 23 bis Gov. Sen. to Min. Mar. & 
Gol. 26.2.1866.
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However, no change was made to the cadi's duties.
When the question resurfaced again in the late 1880, the 
French administration were much more confident in their 
rejection. The crucial argument of the Head of 
Judiciary was that the situation in Senegal was very 
different to the one pertaining in Algeria where cadis 
had much greater powers. His argument is worth quoting 
| at length for it was one that was to be of considerable
| importance in the early-twentieth century. It was one
; of the first signs that the received wisdom about the
i parallel cases of Senegal and Algeria was subject to
|
doubt:
One cannot compare Senegal with Algeria. ...
Islam was the only religion which existed in 
Algeria at the time of the conquest. It was 
natural as much as it was prudent to respect 
it and even facilitate the practice of its 
laws. ... But it is not the same here ... 
and we are not bound by the same obligations. 
Senegal is a colony created by France; the 
town of St Louis was shaped by the French and 
it was only gradually, indeed clandestinely, 
that Islam filtered into the black population 
of the town. ... [Islam] does not, therefore, 
have the freedom of the town and cannot claim 
the same rights to those in Algeria. Here, 
more than anywhere else, the Muslim as a 
result of his profound ignorance which his 
fanaticism has encouraged is absolutely hostile 
to our ideas, our usages, our language, our 
customs and our civilisation.
(1) Archives Nationales du Senegal (ANS) M 8
Chef service judiciaire 'Rapport' 22.6.1888.
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This report was presented to a special commission 
charged with reorganising the Muslim judicial system 
in Senegal. The commission included the cadi of 
St. Louis and for his benefit the substance of the 
report was translated into Arabic. However, the less
i
than complimentary remarks on Islam and the ignorance 
of the Senegalese Muslims were tactfully left 
untranslated I (1)
I
| The education and law debates in nineteenth-century
Senegal provided some interesting pointers for the
i
future. In particular they raised three fundamental 
questions: was Algeria an appropriate model for the
Senegalese administration?were Senegalese Muslims 
true Muslims or merely profoundly ignorant imitations? 
and thirdly, should ideological/confessional 
preferences be allowed to dominate the dictates of 
realpolitik? All three questions were to be burning
| issues in colonial policy-making in the twentieth
|
j century.
(1) ANS M 8 1Proces-verhal de la commission 
chargee de 1'etude de la reorganisation 
de la justice musulmane1 1.4.1889.
PART ONE
1900-1912: FRENCH ANXIETIES AND THE
\
SEARCH FOR A POLICY
Depuis notre conversation, tous 
les passants que je rencontre je 
leur trouve je ne sais quoi de 
louche dans 1*allure. Je 
m'inquiette s'ils me regardent; 
et ceux qui ne me regardent pas, 
on dirait qu'ils font semblant 
de ne pas me voir. Je ne 
m'etais pas rendu compte jusqu' 
aujourd'hui combien la presence 
des gens dans la rue est rarement 
justifiable.
Andre Gide Les Caves du Vatican 1914
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Introduction
By the turn of the century the era of ^vert military 
conquest had come to an end. The conquest of the 
Western Sudan had created heroes - Archinard, Gallieni 
and Marchand amongst the best known - but the financial 
strain it imposed on the colonial budget made these 
heroes the enemies of the colonial accountants in 
Paris. By the 1890s economy was the order of the day, 
and Chaudi6, the Governor-General of AOF, was expected 
to restrain the activity of his military colleagues.^  
The other imperative, linked to the need for economy, 
was organisation. Military conquest had not only 
been costly but it had also been haphazard. Legislation 
passed between 1895 and 1904 gradually imposed order 
on the situation with the creation of a federal 
government headed by the Governor-General based in 
Dakar. By 1904 the federal government had effective 
political control over the local governments of the 
various colonies of the federation. Through its 
control of the federal budget to which all colonies 
contributed their revenue raised from custom duties 
the federal government also exercised economic control.
(1) see A.S. Kanya-Forstner The Conquest of the Western
Sudan:__a study of French military imperialism
Cambridge, 1969.
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The system survived more or less intact throughout the 
period covered in this study.(1)
One aspect of the transfer of power from the military 
to a civilian administration was a change in attitude 
towards Islam. Chautemps, the Minister of Colonies 
in mid-90s, gave specific instructions to Chaudie 
not to underestimate the power and authority of Islam 
in West Africa and to accord it the respect it 
deserved.(2) However, these instructions and the 
attitude that lay behind them require qualification 
and explanation. They were directed principally at 
the administration of the French Sudan and were derived 
from an influential body of opinion in Algeria where 
a similar antagonism existed between advocates of 
military conquest and diplomatic persuasion as in 
West Africa .(3)
The link between Algeria and sub-Saharan Africa was 
personified in Xavier Coppolani, a young and highly
(1) C.W. Newbury 'The Formation of the Governor-General 
in French West Africa' JAH 1 (1) 1960 pp. 111-28.
(2) Newbury op cit p. 116; Kanya-Forstner op cit 
pp. 249-50
(3) C-R. Ageron Les Algeriens musulmans et la France 
Paris, 1968 'VaeVictis'.
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ambitious 'expert1 on Islam who was commissioned 
by the governments of both Algeria and the French Sudan 
to investigate the state of Islam in these two countries. 
The first chapter of this section is concerned mainly 
with Coppolani and his attempt to apply a grandiose 
Islamic policy based on his experience in Algeria in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
However, his scheme foundered, partly as a result of 
tension and conflict within the French community and 
partly as a result of its innate impracticability.
Thus the hopes expressed by Chautemps and others in 
the 1890s that the final stages of the 'pacification' 
of African Muslims could be achieved without bloodshed 
were abandoned. The second chapter deals with the 
intense anxieties that succeeded this early optimism.
In the first decade of the century events throughout 
the Muslim world caused considerable alarm amongst 
colonial powers, and the French moved from a policy 
of coojDtion to close surveillance of Muslim leaders.
They were also years marked by an intense hositility 
to marabouts, and the chapter discusses aspects of 
this peculiarly French distate for what was termed 
maraboutage.
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The third chapter examines the question of education: 
at a time when religious legislation over education 
was dividing opinion in metropolitan France French 
attitudes to Muslim education were particularly 
illuminating and revealing of the often very 
contradictory way in which Islam was viewed by 
France's so-called anti-clerical colonial 
administration. The fourth chapter, concerning 
events in the Futa Jallon in 1909-11, is a case-study 
of the consequences of a combination of French 
anxieties about Islam generally, an overriding 
acceptance of racial and ethnic stereotypes and, 
again, conflicting ambitions within the French 
administration.
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i
i
CHAPTER TWO: THE ALGERIAN SCHOOL - COPPOLANI,
ISLAM AND THE CONQUEST OF MAURITANIA
i
Xavier Coppolani was born in the small village of 
i Marignana in Corsica on 1st February 1866 His early
i
childhood appears to have been dominated by his
i
[ relationship with his pious mother, who, despite his
I
| eventual marriage, was to be the only woman about whom
\
| he ever spoke with any great affection. Her simple
piety together with the strong superstitions of the 
Corsican villagers served as models of popular mysticism 
which Coppolani later applied to his analyses of Islam.
(1) There is no single reliable biography of 
Ccppolani. His friend and colleague,
Robert Amaud, writing under the pseudonym 
of Robert Randau wrote a lengthy biography 
published in 1939 Un Corse d'Algerie chez 
les hcmmes bleus; Xavier Coppolani, le 
pacificateur Algiers, 1939 much of which 
he had already published in a barely 
fictionalised form in his novel Les 
Explorateurs. Reman de la grande brousse 
Paris, n.d. There are a number of other 
shorter works most of which draw heavily on 
Amaud's work but which also include sane 
obscure archival sources and personal memoirs: 
Lt d'Otton Loyewski 'Coppolani et la 
Mauritanie' Revue d'Histoire des Colonies 
1938 pp. 1-69; G-M Desire Vuillemin 
'Coppolani en Mauri tanie' Revue d'Histoire 
des Colonies 1955 pp. 291-342; J-F Maurel 
Xavier Coppolani; son oeuvre St Louis, 1955.
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Both sides of Coppolani's family had long-standing 
Algerian interests having been amongst the first 
settlers after the conquest, and ten years after 
Coppolani's birth his parents emigrated to settle 
in the Constantinois region of Algeria.
In Algeria Coppolani studied at the Ecole Normale in 
Constantine and by the time he started his 
administrative career as Secretary of the 'commune- 
mixte' of Oued Cherg in 1889 he was a competent 
speaker of Arabic. The 1890s were a crucual period 
for the Algerian administration as in addition to the 
problems of the conquest of the south, the ambiguities 
surrounding the dual heritage of civilian and military 
administration had not yet been resolved and there was 
increasing pressure from the metropole on the government 
in Algiers to identify more precisely its policy towards 
the indigenous Muslim populations.
Jules Cambon had been appointed Governor-General in 
1891 with the specific brief to implement a 'native 
policy'. He rejected much of the so-called'Kabyle 
myth' and sought instead a more sympathetic attitude 
towards Islam. To this end he made efforts to
(1) The conflicts and tensions are analysed in 
Ageron Les Algeriens musulmans vol. I,
Part I 'Vae Victis'.
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establish good relations with the Sufi brotherhoods of 
south Algeria, offered help to pilgrims to Mecca and, as 
a gesture, allowed Muslim pupils holidays on religious 
festivals - a minor concession which had been 
consistently rejected in the past by successive 
administrations.^
Significantly, he also obtained from the Cherif of 
Mecca a ruling or fetwa declaring that it was 
permissable for Muslims to obey a government of 
unbelievers. Cambon hoped that this would 
sufficiently impress the Muslims of south Algeria to 
obviate the need for the use of arms - a hope that 
betrayed a basic and widely shared misconception that 
equated the role and power of the Cherif of Mecca 
with that of the Pope in the Roman Catholic church.
In any case he was pre-empted bv the army who had 
already started a conventional militarv campaign in 
the south before he was able to distribute the fetwa. 
Somewhat aqgrieved he nevertheless had fifty copies 
printed which he offered to other colonies including 
the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Senegal and the French Sudan.
(1) ibid pp. 513-18. Ageron concluded, 'Ce retour 
a une plus saine comprehension des usages et 
des besoins religieux des musulmans peut 
apparaitre came assez symbolique de la 
politique de Cambon.1
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The offer met with a mixed response: in the Ivory 
Coast and Guinea it was welcomed, but in the Sudan 
the Governor, Grodet, thought that most of the local 
marabouts were mere 'ignorant fanatics' and incapable 
of understanding the document. A relatively
minor incident but one which nevertheless illustrates 
well certain European concepts of Islam: Cambon's 
over-estimation of the influence of the Cherif of 
Mecca and Grodet's virtual refusal to recognise African 
Muslims as Muslims worthy of the name constitute two 
distinct views of Islam which continue at least to 
the end of the colonial period.
Cambon's attitudes derived in part from the conclusions 
of Louis Rinn, the he^d of the Native Affairs Department. 
He was author of a major study of Islam in Algeria, 
(published in 1884)^) in which he had argued - rather 
confusingly it must be said - that France should combat 
the highly dangerous and very well organised Sufi 
brotherhoods with an official salaried clergy. Rinn's 
definition of the Sufi brotherhoods was somewhat vague.
He contrasted their membership with what he called the
(1) ANSCM Afrique IV 37a Gov-Gen. Algeria to Govs.
Senegal, Soudan, I. Coast, Guinea n.d.; Gov. I 
Coast to Gov-Gen. Algeria 6.1.1894; Gov. Soudan 
to Gov-Gen Algeria n.d.; Gov. Guinea to 
Gov-Gen Algeria 13.1.1894.
(2) L. Rinn Marabouts et Khouan: etude sur l'islam en
Algerie Algiers, 1884.
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Muslim Clergy* (the imam) and the marabouts. He 
argued that both of these groups could be co-opted. 
Not so the brotherhoods:
Their aim is the exploitation of human 
stupidity and the most ridiculous 
superstition. Their practices ... are 
more often than not noisy and theatrical. 
They do not shy from giving their 
followers supernatural powers or talismen 
against which nothing will resist. Almost 
everywhere the active members of these 
brotherhoods are itinerant musicians, 
singers, dancers, snake charmers, jugglers 
and acrobats who mix in with their acts 
the better known prayers and verses from 
the Coran to which all their spectators 
listen with respect. (D
Cambon's willingness to deal with the Sufi 
brotherhoods of southern Algeria suggests that he did 
not share Rinn's pessimistic view, but his eagerness 
to distribute the cherifian fetwa indicates 
nonetheless that he shared Rinn's hopes in the 
official 'clergy' of Islam.
Coppolani, meanwhile, frustrated by his lowly 
administrative position, was actively engaged in 
the search for a high-ranking patron that he might 
be lifted swiftly into the corridors of power.(2)
(1) ibid p. 116.
(2) Randau Corse d'Algerie pp. 16-17.
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He succeeded in attracting the attention of Octave 
Depont, an administrator of a commune mixte, and when 
in February 1895 Cambon issued directives for a major 
study of the brotherhoods in Algeria it was to Depont 
and his young protege that the mission was entrusted.
In 1897 they published their conclusions in 
Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes.
Robert Arnaud, a friend, colleague and biographer 
of Coppolani, claims that Coppolani did most of 
the work and that Depont's role was to lend to the 
conclusions an air of authority that would otherwise 
have been lacking. Certainly the language of the 
book is typical of Coppolani's later reports and, 
like almost all of his writings, it contains a large 
element of propaganda for his own career. Coppolani 
needed more than a patron, he also needed a raison 
d'etre. Islam, or more precisely, the Islamic 
threat, was to be that raison d'etre. Coppolani 
proposed himself as the master of the situation, and 
his 'Muslim policy' was henceforward to be the real 
servant of his career. In this Coppolani had on 
his side the almost universal distrust and fear of 
Islam which it should be said Les Confreries religieuses 
musulmanes did little to allay.(D
(1) See Ageron's comments on the conduct of the enquiry
whose result was, he said, 'un constat de non lieu ...
La conclusion a et£ ecrite d'avance' Ageron op cit 
pp. 514-15.
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Nevertheless, in scientific terms the book did 
represent a clear improvement on the work that it 
supplanted, the idiosyncratic study of Rinn. It was 
also one of the clearest statements of the 'Algerian 
School's' understanding of Islam and remained for 
many years a standard text for students of Islam on 
either side of the Sahara.
The introduction of the book soon progressed from an 
explanation of the origins of Sufism to a warning that,
[Brotherhoods] are by their very nature the 
enemies of all established power, and Muslim 
states, as well as European powers which rule 
over Muslims, have to reckon with these 
anti-social preachers ... the very soul of 
the pan-Islamic movement.
Sounding the crusader * s trumpet it continued
There is a work of justice and of compassion 
to be done here which must be carried through 
without weakness. We must tear away from the 
rapacious hands of merciless and oppressive 
bigots a population which for too long has 
been encouraged to attack our institutions by 
the words and deeds of this politico-religious 
madness. (1)
The account of the Islamisation of the Maghreb conceded,
(1) 0. Depont & X. Coppolani Les Confreries religieuses
musulmanes Algiers, 1897 pp. xiii, xxiv.
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however, that Islam was not the all-conquering force 
it might seem to be and which Depont and Coppolani 
elsewhere suggested it was. Islam, they argued was 
brought to the Maghreb by Arabs 'holding the Coran in 
one hand and the sword in the other' and met with 
stiff resistance from the indigenous Berbers before 
finally, and here the authors stressed that there 
was a lesson for the French, the Arabs, realising 
the dangers of a religiously motivated resistance, 
compromised with the local customs and beliefs.^
The tenacity of superstition was, they argued, 
universal for 'Humanity is everywhere the same:
Man, no matter to what category he belongs, poses 
himself ... insoluble questions and even the most 
sceptical amongst us, in the midst of his pleasures 
thinks of the Invisible and gives himself up to 
Nothingness'. &)
We are perhaps seeing here the start of the erosion 
of a positivist confidence in a clearly defined 
hierarchy of civilisations and cultures. However, 
it is doubtful that Coppolani's interest in and sympathy 
with superstition constitutes in itself a major
(1) ibid pp. 107-20, esp. 110.
(2) ibid p. 121.
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masses whom they dominate and direct as they wish'.
No longer able to mount open resistance - the French 
were too strong - they acted as 'Secret societies 
agitating in the shadows and exploiting the Orient's 
proneness to Mahdism and pan-Islamism'.
The danger represented by the brotherhoods was, 
therefore, vividly portrayed, and Coppolani was to make 
much of it over the next few years. The reader might 
well have trembled as he read such dire warnings 
which probably confirmed all his worst suspicions of 
Islam but ... Depont and Coppolani had a remedy!
In the course of the description of the brotherhoods 
some hints were dropped that their fanaticism was 
measured and could be controlled. Firstly, although 
the authors stated that the strongest opposition to 
European expansion had been offered by the 
brotherhoods they admitted that not all brotherhoods 
were equally hostile and that in the conquest of 
Algeria, for example, the French were able to form 
an alliance with the Tijaniyya. (2) Secondly, despite 
the susceptibility of the Algerian masses to mystic
(1) ibid pp. 169,191, 192.
(2) ibid pp. 176-77, 263-65
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departure from a positivist view of society. The 
contemporary vogue of exoticism appears to have left 
Coppolani relatively untouched and he was to fall far 
short of his companion Arnaud's later reappraisal of 
human civilisation.
Depont and Coppolani were impressed by the ability of 
the brotherhoods to assimilate traditional beliefs and 
rightly saw in this ability one of the greatest 
strengths of the brotherhoods. They warned that when 
the Sufi formula for spiritual regeneration was preached 
to an ignorant and, the authors conceded, often an 
ill-treated mass,(D then their message became 
'Extremely dangerous ... destroying everything, first 
of all preparing the election of fanaticism and later 
encouraging all sorts of excesses'. In such cases,
'One can sense ... all the extreme exaltation of 
religious madness in which there is always to be found 
unfortunately the echo of Islam and which demonstrates 
that we should never cease our vigilance, that we should 
on the contrary always prepare ourselves against the 
surprises that Muslim fanaticism has in store for us.
The principal agents of this fanaticism are ■ the 
brotherhoods, compact bundles of politico-religious 
forces which have seized hold of the minds of the
(1) ibid p. 182. The authors quote Cambon's reference 
to Bugeaud's description of Algerian society as a 
' sort of human dust'.
67
appeals Depont and Coppolani argued that
Happily, the human soul has some penchants 
which not even the purest morality or the 
most austere doctrine can always succeed 
in controlling. Many of the founders of 
the brotherhoods whom posterity has painted 
as saints emerged occasionally from their 
solitude ... and abandoned themselves to 
the enjoyment of earthly pleasures. (1)
Earthly pleasures which in this material age the French 
could now offer in exchange for a little worldly 
obedience.
Tribute was also paid to Cambon's successful 
collaboration with some of the brotherhoods, and in 
their conclusions Depont and Coppolani sketched out the 
principles for policy in the future. They emphasised 
that history had shown that it was futile to attempt 
to destroy the brotherhoods and that, therefore, the 
French should try and work with rather than against 
them. Discreet official sponsorship of education and 
subsidies for the construction of lodges for the 
brotherhoods were favoured as the agents of future 
political control. By faithfully pursuing such 
policies France would do much, they concluded, to remove 
the threat of a pan-Islamic rebellion and would be
(1) ibid p. 175
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assured of a broad sweep of allies rather than having 
to rely on a handful of proven collaborators.
Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes was an extremely 
important work and it contains a wealth of detail that 
has been used by successive generations of students of 
Islam. For our purposes, however, it is more interesting 
to see it for its ideological content, as a sophisticated 
statement of the Algerian school of Islamic experts with 
its long tradition dating back to Bugeaud. The most 
important thing to note is the emphasis placed on the 
Sufi brotherhoods to the extent that other forms of 
Islam are almost wholly ignored. The accent on Sufism 
is significant partly because it exaggerated in the 
European's mind the mystical and mysterious origins of 
Islam but also, and more importantly, because it high­
lighted a peculiarly French sensitivity to conspiracy.
On the other side of the Mediterranean the idea of 
'a secret society agitating in the shadows' was common 
currency and referred, depending on one's convictions, 
either to the Freemasons or the Jesuits. (For someone 
with Corsican origins it might, of course, have had other 
Godfatherly connotations.). The year after the 
publication of Depont and Coppolani's work France was 
divided over another great scandal full of accusations 
and counter-accusations of conspiracy, treason and worse 
as the Dreyfus affair broke on the political scene.
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A few years later with the advent of the Bloc Republicain 
to power in France a four year battle was engaged against 
the church. The first attack was made against the 
monastic orders - congregations in French. The same 
wcrd was frequently used to denote the Sufi brotherhoods. 
Although neither the Dreyfus affair nor the conflicts 
over secularisation had in 1897 impinged upon domestic 
politics the tensions that lay behind them and which 
explain the passions they were to arouse were already 
apparent. Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes must 
be seen in this context.
That the book had an immediate impact on French policy 
can be seen in two sets of government circulars issued 
the year following its publication. The first, dated 
4th June 1898, was issued by Lepine, the new Governor- 
General of Algeria, to divisional commanders and prefects 
in the departments of Oran, Algiers and Constantine, 
and it concerned the need 'To elevate the status of our 
native chiefs ... the indispensable intermediaries 
between their coreligionaries and the various services 
of the administration [and] the sole representatives of 
our authority in Arab country1. Chiefs could be 
recruited from three social categories, the nobility, 
men of proven ability and intelligence but the most 
important category was the third, the religious leaders - 
and by this Lepine meant the leaders of the brotherhoods.
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In words that echo those of Depont and Coppolani he 
explained that:
As a result of their religious character, their 
austere lifestyle and the prestige that goes 
with their titles of chiefs of representatives 
of these occult powers that are the muslim 
corporations, the [Chioukh and Moqaddim] are 
the true spiritual and temporal rulers of their 
coreligionaries. They are the ones who form 
their minds, inspire and direct them. I am 
not unaware that their doctrines are hostile 
to our government. But we shall not succeed 
in either suppressing them or in restricting 
them through persecutions whose only result 
would be to increase fanaticism and to give 
them new recruits. On the contrary, I believe 
that by managing them by giving them some of 
the 'horma' which they esteem so highly we can 
attract their sympathy and use them for the 
greatest profit of our domination and the 
interests of our Muslim subjects. (1)
The second set of instructions were those issued by 
General de Trentinnian, Governor of the French Sudan, 
who was anxious to find a cheap and efficient means of 
administering his vast colony and its northern Tuareg 
nomads. A European trader who had spent 18 years in the 
Sudan advocated starving the Tuareg into submission or 
extinction along with the marabouts whom he described 
as 'a vermin that becomes dangerous unless it is 
crushed'. (2) However, de Trentinnian was of a
more liberal and tolerant disposition and in December 
wrote individually to his regional commanders with 
instructions to respect local beliefs and customs
(1) ANS 12 G 15 Gov.-Gen. Algeria to Generals & Prefets 
Oran, Algiers, Gons tan tine 4.6.1898.
(2) ANSOM Soudan l/9a M. Audeod to Commt. Region Nbrd 
15.9.1898; same to same 27.10.1898.
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as much as possible. To the commander of the North 
and North-East Region he wrote,
Religion which looms up in front of us like 
an insuperable barrier can become in capable 
hands a precious instrument. By making 
ourselves the protectors of Islam we will get 
to know it better, we will make use of its 
resources made available through our political 
action and with perseverance we shall certainly 
be able to draw towards us certain influential 
men who still appreciate the goods of this 
world. In any case we shall reassure the 
masses to whom Christians have been presented 
as enemies. (1)
In his political report at the end of the year 
de Trentinnian reflected that,
The influence of Islam has almost always been a 
powerful lever used against us; it is an 
inexhaustable seam for the marabouts who exploit 
the credulity of the naturally simple and good 
blacks as well as the instincts of the Tuaregs, 
so proud of their independence and so ardent in 
war and pillage. ... The utilisation of the 
very real influence of Islam ... is a question 
of prime importance. It has become the object 
of the constant preoccupation of the Government 
of Soudan.(2)
Proof of this constant preoccupation was most evident 
in de Trentinnian1s invitation to Coppolani to go on 
a mission amongst the Moorish and Tuareg tribes of the
(1) ANSCM Soudan l/9e Lt.-Gov. Soudan to Count.
Region Nord & Nord-Est 19.12.1898.
(2) ANSCM Soudan l/9e 'Rapport politique du 31 Decembre'
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Sahel. Coppolani, whose request to the Foreign 
Ministry to be given the charge of a world-wide study 
of Islam had been refused earlier in the year, had 
every reason to find de Trentinnian's invitation 
particularly interesting. At the end of Les Confreries 
there was much emphasis on the potential benefit of a 
correct Islamic policy in Algeria for French efforts 
south of the Sahara. For some time Coppolani had been 
privately critical of the slow progress in the Saharan 
hinterland, and now de Trentinnian had given him an 
opportunity not only to publicise his misgivings but 
also to put forward his own grandiose policies for a 
French Saharan empire.
At the same time as de Trentinnian wrote to his junior 
officers to inform them of Coppolani's m i s s i o n  (2) he 
issued a circular that might have been drawn up by 
Coppolani himself.
For some years, de Trentinnian wrote, the 
attention of the public powers has been drawn 
towards the important role played in Islamic 
countries by Muslim religious brotherhoods, 
veritable states within states. These sects 
of theocrats enslave believers and maintain them 
in a state of vulgar ignorance, preventing 
them from progress, levy private taxes and enrich 
themselves to the detriment of public and private
(1) Randau Corse d'Algerie. pp. 27-28; Maurel Xavier 
Coppolani p. 23. It seens that M. Hanotfeaux, 
the Foreign Minister, disliked Coppolani)
(2) S(ervice) H(istorique) de l'A(rm£e) de T(erre) 
(SHAT) AQF Soudan VI/6 Lt.-Gov. Soudan to Count. 
Region Nord 1.1.1899; same to same 6.1.1899.
wealth. From a political point of view these 
little governments hold and manipulate in the 
shadows and in mystery the strings of the 
Muslim world. ... The religious men personify 
the religious force which is the only one still 
capable of arousing the masses and creating 
difficulties for the European governments.
De Trentinnian concluded that it was vitally important 
to know who the religious leaders were and ordered 
each commandant de cercle to draw up a file on the 
leading local religious personalities. As a guide 
for the administrators a glossary of terms such as zaouia, 
chioukh and moqqadim along with brief paragraphs on the 
principal brotherhoods was also included with the 
circular. ^
In this little episode there are a number of elements 
worthy of interest. Firstly the iniative was a 
personal one: de Trentinnian emerges as a thoughtful
administrator aware of the need of a cheap and long 
term policy. Although it cannot be proved it is 
reasonable to suppose that he read Depont and 
Coppolani's work very shortly after its publication 
and this would suggest that he took some care to keep 
abreast of the latest 'scientific' opinions. The 
inclusion of a glossary with the circular suggests
(1) ANSQM Soudan I/9e Lt.-Gov. Soudan to counts, 
regions & cercles n.d.
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that he was not confident that the local administrators 
had even the most rudimentary knowledge of Islam. 
Secondly there was a curious ambivalence in the attitude 
towards Islam which was typical of the 'Algerian school' 
Islam, and again by Islam de Trentinnian meant the Sufi 
brotherhoods, was described as a serious threat to the 
French, a state within a state, an agent of fanaticism 
and obscuranticism, but, in the right hands it need not 
be a threat and on the contrary it might even prove 
a powerful ally. This pattern of personal initiative, 
widespread ignorance and ambivalent attitudes towards 
Islam was to be repeated several times in the next few 
decades.
Coppolani made it quite clear that the pair of hands 
most capable of transforming Islam into a compliant 
and benign force were his own. A military expedition 
was out of the question, he said, as it would have 
provoked the suspicion of the tribes and doomed the 
mission to costly failures
No, he continued in language that reveals much 
about Coppolani*s modesty, My role was greater, 
my action was to be one of energy, tolerance 
and humanity towards the untamed Muslims who 
were waiting for me. I had to inspire 
confidence on them and to achieve this it was 
necessary ... to surprise them ... as a friend, 
in the name of the Governor of the Soudan their 
natural protector. I needed confidence in 
myself and this confidence was never found wanting.
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I knew from experience that these fanatics 
who had been generally described to me in 
a bad light were for the most part men 
appreciative of our sentiments of justice 
and wisdom. Furthermore I was only too well 
aware of their divisions, their interests and 
their misery to worry for a moment about the 
welcome they were to keep for me ... (1)
Coppolani neglected to mention his own writing on the 
subject of untamed Muslim fanatics and henceforward his 
emphasis was to be on his own unique understanding of 
Islam, thereby marking the beginning of a subtle change 
in his attitude to Islam.
From his report on his mission to the Sudan it is not 
at all clear what actually happened. It seems 
Coppolani left Nioro on the 19th January and returned 
barely a month later having obtained the submission of 
all the principal tribes (the Mechdouf and the Allouch) 
without a shot having been fired. According to 
Coppolani he simply rode out and met the chiefs who 
everywhere gave him a warm welcome because, 'In their 
eyes I was the happy messenger who brought lasting 
peace and the hope of tranquility that was so necessary 
in their tribes'.
(1) ANSQM AP 1420/1 Coppolani 'Rapport d'ensemble sur 
ma mission au Soudan francais' Paris, 1899 p. 14.
(2) ibid p. 18.
76
Coppolani often mentioned in his report the help given 
him by Cheikh Sidi el Kheir, an influential religious 
personality who made many of the initial contacts with 
the hitherto hostile tribes, but in no place was it 
made clear where he came from or to what he owed his 
religious authority. Elsewhere Coppolani wrongly 
described him as the third son (he was the 48th) of 
Cheikh Mohammed Fadel, the founder of a major branch 
of Qadiriyya in Western Africa. (1) At this stage 
Coppolani's Islamic policy even at a rhetorical level 
appeared vague and.in its details was often ill-informed.
Even greater confusion surrounds the details of the 
second part of Coppolani1s mission amongst the Tuareg 
tribes around Timbuktu as there is no surviving report 
and very little correspondence between Coppolani and 
his colleagues. However a letter from Coppolani1s 
companion, Robert Arnaud, gives a lively account that 
is worth quoting at length. Addressed to 'Mon 
Capitaine' it described how Arnaud and 'Coppo' had 
arrived in Timbuktu having successfully completed the 
earlier part of the mission;
(1) Coppolani 'L'action religieuse musulmane dans le 
nord-ouest Africain' Revue Franco-Musulmane et 
Saharienne (1 & 2) 1902, pp. 15-33; 12-31.
See also P. Marty Etudes sur l'islam et les 
tribus du Soudan t.III Les Tribus maures du 
Sahel et du Hodh Paris, 1921 pp. 256-81 for 
details of Sidi el Kheir and the French.
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At Tombouctou serious problems were waiting 
for us. Up until our arrival the policy 
followed had been to consider the nomad as 
the enemy, and to protect the negro 
excessively. This had naturally alienated 
us from the white populations, Moors and 
Tuaregs, and one couldn't wander outside 
Tombouctou without danger. We had to do 
something about this because of the great 
interest there is for France to win the 
sympathy, the alliance or the clientele 
of the tribes situated as much in the south 
of Algeria as in the north of the Soudan.
An officer was there, a Captain Henrys, 
who agreed completely ... Unfortunately, 
all endeavour was premature for it wasn't 
a question of a pure and simple tour but of 
more serious matters. Coppo had worked 
upon the Moors ... The Tuareg as well had 
to come to terms with us. To this end,
we left at the end of March in the direction
of the eastern wells where we were supposed 
to find the main dissident tribes. The 
chief of the Bouamine came with us. One 
by one the chiefs of the eastern Kel Anstar 
arrived to ask for 'amam' and offered 
serious guarantees of submission provided 
we gave them justice, that is to say provided 
we didn't shoot them at random and that we
stopped raiding their women in order to
satisfy the ardours of certain men starved of 
white flesh and that we designated them land 
for nomadisation [terre de parcours] .
Their demands were too reasonable not to be 
accepted, and an order has just been sent from 
Tombouctou designed to prevent the capture 
of white women in the future, and women held 
are to be released.
In short, our tour has been most fruitful.
The regagda have joined the Kel Antsar in seeking 
peace; in this country of so-called savages 
there was only one cry - 'Give us tranquility I'
At Bamba Coppo had in an Algerian officer a 
powerful and devoted helper who brought to him 
all the chiefs and marabouts of the region. ... 
The famous Sakraouai, chief of the Igoudanen, 
came to pay hommage and complete his submission. 
It was truly a fine sight; there were just the 
two of us, alone without escort or arms, alone 
in the middle of a hundred imochar armed up to 
the teeth, all arrogant with great black eyes,
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dark clothes, long medieval spears and the 
obligatory litham. Before returning to 
Tombouctou Coppo was able to open negotations 
with the Aouelliminden who had been upset by 
a recent patrol but the submission of this 
great tribe will be a matter of time.
After a perilous trip back in a leaky canoe they 
returned to Timbuktu where,
... Coppo had a hard task; he had to have the 
treaties ratified, receive delegations, reassure 
the chiefs and put up with all sorts of dirty 
handshakes. Finally, despite the nuisance 
caused by the petty resistance of men whose 
passive obedience ought to be their first 
virtue, all has been brought to a happy 
conclusion! ...
However the shortcomings of the old days when 
policy consisted of not having one and saying 
'Kill everything' have alienated the chief of 
the Berabiches; he has been writing insolent 
letters ... and making a nuisance of himself.
We had to change his ideas and so we have 
decided ... to go to Araouan. We are leaving 
this evening in the company of Moors from 
the Sahel and four meharistes for the town (?) 
or village (?) of Araouan. If we get there 
we shall be the first Frenchmen since 
Rene Caillie to have done so, if we get there 
that is for one mustn't forget that 
Major Laing was killed on the way. (1)
Arnaud's letter is interesting on several counts not the 
least of which is as an insight into the author's 
character. The unflattering comments on previous
(1) I(nstitut) de F(ranee) (IF) Fonds Terrier no. 5984 
Arnaud to 'Men capitaine' 8.5.1899.
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administrative policies are particularly noteworthy, 
and the final evocation of Caillie and Laing remind 
us that at the turn of the century European knowledge 
of parts of Africa was far from complete, and it could 
still almost be said that, 'Geographers in Africa maps/ 
With savage pictures fill their gaps/and oer inhabitable 
downs/Place elephants for want of towns'.(1) But 
despite Arnaud's enthusiastic 'Boy's Own' description 
the mission did not appear to have had any concrete 
results other than a bundle of treaties.
This suspicion is reinforced by Coppolani's own 
reticence about the second half of his mission and by 
the letter of Capt. Henrys (whom Arnaud had portrayed 
as a man of similar ideas to Coppolani) to 
Auguste Terrier, President of the Comit6 de l'Afriaue 
francaise and father-confessor to a generation of 
Africains . Henrys reported that,
From Tombouctou to Bamba, Coppolani has only 
had dealings with compliant regions and has 
obtained the submission only of the Kel Antsar, 
who had already submitted. Then he went to 
Araouan but did not enter the town. The chief 
of the Berabich forbad him to enter and made 
him establish his camp more than a kilometre 
from the town. Coppolani kept a watch on him 
for the two days he was able to stay with the 
few tirailleurs Commt. Damal gave him as escort.
(1) The verse is Swift's fran 'On Poetry' cited 
in Curtin Image of Africa p. 198.
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Unable even to take a photographic view he 
returned as quickly as possible and not in 
the least bit reassured. ... I scarcely 
believe more in what he has done in the 
Sahel than the results obtained here. (1)
Even allowing for personal prejudice on the part of 
Henrys it is hard to see his scepticism as unreasonable. 
Coppolani probably achieved as much as was possible in 
a lightening tour by two relatively inexperienced 
young men. However what was realistically possible 
under the circumstances fell far short of Coppolani's 
vastly inflated claims of what actually was achieved.
Apart from introducing Coppolani to the intricasies 
of Moorish and Tuareg society the tour in the Sudan 
gave him his first taste of black Africa. Arnaud 
made no attempt to disguise the degree of his 
colleague's dislike for what he saw. Whether an 
encounter with a prostitute in Kayes which proved to 
be a traumatic experience was the cause of his 
dislike is not clear but it is certain that his 
contempt for black Africa was to be one of the 
hallmarks of his philosophy. Arnaud wrote that,
'He believed the Bible story that Cham had no other 
destiny than to serve Sem and Jephat.' Coppolani's
(1) IF Fonds Terrier no. 5900 Capt. Henrys to Terrier 
27.7.1899.
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hatred was racialist; Africans, whether Muslim or 
animist, were simply dismissed as a race of slaves in 
need of a master. A view that was shared, it should
be said, by some Moors and Tuaxegs who for centuries 
had treated the blacks as slaves.
In the late summer of 1899 Coppolani returned to Paris 
and began to seek official backing for his schemes for 
a unified North-West African Empire. His main interest 
was now in the vast area of contemporary Mauritania 
north of the river Senegal and south of the Cherifian 
empire in Morocco, an area which had hitherto been 
largely ignored by the French who had been content to 
pay tribute to the chiefs of the right bank of the 
Senegal in exchange for peace and trading possibilities. 
Despite a tradition dating back to the sixteenth century 
of trade with the coastal and riverain region of
(1) Randau Corse d'Algerie p. 30. See also ANSOM AP 
1420/1 Coppolani 'Rapport ...': 'Quels que
soient les sentiments de pitie qui peuvent nous 
animer a l'egard de la race noire du Senegal et 
du Soudan, quels que soient nos efforts pour 
la sortir de l'etat d'Asservissonent ou elle est 
plongee depuis des siecles, il faudra plusieurs 
generations avant de l'elever au niveau des 
peuples libres. Pour sa vitality elle-meme, il 
lui faut un maitre. Le Maure le demeurera encore 
longtemps'.
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Mauritania ^  the French were little tempted to engage 
in more direct action into the interior of the 
country. Therefore for Coppolani the area provided 
great scope for action provided he could convince the 
authorities that it was worth the effort.
In Paris Coppolani was able to convince the new 
President, Waldeck-Rousseau, of the benefit to France 
of a greater degree of French control in Mauritania. 
It also seems likely that he found an ally in the 
'Parti colonial' which had long been interested in 
the possibilities of uniting France's colonies on 
either side of the Sahara.(2) However, there was as
(1) In the past French, British, Dutch and Portuguese 
had carpeted for trading posts. Ihe gum trade 
was the most important, tyfest Africa having beccme 
the main supplier for Europe's gum needs. The 
gum was extracted fran the plant Accacia Senegal 
which grew mainly in Trarza and Brackna. A 
thriving arms trade based in St Louis supplemented 
the gum trade. See G-M Desire Vuillemin 'Essai 
sur le gamier et la earnerce de la ganme dans les 
escales du Senegal' Th£se de doctorat, 1966.
(2) On the 'Parti colonial' see R. Girardet L'ldee 
ooloniale en France depuis 1871 a 1962 Paris, 1975; 
C-R Ageron France coloniale ou parti colonial?
Paris, 1978. Interest in a trans-Saharan railway 
was almost as old as the conquest itself. The 
first schanes were drawn up by the St Simonians
in the 1840s. See G-M Desire' Vuillemin 'Les 
premiers pro jets du transaharien et l'Afrique du 
NDrd' Revue de l'Histoire Maghr^bine 1977 pp. 107-21
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many opponents of French intervention in Mauritania.
The Foreign Office, with recent memories of Fashoda, 
was anxious about the consequences of such a policy on 
diplomatic relations with Spain and Britain both of 
whom had interests on the coast of the western Sahara, 
and in Africa the government in St Louis simply did not 
think that it was worth it.(l)
Coppolani had argued strongly in favour of a protectorate 
for all the country occupied by the Moors who, he said, 
were a population with a recognised hierarchy and a 
tradition of power. However he was only partially able 
to convince Binger, the Director of African Affairs at 
the Colonial Ministry of the wisdom of a protectorate. 
Binger was suspicious of Coppolani and would have 
preferred to work with a military man.(2) Nevertheless 
he accepted Coppolani's argument that in view of the 
racial differences there should be separate policies 
for the regions north and south of the Senegal. He 
was in favour of a new administrative unit to be 
called Mauretanie Occidentale governed by a Resident 
with the help of contrOleurs . He further 
recommended a new department 'designed to centralise 
all the documents relative to Islam, the brotherhoods
(1) Governor-General Ballay stated bluntly 'Une action 
en pays maure ne peut rien apporter1 cited in 
Desire Vuillemin 'Coppolani' p. 300.
(2) Randau Corse d'Alg&rie pp. 71-74.
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and the topography of the Saharan region' which was to 
be called the Service Special des Affaires Maures . 
Coppolani was to be put in charge, seconded by 
Capt. Lacroix, a former head of a bureau arabe and whom 
the Governor-General of Algeria had agreed to release 
for the work in Mauritania. These suggestions were 
put into effect by a decision of the 30th December 1899.(1) 
Coppolani was disappointed by this, considering it to 
be a half measure and objecting that the new special 
department was superfluous as the necessary studies had 
already been made, but, pending the creation of a true 
protectorate, he agreed to co-operate.(2)
The decision to create the new administrative unit and 
the new department has been described with some 
justification as the apogee of Coppolani' s career .(3)
(1) ANSCM AP 1420/1 Directeur Affaires d'Afrique to 
Min. Col. 27.12.1899. There seems to have been 
same confusion over the precise name and date of 
the ' Service speciale des Affaires maures'. In 
ANSCM Afrique IV/68 'Note' to Min. Col. 31.5.1900 
there is also a reference to a 'Service des Affaires 
musulmanes et sahariennes' created in 29.10.1899 and 
whose base was a roan in the Eoole coloniale.
(2) ANSCM AP 1420/1 Coppolani 'L'organisation politique 
et administrative des pays maures de notre empire 
du Nord Ouest Africain' 12.6.1901.
(3) Maurel Xavier Coppolani p.26.
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The Yellow Fever epidemic (1900-2) in Senegal made the 
government there more reluctant than ever to spend 
scarce resources on an enterprise of whose value they 
were not in any case convinced. The failure of the 
Blanchet mission which had set out from France in an 
expansionist mood to investigate the possibilities of 
a trans-Saharan railway but which soon succumbed to 
illness and only narrowly escaped destruction at the 
hands of the followers of Ma el Ainin, served to 
reinforce the traditional objections to the occupation 
of Mauritania.(1) Coppolani faced a formidable task 
having to convince his opponents that occupation of 
Mauritania was economically viable, diplomatically 
acceptable and finally that it was possible at all. 
Between 1900 and 1902 he was forced to resort to the 
most optimistic prognostications in order to make his 
case sound plausible.
His first step was to emphasise still further the role 
of Islam. As the British in India, the Russians in 
Asia and General Bugeaud in Algeria had all done with 
success the French in North West Africa should, he 
argued, also make use of the predominant influence of 
Islam, and in particular, the brotherhoods:
(1) See ANSCM AGF III/4-9 for details of Blanchet mission.
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With their co-operation ... we will have peace, 
the security of the caravan routes and the 
solution to the problem of the unification 
of our North West African empire.
Without their help we will have Holy War involving 
a disproportionate expense of men and money. It 
would mean a step into the unknown and a permanent 
state of hostility with the Saharan and Moroccan 
populations.
Fortunately, Muslims ... have more or less the 
same character under different latitudes, ,,,
These white races whose adventurous and commercial 
spirit has, we believe, been wrongly presented to 
us as that of untamed Muslims lost in the so-called 
Saharan steppes are no other than those Arabs and 
Berbers of the tent that all Algerians have seen. 
... We have found amongst them the same tribes, 
the same language, the same morals and the same 
religion albeit with a more liberal element than 
amongst their brothers in North Africa, What has 
enabled us to traverse without conflict the 
principal Moor and Tuareg camps is the presence 
of those same brotherhoods and those same 
religious groups that we have studied in Algeria 
and which we found there just as powerful and 
just as interested in serving our cause. (1)
Coppolani's emphasis on the uniformity of Islam under 
different latitudes was something of a two-edged argument. 
Here it was used to suggest how easily new territory 
could be acquired. It was a disarmingly simple argument 
and for Coppolani it also had the additional advantage 
of almost global applicability - the sort of grand 
strategy to which he was so attached. Yet the 
uniformity of Islam and the power of the brotherhoods 
was also the a priori assumption of those who most 
feard the political threat of Islam and was later to
(1) ANSCM AP 1420/1 Coppolani 'L'organisation 
12.6.1901.
be used to justify policies towards Islam entirely 
opposite to those which Coppolani now proposed.
At the end of this report Coppolani advocated the 
creation of an 1Interministerial Commission' with 
representatives from the Colonial, Home, War and Foreign 
Ministries to investigate the problems of North-West 
Arica. The recommendation was accepted and the 
commission was formed in July 1901 with the aim of 
'examining the respective situations of Algeria and 
West Africa with regard to each other and to 
neighbouring countries. ^  Coppolani reported to 
the commission in October elaborating a scheme which 
in his eyes answered all the possible objections to 
French occupation of all the land which lay between 
Algeria and the West African colonies.
He introduced his argument by suggesting that accounts 
of the aridity of the Mauritanian landscape and 
fierceness of its climate had been greatly exaggerated 
and went on to describe the various regions from the 
desert to the valley of the Senegal in language that 
would not have been inappropriate for a description of 
the lush pastures of Burgundy, concluding that, 1 In 
general the temperature is healthy and certainly not 
to be compared with the debilitating temperatures of
(1) ANSCM Mauretanie IV/I Arrete 6.7.1901
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Senegal and the Soudan'.
Having dismissed one traditional obstacle to French 
progress Coppolani proceeded to explain why Europeans 
would be wrong to consider the nomadic tribesmen as a 
further obstacle. As in his report in June, Islam 
was seen as the crucial factor but by October Coppolani 
had discovered a way of giving his argument only one 
possible cutting edge.
First he stated that, 'From St Louis to Tombouctou 
there is a demarcation line between blacks and whites 
that not even El Hadj Omar and his Tukolor were able 
to cross'. He therefore conceded that Islam might 
after all change under certain latitudes and that he 
was only discussing its role in Arab or Berber-dominated 
society. Next he argued that Moorish society was 
particularly well-suited to a Muslim policy because of 
the peculiar division between the warrior Hassanic 
tribes and the religious clerical (or in the parlance 
of the day, 'maraboutic') tribes. The distinction, he 
argued, was simple:
A warrior is neither a trader nor a 
manufacturer, he can neither read nor write.
He is the master of the gun, the 
representative of force and consequently 
the defender of the country ... The clergy is 
represented by veritable tribes of learned men...
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They are independent of the Hassania, never 
take part in war but rather dispense justice 
and are mediators of peace. Their rosary 
replaces the gun. ... The action of the 
religious leaders is preponderant over the 
masses and often over the warrior chiefs 
as well. They have become the auxiliaries 
of our policy and could become the precious 
instruments of pacification if, bearing in 
mind the rivalry between warrior tribes, we 
combine the various elements and attack the 
question with determination and unity of 
views. (1)
Although based on fact Coppolani's analysis was 
something of an over-simplification. Until the 
tenth century Mauritania had been populated by a 
people - probably black - called the Bafour, centred in 
the Adrar. (2) In the eleventh century they were
invaded and defeated by the recently Islamised Berber 
Almoravids. In the fourteenth and in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there were 
fresh waves of northern invaders but of Arabic origin 
(Beni Hassan) and in a drawn out conflict, known as the 
War of Babbah, in the mid-seventeenth century the 
Hassanic Arabs finally defeated the Berber tribes.
(1) ANSCM f'huretanie IV/I Coppolani ’ Rapport presente 
a la catmision interministerielle du Nord Ouest 
Africain* 14.10.1910.
(2) The following account is based on P. Marty L'Emirat
des Trarzas Paris, 1919 Part I chs. 1-5 and C.C. Stewart 
Islam and Social Order in Mauritania: a case study
fran the nineteenth century Oxford, 1973, ch.3.
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The Hassanic tribes, although in a minority, became 
the effective masters of the country offering protection 
to the other groups in exchange for a variety of
payments and services. The defeated Berbers
abandoned - in theory at least - their arms, giving 
themselves up to study, commerce and agriculture.
Beneath these two dominant groups there came a 
group of diverse origins known as the zenaga who were 
liable to pay tribute to both the warrior and the 
clerical tribes. Beneath the zenaga came the 
harratine - freed slaves who were closely associated 
to one or other of the Hassanic tribes - and, finally, 
slaves, smiths and griots.
There were also a number of very small tribes whose 
existence and position in society was related to specific
economic activities in specific locations and which do
not fit very clearly into the overall social hierarchy.(1)
Command within each tribe was exercised, in the case 
of the warrior tribes, by a chief advised by an assembly 
of notables - djemaa - acting as a consultative assembly
(1) For example the Imraguen, fishermen on the coast 
between Cap Blanc and Nouakchott and the Nemadi, 
primitive dear hunters (hunters) who hunted on foot 
with packs of dogs in the Djouf. Both groups were 
in a vulnerable position, and the Nemadis were 
especially despised. See A TCMAS 'Les Imraguen 
de Mauretanie* CHEAM no. 757, 1937; Capt. Fondacci 
'Les Nemadis1 CHEAM no. 1009, 1946.
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or, in the case of the clerical tribes, by a more 
powerful djemaa with a chief acting as spokesman.
It was very rare that tribes joined to form a 
confederation and on the contrary each tribe was 
generally split into several fractions. Because 
of the highly segmented nature of society conflict 
was endemic. It could be controlled either by force 
or by the arbitration of a respected religious 
personality. It seems to have been only rarely 
that such a personality could make good the claim - 
to which everybody paid lip service - that spiritual 
authority was superior to temporel power. One such 
exception was Cheikh Sidiya al Kabir (1775-1886) whose 
reputation as both a Sufi and a jurist made him one 
of the most influential men in southern Mauritania in 
the nineteenth century. In general, however, clerical 
tribes were unable to command such respect and were 
relatively powerless against the warriors.
From this brief and rather approximate survey of 
Moorish society there are at least two points to be 
made. The first is that it was a highly complicated 
structure that cannot be easily described. The 
distinction between the groups was often blurred - 
there were religious men who took up arms and warriors 
who forsook them - and not even the racial distinction 
was as clear cut as Coppolani suggested as generations 
of black concubines had done much to dilute the purity
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of the Arab blood. The second point is that although 
the social structure appeared remarkably static not 
having changed greatly since the end of the seventeenth 
century it was nonetheless the result of an historical 
process and quite capable of future change. It was 
likely, for example, that the intervention of the 
French would have a great effect on the relationship 
between the warrior and the clerical tribes.
Coppolani's simplistic appreciation of the situation 
was perhaps best seen in his statement that, 'Cheikh 
Ma el Ainin is the brother of our friends and proteges 
Chiekh Saad Bu and Cheikh Sidi el Kheir and is 
consequently our ally'. (2) in fact Cheikh Ma el Ainin 
and his son el Hiba were to be the most bitter opponents 
of French rule in Mauritania and in Morocco.
Nevertheless his policy had a certain attraction and 
the idea that Moorish society was divided into two 
distinct groups, of which one was calling out for 
French support, seemed to have a sound scientific and 
humanitarian appeal. If Coppolani had gone a long
i
way to convincing the authorities that a relatively 
inexpensive and peaceful occupation of Mauritania was
(1) One commentator thought that he could discern in 
the zenaga tribes the same characteristics as the 
bourgeoisie of 16th and 17th century Europe. See 
Capt. Aubiniere 'La hierarchie sociale des Maures'
CHEAM no. 1496, 1949.
(2) ANSCM Mauretanie IV/I Coppolani 'Rapport ... ' 14.10.1901.
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possible he still had to convince them that it was 
necessary.
Coppolani addressed himself both to the local 
Senegalese administration and to the wider audience of 
those concerned with the general direction of colonial 
strategy. To the first he emphasised the anomaly 
existing on the two banks of the Senegal whereby on 
the left bank the French collected taxes from the 
indigenous populations but on the right bank they 
actually paid an annual 'custom' to the chiefs of 
Trarza and the Brackna. (1) However, although this 
was an obvious offence to French pri^e Governor-General 
Chaudie, at least, thought that it was a price worth 
paying for the assurance of peaceful relations.
To the second group Coppolani urged the advantages to 
be gained from having a unified strategy towards Islam. 
Together with a group of like-minded persons he founded 
the Revue Franco-Musulmane et Saharienne of which 
thirteen issues were printed between 1902 and 1903. 
Despite its short life it enjoyed the patronage of most 
of the leading lights of the Parti colonial and had
(1) ANSCM AP 1420/1 Coppolani 'Rapport sur ma mission 
au Soudan francais' 1899; 'L'organisation politique 
et administrative des pays maures' 12.6.1901.
(2) Maurel Xavier Coppolani p.29
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Etienne as its President. (1) The editorial of the
first issue spoke of the urgent need that would assure
I France's standing in the Muslim world, a world, it
!
j
! suggested, of 'remarkable unity' in which the faithful
recognised no other capital except Mecca and Medina.
[
; It concluded,
i|
!
j France ... cannot without risk attempt a
| work of assimilation which almost certainly
| is condemned to failure. On the contrary,
j it behoves to her to take account of the
state of mind of her Mahometan subjects and 
I the elements which dominate them with a view
to allowing them to evolve within their own 
| civilisation in order to bring them more
happiness, more peace and to influence
itsl
¥7V>
Applied specifically to Mauritania this approach was 
particularly suitable and likely to succeed because, 
Coppolani argued, here,
The brotherhoods are in principle the partisans 
of peace ... If we know how to show respect 
to their religion ... and protect their 
interests, their 'fanaticism', hitherto seen 
as irreductible, becomes a meaningless word. 
These are ... intelligent men. The essential 
thing is to understand them and to learn how to 
make use of their incontestable q u a l i t i e s .  (3)
their minds [pendtrer dans les espr 
without irritating their conscience
(1) Members of its committee included 
Binger, Bourgeois, Hanot^aux, Houdas, Jonnart, 
Leroy-Beaulieu and Poincare.
(2) Editorial Revue Franco-Musulmane et Saharienne
(1) 1902.
(3) Coppolani 'L'action religieuse ...' Part II p.30.
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In two years of intense propagandising Coppolani had 
repeated his policy over and over again taking every 
available opportunity to publicise it. By the winter 
of 1901-2 he had refined it to the most simplistic 
and optimistic of formulae which equated the 
brotherhoods and the clerical tribes with a progressive 
peace-loving and pro-French party whose support would 
obviate the need for any form of direct military action
However, despite, or perhaps because of, Coppolani's 
bull-dozer tactics and even though his supporters 
included the (^resider^ of the Third Republic,
Waldeck Rousseau, and the new Governor-General of AOF, 
Ernest Roume, Coppolani succeeded in winning only 
limited approval for a French occupation of Mauritania. 
From the available archival material it is not at all 
clear when the major decisions were taken to go ahead 
with a partial occupation of Mauritania. This 
confusion reflects the uncertainty towards Mauritania 
in this period. The uncertainty was to persist for at 
least another three years as Coppolani's efforts were 
to be consistently marked by very hesitant official 
support.
However, in October 1902 Roume appointed Coppolani 
as Civil Commissioner of the Governor-General in
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Mauritania and entrusted him specifically with a 
mission to the Trarza. The French had become 
increasingly impatient with the inability of the Emir 
of Trarza, Ahmet Salum, to control unrest and exercise 
proper authority over his subjects. (1) A small military 
expedition under the command of Lt Delaplane had been 
sent to the Trarza in the spring of 1902. It was 
intended as a demonstration, rather than as an exercise, 
of force in order to impress on Ahmet Salum's opponents 
that the French meant to support and protect their ally. 
Delaplane quickly persuaded the principal opposition 
group, the Awlad Ahmet ben Daman, to submit and thus, 
he claimed, assure the security of Ahmet Salum and 
French interests in the Trarza. (2) Later in April 
Delaplane's efforts were followed by a meeting convened 
in Dagana by Decazes, the Director of Native Affairs, 
of all the chiefs of the Trarza who were asked to 
pledge their loyalty to Ahmet Salum. Decazes 
reported that the meeting had been a success concluding 
that, 'The population of this part of the right bank 
feel that times have changed and that the era of 
pillages is over. In contact with us they, but 
especially the maraboutic tribes, understand the
(1) Marty Trarzas Bock I, chs. 6 &7 contains full details 
of intrigues within Emir's family.
(2) ANS 1 D 221 Gen. Houry (Gamrit. superieur des Troupes 
en AOF) instructions to Delaplane 3.3.1902; Delaplane 
to Houry 13.4.1902.
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advantages of peace'. Decazes paid particular tribute 
to Cheikh Sidia (1) who was to be one of the central 
figures of French policy towards Muslims in AOF as a 
whole, reporting that 1 [cheikh Sidia] is eager to 
demonstrate that religion isn't a fanaticism tightly 
bound to sacred texts' . The following month Roume 
wrote to Decrais, the Minister of Colonies, that the 
mission had been a success and that it offered further 
proof of the need to revise policy towards the Moors 
of the Lower Senegal.&)
However the loyalty of the other tribes to Ahmet Salum 
was shor.t-lived. Ahmet's nephew, Sidi ould Mohammed 
Fall, soon broke his promises, and this time Coppolani 
was sent to deal with the unrest. Five months later 
Roume reported in May 1903 to the Minister of Colonies 
that Coppolani, by exploiting the divisions between 
the Hassanic and the clerical tribes and with the help 
of Cheikh Sidia and Cheikh Saad Bu, had been able 
quickly and cheaply to restore French authority.
(1) Cheikh Sidia - grandson of Cheikh Sidia al Kebir - 
as head of clerical Awlad Biri federation had a 
vested interest in French support against his enemies, 
the Djedjiba, in Brackna, and against the Awlad Bu Sba 
in the north. See P. Marty L'Islam en Mauritanie et 
au Senegal Paris, 1916 ch. 2.
(2) ANS 1 D 221 Decazes retort 20.4.1902; Gov.-Gen. 
AOF to Min. Col. 13.5.1902.
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Again, Roume urged a positive approach to Mauritania, 
destined, he said, to be 'l'une des plus belles 
provinces de l'Afrique occidentale1 and an important 
link between French colonies either side of the Sahara. 
In order to establish more effective control he 
requested official permission to establish a post on the 
coast of Nouakchott in addition to those created by 
Coppolani at Souet el Ma and Khroufa in December and 
February respectively. (1)
That French control was still incomplete seemed to be 
confirmed very soon afterwards as reports came through 
of serious unrest and anti-French conspiracies near 
Kaedi. These reports worried Roume who cabled to 
Coppolani forbidding him to march into the interior as 
there had been insufficient preparations. Coppolani 
dismissed the reports as exaggerated saying that he had 
events under control and that he saw no obstacle to 
continuing with his mission to Brackna(2) and in 
characteristically self-congratulatory style Coppolani 
reported in July that he had succeeded in the space of 
a few months in establishing French authority 
throughout Trarza and Brackna.
(1) ANSQM AP 1420/1 Gov.-Gen ACF to Min. Col. 16.5.1903.
(2) ANS 9 G 20 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Coppolani 24.4.1903; 
26.5.1903; Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. AOF 25.5.1903; 
29.5.1903.
(3) ANSQM AP 1420/1 Coppolani 'Organisation des pays 
maures' 20.7.1903.
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Many of the telegrams sent during the mission were 
coded. It would be interesting to know from whom 
they were being kept a secret.
Roume's worries about Coppolani1s control of the 
situation may well have been sown by the misgivings 
of the military command. An analysis by the Bureau 
Militaire of Coppolani's budget provisions for 1903 
did not fall far short of an outright condemnation: 
'There is little to say about the report itself which 
is no more than a series of all kinds of affirmations 
whose value is necessarily relative since they cannot 
,be judged by any precedent'. As for the budget, the 
expenses were, it warned, underestimated for, 'Whatever 
M. Coppolani may say there will be military expenses 
to include for 1903'. Finally it argued that 
Coppolani's plans for the organisation of Mauritania 
were 'nothing less than the creation of a new colony - 
having a special governor - the director of Muslim 
affairs' . (1)
Military suspicion of Coppolani was a constant feature 
of his career. The suspicions were well-founded. 
Coppolani's predictions were excessively optimistic, 
and he was determined to guard sole control over the
(1) ANS 1 D 222 Bureau militaire 'Examen et avis' n.d.
101
conduct of the campaign in Mauritania. In November 1903 
he wrote to Roume that, 'It is essential that there is 
only one chain of command and that the delegate of the 
Governor-General ... is able to make use of troops 
without requiring the commanding officers first to 
inform their superiors of their orders and then wait 
for authorisation to carry them through. (1)
Coppolani had replied to Roume1s anxious telegrams not 
only with assurances that the situation was under control 
but also with the argument that it was necessary to 
proceed further inland in order to protect the land in 
the north nomadised by Moors during the rainy season in 
the south. As long as the French were unable to 
control this area they would, he argued, be incapable 
of offering loyal tribes the protection they had been 
promised against the warlike tribes. In the autumn 
of 1903 Coppolani was again in Paris to plead the same 
case before potential s p o n s o r s . (2)
During his absence Ahmeidu, the former Emir of Brackna 
allied with the warrior Edouaich tribe against the 
French and shortly after Coppolani's return to 
Mauritania they mounted their most serious challenge in 
an attack on the new post of Aleg, (9.12.1903) .
(1) ANS 1 D 221 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. AOF 4.11.1903.
(2) Randau Corse d'Alg6rie p. 96.
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The attack was crushed because, Coppolani explained,
It was necessary to reply to this insane act 
by an exemplary punishment to affirm the idea 
of our domination in this country ravaged 
by constant struggle and whose more or less 
war-like populations have a mentality formed 
by the fundamental principles of the Coran. 
That is to say, an understanding of power be 
it moral or material. (1)
This was a convenient argument for Coppolani as it 
enabled him to justify a policy of force on the Muslim's 
respect for power just as surely as his exaltation of 
the clerical tribes' naturally peaceful inclinations 
had earlier enabled him to justify a policy of minimalist 
intervention.
At the same time as the revolt was being suppressed the 
final arrangements were made for the creation of the 
post of Nouakchott which it was hoped would assure the 
stability of the western part of Trarza .(2)
(1) ANS 9 G 20 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. ACF 31.12.1903.
In a later report Coppolani argued that 'cet acte 
insense canmis par Ahmeidou, loin de gener notre 
action, precisait, au oontraire, la situation et 
nous permettait d'agir surement pour la repression 
des uns et la protection des autres'. AN SCM 
Mauretanie IV/L Coppolani 'Rapport am. le Gov.-Gen. 
de l'AOF sur la mission d'organisation du T&gant'
1.7.1904.
(2) ANS 9 G 20 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. AOF 30.12.1903. 
ANS 1 D 221 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. AOF 21.11.1903.
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Coppolani's main concern, however, was with the 
administrative organisation of Tagant and the 
penetration into the region of Adrar. He had 
consistently urged the importance of French control 
in Adrar and had always made it clear that he regarded 
the occupation of Trarza and Brackna as merely the 
first steps of a grander design.
In the winter of 1903/4 he encountered some difficulty 
in acquiring the troops he considered necessary for the 
mission. (1) However, by the end of January this 
problem had been overcome, and Coppolani set out as 
overall head of a mission composed of some 150 me n . (2)
Difficulties with the military continued throughout the 
campaign. Capt. Maroix, acting as Secretary-General 
in St Louis whilst Coppolani was away on a mission, 
wrote to Roume in March that there were inadequate 
forces to protect loyal tribes in Trarza and that there 
was a certain 'inertia' in the command as Coppolani's 
instructions were either non-existent or took too long 
to arrive. Maroix therefore suggested the appointment
(1) ANS 1 D 221 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. ACF 4.11.1903. 
Coppolani requested 100 tirailleurs, 60 spahis &
100 frontier guards; Houry to Roume 7.12.1903.
Houry thought that it would be possible to raise 
this force but doubts were then expressed by
Houry's successor, Gen. Perreaux. See correspondence 
in this file.
(2) ANS 1 D 221. Maroix list of personnel 27.1.1904.
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of a major to assume command in Trarza whilst Coppolani 
was away. Roume shared these worries and communicated 
them to Coppolani who was, however, unimpressed and 
replied that if a temporary deputy was felt to be 
absolutely necessary then he would insist upon the 
employment of an administrator of an Algerian commune 
mixte. (1) Later Coppolani made a strong attack on 
Maroix' handling of the situation accusing him of 
being attached to 'A method of conquest and the 
vulgarisation of sterile efforts which are perhaps 
excellent in Madagascar, Tonkin and in the former Soudan 
but which are disastrous when applied to populations 
whose characteristics are entirely d i f f e r e n t 1 . (2)
Coppolani's difficulties were not confined to military 
suspicion as he also succeeded in provoking the 
suspicion of the Senegalese administration. Roume 
was worried by reports that Coppolani had been giving 
direct orders to the chiefs in the villages of Toro,
Lao and Irliabe in the riverside canton of Deimette 
without prior consultation of the local administration. 
He had also received a complaint that Coppolani had 
taken with him Bokar Baidy, the chief of Deimette,
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Maroix to Gov.-Gen. AOF 19.3.1904;
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Coppolani 22.3.1904; Coppolani 
to Gov.-Gen. AOF 29.4.1904.
(2) ANSOM Mauritanie IV/I Coppolani 'Rapport au sujet 
d'agissonents ... aupres des populations des regions 
Trarza' 27.6.1904.
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along with two regional guards and four horses. Roume 
wrote to Coppolani to remind him that all the 
administrators in the region of the Senegal river had 
been given instructions to keep him informed of events 
of interest to him and that he should return this 
respect. 'Without wishing to limit' the powers granted 
to Coppolani Roume deplored his disregard for the 
Senegalese administration and in future expected to see 
more evidence of a co-operative spirit. (1) As a sequel 
it should be added that having recruited these extra 
forces Coppolani paid scant regard for their welfare.
On their return the Tukolor from Lao complained that 
they had been forced to give their horses to the 
Algerian contingent and had not been compensated for 
their sacrifice. (2)
A third obstacle in the way of Coppolani was the 
trading-houses in St Louis which feared the 
consequences of French control of the interior of 
Mauritania on their lucrative arms trade. (3)
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Coppolani Jan. 1904;
ANS 9 G 20 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. AOF 21.12.1903.
Coppolani had written to Roume asking for permission 
to anploy Bokar Baidy whcm he referred to as the 
chief of the canton of Aleibi and not Deimette - 
confusion or ignorance on Coppolani' s part?
(2) ANS 1 D 225 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 15.3.1905.
(3) ANS 1 D 222 The possession of firearms had been made
illegal by a decision of 15.6.1904.
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The Deves brothers in particular had a reputation for 
intrigue in local politics and were generally held 
responsible for the insecurity of Ahmet Salum prior 
to the Delaplane mission in 1902.(1) Such traders 
made use of their proximity to the French administration 
in St Louis to suggest to native Africans that they had 
the ear of the administration and belonged in some way 
to the 'djemaa francais'. Along with military 
interference they were singled out by Coppolani as 
being responsible for the unrest in Trarza during his 
absence in the Tagant. (2)
In February and March Coppolani led a military campaign 
against Ahmeidu and his allies the Edouaich under the 
command of Osman and his son Bakar. In February he 
had been given firm orders to limit his action to Tagant 
and not to proceed further into the Adrar. Coppolani 
made no secret of his disappointment and in a long 
telegram to Roume he outlined again in familiarly 
optimistic language the rosy prospects for France if 
only he were allowed a free hand. The security of 
Senegal and the unification of the North-West African
(1) ANS 1 D 221 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. ACF 26.3.1902.
(2) ANSCM Mauretanie IV/I Coppolani 'Rapport ... Trarza' 
27.6.1904; ANS 9 G 21 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. ACF
25.3.1904. Coppolani also held the traders responsible 
for leading Ahmeidu, the former Emir of Brackna against 
the French.
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empire were, he argued, the two main advantages to be 
gained from a French occupation of Mauritania. The 
unexpected richness of the land in Mauritania added 
a further bonus and, as his rapid success in gaining 
the submission of almost all the tribes except the 
Edouaich indicated, all these benefits could be had 
at minimum expense. (1) A crucial victory against the 
Edouaich was won on the 14th March when they were 
scattered into the Assaba mountains, thereby isolating 
them from their former allies many of whom now began 
to seek French protection. Coppolani concluded that 
the security of the area was now complete and outlined 
plans for its subsequent political organisation 
proposing the division of the area into two administrative 
regions, Mai in the west and Gorgol in the south-east 
with a new post of m'Bout to add to those already 
established at Mai, Mouit and Aleg. In April the 
'dissident' groups in Reguieba in south-east Tagant 
submitted, but Coppolani warned that in order to exploit 
such advances it was now imperative to organise the 
central northern plateau of Tagant and establish 
posts at Tidjikja and Oussinia. In June further 
'dissident' tribes, the Awlad Seid and the Djedjiba,
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Coppolani 9.2.1904;
Coppolani bo Gov.-Gen. 25.3.1904.
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submitted and the Edouaich were rapidly changing their 
strategy leaving the Awlad Bu Sba as the sole opponents 
of the French.
Coppolani summarised the main events of the campaign in 
the report he presented to Roume in July. The report 
was a predictable rehearsal of the argument for the need 
to occupy the Adrar and it attracted the scorn of at 
least one of its readers (unfortunately anonymous)
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. ACF 21.3.1904,
25.3.1904, 5.4.1904, 27.6.1904. Lt. Martin tells 
an interesting story about the relationship 
between Coppolani and the Awlad Bu Sba based on 
oral evidence from chiefs of the Awlad Bu Sba. 
According to Martin, the Awlad Bu Sba, traditional 
enemies of the Kunta, were the victims of a 
misunderstanding between Coppolani and 
Capt. Frerejean in the spring of 1904. Fr&rejean 
thinking Coppolani to be an admirer of the Awlad 
Bu Sba gave them permission to raid the Kunta. 
However, the Kunta were close to the French 
administration and immediately sought official 
backing for a reprisal which Coppolani gave on 
his way to Podor. Lt. Rosfelder led an attack 
against the Awlad Bu Sba whilst they were resting 
at a camp of Cheikh Sidia which would normally 
have been regarded as a sanctuary. The Awlad 
Bu Sba felt betrayed by Cheikh Sidia's Awlad 
Biri as a result. Martin deplored this treatment 
of a former ally of the French and argued that 
the Awlad Bu Sba could have been a useful ally 
in the FKench penetration of Mauritania. See 
H.G. Martin 'Une tribu marocaine en Mauritanie: 
les Oulad Bou Sba'. CHEAM (R) no. 1008, 1937.
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who whenever he came across reference to the use of 
soldiers commented ironically in the margin 'Peaceful 
occupation?1 or 'This isn't peaceful'. Such comments 
were symptomatic of the growing oppostion to Coppolani's 
methods.
In the course of the campaign even Roume, normally a 
loyal supporter of Coppolani, had shown, as we have seen, 
signs of impatience with Coppolani's reluctance to 
communicate with his colleagues. In March he added 
that even the reports which he received were 'much too 
vague and summary' and were especially lacking in 
details of troop movements. Roume was particularly 
anxious for such detailed information in view, he said, 
of the worrying situation in the Far East and its 
possible consequences on France. (2) Coppolani's 
preoccupation with a swift advance into the Adrar also 
provoked resentment from the administration left behind 
in Trarza. The administrator at Souet el Ma complained 
in the course of the year of the lack of staff left at 
his disposal. In particular the absence of an 
interpreter made, he said, his task impossible as he 
could neither understand nor be understood by the local 
population. (3)
(1) ANSCM Mauretanie IV/I Coppolani 'Rapport am. le Gov.-Gen. 
sur 1'administration du Tagant' 1.7.1904.
(2) ANS 9 G 21 Gov.-Gen. ACF to Coppolani 14.3.1904.
(3) ANS 9 G 21 'Rapport politique de la region orientale 
du pays Trarza' 18-29 April 1904 & 1 - 10 August 1904.
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Nevertheless when Roume wrote to the Minister of Colonies 
enclosing Coppolani's report he spoke flatteringly of 
Coppolani's achievement and urged that he be allowed 
to carry on to Tidjikja which would, he argued, be a 
sensible stopping point for the French advance and would 
guarantee complete control of the Senegal valley.(1)
Coppolani returned to France in the summer of 1904. 
Waldeck-Rousseau1s death in August was a blow to 
Coppolani's power base in Paris but he still enjoyed the 
good-will of the parti colonial and he was at last able 
to secure official support for the advance into the 
Adrar. In October Mauritania was constituted as a 
'Civil Territory', and Coppolani became its first 
'Commissioner'. During his absence in Paris the 
political situation again deteriorated in Trarza as 
Ahmet Salum had started to intrigue with the Awlad bou 
Sba who were raiding clerical tribes loyal to France.
In the east, Ahmeidu and the Edouaich were reported
to be planning similar action. Adam, Coppolani's 
deputy, prescribed what was by now a familiar remedy to 
this apparently chronic unrest and argued that French 
authority would only become effective with the control 
of Adrar. (2)
(1) ANS 9 G 20 Gov.-Gen. ACF to Min.Col. (Doumergue) July 1904.
(2) ANS 9 G 21 'Rapport politique de la Mauretanie depuis fin
AcCit jusqu'au 20eme Octobre 1904'; Sec.Gen. p.i. Adam
to Gov.-Gen. AOF 11.10.1904.
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On his return to Mauritania Coppolani set about 
organising his campaign to achieve this goal. In 
December he wrote that, 'The respect of the religion, 
morals and customs of the population, backed up by a 
sufficient defensive force will be for us the guarantee 
of success'. (1) Having assembled his 'defensive force 
Coppolani marched towards Tidjikja in the spring of 1905 
He arrived at his destination in April and was impressed 
by the discovery of archaeological evidence of a large 
town dating back to the Ghana empire which he offered 
as further evidence of the present richness of the soil 
and the potential prosperity of the country.(2)
However the mission was held up by a delay in supplies 
and Coppolani was forced to stay several weeks in 
Tidjikja without being able to pursue his campaign into 
the remoter regions of the Adrar. It was during this 
enforced stay that on the night of the 12th May 
Coppolani was killed by a Muslim belonging to the 
Ghoudf brotherhood who had successfully penetrated the 
camp. (3)
(1) ANSOM AP 1407 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. ACF Dec. 1904.
(2) ANS 1 D 225. Coppolani to Gov.-Gen. ACF 23.4.1905.
(3) All the biographies of Coppolani have a blow by blow 
account of the manner of his death, all of which are 
based on the eye witness account of Amaud in Randau 
Corse d'Algerie pp. 155-85. See also ANS 1 D 224 for 
official reports.
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His death marked the end of the fiction of the 
'peaceful penetration' of Mauritania. As Coppolani's 
critics on all sides had pointed out, and as he himself 
admitted, he had always needed to make use of a military 
force to back up his diplomacy. From 1905 to 1909 
Colonel Gouraud led an unashamedly military campaign in 
the Adrar. After the conquest of the Adrar resistance 
was confined mainly to the north led from their base in 
Seguiet el Hamra by Ma el Ainin and later his son el Hiba. 
From 1910 until 193 0, the date of the final submission, 
the French conducted what amounted to a campaign of 
police action against raids when and where they o c c u r r e d  .(2) 
Even with the advantages of motor vehicles and aeroplanes 
the establishment of control over Mauritania posed major 
problems and despite Coppolani's claims for the great 
wealth of the country successive administrations seldom 
showed much enthusiasm for the colony.
Coppolani's was a brief but controversial appearance 
upon the Mauritanian stage. Locally many members of 
the Conseil General in Senegal refused to mourn him
(1) For details of this campaign see Col. Gouraud 
La Pacification de la Mauretanie. Journal des 
marches et operations de la colonne d'Adrar Paris. 1909.
(2) For details of such action, at least up until 1926, 
see Capt. Gillier La Penetration en Mauretanie Paris, 
1926.
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or agree with the official description of his death 
as an assassination, saying rather that he had simply 
been killed in action. His severest critic was 
Monsieur Deves who invited the Conseil General to 
spare their tears and to think instead of the 
unfortunate Tukolors who had been killed in Mauritania. (1)
There is little agreement even amongst his admirers 
about what Coppolani actually achieved in Mauritania.
His immediate successor, Lt-Col Montane wrote that he 
was the founder of a Muslim policy in West Africa. 
Successive commentators have, however, interpreted the 
'Muslim policy1 in different ways. Arnaud and 
d'Otton Loyewski, in their biographies of Coppolani, 
tended to emphasise the personal aspects of the policy 
suggesting that it was the product of a combination of 
physical attributes - notably broad shoulders - and a 
unique insight into the mentality of the Moors which 
enabled Coppolani to win their confidence. (3)
XI) Cited by Desire Vuillemin in Contribution a l'histoire 
de la Mauritanie, 1900-1934 Dakar, 1962, p. 142.
See also Randau Corse d'Algerie p.l05fn. for 
account of same debate.
(2) ANS 1 D 224 'Rapport du Lt.-Col. Carmissaire du
Gov.-Gen. en Terri toire civil de la Mauri tanie sur les 
circonstances et les resultats de la mission dans le 
Tagant' 29.7.1905.
(3) Randau Corse d'Algerie passim; d'Otton Loyewski 
'Coppolani et la Mauritanie' pp.35,69.
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Another common interpretation of the 'Muslim policy' 
especially favoured by military commentators was that it 
was one of opportunism based on the principle of divide 
and rule. For Capt. Delby it was 'Anarchy, the 
principal vice of Moorish society which allowed the 
rapid success of Coppolani'. Capt. Frerejean argued, 
and Lt. d'Otton Loyewski wholeheartedly agreed, that 
Coppolani was above all an opportunist who made use of 
tribal rivalries and of the clerical alliance not 
because he was particularly disposed that way but 
because the opportunity presented itself. Paul Marty 
wrote that Coppolani inaugurated 'une politique de 
tribus' - although he went on to say that, 'The 
principal task of the French occupation was to assure 
the protection of the clerical tribes, which were 
absolutely incapable of defending themselves against 
the raids of the Oulad bou Sba'. Coppolani himself 
was not shy of portraying himself as an opportunist. (1)
However to emphasise only the element of opportunism is 
to underestimate the importance that Coppolani quite 
clearly attached to the role of Islam and the clerical 
tribes in Moorish society. For it was his insistence
(1) Capt. Delby cited in Gillier Penetration p. 138,
Capt. Frerejean cited in d'Otton loyewski 'Coppolani 
et la Mauritanie' pp. 46,66-67, Marty Trarzas 
pp. 138-41; ANS 9 G 20 20 Coppolani to Gov.-Gen.
AOF 25.3.1905.
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on the importance of these factors which enabled him to 
argue that the occupation of Mauritania could be achieved 
at minimum cost and with maximum long term advantages.
A policy of mere divide and rule implied a constant 
juggling of forces which in turn implied a constant 
degree of activity on the part of the French which might 
prove difficult to justify in terms of the material and 
strategic gains to be had out of the occupation of such 
a country as Mauritania.
A policy based on Islam offered something altogether 
simpler. Shortly before he was killed Coppolani told 
Arnaud that,
To achieve anything in a Muslim country, you 
need the support of the religious element, 
the only intelligent one and also the only one 
whose authority is uncontested ... Once we 
have got the religious chiefs on our side we 
will not intervene in the quarrels and polemics 
of doctrine ... The first principle of general 
politics is to divide and rule, but in Muslim
politics it is to let well alone within certain
limits.
It was for arguments such as these whose evolution we 
have attempted to trace from Coppolani's days in Algeria 
to his campaign for a 'positive approach' to Mauritania
that caused Montane to speak of Coppolani as a 'founder'
of Muslim policy and for Arnaud, in an important official
(1) Randau Corse d'Algerie pp. 155-56.
publication in 1906 to describe him as 'the apostle of 
French Muslim policy' . (1)
Like many 'apostles * before and since there was something 
of a gap between the rhetoric and the reality of 
Coppolani's achievement. Coppolani's lack of tact and 
diplomacy with his colleagues and superiors apart, there 
were very good reasons why the wholehearted support for 
his policies was never forthcoming.
Coppolani's policies were plainly simplistic and his 
description of the lush Mauritanian countryside was a 
considerable exercise in poetic license - and was 
recognised as such. The fact that he met his death at 
the hands of a Muslim, apparently claiming divine 
authorisation, served to highlight the fragility of the 
base on which he was seeking to unify the French north 
west African empire. It is not surprising that his 
successors no longer saw the clerical tribes as the 
trump card that Coppolani had suggested they were.
Capt. Frerejean considered that,
The marabouts have done everything to exploit 
the initial profound ignorance of the French, 
posing themselves as victims whereas too often
(1) R. Arnaud Precis de politique musulmane
Algiers, 1906, pp.ll-12fn.
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they were merely trying to enlist our support 
in their illegitimate refusal to pay their 
suzerains for the protection which had been 
afforded them for centuries. (1)
In 1910 Colonel Patey gave instructions to allow more 
authority to the warrior chiefs who were by now starting 
to play an important role in the policing of the desert. 
Commt. Gillier in 1926 in an attack which was 
specifically directed against recent policy towards 
the 'grandes nomades' but which applied equally well 
to the earlier policy of 'peaceful penetration' asked. 
'Why delude ourselves with the vain hope that 
dissidents will voluntarily submit ... when we have 
to admit our inability to compel them to submit by 
force.' (2)
Coppolani's career is of general interest to the 
colonial historian for the insights it provides into 
the relationships and conflicts within the French 
community in West Africa and as a reminder that the 
'conquest' of West Africa had by no means come to an end
(1) Frerejean cited in Desire Vuillemin Contribution 
p. 293.
(2) Patey cited in Desire Vuillemin op cit p. 183; 
Gillier Penetration p. 286. Whrrior tribes were 
first used in the mehariste units (formed in 1906) 
as a police force but recognised in 1912 as a 
strike force as well. See Desire Vuillemin 'Notes 
sur les origines des pelotons meharistes du 
Mauritanie' Revue d'Histolre des Colonies, 1958 
pp. 53-60.
with the defeat of Samori. However, for our immediate 
purposes two main points require emphasis.
The first is the fact that he brought Mauritania, which 
might otherwise have been regarded as a peripheral issue, 
to the forefront of French thoughts and thereby gave 
extra prominence to some of the country's leading 
Muslim personalities. Historically, Mauritania was of 
great importance in the development of Islam in West 
Africa and its leading marabouts had disciples as far 
afield as Casamance and Guinea. It was therefore 
impossible that these leaders would ever have escaped 
French attention. However, Coppolani was at least 
in part responsible for the importance attached by the 
French to Cheikh Sidia and to a lesser extent, to 
Cheikh Saad Bu. For Coppolani Cheikh Sidia was the 
personification of what could be achieved by a 
successful policy towards Islam and this view was 
shared by Coppolani's colleagues in the colonial 
administration. The Cheikh's camps in Boutilimit and 
Souet el Ma were to be regarded as important centres 
whose pro-French atmosphere made them useful places to 
send anti-French Muslims in need of 'education'.
The second point to make is that Coppolani's grandiose 
'Islamic policy' was a failure. Starting from his 
original premise that Islam was a universal force which
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if controlled offered the French the opportunity to 
dominate the whole of north-west Africa, Coppolani made 
some revisions to take into account the particularity 
of Islam and social order in Mauritania and to distance 
himself from African Islam generally. However, even 
on this more modest scale Islam did not reveal itself 
as the uniform force which Coppolani had suggested. 
Instead, Coppolani's failure and the manner of his 
death became object lessons in the complexity of 
Islamic politics. Paradoxically, therefore, his 
legacy was one of insecurity as much as of knowledge.
As we shall see in the next chapter this insecurity 
was to be translated into a profound mistrust of 
Islam.
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CHAPTER THREE: FRENCH ANXIETIES ABOUT ISLAM,
1905-1911
Introduction
At the same time that Coppolani was embarking on his 
final mission to the Adrar the new Governor of Senegal, 
Camille Guy, was worrying about the influence of 
Mauritanian marabouts on their alms-collecting tours 
in his colony. The preoccupation with the activities 
of local marabouts was not new but it was to acquire 
a new urgency under the administration of men such as 
Guy, Francois Clozel and above all William Ponty in 
whose eyes marabouts were generally seen as greedy and 
illiterate charlatans who exploited African credulity 
for their private gain at great expense to the colonial 
economy.
In the first decade of this century the concept of 
maraboutage became common usage in the vocabulary of 
the French administration. It was a concept that had 
no direct equivalent in English and which was meant to 
evoke all that was considered disreputable in West 
African Islam - particularly the encouragement of
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begging and superstition. The severest strictures 
were reserved for the category of marabouts 
ambulants, itinerant marabouts, whose crime was 
twofold; exploitation of credulity for private 
gain etc. on the one hand, diffusion and 
encouragement of 'pan-Islamic' sentiment on the 
other.
The control of the activities of the itinerant 
marabouts necessitated a centralised intelligence 
service so that in the ideal colonial state 
potential 'trouble-makers' could be apprehended 
as soon as they entered the colony. This chapter 
deals with some of the main preoccupations of the 
French during the first five years of the embryonic 
intelligence service under its first director,
Robert Arnaud. The events of these years and 
the French response to them reflect the uncertainty 
of the French about what Islam in Black Africa 
amounted to, as it was seen variously as a peripheral 
heresy, a mildly superior form of animism or an 
orthodox part of the Islamic world whose spiritual 
leaders were to be found in Istanbul and 
Alexandria.
122
Developments in the Islamic world
The decade before the First World War was rightly 
seen by the European powers as a time of great 
unrest in the Islamic world. Dramatic and 
alarming metaphors abounded in the numerous 
articles written about Islam as the rumblings in 
officer messes in Turkey and the nationalist 
printing presses of Alexandria were widely supposed 
to be the first signs of a 'volcanic explosion1 
within the world of Islam unleashing all the latent 
fanaticism of the 'Mohammedan peoples' against 
the ill-prepared defences of Europe.
The substance of European fears was founded on 
the revolutions in Persia (1906), the deposition 
of both the Ottoman and the Moroccan sultans 
(1908), the growing radicalism of the Egyptian 
nationalists and the first Italian -Sanusiyya war, 
all of which combined to add a fresh urgency and 
a new dimension to traditional European 
Islamophobia. The Japanese defeat of the Russians 
in 1906 was also a severe blow to European confidence 
about its ability to contain the diverse forces of
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the 'Orient'. (1)
Missionaries came to see their major enemy as Islam, 
and two Protestant conferences in Cairo (1906) and 
Lucknow (1911) addressed themselves specifically 
to the problem of evangelisation amongst M u s l i m s . (2) 
Even the scholarly Revue du Monde Musulman had a 
special issue in 1911 devoted entirely to 'La 
conquete de 1 'I s l a m '.(3) Snouck-Hurgronje and 
C-H Becker, the most respected experts in Holland 
and Germany on Islam, were employed by their 
respective governments as advisers on Islamic 
policy, and their articles were swiftly 
translated into other European languages. (4)
(1) On developments in the Islamic world see 
A. Hourani Arabic Thought in the Liberal
Age Oxford, 1962 and on European uncertainties 
see M. Rodinson La Fascination de 1'Islam Paris, 
1981 ch. 8.
(2) cf. editorial of first issue of Moslem Vforld
1911 and a series of articles in International 
Missionary Review 1912 on 'The vital forces 
of Christianity and Islam' for insights into 
mission attitudes to Islam during these years.
(3) EMM 1911 and see Le Chatelier's justification
for this issue in RMM 1912.
(4) Becker's article '1st der Islam eine Gefahr fur
unsere Kolonien?1 (1909) appeared in French 
translation L* Islam et la colonisation de l'Afrique 
Paris 1910.
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There was then a perception of a struggle which 
opposed Christian Europe against the Muslim 'Orient', 
a struggle which, it should be stressed, the 
Europeans by no means felt entirely confident about 
winning. To a certain extent this perception was 
merely a continuation of a suspicion and fear of 
Islam that dates back to the Crusades but in the 
early twentieth century the fear was not so much of 
what Islam was (or what the Europeans believed it 
to be) but what, mixed up with nationalism, it 
might become. Le Chatelier, the editor of the 
Revue du Monde Musulman, wrote that 'Islam was 
at its 17 89' - a date which in the Third Republic 
was as liable to evoke the Terror which followed 
as the birth of democratic and enlightened 
government - but Le Chatelier was cautiously 
optimistic. (1) Others, haunted by the spectre of 
a pan-Islamic revolt were less sanguine. All were 
agreed that Europeans had to be careful, that they 
had to do something, in short that they had to have 
an Islamic policy.
Colonial rivalries of the past thirty years were 
not, however, swept aside in the face of the common
(1) A. Le Chatelier 'Le pan-islamisne et le progr^s'
EMM 1907 pp. 465-71.
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enemy of Islam. In particular, the French whose 
colonial expansion had been so intimately linked with 
the experience of metropolitan humiliation in 1870-1 
were ultra-sensitive to European challenges to their 
Empire. Since Fashoda and the establishment of the 
Entente Cordiale (1904) French suspicion of 'Perfide 
Albion' had been tempered. Rather it was the Germans, 
the new lords of Alsace-Lorraine, who caused the 
greatest headaches for French colonialists as French 
and Germans clashed in two areas in Africa: In Wadai
and Tibesti in Central [Frioa the French suspected that
the Germans were intriguing with local chiefs against 
the infant French presence. The area, on the 
eastern border of the French Empire was of symbolic 
interest to French colonialists. A plainly barren 
land over which as yet the French army exercised no 
control it nonetheless represented an important link 
in fhe chain of French colonies running from the 
Mediterranean to the Congo. (1)
(1) The political situation in the central Sudan was
somewhat anarchic and no power - European or African - 
was capable of guaranteeing security for the trans- 
Saharan traders. Rabih, the Sultan of Bomo, had 
been killed by the French in 1900 but his followers 
had taken refuge in Wadai, Tibesti and Borkou. The 
French particularly feared the power of the 
Sanusiyya, traditionally regarded by them as the most 
xenophobic of the Sufi brotherhoods. They were also 
alarmed by the activities of the Young Turk,, 
political exiles banished by the Ottoman authorities 
to the Southern Tripolitanian province of Fezzan.
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Morocco, the other area in which French and Germam 
interests clashed dramatically, was altogether 
different. Never part of the Ottoman Empire, its 
independence had been respected by the Europeans in 
the scramble for Africa but during the reign of 
Sultan Mawlay Hassan (1873-1894) European interest 
in Morocco increased greatly. Between 1864 and 1894 
the European presence in Morocco increased from 
1,350 to 9,000 as new commercial and administrative 
possibilities were provided by the Sultan's schemes 
for modernising his country. As the French 
reconciled themselves to British pre-eminence in 
Egypt and the Sudan their eyes turned to Morocco. 
Treaties were signed with both Britain and Spain in 
1904 which prepared the way for an eventual French 
occupation of the bulk of the country. The 
occupation was justified by the French on the grounds 
of the anarchy of the Moroccan state which it was 
felt had grown worse under Mawlay Hassan and showed 
no signs of improving under his young successor 
Abd al Aziz (1900-8). Only the Germans stood in 
the way of the smooth diplomatic preparations for 
the carve-up of Morocco. In April 1905 Kaiser 
Wilhelm II landed in Tangiers and proclaimed German 
support for an independent Moroccan state. A 
diplomatic crisis ensued before the Algeciras 
conference the following year provided an acceptable
127
compromise. Meanwhile French plans for occupying 
Morocco moved on a stage as French troops arrived 
in Casablanca and Oujda, on the Algerian border, 
ostensibly to protect French citizens. In 1908 
Abd al Aziz, whom the French had supported, was 
deposed and replaced by his younger brother,
Mawlay Hafiz. The new Sultan, however, was no 
more able to defend himself against his (Moroccan) 
enemies than his brother had been. In 1911 he 
found himself besieged in Fez and had to be rescued 
by a French force. The Germans responded to the 
French march on Fez by sending a gunboat to Agadir, 
and a new diplomatic crisis resulted. The 
following year the myth of Moroccan independence 
was finally given the lie, and a French protectorate 
was declared. Resistance to French rule was stiff 
in the traditionally unruly Bilad al Siba ('Land 
of Disorder') particularly in the South and in 
the Rif mountains in the North, and it was not 
until 1934 that the whole country was eventually 
'pacified' . (1)
(1) H. Terasse Histoire du Maroc vol 2 Casablanca 
1950 gives a blow-by-blow account of the 
Moroccan crisis, C-A Julien Le Maroc face aux 
imperialismes Baris 1978 is a good introduction 
to more recent scholarship.
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A glance through the Bulletin du Comite de l'Afrique 
francaise in the years prior to the declaration of 
the Protectorate reveals the extent of French 
preoccupation with German 'interference' in Morocco. 
The German alliance with Islamic leaders in Morocco 
and in Central Africa was an example of how in the 
twentieth century relations between Islamic and 
European countries were changing - or, more 
accurately, were seen to be changing - as political 
developments outside Europe began for the first time 
since the seventeenth century to impinge on 
political strategies and calculations within Europe. 
The roots of post Second World War analyses of a 
Soviet plot to use Islam as a springboard for its 
own devices are to be found in the beginning of the 
century, and, as we shall see, in an environment 
in which conspiracies and rumours of conspiracies 
prospered handsomely even far-flung corners of AOF 
were at times included in an analysis of global 
conflicts that owed little or nothing to local 
realities and a very great deal to metropolitan 
politics, inbred phobias and personal whim.
This is not to say that no attempt was made to 
understand local realities. On the contrary,
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learned journals appeared devoted to Islam, (1) and 
specialist government departments were created 
specifically to document developments in the 
Islamic world. In June 1906 a Service des Affaires 
Musulmanes was created in the French Colonial 
Ministry headed by Lt-Col Levd. Leve drafted a 
memorandum on pan-Islamism in which he warned that:
It is quite clear that the movements of 
a world which comprises in round figures 
200,000,000 followers ... animated by 
a still active religious fanaticism and 
which one of the Western powers [i.e. 
Germany] may hope to enlist for its profit 
is a real danger if the opposing powers 
[i.e. Britain and France] do not know how 
to recognise the diverse elements which 
maintain this mass in its present state 
of anarchy. (2)
The danger in Islam according to this widely accepted 
belief lay not so much in the intrinsic fanaticism 
of Islam (for this was balanced by the intrinsic 
anarchy and internal divisions amongst Muslims) but 
rather with the possibility that such fanaticism 
could be exploited for political purposes by a 
third party - Muslim or non-Muslim.
(1) Revue du Monde Musulman was founded in 1906, 
Per Islam in 1910 and Moslem World in 1911.
(2) I(nstitut) C(atholique) Fr 378 i (Leve) 'Note 
au sujet du mouvement pan-islamique'.
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But how could any European power harness the forces 
of Islam? An article written by one of the first 
specialists on Morocco, Edmond Doutte, which sets 
out to analyse 'scientifically and objectively' the 
reasons for the fall of the French-supported Sultan 
Abd al Aziz emphasised the delicacy of the problem. 
The author asked:
What are the causes of this acute 
fanaticism of the Moroccans who are 
so bitterly opposed to all influence 
of our civilisation in their country 
and how is it that the innocent 
amusements of Abd al Aziz could have 
precipitated his fall? ... How is 
it that a Sultan whom we supported 
seems to have been compromised by the 
very fact that we supported him, and 
that he cannot be sympathetic to 
Europe without arousing the suspicions 
of his subjects?
The answer, he argued, lay above all in Islam,
'The old Islam of the marabouts and prophets 
[which] weighs down like a cloak of lead over the 
country'. Until the very gradual process of the 
modernisation of Islam in Morocco was complete the 
obligation of the French (in 1909'.) was 'To 
preserve carefully the present framework of 
Moroccan society, limiting ourselves to improving 
it and advancing the evolution of ideas that has
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already begun.* (D Le Chatelier argued that it was 
important to do more than this and that it was above 
all essential to be as completely informed as 
possible and that the French should follow the 
German example of reading and cataloguing all that 
was published in the Islamic world. Elsewhere he 
wrote that, 'There can be no Muslim policy without 
a social science of the Muslim environment.' (2)
What meanwhile was happening in AOF?
'Maraboutage1
Early in 1905 Cheikh Saad Bu, who, along with 
Cheikh Sidia, had been of much assistance to 
Coppolani, intended to make an annual tour to 
collect alms from his disciples on the left bank of 
the Senegal. As a leading member of the venerated
(1) E. Doutte 'Les causes de la chute d'un Sultan' 
FCBCAF 1909 pp. 130,135, 267. It should be noted 
that the formal declaration of a Protectorate was 
still three years away but the blueprint already 
existed.
(2) A. Le Chatelier Politique musulmane Tours,
1907.
132
Fadel family Cheikh Saad Bu exercised qreat 
spiritual authority over the Fadelliyya branch 
of the Qadiriyya brotherhood, and his disciples 
were to be found as far away as the Futa Jallon.
Great material interest went with the spiritual 
leadership and Cheikh Saad Bu profited from it 
handsomely.(1) Coppolani, who cared little for what 
went on on the other side of the river gave the 
Cheikh permission to go on his customary tours 
accompanied by his vast retinue of servants.
However, Guy had not been consulted and was plainly 
displeased at Coppolani's lack of courtesy.
Although Guy did not imagine that the Cheikh's 
presence in itself in Baol and Cayor was particularly 
dangerous nonetheless he wrote angrily to Roume,
It certainly reveals, in a particularly 
inopportune manner the fanaticism amongst 
the natives and it seems to me that the 
moment was badly chosen to allow the 
inhabitants to be robbed of the few savings 
they might possess ... Whilst the poor 
harvest of maize and the low prices 
rmeventel for groundnuts does not allow 
them to pay their taxes. (2)
(1) At the turn of the century the
Fadeliyya were enjoying 'une grande 
vogue' according to J. Cuoq 
Les Musulmans en Afrique Paris, 1975 
p. 135.
(2) ANS 9 G 21 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen.
AQF 6.2.1905.
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The following day Guy received a telegram from 
M. Jacques, the administrator of the cercle of 
Thies, reporting on his interview with the Cheikh 
who openly admitted that he had come to collect 
alms in order to repay debts in St Louis.
M. Jacques continued:
Cheikh Saadibou exercises a great 
influence on black Muslims ... For 
these people his arrival was a holiday, 
a day of celebration. Quiet and 
tranquil in his camp he received 
numerous presents either in silver or 
in kind, some of them even from the far 
side of Baol. Every day emissaries 
bring more offerings than the previous 
day. The traders, who are somewhat 
unhappy, go as far as saying that the 
natives sell their groundnuts in order 
to get money which they can then offer to 
the great marabout. I think that they 
are exaggerating but it cannot be denied 
that many natives bring him presents and 
that his passage through the country will 
to a certain extent have made money rarer 
in the colony.
He concluded that it would be in everybody's interest 
if the Cheikh left the cercle without delay. Roume 
was not entirely sympathetic to Guy's complaints and 
rebuked both the Senegalese and Mauritanian 
administrations for their unwillingness to co-operate
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Jacques to Lt.-Gov. Sen. 7.2.1905.
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with each other. Cheikh Saad Bu was to be allowed 
to continue his tour but not as far as Dakar as 
he had planned. (1)
In November two of the Cheikh's envoys arrived in 
Cayor with permits to collect alms, and again the 
Senegalese administration complained. Guy was 
on leave but his temporary replacement wrote,
'I am aware that this religious chief enjoys 
considerable political influence in Mauritania and 
in refusing his request I would be afraid of 
being ungracious about the services he has rendered 
on the right bank. Nonetheless, I feel obliged 
to point out that as it is the natives of Senegal 
have difficulty in meeting the numerous demands made 
on them'. This last remark attracted Roume's 
indignation as he noted in the margin, 'What are 
these 'numerous demands'? I know of no other except 
the capitation tax. The Governor of Senegal will 
have to explain himself'.
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Adam (Camnissaire 
adjoint Mauritanie) 8.2.1905; Gov.-Gen. AOF 
to Lt.-Gov. Sen. 8.2.1905.
(2) ANS 9 G 21 Lt.-Gov. p.i. Sen. to Gov.-Gen.
AOF 17.11.1905.
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The Mauritanian administration were in the meantime 
preparing their case, and Montand, Coppolani's 
successor as Commissioner, wrote a lengthy letter 
to Roume in favour of Cheikh Saad Bu. He argued 
that as the money collected by the Cheikh was
used to repay St Louis traders it could not be said
that the colony was being drained of money. The 
loyalty of the Cheikh, despite his family ties
with Cheikh Ma el Ainin, could not be doubted, and
he was a useful ally for the French - though in a 
different way to Cheikh Sidia: 'By their character,
their mentality, their personal attributes and 
ambitions Cheikh Sidia and Cheikh Saad Bu are two 
different personalities, two tools appropriate 
for distinct uses, whose usefulness to France 
should not be compared in order to reject the 
less perfect?. The comparison between the two
men was an interesting one. Wisely Montane 
wanted to keep as many strings to his bow as 
possible and he thought it foolish to impose a 
self-denying ordinance on the recruitment of 
potential allies merely because they offended some 
purist Republican ideal. The moral qualities of 
Cheikh Sidia may have been superior but 
Cheikh Saad Bu was easily bought. The Senegalese
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Montane to Gov.-Gen. AOF 27.11.1905.
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would just have to put up with him.
Guy on his return to Senegal in February 1906, was 
not prepared to give in without a fight and again 
he wrote to Roume to complain of the Cheikh1s 
recent tour which he claimed the previous year had 
drained 100,000 francs from the cercle of Thies 
alone. More seriously he deplored the fact that, 
'The facilities granted to these marabouts have a 
political repercussion which should be properly 
understood as the Muslims do not neglect to show 
to the faithful that our subservience with regard 
to certain Muslim chiefs proves that their power 
is as strong as ever'. (1)
The pressure on Roume to adopt a more rigorous 
policy towards Islam was further augmented by the 
events in the Military Territory of Niger in 
December and January. In December two 'gardiens 
de cercle1 had been killed in the cercle of Djerma,
(1) ANS 9 G 21 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF
7.2.1 (06; see also ANS 19 G 3 draft decree on 
alms collecting Lt.-Gov. p.i. Sen. to Gov.-Gen.
AOF 19.4.1914 in vfaich alms were described as 
'une perte s&che pour le commerce, une entrave 
au d£veloppement dconcmique du pays et aussi, 
consequence immediate et non moins inquietante, 
une extension continue du mouvement propagandiste 
anti-europeen ... un danger a la fois moral, 
econonique et politique'.
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and a force of 50 guards under Capt. Loffler was 
sent out in what was thought to be a simple police 
action. However, it became apparent to the French 
that they had on their hands a general rebellion 
stirred up by one Saibu whom Ponty, Governor of 
Haut-Senegal et Niger, described to Roume as, 'this 
marabout, or rather this charlatan, ventriloquist 
and adept trickster' who 'thanks to his talents was 
able easily to involve the natives in an anti-French 
movement'. Capt. Loffler was given reinforcements 
and forced Saibu to flee across the border to 
Northern Nigeria.(1) From Dahomey there came the
(1) ANS 11 G 4 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AOF
26.3.1906. See also R. Adeleye Power and 
Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, 1804-1906 London 
1971 pp. 322-25 and P. Marty 'L'islam et les 
tribus du Niger' REI 1930 p. 350 ... 'La cause 
de tout le mal, le marabout p^lerin Sahibou, 
fetait un petit honme aveugle. ... Tres 
adroit malgre son cecite, poss6dant le don de 
la ventriloquie il avait tout ce qu'il fallait 
pour persuader a ses naifs coreligionnaires en 
faisant parler devant eux un arbre, une sandale, 
un Goran que c 'etait la parole de Dieu lui-meme 
qu'ils entendaient. Et il annon?ait ainsi 
1'extermination des Blancs, 1'apparition subite 
d'une anmee de vrai croyants ...'
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warning, 'It seems that an Islamic movement is at 
the moment current in the French and foreign 
colonies of West Africa. Profiting from our 
respect for all religious belief the marabouts enter 
our colonies under the cover of religion and ... 
then push the natives more or less openly into 
revolt. 1 (1)
By 1906 as a result of these diverse reports from 
all over AOF the administration had developed a 
very strong and none too flattering image of the 
'typical' marabout. The concept was not, of course, 
an entirely recent development nor was it restricted 
to the West African context: Rinn's Khouan,
for example, closely resembled the portrait of the 
'typical' Senegalese marabout. However, it is 
clear that French antipathy to marabouts was 
peculiarly strong at this time. One reason for 
this lay in the fears resulting from the 
international climate and in the upheavals in the 
Muslim world. Another reason can be found in 
the political and intellectual currents of 
metropolitan France. At the time when village
(1) ANS 8 G 14 Lt.-Gov. Dahomey to Gov.-Gen. AOF
10.1.1906.
(2) RLnn Marabouts et Khouan cf. above p. 6 0
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cures were being so vehemently denounced in some 
quarters and legislation was being enacted against 
the power and wealth of the monastic orders it 
would have been surprising if similar arguments 
were not used against Muslims. Finally, it must 
be remembered that marabouts were not a mere 
invention of the French: marabouts did exist, 
they did collect alms, sell talismen, direct 
Qur'anic schools and some undoubtedly did preach 
against the French. Maraboutage should therefore 
be seen as a peculiarly French interpretation of 
an African reality.
The French reaction: the Arnaud mission
Roume responded to the various warnings about 
maraboutic activity with a number of measures. 
Firstly he issued a circular which was to serve 
as the basis for a new information service. He 
wrote that as the natives were themselves unable 
to understand that they were being cheated by the 
itinerant marabouts;
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It is necessary to get to the root of the 
evil. As soon as the presence of a 
foreign marabout effecting unauthorised 
alms-collecting tours is communicated to 
you, you should immediately put them under 
surveillance and obtain more complete 
information about them. ... Whether the 
marabout is a peaceable man or whether he is 
considered as a dangerous individual, you 
should draw up a personal file, if possible 
with a photograph attached.
The files were then to be sent to Dakar where other 
documents concerning Islamic movements were to be 
centralised. Once the files were classified they 
would constitute 'A methodical register of Muslim 
proselytism which it is permissible to consider 
as a constant threat to the tranquility of our 
domination in Africa. (1)
This collection of files formed the basis of what 
was later to become the Service des Affaires 
Musulmanes. (2)
Secondly, he employed Robert Arnaud on a mission 
to investigate the state of Islam throughout the 
West African colonies. His instructions to 
Arnaud were detailed, precise and very extensive. 
Arnaud was to follow a fixed itinerary as follows:
(1) ANS 19 G 1 Gov.-Gen. AQF circular to colonies
10.2.1906.
(2) See be lew ch. 6
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1. St Louis, Fouta, Brackna, Guidimaka; 
propaganda of the marabouts of the 
right bank of the Senegal amongst the 
Ouloffs & Toucouleurs, special study 
of the Tijania.
2. Kayes: muslim population of the Soudan 
in general and a methodical study of 
influential religious personalities.
3. Kita & Bamako: study of the penetration 
of Islam amongst the fetishists.
4. Segou-Sikoro; Tijania brotherhood amongst 
the Fulani, relations of their marabouts 
with the French authority.
5. Sansanding: local marabouts, historical
studies of the empires of Mali and Sonrai.
6. Djenne: center of religious influence -
study of Muslim education in this town, 
local marabouts and their influence.
You should coincide your presence in 
Djenne with the opening of the 
franco-arab 'medersa'.
7. Tombouctou: historical centre of
maraboutic influence, study of bekkai 
Qadriya, the Kounta, local marabouts, 
their regional influence, their relation 
with the exterior, schools and mosgues.
8. Say Kanday, Fada N'Gourma; study of 
mahdist & Senoussi influence, research 
on influential local marabouts and the 
services which they might be able to 
render.
9. Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso, Sikasso: 
nature of religious propaganda in this 
part of the Soudan, how is it exercised?
10. Fouta Djallon, Timbo: study of religious
propaganda amongst the Foulahs.
142
Finally Arnaud was to draw up a manual of Muslim 
policy, un precis de politique musulmane for the 
use of French agents in AOF.(1 ) A copy of these 
instructions was then sent to all the local governors 
along with an introductory note with an exhortation 
to give Arnaud all the assistance he r e q u i r e d . (2)
Arnaud's brief was as unrealistic as it was impressive 
and, indeed, it does not appear to have been fulfilled. 
Little matter, for the instructions themselves are 
very revealing of the extent to which the French 
had already identified the potential trouble areas 
in Islam. Clearly marabouts as much as 
brotherhoods were now the focus of attention.
Another theme touched on the instructions and which 
was to acquire great significance under the 
Governorships of Ponty and Clozel was that of the 
relationship between traditional African religions 
and Islam and the degree to which conversion to 
Islam might be prevented. The instructions to 
conduct historical research into the ancient empires 
of Mali and Songhay was an interesting diversion 
from traditional administrative preoccupations and 
is a reminder of the way in which the duties of
(1) ANSCM ACF 111/3 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Arnaud 21.3.1906.
(2) ANS 19 G 1 Gov.-Gen. AOF circular to colonies
26.3.1906.
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scholar and administrator were supposed to be 
combined.
Robert Arnaud, the man who was credited with 
possessing the necessary combination of 
administrative and scholarly qualities, was born 
in Algiers on the 16th February 1873.(1) His 
father worked in the Algerian administration and 
had translated many of the Arab documents for Rinn, 
Depont and Coppolani. After completing his 
studies and mastering Arabic, Arnaud followed his 
father into the Algerian administration, becoming 
an administrateur adjoint of a commune mixte in 
1898. At the end of the same year he was chosen 
to accompany Coppolani, whom he had already met 
through his father, on his mission to the Soudan.
In 1905 he was a member of the Tagant-Adrar 
mission and was present in Tidjikja at the time 
of Coppolani's death. There can be no doubt 
that he was profoundly influenced by Coppolani 
not merely from an intellectual but also from 
a spiritual point of view. Coppolani was more 
than a tutor in Islam and Islamic policy for
(1) Biographical details are taken from
Arnaud's c.v. in ANSCM (unclassified).
I am grateful to the archivists for 
allowing me to see copies of this 
and other c.v. 's.
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Arnaud, he was also a very great friend whose 
death Arnaud quite consciously set out to 
a v e n g e . T h e  other great influence in 
Arnaud's early life was Isabelle Eberhardt, a 
young woman of mixed Russian and German parentage 
who emigrated to Algeria where she converted to 
Islam, married an Algerian and rode about the 
Algerian 'bled' disguised as a native Muslim male. 
She wrote articles for the liberal franco-Arab 
newspaper Akhbar and in the tense political 
climate in Algeria at the turn of the century her 
journalistic activity led to her expulsion from 
the colony. Arnaud had spent some time with 
her in 1902 (and had lent her his copy of Thus 
spoke Zarathrustra which was one of his favourite 
books). Soon after her clandestine return to 
Algeria Isabelle was drowned in a freak storm at 
the age of 27 in 1904.(2)
(1) IF Fonds Terrier Arnaud to Terrier 18.5.1907. 
Arnaud' s list of reasons why the conquest of 
Mauritania needed to be pursued was headed by 
the need to avenge Coppolani's death.
(2) These details are taken frcm Randau/Amaud's 
biography Isabelle Eberhardt Paris 1945.
For Algerian background see Ageron Les Alg&riens 
musulmans 'VaeVictis'.
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In the last years of his own life Arnaud wrote 
biographies of his two mentors to defend them both
i
i against some of the charges that had been levelled
against them. For Arnaud also fancied himself 
as a poet, philosopher and man of letters. His
| first novel Rabbin, a mildly anti-semitic tale of
marital woe, was published in 1896 and from then
f
until his death in 1946 at least twenty novels and
|
collections of poems were published under the 
pseudonym of Robert Randau. (1) His favourite
L
| subject matter - indeed, his only subject matter -
was colonial life as Arnaud attempted to write a 
sort of comedie humaine depicting French colonials 
north and south of the Sahara. Both Coppolani 
and Eberhardt, called Antonettii and Sophie Peterhof 
respectively, appear in several of the novels, and
| Arnaud, himself, under the name of Cassard or
Lemare plays a prominent role in almost all of the
| novels. Arnaud saw himself as one of the leaders
[
| of a new and youthful 'colonial' school of
i
! literature which rejected both the dilettante
lifestyle of the metropolis and the transient
|
; (1) Full bibliography of Arnaud's writing is given
in C. Harrison 'Bad monks and Frenchmen: a
I literary view of Islam in West Africa'
unpublished saninar paper, African History 
Seminar, SQAS 2.11.1983.
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fancifulness of the 'exotic' writers such as 
Pierre Loti in favour of a tougher, heroic, action- 
packed, patriotic and 'realistic' portrayal of 
'Africans' (as they all liked to call themselves). 
These European 'Africans' were almost a race apart - 
Arnaud describes himself as a Franco-Berber - and 
they were characterised in Arnaud's novels by a 
seemingly unquenchable appetite for sex and drugs 
and an apparently limitless capacity to talk 
earnestly about Kant and Nietzsche whilst sailing 
down the Niger or crossing the Sahara on camels. 
Strong, intelligent and beautiful - a master race 
indeed. (1)
(1) For the 'philosophy' behind this school see, 
for example, R. Randau 'L'^crivain colonial 
au colonies' La Grande Revue Feb. 1926;
E. Pujamiscle 'La litterature coloniale et 
ses difficult^' La Grande Revue Dec. 1921, 
Jan. - Feb. 1922; J. Parmer 'Le mouvanent 
litteraire franchise de le l'Algerie'
La Grande Revue June 1923; R. Lebel 
L'Afrique occidentale dans la litterature 
franqaise depuis 1870 Paris 1925 chs. 3 & 4; 
see also Arnaud's prefaces to his novels 
Lss Colons (1907) Les Explorateurs (n.d.) and 
L'Aventure sur le Niger (n.d.)
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Whatever m i g h t  be said for their literary merit - 
which was minimal - the novels nonetheless 
certainly provide evidence of a lively imagination 
on the part of their author, the man in charge of 
conducting the detailed survey of Islam in 
sub-Saharan Africa.(1)
There appears to be no evidence that Arnaud did 
actually complete his mission but he did fulfil at 
least one of its demands and towards the end of 
1906 his Precis de politique musulmane was 
published - significantly in Algiers. Only vol. I 
dealing with the Moors of the right bank of the 
Senegal ever appeared but it contains some 
interesting comments on more general issues. The 
introductory chapter discusses the nature of 
colonialism which Arnaud saw primarily as an 
economic activity safeguarded by a 'social policy'
(1) Another example of Arnaud's imagination is 
seen in the incident when an administrator 
(Geubhard) found a document which Arnaud 
believed to be an original part of the 
'Book of Enoch' and wcrthy of a place in 
the library of the Ecole des Langues 
Qrientales in Paris. The Inspector of 
Muslim Education was asked for a second 
opinion and revealed that Arnaud's claims 
were unfounded and his scholarship faulty. 
ANS 19 G 2 Chef de Cabinet to Inspect. 
Enseignament Musulman 5.3.1908, Inspect, 
to Chef de Cabinet March 1908.
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which respected the physiology and psychology of 
the indigenous societies.(1) In practice, in vast 
areas of Africa where Islam was the dominant 
culture, a social policy meant a Muslim p o l i c y . ^ )
The following chapters narrated the history and dogma 
of Islam. A chapter on 'Prophetism' denied that 
Sufism belonged to the Islamic orthodoxy and urged 
the need for 'the strictest prudence' when dealing 
with important Sufi figures. Luckily, Arnaud 
wrote, rehearsing a well-loved theme of Coppolani, 
few Sufis were indifferent to material persuasion 
and 'It is therefore necessary, having made sure of 
the influence of each one of them, to calculate the 
services he can render and from then on to make 
sure he renders the maximum within the framework 
of directives sent or approved by the central 
power.* (3) This maxim was to remain a central plank
(1) R. Amaud Precis de politique musulmane. vol. I 
Les Maures de la rive droite Algiers 1906 p. 8 
'Tout conquete de pays d'outre-mer est une affaire 
carmerciale et son but unique est d ' assurer la 
securite des transactions carmerciales'.
(2) ibid p. 10 'La politique indigene en Afrique est
... fatalement une politique musulmane'.
(3) ibid pp. 24,25 'Le soufisme est contraire a la 
lettre et a 1'esprit de la foi musulmane, ses 
doctrines se basent sur le pantheisme condamn£
par le Qoran; ses procedds empruntes a 1' ascetisme 
le plus pur sont egalement condamnes par le Qoran.'
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of French policy for the entirety of the colonial 
period* Religious leaders such as Cheikh Sidia 
and later the Tijani Cheikh Seydou Nourou Tall 
were selected - or selected themselves - as allies 
and in return for rich rewards were expected to 
deliver anything the French asked of them.(l)
However, Arnaud warned that, 'The tolba who initiate 
the youth into the Qoran are in general as a result 
of their fanaticism hostile to the French influence. 
They should be the object of a strict s u r v e i l l a n c e 1 . (2)
On the brotherhoods Arnaud made a firm and classic 
distinction between the Qadiriyya ('broad-minded and 
philanthropic') and the Tijaniyya ( distinguished by 
their 'extreme intolerance and their appeals to 
violence against all Christian domination').^)
Again Arnaud showed that he had been an attentive 
and admiring pupil of Coppolani when he went on to 
argue the folly of attempting to destroy the 
brotherhoods: 'As long as they continue to exercise
(1) See below ch. 9
(2) Arnaud Politique p.35.
(3) ibid pp. 113,115. See also M. Ndiaye
' Rapports entre Qadirites et Tijanites au Fouta 
Toro' Bull. IFAN (serie B) 1979 pp. 190-205 
for a discussion of the differences between 
the two brotherhoods as seen through a contemporary 
text of Cheikh Moussa Kamara.
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an undeniable political influence we have to make 
use of the brotherhoods and attempt to reduce them 
to simple and purely local associations that are 
not at the beck and call of outsiders.1 (1) There 
then followed several chapters detailing precise 
colonial policies ranging from ensuring that each 
outpost was staffed with a native Muslim nurse and 
maintaining the moral superiority of Europeans 
through to granting honorific titles to heads of 
brotherhoods and above all encouraging divisions 
between Muslims. (2) Finally, he concluded that, 
'The aim of native policy applied to Muslims is to 
lead them to our civilisation by making use of 
their's in order to achieve that a i m ' . (3)
In many ways the book (which was specifically about 
Mauritania) was simply a restatement of views long 
held in Algeria, and the influence of Coppolani was 
not only obvious but openly recognised. Islam was 
seen as an inherently hostile force that could not 
be destroyed but which with correct policies could
(1) Arnaud Politique p. 119
(2) ibid p. 120 'Le principe divide et imperes 
est ici plus ef ficace que jamais'.
(3) ibid p . 182.
be contained and modified. At this juncture it is 
worth taking account of the state of the debate 
amongst Europeans about the nature of Islam in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
Three French views on Islam
1. Le Chatelier
At the end of the nineteenth century the only 
serious studies of Islam in Africa were confined 
to North Africa, and to Algeria in particular. In 
1899 Le Chatelier published the first serious study 
of Islam in black Africa.(1) He had actually written 
the book in 1888 but had been reluctant to publish 
his conclusions because they ran counter to those 
of the Algerian school, and he feared that, 
therefore, his conclusions were wrong. However, 
in the 1890s further tours in Muslim countries 
outside Algeria made him more confident that he had 
been right to doubt the universal applicability of
(1) A. Le Chatelier L 1 Islam dans l'Afrique 
occidentale Paris 1899.
152
the Algerian experience and that his failure to 
appreciate the overriding importance of the 
brotherhoods south of the Sahara had less to do 
with his blindness and the inferiority of his 
research methods than with the fact that outside 
Algeria the facts were different:
The life of a people, he wrote in his 
preface, when seen through the administrative 
prism appears differently when viewed without 
this prism. There is, perhaps, no other 
society in the world so completely surrounded 
by administration than the native society 
of Algeria. On the surface it is entirely 
hierarchical and when one looks at it 
looking for hierarchies it is normal to 
find hierarchies everywhere. If to this 
point of view is added the political conception 
of the Native Affairs Department of Algeria 
which is excellent as an instrument of 
government but which is based on fiction and 
conventions there is nothing more natural 
than to attribute to the Muslim brotherhoods 
a character of strongly organised associations 
and of secret societies which they do not 
always have in Algeria and which elsewhere 
they have only in exceptional instances.
Le Chatelier admitted that there were some brother­
hoods that combined great political and religious 
strength,
But that does not mean that all Muslim 
brotherhoods should be considered as 
immense temporal religious associations 
sending out their masonic roots through­
out the Mohammetan w o r l d .  (2)
(1) ibid pp. 10-11
(2) ibid p.12.
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Later he described the Islamic culture in Kankan 
in Guinea:
The Muslim brotherhoods in reality count 
very few followers in the southern Sahara 
and in the Soudan. But there exists within 
the Muslim world a sort of ecclesiastical 
hierarchy of which the Cheikh el Triqa 
forms the head ... A few Kadriya 
affiliated to their brothers in the north, 
a few marabouts brought up in their schools 
are the sole direct representatives in 
Kankan of the doctrines of Sidi el Mokhtar 
el Kebir or his precursors. (...) It is 
from this viewpoint that it is true to say 
that the entire Muslim centre is attached 
to the Kadriyan traditions .(1)
However, even if Islam was not quite as powerful 
and organised as some argued, Le Chatelier forecast 
that it would spread rapidly south of the Sahara 
for:
In contact with European civilisation all 
the peoples of West Africa feel, 
consciously or unconsciously, the need 
to substitute their ancient beliefs with 
a more elevated religion. Christianity 
... is too perfect, too absolute. Only 
Islam meets for everybody the needs of the 
moment.(2)
Le Chatelier was entirely convinced that Islam was 
far superior to traditional African religions which,
(1) ibid p.163.
(2) ibid p.259.
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he said, entirely lacked 'a philosophical system'. ^  
In a paragraph which brilliantly stated the dilemma 
of Europeans he wrote:
When one studies the African races and 
when one lives amongst them one cannot 
help but be struck by the superiority 
of the Muslim over the fetishist. The 
former is sometimes a great cutter of 
throats, a slave dealer and a rebel but 
he has always a more open intelligence 
and a less primitive civilisation.
Even when seen as an enemy it is 
nonetheless to him that we give our 
preferences. (2)
He argued that there was a great need for a detailed 
study of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa and that 
meanwhile the French should understand that:
The fundamental rule in our African policy 
with regard to Soudanian Islam in its 
entirety ... should be an extreme reserve, 
an action determined by apparent 
indifference, by a rational sentiment 
of tolerance, neither aggressive nor 
tyranical but attentive, unhesitatingly 
energetic and preferably preventive.v3)
Finally, he concluded that the key to the problem 
lay in the replacement of Arabic by French as the 
official language.(4)
(1) ibid p.313.
(2) ibid p. 348 (my emphasis)
(3) ibid p.350
(4) ibid pp. 355-66
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2. Binger
In 1906 Gustave Binger, the Head of the African 
Section at the Rue Oudinot, published a book with 
the ironic title of Le Peril de 1' Islam. Binger 
had spent much of his career in West Africa as a 
soldier and explorer (1) and this experience had 
led him to respect Islam. In 1891 he had written 
a little book which challenged the Christian 
Eurocentric notions about slavery and polygamy 
which he analysed in terms of the social hardships 
of the African environment, Islam, he argued, 
had been unfairly blamed as a cause of these two 
evils. France was officially monogamous only 
(Binger emphasis) and as for slavery in Africa:
It remains to be known whether the negro 
slave in his own country, would not prefer 
his situation to that which is reserved for 
those unfortunate people in Europe who 
struggle for a morsel of bread.
Amongst the Muslims the slave will always 
be fed; whatever his work he will not die 
of hunger; in Europe people hardly give a 
thought about where a poor fellow who has 
been dismissed from his work will find his 
bread; he might well die the following day 
and no one would be troubled very much.
(1) H. Brunschwig 'Louis Gustave Binger' 
in Gann and Duignan (eds) African 
Proconsuls New York 1978.
156
Are we as hospitable as the Muslims are?
Are we really as fair-minded as they?
Do we know, as they do, how to lend money 
without usury, even to slaves? (1)
Binger undoubtedly painted an over rosy picture 
of social conditions but nonetheless he had 
challenged European Christian self-righteousness, 
and this broad-mindedness was reflected in the 
arguments of his later book in which he again 
stressed the importance of social issues in 
determining people's behaviour and shaping 
institutions in Africa. Pan-Islamism was, he 
argued, a defensive rather than an aggressive 
movement in which 'religion' counted for very 
little. France should practise a strict policy 
of religious neutrality and concentrate on social 
projects - such as railway construction but above 
all education - in order to make sure that 
unscrupulous marabouts, for he admitted that such 
a class existed, and secular leaders did not 
exploit native discontent to further their own 
aims at French e x p e n s e .  (2)
(1) L-G Binger Esclavage, islamisme et le 
christianisme Paris 1891 p.44.
(2) L-G Binger Le Peril de l'islam Paris 1906 passim
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It is difficult to assess the importance of the 
intellectual arguments of men such as Le Chatelier 
and Binger. It is extremely doubtful that their 
books were read by more than a small percentage 
of administrators. To a certain extent this 
attitude was officially approved, and the quality 
that administrators were encouraged above all to 
cultivate was 1common-sense'. (1)
3. Dr. Barot
A lengthy book published in 1902 provides a 
fascinating insight into what may be said to 
constitute officially approved 'common-sense'. (2) 
Much of the book deals with the principles of 
colonial hygiene for at a time when mortality rates 
were still very high, Europeans worried more about
(1) See W.B. Cohen Rulers of Empire; the French 
colonial service Stanford, 1971 ch. 5
M. Delafosse Broussard ou les 6t£ts d'ame 
d'un colonial Paris 1909; R. Delavignette 
Service africain Paris 1946 for examples 
of encouragement of ' cctrrmon-sense'.
(2) Dr Barot Guide pratique de I europeen en Afrique 
Paris 1902. The preface is by Binger.
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their health than the finer points of Sufi Islam.(1) 
However, one chapter addressed itself to the problem 
of 'social relations' - a wide-ranging subject 
which included advice on choosing 'native wives' for 
temporary marriages which were regarded as un mal 
necessaire. (2) Of more immediate relevance here 
was the section on relations with Muslims and 
animists:
Relationships with Muslims are codified,
Islam being a religion recognised in the 
same wav as others. ... Negro Muslims, 
who ... are distracted from the influence 
of the Turkish or Moroccan Sultans are 
not hostile to us. On the contrary, 
by a wise and just administration we 
should win their confidence and take the 
lead of Islam in West Africa. It is a 
considerable and vital force which is 
easy for us to turn to our profit and to 
use it to the best of our interests. One 
day [Islam] could assure us supremacy over 
all this continent.
The fetichist peoples who have lived some 
time in contact with us ... have adopted 
all our vices, especially alcoholism. ...
They obey us through fear of the policeman ... 
It is necessary to consider and to treat 
fetichists as children. Only a slow 
adaption over three or four generations will 
lead them to a conception of social duties 
and moral laws.
(1) A short list of manuals on colonial hygiene 
includes: Dr. Villedary Guide Sanitaire de
1'off icier et du colon (1893); Dr. Gayet 
Guide Medical de 1'officier colonial (1897); 
Dr. Legrand and Dr. Burot Hygiene des troupes 
aux colonies (1898); Dr. Tceille Hygiene 
coloniale (1899); Dr. D'Enjoy La Sante aux 
colonies (1901).
(2) Barot Guide pratique p. 330.
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Amongst the fetichist peoples whom we are 
in the process of conquering we have to 
struggle against the enormous influence 
of witches. ... In the countries still to 
be explored one cannot count on anything 
except chance and luck; for the griot 
bought one day for the price of gold, 
will declare himself against us the 
following day if the white rats, the 
Kolas or the other oracles give an 
unfavourable opinion. Many explorers 
have been the victims of the idiotic 
captriciousness of fetichists.(1)
For early European administrators worried about 
their health and generally impatient to get back 
to the metropole animist beliefs and rites must 
have been not only incomprehensible but also 
simply terrifying. One should not be taken in 
by the bravado of colonial rhetoric and believe 
that all Europeans were self-confident and 
unquestioning exporters of a hegemonic culture.
Fear as much as arrogance made up the colonial 
psyche. Because Islam was 'recognised as a 
religion like any other' it was to 'Muslims even 
seen as enemies' to whom French preferences flowed. 
However, in the next few years with a second rate 
novelist responsible for advising the Governor- 
General and in an atmosphere thick with rumours of 
conspiracy spiced up with great upheavals throughout
(1) ibid pp. 316-17 (my emphasis)
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the Muslim world the Muslim populations of West 
Africa could appear just as irrational and fearful 
as the animists.
The Mahdist 'plot1 of 1906
As we have seen the unrest in the military territory 
of Niger in December/January 1905/6 formed part 
of the background of the apparently religiously 
motivated unrest that prompted Roume to start a 
systematic collection of files of Muslim individuals, 
and to send Arnaud on a mission throughout AOF.
Saibu, the marabout held responsible for the 
agitation, fled across the border to Northern 
Nigeria but on the 10th March a large British force 
massacred his followers at Satiru, a village 
some 14 km. north of Sokoto and the scene since 
1904 of much Mahdist unrest. The British had been 
concerned by the Mahdist phenomenon and 1906 has 
been described as a 'crisis year' for them.
When Saibu had encouraged Isa, the chief of Satiru, 
to revolt, the British had immediately sent out 
a force to arrest the two men. However, in one 
of the most serious setbacks suffered by the
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British in Northern Nigeria, the force was ambushed 
and 28 were killed including Hilary, the acting 
Resident of Sokoto. Shocked by this reversal the 
British amassed a large force to put down the revolt. 
Satiru was razed to the ground and over 500 were 
killed. Saibu was captured and later beheaded.
Roume had kept in touch with Lugard and offered him 
assistance against a movement which, he said, was 
'Certainly of a religious character directed 
indiscriminately against whites, whether they 
are English or French'. Roume's offer of help 
was welcomed but declined as Lugard believed that 
the rout of Saibu*s forces had effectively put an 
end to the rebellion.(2)
Although William Ponty, the Lt. Governor of Haut 
Senegal et Niger, denied that the revolt was 
a religious one, and stressed rather the social 
grievances of the African population of a colony 
which after a rapid conquest at the end of the 
century had been ignored by all but the tax- 
collectors, (3) the discovery of another 'plot',
(1) Adeleye Power and Diplcmacy pp. 321-25
(2) ANSCM AP 193/3 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col.
26.3.1906.
(3) ANS 11 G 4 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AOF
26.3.1906.
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this time based around the Sultan or 'Sarki' of 
Zinder, reinforced the impression that politico- 
religious agitators rather than social grievances 
lay behind the unrest.
After the failure of a clumsy assassination attempt 
in early March on Capt. Lefebvre*the commandant 
de cercle of Zinder, the French authorities 
believed that they had stumbled across a plot.
A force under the command of Major Gadel, the 
commander of the region of Zinder, was despatched 
to Zinder and at around 8.30 a.m. on the morning 
of the 30th March Gadel arrested Ahmadu, the 
Sultan, together with eight others believed to be 
implicated in the plot. Around 6 p.m. the 
following day Gadel arrested three others, all 
favourites of the Sultan. (1) Unfortunately, 
although very precise about the times of the 
various arrests, Gadel was unable at this early
(1) Hie following were arrested on 30.3.1906; Ahmadu, 
Sultan of Zinder; Kaigama and Mosterama, both 
chefs de province; Malam Gap to, described as a 
'marabout intime' of the Sultan; Cherif Hattin, 
the Sultan's Arab interpreter; Tchiakafada, 
former chef de province; Marnadu Chetima, 'marabout' 
of the Sultan; Malam Yoro, a trader from Zinder; 
and Ali, interpreter of the cercle.
See ANS 11 G 5 Chef de Bataillon Gadel to 
Lt.-Gov. HSN 5.4.1906.
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stage to provide precise proof of the guilt of 
the accused. Nonetheless, he listed nine 'moral 
and material' proofs, namely:
1. Mysterious correspondence between 
the Sultan and the marabouts who 
caused the trouble in Djerma and 
Sokoto.
2. Declarations confirming the preceding 
fact and rebellious speeches uttered 
at this time by the Sultan and his 
followers.
3. Public rumour.
4. Rapid preparation of guns.
5. Contradictory lies of Malam Yoro and 
Sultan.
6. Lie of the Sultan (who claimed to have 
no more guns).
7. Discovery of c.280 guns and other 
weapons.
8. Very probable means of transport to 
put [the guns] aside in the house
of the interpreter Ali in the interior 
of Birni. (We are not yet completely 
certain about this.)
9. Feigned ignorance of Ali with regard 
to these events and formal accusations 
of certain parties which prove his 
active participation.
Gadel thought that these proofs were sufficient 
to justify demanding the execution of those he had 
arrested on the 30th but he would not act without 
further orders. Together with further 'evidence'
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that Deuda, the chief of the imezureg was also 
plotting with the Sultan of Zinder this incident 
proved, Gadel claimed, the absolute necessity of 
occupying Agades. (1)
Meanwhile Roume had had a meeting with Brigadier- 
General Morland, the Inspector of Colonial Troops 
in British West Africa in order to discuss Franco- 
British co-operation on the frontier of Niger and
(1) The Imezureg, a quasi-territorial group, 
whose vealth was based on taxation of 
sedentary dependents, had quarrelled 
with Kel Ewey when the French had 
arrived in Zinder in 1899. The French 
allied with the Kel Ewey and killed 
the Imezureg chief, Musa Mai Damergu, in 
1901. He was succeeded by his half- 
brother Deuda. See S. Baier 
An Economic History of Central Niger
Oxford 1980 pp.81-82.
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Northern Nigeria. Roume reported to the 
Colonial Ministry in Paris that the meeting had 
been cordial and productive, and that now that 
the era of colonial expansion was over the 
colonial powers should co-operate against their 
common enemies:
In the present state of these regions 
we have only one danger to fear ... 
that is a movement produced by an 
exaltation of religious sentiments 
which threatens all Europeans regardless 
of nationality. This exaltation is 
provoked by fanatics whose prophesies 
are quickly made known to the local 
administrations. Prevented in their 
action as soon as their influence starts 
to become dangerous, they find today a 
refuge from all pursuit in neighbouring 
colonies. Followed by a few disciples 
and their prestige augmented by their 
previous propaganda they can prove a 
real danger before the administration 
can stop them. It would be very 
different if a special organisation 
enabled us, through the exchange of 
regular communications between the local 
authorities, to warn each other of their 
movements from one colony to another.
The strict surveillance under which they 
would be kept would be sufficient in most 
cases to foresee any disorder.(1)
British and French authorities were willing to 
provide such a service and after a trial period 
the exchange of regular bulletins with information
(1) ANSOM AP 193/3 Gov.-Gen. AQF to Min. Col. 
14.4.1906 (my emphasis)
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covering the whole of West Africa was established 
in 1907. (1)
No action had yet been taken against the Sultan 
of Zinder, but in May Gadel reported that now he 
had Absolutely convincing material proof' of the 
connection between events in Djerma, Sokoto,
Zinder and elsewhere. Gadel had managed to 
extract a confession from the Sultan's messenger 
that he had carried letters between Zinder and 
Sokoto in November 1905. The Sokoto letter 
gave instructions to Zinder to attack the 'Whites' 
in mid-April. The Sultan of Zinder had been 
tempted to attack on 7th March, but to the great 
luck of the French he was persuaded at the last 
minute to follow the Sokoto instructions. Gadel 
had the letter to prove the plot and a further 
oral testimony to prove another link with Kano.(2)
(1) ANSOM AP 193/3 Min. Affaires Etrangeres
(Aff. Et.) (Bourgeois) to Min. Col. 19.5.1906; 
same to same 16.6.1906; Paul Carnbcn (French 
ambassador in London) to Min. Aff. Et. 8.6.1906; 
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 14.8.1906; Min. Aff. 
Et. to Min. Col. 8.6.1906; Min. Aff. Et. to 
Sir E. Grey (British Foreign Secretary)
12.2.1907.
(2) ANS 11 G 5 Gadel to Lt.-Ool. Carmt. Region 
du Niger 8.5.1906.
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Gadel and Lefebvre compiled an enormous dossier 
containing around 250 pieces of evidence to prove 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Sultan of 
Zinder was guilty. The 205th piece of evidence 
was a 100 page report by Capt. Lefebvre in which 
he narrated how his suspicions had been alerted 
after someone had poisoned his milk. Again 
there was little evidence of a truly widespread 
and well-coordinated conspiracy. Lefebvre argued 
that although the Sultan held a personal grudge 
against him for having reformed the anarchic system 
of tax-collection which had been a lucrative source 
of income for the Sultan, that this was not the 
fundamental cause of the revolt. Rather, he 
continued:
It is an undeniable fact that in all the 
regions where Islam is profoundly rooted 
we are held in the greatest scorn by 
certain marabouts. The biggest danger 
is that there is in this country a form 
of bastardised Islam, a mixture of religion 
and ridiculous superstitions, a superficial 
religion in which the marabouts and pseudo­
marabouts who abound in this country are 
the carriers of malicious rumours, maintain 
the credulous people in sentiments of hatred 
against us and work towards the brutalisation 
of the race by superstitious practices.
This element is perforce hostile to us.
The chiefs need these marabouts who distribute
169
a thousand 'gris-gris' for the success 
of their pillages and, in exchange, these 
marabouts enjoy numerous privileges.(1)
The alliance between the traditional chiefs and 
the marabouts, it should be noted, was to become 
one of the principal targets of the Ponty 
administration. Unrest in the colony was not 
confined to the Military Territory of Niger. The 
visit of an Algerian marabout, Mohammed ben 
Abdallah, was blamed for the unrest in Bamako 
during the month of May when the Markas of Banamba 
had resisted the attempts of their servants to 
leave them. In Djenne in the same month eight 
marabouts were sentenced to three months prison 
for having *exploited the credulity of our African 
Muslims'. Two more were sent to prison in 
Bandiagara - one of them for having made a speech 
in the market place at Kaba containing 'words 
likely to ridicule our authority'. (2)
(1) ANS 11 G 5 'Rapport du Gapt. Lefebvre, 
count, le cercle de Zinder sur les agissements 
du Sultan de Zinder et de ses canplices en 
Mars 1906'. The other 250 pieces of evidence 
are also filed in 11 G 5.
(2) ANSCM Soudan I/II 'Rapport sur la situation 
politique' 2one Trimestre 1906. See also
R. Roberts & M. Klein "Ihe Banamba slave exodus 
of 1905 and the decline of slavery in the western 
Sudan' JAH 21 (1980) pp. 375-94 for discussion 
of slavery and ambiguity of French attitude 
towards it.
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Arnaud was sent to investigate the unrest in Niger.
He confirmed the alliance of the aristocracy and 
marabouts against their former slaves and their 
liberators, the French. In the region of Zinder 
he claimed that slaves outnumbered free men by ten 
to one and that were it not for the French presence 
the slaves would have massacred their former 
masters. Interestingly Arnaud had revised his 
distinction between the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya, 
and the Gmarien branch of Tijaniyya was now described 
as the only truly loyal brotherhood in AOF. The 
Qadiriyya's reputation had been tarnished by Cheikh 
Saad Bu's alms collecting tours, by their close 
relationship with the Ghoudf brotherhood who were 
responsible for Coppolani's death and, Arnaud added, 
by their strong connections with Mahdism. The 
French, he said, had been lucky in Djerma and he 
warned that:
In a maraboutic revolt it is not the rebels 
killed that one should count; whether a 
hundred or a thousand are killed it still 
won't stop the other exaltes following the 
first imposter to appear. One has to go 
straight to the chiefs. Behind the 
sheeplike crowd we find ... the local chiefs: 
the present Sultan of Sokoto, the Sultan in 
Zinder, the chief in Karma and all the Hausa 
and Djerma nobility. The most guilty of all, 
the man who wanted to reconstitute the old 
empire was Sahibou.
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Since the second half of the nineteenth century 
Africa, he argued, had become 'the chosen land 
of Mahdis'. All this was serious enough said 
Arnaud but it was exacerbated by the influence 
of pan-Islamist agents in the pay of the German 
ambassador in Cairo, Baron von Oppenheim.
In one of his later (1931) novels Arnaud mocked 
the local administrator who was obsessed by the 
threat of a pan-Islamic revolt. (2) jn the defence 
of the local administrator it should be said that 
Arnaud himself at the time not only shared but 
also contributed to this obsession. His report on 
the unrest not only confirmed, but it also amplified, 
Major Gadel's suspicion of a vast conspiracy, for 
Gadel never suggested that Baron von Oppenheim was 
involved. However, neither Gadel nor Arnaud 
succeeded in entirely convincing Gadel's 
commanding officer, Lt-Col Lamolle who had to admit 
that proof of the Sultan of Zinder's guilt consisted 
in a bundle of circumstantial evidence rather than 
in concrete proofs. Nonetheless he recommended to
(1) ANS 11 G 4 'Rapport a m. le Gov.-Gen. de l'AOF 
sur les mobiles islamiques des troubles de 
Janvier a Mars 1906 dans le Territoire Militaire 
du Niger' 22.11.1906.
(2) R. Randau Les Msneurs des homes Paris 1931 p.28
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Ponty in January 1907 that the Sultan should be 
exiled. Shortly afterwards the Sultan and his 
'accomplices' were sentenced to varying lengths 
of imprisonment in the Ivory Coast.(1)
Arnaud's introduction of a German element into the 
conspiracy reflected anxieties in Paris about 
'Perfide Teuton'. The government had received 
information of a German mission in Ottoman 
Tripolitania and had decided to take all measures 
necessary to prevent German obstruction of the 
link between Algeria and Lake Chad. Dakar was 
instructed to prepare immediately for the 
occupation of Bilma, Kawar and Tibesti leaving 
the Algerian authorities responsible for Djanet 
and south-west Wargla. Ponty transferred the 
instructions to Lamolle who was given an extra 150 
men but warned that his action should be diplomatic 
rather than military.(2) The Paris analysis 
coincided happily with military demands for a 
second occupation of Agades which had been briefly
(1) ANS 11 G 5 Lt.-Ool. lamolle, ccrnnt. Territoire 
Militaire du Niger to Lt.-Gov. HSN 6.1.1907 
Marty 'L'Islam et les tribus du Niger' p. 397; 
Baier Economic History pp. 97, 101.
(2) ANS 11 G 4 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AQF 24.4.1906; 
Lt.-Gov. HSN to Qrmt. Ger. Mil. Niger 7.5.1906.
173
occupied in 1904. Between April and November of 
1905 Gadel and Capt. Lefebvre had made a tour in 
the Air region in order to obtain the submission 
of the Tuareg tribes and to study the possibility 
of further French expansion north and eastwards.
Gadel*s 'guiding principle' had been that,
Thanks to the nomads who wander on the 
borders [of our colonies] our reputation 
for humanity, tolerance and justice is 
established in the desert thus 
facilitating our penetration to the 
North and to the East which will soon be 
completed not by force and the superiority 
of our weapons but by persuasion and 
confidence. (1)
The parallel with Coppolani is striking, but logical, 
for official support for the occupation of vast 
areas of unproductive desert could only be won if 
it was argued that it could be achieved without 
recourse to arms. However, it was only when security 
of major French interests elsewhere was threatened 
that occupation and control of the desert was seen 
to be important and in any way urgent.
What then should one make of the distinctly manic 
efforts of Gadel and Lefebvre to establish beyond
(1) ANS 11 G 4 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AOF 22.6.1906 
enclosing reports of Gadel and Lefebvre.
174
a shadow of a doubt the existence of a vast Islamic 
conspiracy? To establish a dossier which included 
250 pieces of often very lengthy pieces of evidence 
in order to prove their suspicions seems a clear 
case of overkill that can only partly be explained 
by the military mind's need for precision. To 
conduct all the interrogations of suspects and 
witnesses and then to write up voluminous reports 
are not normally favourite pastimes of a soldier 
unless he has a definite point to make. What was 
this point? One possibility is that the conspiracy 
was exaggerated if not invented in order to increase 
pressure for the occupation of Agades. In April, 
a month before Ponty gave directions for the 
occupation, Gadel had written to Ponty that the 
conspiracy proved the absolute necessity of 
occupying Agades. (1) A second and related possibility 
is that the French in Zinder simply felt isolated and 
frightened and were frustrated by the limits imposed 
on their actions by the central civilian authorities. 
Proof of a widespread conspiracy would provide 
justification for a widespread mopping-up operation,
(1) ANS 11 G 5 Gadel to Lt.-Gov. HSN 5.4.1906.
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justification, that is, for more soldiers. (1)
Writing about rumours of rebellion in Natal in 1905, 
Shula Marks has commented in words that could easily 
be applied to Niger,
For some, both black and white, prophesies 
of a native uprising may have been an 
expression of wishful thinking, for others 
the projection of their own hostility, 
and yet to others a reflection of their 
deepest and most genuine f e a r s .  (2)
(1) IC fr. 378 (Leve) see Lef&bvre letter to 
an anonymous friend for a fascinating 
insight into such feelings and for a clear 
expression of the desire for a ' simple', 
i.e. military, solution: 'Le coup de filet
a dtd heureux, les preuves abondent, 
renseignements, fusils trouv£s chez le 
Sultan, mensonges des accuses, il y aura 
des confrontations sensationelles. Au 
fond tout le monde a ete conprcmis car c'est 
un gros mouvement religieux qui couvait 
depuis trois mois. ... J'ai eu la chance 
d'echapper a 3 tentatives d'assassinat. ... 
Charmant pays n'est-ce pas? Vous voyez, 
mon cher Jean, nous avons passe pres d'un 
grand malheur. Mais voyez notre situation 
a 800 km du premier poste telegraphique, 
quand aurons-nous des instructions du 
gouvemement? II faudrait mettre le pays 
en etat de siege et etablir une cour martiale, 
autrement en n'en finira jamais'.
(2) S. Marks Reluctant Rebellion: the 1906-8
disturbances in Natal Oxford 1970 pp. 144-45
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In Natal the Boers were also widely suspected of 
fomenting such rumours in order to win back the 
right to carry arms. (1) One cannot help feeling 
that Capt. Lefebvre would have sympathised.
Did the Djerma and Zinder 'conspiracies' really 
amount to anything more than a handful of letters, 
the ambush of a police patrol and a bowl of 
'poisoned' milk? Arnaud's claim that the Sultan 
of Sokoto was involved appears unlikely in view of 
the fact that none of the Northern Nigerian emirates 
had attempted to come to the aid of Saibou and his 
followers from Satiru and that in 1904 the Sultan 
had come down unequivocally against an earlier 
Mahdist movement. (2) A recent analysis has argued that 
the early colonial impact in Damagaram and Damergu, 
the areas around the north of Zinder respectively, 
was much greater than has often been suggested and 
that after the entry of the Joalland-Meynier mission 
into Zinder in July 1899 the ruling elite were made 
immediately aware of the French presence. The first 
to suffer was the Sultan Ahmadu Kuren Daga whom the 
French executed soon after their arrival. He was 
replaced by a younger relation, Ahmadu 'dan Bassa,
(1) ibid pp. 158-59
(2) Adeleye Power and Diplomacy pp. 323-35.
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who was made responsible for the collection of the 
newly created head-tax. However, the young Sultan 
was not highly regarded by the French, and on his 
arrival in Zinder in 1903, Capt. Lefebvre attempted 
to reduce his authority. In the same year Ahmadu 
was suspected of plotting against the French.
The following year relations between Ahmadu and 
his chief adviser, the bellama deteriorated, and 
an account written in 1921 suggested that it was 
the bellama who made up, and led the French to, 
the letter implicating Ahmadu in a plot with Saibou. 
Leffebvre's alarm was apparently augmented by the 
sight of the arrival on horseback of one of Zinder's 
richest traders, Malam Yoro, accompanied by his 
large retinue of servants whom Lefebvre supposed to 
be Mahdist rebels. After Ahmadu had been deposed 
he was replaced by the bellama - no longer as Sultan 
but as chef de province. In 1921 the bellama 
was, himself, deposed and the sultanate restored. 
Whatever the verity of this account which, it should 
be recognised, may itself have been fabricated in 
order to justify the deposition of the bellama it 
is clear that the first decade of the twentieth 
century saw great change in the economic situation 
of the area. The most dramatic change was the 
decline in the trans-Saharan trade which was
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diverted southwards as the Lagos-Kano railway 
(completed in 1911) and the introduction of parcel 
post to Kano in 1907 proved quicker, cheaper and 
safer than the traditional trans-Saharan routes. (1) 
Certainly there were common economic and social 
problems, recognised indeed by the French, which 
were sufficient to explain widespread resentment of 
the European presence. Nonetheless it was the 
religious nature of the unrest which appeared most 
worrying to the French. Roume took the Mahdist 
threat very seriously as was shown by his 
consultations with the British authorities about 
what action could be taken against the 'common 
enemy' - Islam. Although it is impossible to 
prove absolutely it seems likely that the great 
Islamic conspiracy was a French fabrication, that 
religious 'fanaticism' was used as a convenient 
scapegoat for more general socio-economic problems 
and that as is so often with conspiracy theories 
more can be learnt from the study of the documentation 
about the state of European preoccupations than 
about the local African reality. It is interesting
(1) See Baier Economic History chs. 4 & 5. See also 
Marty 'L'Islam et les tribus du Niger' pp. 394-47 
for official version: 'Ahmadu ne fut jamais un
auxiliaire devout. Glorieux, fanfaron, paresseux 
il etait de plus extremement superstitieux' 
p. 394.
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to see how the following year religious 'fanaticism' 
appeared to have evaporated as Ponty reported back 
to Paris that he believed the crisis was over:
The tax collection has been ... exceptionally 
brilliant. It is a criterion which well 
proves the progressive pacification of these 
populations formerly regarded as hostile to 
our occupation. (1)
Ponty and Is1am
William Ponty, Governor of Haut Senegal et Niger, 
was promoted to Governor-General of AOF when Roume 
was forced to retire as a result of illness in 1907.
He remained as Governor-General until his death in 
1915. A recent historian has made the claim that 
Ponty was 'probably the strongest and most influential 
Governor-General who ruled French West Africa'. (2) -
(1) ANSOM Soudan I/II Lt.-Gov. HSN to Min. Col. 
August 1907.
(2) G. Vfesley Johnson 'William Ponty and 
Republican Paternalism in French West Africa' 
in Gann & Duignan (eds) African Proconsuls 
p. 127. The following paragraph is based 
on this article.
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and the claim is probably correct. Ponty, born 
in 1866, joined the colonial section of the Marine 
Ministry having graduated with a law degree at the 
age of 22. He did not stay long in Paris as in 
1890 he was appointed Col. Archinard's personal 
secretary in the campaign against Samori. A 
'baptism by fire1 which was rewarded with the 
Legion d'Honneur. In 1896 he was sent to 
Madagascar but returned the following year to West 
Africa where he was made commandant de cercle in 
Djenne where he continued his impressive record 
of impressing his superiors with his hard work and 
good manners. He succeeded de Trentinnian as 
Governor of Soudan in 1899 and despite his youth 
he was the favourite to succeed Roume in 1908.
Unlike Roume, Ponty had had both military and 
administrative experience in Africa and was more 
sympathetic to the claims of the military than his 
predecessor had been. Indeed, Clozel complained 
privately that Ponty lacked firmness in his dealings 
with both the Colonial Ministry and the military. ^  
Ideologically, Ponty has been dubbed as a 
'Republican Paternalist' (2) - a woolly category 
justified by his concern for native administration
(1) IF Fonds Terrier Clozel to Terrier 22.4.1911.
(2) Wesley Johnson 'William Ponty'.
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(establishment of socletes de prevoyance, abolition 
of slavery) and his anti-clericalism. He was also 
a Freemason, a fact of which the significance is not 
clear. Whether or not Ponty's tolerance and 
protection of M. Courcelle, a manifestly unqualified 
Inspector of Education, who was also a Freemason, 
was a manifestation of masonic solidarity cannot be 
said. Nevertheless it took three years for Clozel 
and Hardy, the future Inspector, to convince Ponty 
that Courcelle, who was barely educated himself, 
was not the right man for the job of Inspector 
of Education in AOF.
Ponty's first experience of Islam in Africa was 
gained not in Algeria but in the campaign against 
Samori, and the impression which this gave him 
seems to have stayed with him for the rest of his 
life. For in a series of circulars and official 
reports Ponty expressed his concern that there 
should be no successor to Samori and revealed his 
abiding fear that in Islam there lay a danger to 
France of the highest order. His circulars
(1) See D. Bouche L1 Enseignement dans les territoires 
fran^als c3e l'Afrique occidentale: mission 
civilisatrioe ou formation d'une elite? Paris 
1975 Ch. 19 for details of Courcelle's career 
(masonic references are on p. 787)
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1906-11 (1) provide evidence of adegree of suspicion 
of Islam so profound that it could not be made
compatible with the official policy of religious
neutrality to which Ponty paid lip service. The
concern with maraboutic activity within the context
of a changing African social order, combined with
the anxiety about * foreign' influences - Moroccans,
Syrians, the Arabic language itself - on local
African politics leading to a perception of Islam
as a potential threat that could only be countered
by an effective intelligence system are recurrent
themes within the circulars that require further
explanation.
1. Maraboutic unrest 1906-1910
Ponty stated in the preamble to the strongly worded 
circular of July 1906 (2) that the recent events in 
Zinder and the surrounding areas provided further 
evidence of the need to adopt a tough policy towards
(1) See Appendices for texts of circulars.
(2) See Appendix I
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marabouts. This seems to have been a widely- 
shared belief. M. Vidal, the administrator of 
Bamako described marabouts as 'Parasitic nuisances 
and charlatans'.(D In Senegal Cheikh Saad Bu
was not the only object of vilification; the 
stream of visitors bearing generous gifts for the 
exiled Mouride leader, Cheikh Ahmadu Bamba, was 
remarked upon with obvious displeasure in official 
reports. (2) Even in the Ivory Coast, a colony 
where talk was more of pagans and priests than of 
Muslims and marabouts, administrators knew all about 
the dangers of Islam. In the cercle of Bondoukou, 
in the north-east of the colony the administrator 
Benquey confessed that he was becoming ' a little 
sceptical about the beneficial and civilising 
influence of Islam on the Blacks' and proceeded 
to relate a harrowing tale of human sacrifice 
committed by pious Muslim Dyulas. (3)
(1) ANS 15 G 3 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
16.5.1906 enclosing Vidal's feport on unrest 
in Bamako.
(2) For example, ANSOM Senegal 1/97 Gov.-Gen. p.i.
AOF (Merlin) to Min. Col. 'Rapport sur la 
situation politique au Senegal' 2eme Trimestre 
1906 ccxnplained that gifts worth 10,000 francs
'had been given to Ahmadu Bamba.
(3) ANS 5 G 63 'Cote d'Ivoire - Rapport politique'
4eme Trimestre 1905. See also Triaud 'La question 
islamique en Cote d'Ivoire' for analysis of French 
concerns about Islam in a predominantly Animist 
society.
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Two years later Benquey was administrating the 
north-west cercle of Korhogo, and what had started 
as a twinge of scepticism was now a fully-fledged 
conviction: 'Islam is perhaps a perfect religion
in theory' but one only had to cast one's eyes 
around to realise that in practice it offered 
'very little from a political point of view and 
nothing from a moral one'. Furthermore, he 
reasoned that whatever divisions may have existed 
between Muslims they were all nonetheless agreed on 
one imperative - 'To wage Holy War against the 
infidel and chase him from the country'. (1) His 
immediate predecessor in Korhogo, M. Folquet was 
quite convinced that, 'It is preferable to 
administer people over whom Islam has no or at
i
least a very superficial hold, than Muslims or 
apprentice Muslims with whom one cannot treat and
| who will never be made to evolve according to our
! ideas. (2) From all corners of AOF there came;
reports of disturbances - some of them serious - 
all of which were apparently the result of 
individual maraboutic activity.
i
(1) ANS 5 G 63 Benquey to Lt.-Gov. I. Coast 20.10.1907.
i
i
I (2) ANS 5 G 63 Folquet to Admin. Region Kong 30.9.1907.
In the area of Guidimaka on the right bank of the 
River Senegal the French claimed to have been the 
victims of a local conspiracy amongst the Sarrakole 
population who in the past had been the main group 
to support Mahmadu Lamine. According to the 
French account (1) in May 1907 the inhabitants of 
Selibaby employed an influential Senegalese marabout 
named Fodie Diaguili to prepare magic potions to 
rid the country of the French. The names of 
M. Dupont, the resident administrator, M. Audan, a 
junior official and Malami Tandia, the interpreter, 
were engraved on the skull of a hyena which was 
thrown into the well of the residence along with 
the putrefying entrails of the animal. A few days 
later M. Dupont fell gravely ill and the other 
members of the residence complained of upset 
stomachs. Seeing the success of Fode Diaguili's 
actions the Sarrakole attacked the local Africans 
who worked with the Europeans and the unrest spread 
to the Moors before Capt. Repoux along with 40 
tirailleurs came to the rescue of the residence.
(1) ANSOM AP 145/2 1 Proc£s-verbal de la seance 
du 29.2.1908 de la canmission permanente du 
Conseil de Gouwemement de l'AQF'.
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The principal leaders were sentenced to obligatory 
residence in Port Etienne in Mauritania for periods 
of one to two years.
In Dagana early in 1908 there was a minor revolt led 
by Aly Yoro Diaw, a marabout who in 1906 had been 
interned in Tivouane for having preached against 
the French but who had soon escaped and gone into 
hiding in either Mauritania or, more probably, in 
Bamako. (1) In 1908 he returned to his native village 
of Fanaye on the left bank of the Senegal claiming 
to have been to Mecca and that he was the Mahdi sent 
to chase away the Europeans whose guns, he promised, 
would be useless against him and his followers.
On the 10th March the order was given to arrest him. 
However, French forces were too small to effect the 
arrest and so a local village chief was sent instead 
to try and persuade the people of Fanaye that the 
French would not tolerate insubordination and that 
their threats to quell it were sincerely meant.
The effort was unsuccessful, and Aly Yoro recrossed
(1) ANSOM S6ndgal IV/132 'Carnet joumalier'
Henri Chesse, Admin, cercle Dagana is the 
fullest account of the event. See also 
letters of Lt.-Gov. p.i. S6ndgal to Gov.-Gen.
AOF 26.3.1908 & of Carmissaire du Gov.-Gen. 
en Mauritanie to Gov.-Gen. 16.3.1908.
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the river from his sanctuary on the right bank and 
marched towards Dagana on the 15th March. Dagana 
was well defended, and the attack was easily repulsed 
Aly Yoro and twenty-eight others were killed, 
sixteen were wounded and four taken prisoner. The 
French took comfort from the fact that the movement 
appeared localised and spontaneous. Van Vollenhoven, 
the acting Governor of Senegal, reported that the 
situation in Dagana had been good; taxes had been 
handed in on time and the cercle had not been called 
upon to supply reservists for the Moroccan 
campaigns. ^
However, Van Vollenhoven's complacency about the 
social and economic situation was not universally 
shared. According to other reports a serious 
drought and an invasion of locusts had caused 
considerable suffering, and taxes had been collected 
with difficulty. Aly Yoro's followers were said 
to have been 'common and poor ... certainly men of 
little means'. (2)
(1) ANSCM Senegal IV/132 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen.
AGF 16.3.1908.
(2) ANS 2 G 8 (36) 'Rapport mensuel - Dagana'
Feb. & March, refer to locusts and drought.
ANS 13 G 116 Carmissaire du Gov.-Gen. en 
Mauritanie 21.3.1908 reports that the 
followers of Aly Yoro were poor.
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Many of Aly Yoro1s supporters were also in some way 
related to him, and Van Vollenhoven concluded 
fatalistically that nothing much could be done 
for 'Movements of this kind are always to be reckoned 
with in Muslim country1. (1)
At the same time there was unrest amongst the Mossi 
of Kipissi where a 'religious agitator' called 
Alassan Moumeri was attempting to convert the 
animist inhabitants to Islam and to persuade them 
not to pay their taxes. He led a force of some 
2,000 against a much smaller, but well-armed, 
defence and was quickly killed leading his followers 
into battle. French concern at the activities
of a Muslim preaching in a predominantly animist 
area had been shown the previous year in Guinea 
where Tibini Connaro a 'Muslim agitator' had been 
destroying idols and converting animists. After 
he had refused to present himself to the French 
administration a force of 20 was sent to arrest 
him - a little incident, which the Bulletin du 
Comite de L'Afrique Franchise suggested merely
(1) ANSOM S^n^gal IV/132 Lt.-Gov. p.i. Sen. to 
Gov.-Gen. AOF 28.3.1908.
(2) ANSOM Soudan I/ll 'Haut Senegal & Niger - 
Rapport politique* lere Trimestre 1908.
See also R. Arnaud 'L'Islam et la politique 
musulmane franciase' RGBCAF 1912 p.7.
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merely offered ' Further proof of the care with, which 
all Muslim movements should he watched in West 
Africa'. (D
In March 1909 M. Bastie, the administrator of the 
Guinean cercle of Timbis was assassinated on what 
were widely believed to be the orders of a local 
religious notable. jn 1910 the French
authorities in Niger again claimed to have 
uncovered a vast spy network this time centred 
around Abidin, the great-grandson of Cheikh Sidi 
Mokhtar al Kunti, who, having returned from Mecca 
in 1890 led a series of raids against the French 
from 1892 to 1911. These earned him a reputation 
as both a warrior and a holy man, and he was 
described by Marty as 'amongst the most unyielding 
of our enemies.' (3) The report on the discovery 
of the spy network admitted that the evidence was 
not conclusive but concluded that, 'Nonetheless 
their guilt was evident'. (4)
(1) BCAF Jan. 1907 p.29
(2) See below chapter 5 for account of situation in 
Futa Jallon.
(3) P. Marty Etudes sur l'islam et les tribus du Soudan 
vol. I Les Kounta de l'est Paris 1920 pp.100-13.
(4) ANSOM AP 145/2 Lt.-Gov. p.i. HSN 'Rapport au 
conseil de gouvemement' 20.6.1910.
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These various incidents seemed to confirm the 
administration's fears that marabouts represented 
the biggest potential threat to French security. 
Although none of the incidents ever seriously 
challenged French supremacy there can be no doubt 
that they did affect French confidence away from 
the administrative centres of Dakar, St Louis and 
Conakry. Two main attitudes characterised the 
French response to these incidents. The first 
was to adopt a fatalistic attitude to the Mahdist 
phenomenon, to dismiss as inevitable the occasional 
actions of individuals judged to be no more than 
madmen. The archives are full of contemptuous 
remarks about such individuals and their gullible 
followers. The other response was to attempt 
to rationalise such events by portraying them as 
the death throws of a 'feudal' society in which 
nobles and marabouts had conspired to subjugate the 
populace. The French believed with some 
justification that they had engineered a social 
revolution which had destroyed the 'feudal' alliance 
between the nobility and the clergy and which had 
liberated the 'Third Estate' and the slaves.
Unrest in these circumstances was inevitable as the 
French set about the destruction of the 'hypocritical 
facade' of religion with which chiefs and marabouts
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had cloaked their secular ambitions.(1) Ponty was 
the chief advocate of this analysis, and his 
politique des races w ith its commitment to 
ethnic particularism was offered as the means of 
breaking up the unholy alliance between overmighty 
barons and an unscrupulous clergy.
Slavery was the key to this analysis of society.
At the turn of the century it was true that the 
Western Sudan comprised a very substantial slave 
population - in some towns of the middle Niger the 
proportion has been estimated as being as high as 
two thirds. Although the slave population had 
been enormously swollen by Samori it is nonetheless 
clear that the labour needs of large areas of the 
Sudan had traditionally been met by unfree labour. 
Faced with this situation the French were placed 
in a dilemma: on the one hand they did not want to
be seen by their metropolitan observers to be 
condoning the system of slavery but on the other 
hand the French in the 1890s could not afford to 
antagonise African rulers by liberating their 
slaves. Furthermore, they had labour needs of
(1) See Appendix VI
(2) See Appendix III
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their own - porterage, railway construction etc, - 
which were most conveniently met by recourse to 
unfree labour. The result of this dilemma was a 
fudged compromise consisting of abolitionist 
rhetoric (and a certain amount of legislation) to 
satisfy the metropolitan audience and a policy of 
non-intervention in the affairs of master and slave. 
Although the French did undermine the position of 
slave-owners by refusing to recognise the legal 
basis of the state of slavery (1903) and by a 
formal abolition of the slave trade (1905) it is 
clear from recent scholarship that it was the slaves 
themselves who took the initiative in deserting 
their masters in their thousands in the early years 
of the century. (1) Ponty's analysis of a social 
revolution in West Africa was accurate, but it was 
a revolution which had taken place as much in spite 
of as as a result of French policies.
In this social revolution it was convenient for the 
French to tar Islam with the brush of slavery. By 
arguing that Muslim unrest was a protest led by 
marabouts annoyed by the loss of their slaves the
(1) See Roberts & Klein 'Banamba slave exodus' and 
Love joy Transformation of Slavery ch. 11.
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French were able to absolve themselves of all blame. 
The argument - as with so many colonialist analyses - 
was founded on fact, namely the historic ties between 
slavery and Islam in Africa, but the reasoning was 
contrived. In the Islamic unrest in Dagana and 
Futa Jallon, for example, it is clear that the 
'rebels' were made up of the poor and hungry, 
including many former slaves. (1) However, it was 
much more comforting for the French to stick to 
the ir s te reo type s .
2. Foreign influences
However, although the administration was worried by 
the evolution of Islam in West Africa and regarded 
the marabouts as the biggest trouble-makers, this 
perception was counterbalanced with a belief that, 
despite occasional unrest, local indigenous West 
African Islam did not in itself pose an overbearing 
threat to French supremacy. As common as the 
contemptuous remarks about 'charlatan marabouts' 
in the archives were the indulgent and patronising
(1) See below ch. 5 for Futa Jallon and above p. 186 
for Dagana.
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descriptions of Muslim loyalty. For example, in 
Casamance in 1910 it was reported that the elderly 
Muslim leaders who disputed amongst themselves rival 
claims of cherifian descent presented no problem: 
'These elderly and respectable saints ... have 
well understood the interest there is ... in 
maintaining the most cordial and devoted of relations 
with the administrative authority'.(1) In 1911 Ponty 
wrote to Francois Clozel, Lt.-Gov. of Haut-Senegal 
et Niger that, 'Luckily the Islam of our West Africa 
still retains a rather special character which we 
have the greatest interest in preserving. Our 
Muslims have not accepted the pure Coran, whatever 
their devotions they have wanted to conserve their 
ancestral customs' but he also listed three 
personalities likely to disturb this happy state of 
affairs - Baron von Oppenheim, the Sultan of 
Constantinople and the Khedive of Egypt ( who 
'under the inspiration of Lord Cromer dreams of 
becoming the Commander of the Faithful in Africa (2)
(1) ANS 13 G 67 'Rapport sur la situation en Casamance 
en 1910' unsigned. See also ANS 13 G 379 Amaud' 
'Mission en Casamance - etude des question 
musulmanes' 7.1.1908 for similar confidence in 
French position.
(2) ANS 15 G 103 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. HSN 
August 1911.
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Thus Ponty's main anxiety was about 'foreign' 
influences. Although the military campaigns in 
Adrar and Central Africa were proving extremely 
difficult and costly and were a reminder of the 
weakness of the French against some sections of 
African society the main threat to the French 
position in Africa was seen to lie in an alliance 
between Germany and certain Middle Eastern 
leaders. (1)
If the'Islam of our West Africa' was to be kept 
unmolested by the likes of Baron von Oppenheim it 
was essential that the linguistic barrier between 
black Africa and the Arab world should be 
maintained. However, since Faidherbe Arabic had 
been used as the most convenient language for 
transactions with indigenous Africans, and as late 
as 1906 it was still possible for Roume to deplore 
the shortcomings of Arabic teaching at the Ecole 
Normale in St Louis.(2) Increasingly over
(1) See, for example, BGAF June 1906 pp. 105-6 
for text of letter issued by the 'Gcmite 
central de 1'union islamique' calling on all 
Muslims to unite against colonial powers.
(2) ANS J 91 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Directeur Ecole 
Normale de St Louis 20.11.1906. Only 3 of 
the 18 candidates had achieved above average 
marks for translation fran Arabic to French.
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the next few years the stress was put on the 
importance of teaching French and the unsuitability 
of the Arabic language for Africans. In 1910 
Mariani, the Inspector of Muslim Education in AOF 
wrote to Ponty that, 'Knowledge of the French 
language is the best possible antidote against the 
danger of a retrograde Islam'. (1) In May 1911 
Ponty issued a circular banning the use of Arabic 
in judicial and administrative matters,(2) which 
was universally welcomed and in many cases had 
already been anticipated: in Dahomey all such
business had always been conducted in French, in 
Guinea Guy had given instructions in March for 
the replacement where possible of marabouts with 
'natives instructed in our schools and imbued with 
our civilisation' as secretaries of tribunals, and 
Ponty's move seems to have been similarly 
anticipated in Senegal where for some time French- 
speakers only were being employed as secretaries.^)
(1) ANS J 86 Mariani to Gov.-Gen. AOF 2.4.1910.
(2) See Appendix IV
(3) ANS M 241 Replies frctn Lt.-Gov. to Gov.-Gen.: 
Dahomey 29.6.1911; Guinea 8.6.1911;
Sdndgal 28.3.1911.
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In Senegal inability to speak French could cost a 
man his job. In December Assane N'Doye and 
Moustapha Diop the clerks of the Muslim tribunals 
in Dakar and Rufisque were both sacked because they 
could not speak French and were replaced by 
Ibrahim Kane and Abdoulaye Samba who could. (1)
The attack on the use of Arabic was partly aimed at 
stemming the growing influence of the Arab press in 
AOF. Ponty issued a circular in February 1908 
banning all Arab publications which, since the 
Casablanca events, had become critical of the 
French position. He further requested information 
about any indigenous Muslim subscribers to such 
papers. In Guinea, Ivory Coast and Dahomey 
there were no subscribers and in Senegal only 
twelve. However, censorship of the Arab press 
was not an easy matter: in Dahomey, for example,
there was nobody able to read Arabic and so the 
Lt.-Governor asked for a simple list of the names 
of the anti-French papers. (2)
(1) ANS M 244 Lt.-Gov. Sdn^gal to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
29.12.1911.
(2) ANS 19 G 4 Gov.-Gen. circular to colonies 
16.2.1908; replies of Lt.-Govs. Guinea 11.3.1908; 
I. Coast 16.3.1908; Dahaney 23.3.1908;
Senegal 31.3.1908. See also Lt.-Gov. Dahomey 
to Gov.-Gen. 7.10.1910.
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The French were not only concerned with the written 
word but also with images. The following incident 
reveals the extent to which all branches of the 
French administration - in Conakry, Dakar, Cairo 
and Paris - co-operated in order to control 
'subversive' propaganda. In 1911 several caseloads 
of engravings depicting the Ottoman fleet outside 
Constantinople were seized in Dakar and Conakry.
The engravings were printed on the presses of the 
Cairo Punch in Bologna and so the Colonial Ministry 
wrote to the Foreign Ministry to ask for information 
about the paper. The Foreign Ministry made 
enquiries to the French plenipotentiary in Cairo 
and the details were in time transmitted back to 
Dakar where Ponty decided that the best way to 
combat this insidious propaganda was to fight kind 
with kind and commissioned some engravings of 
portraits of French heroes and the interior views 
of French factories. In July 1912 the Colonial 
Ministry approved the payment of 100 francs to 
'Cantin Brothers', lithographers of 104-5 rue 
Oberkampf for the supply of a quantity of these 
improving engravings. (1)
(1) ANSCM AP 907 bis/1 contains all relevant 
correspondence.
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Both Guy and Clozel seem to have got carried away 
in their enthusiasm to stamp out Arabic in their 
respective colonies. Guy regretted that the laws 
on the freedom of the press prevented him from 
banning the sale of 'Arabic works, Corans, books 
of prayer etc.' and proposed adopting a similar 
decree to one used in Madagascar in 1901 which gave 
Governors powers to decide what books written in 
a foreign language were to be allowed to go on 
sale in the colony. Ponty agreed that, 'We should 
not neglect any opportunity to combat an ardent 
proselytism which is hostile to our influence and 
to European domination' but he felt obliged to 
remind Guy that a distinction should be made 
between religious and political works. (1) In Bobo 
Dioulasso Clozel was worried about the increased 
sales of Qur'ans through representatives of the 
'Maurel & Prom' and 'Dutheil & Rochene' trading 
houses and thought that the two houses should be 
requested to forbid their African agents from 
trading in Qur'ans. Ponty replied to Clozel's 
interim that Clozel did well to investigate such 
matters but that the sale of prayer books and 
Qur'ans was not illegal, 'officially at least' .
(1) Lt.-Gov. Guinea to Gov.-Gen. AOF 19.9.1911;
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Guinea 14.10.1911.
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Nevertheless, he continued,
As our role obviously does not consist 
in favouring the development of coranic 
doctrines especially in countries where 
the fetishist element is still strongly 
represented, it is in our interests to 
restrain as much as possible the 
propaganda of religious works whilst 
carefully avoiding any measures which 
could be considered to inhibit the thought 
and faith of our subjects. (1)
Many of the measures we have discussed in this 
section were aimed primarily at Arabs, either as 
residents or as traders in AOF. Levantines - 
both Christian Maronite exiles and Muslims - had 
first arrived in Guinea in 1897 and by 1919 the 
Levantine population of the colony (986) exceeded 
that of the Europeans (963) . (2) in AOF according
to an official report made in 1920 a Levantine 
could expect to become rich in a third of the time 
it took in the United States. (3) Initially they 
were welcomed to AOF as they provided a valuable 
service as middlemen for French trading houses and,
(1) ANS 19 G Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen AOF 14.12.1911; 
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. HSN 25.1.1912.
(2) ANSCM AP 1054/2 'Mission Depont: Bnigration 
syrienne et les syriens en AOF' 28.7.1920.
(3) Ibid
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in Guinea, they helped to monetarise the trading 
network in rubber - buying rubber from Africans for 
barter and reselling it to Europeans for currency. 
However, in Guinea the smaller European traders 
very quickly sensed the threat which they posed to 
their position, and the first petition against the 
Lebanese was organised in 1898 - only a year after 
the first arrivals. It was not until 1910 - a 
critical year both politically and economically - 
that there was more concerted official opposition 
and they became the target of official measures 
designed either to destroy their means of livelihood 
or even to prevent them from coming to AOF at all.(l) 
In Senegal opposition to Levantines appears to have 
been muted until the depression of the 1930s. (2)
Libyans and Moroccans were also included in the list 
of suspect Arab groups in AOF and it is interesting 
to follow the correspondence in 1911 concerning
(1) 0. Goerg 1 Echanges, marches, reseaux. L'impact
colonial en Guinee (mi XlXeme - 1913' Th&se de 
3eme cycle, Paris VII, 1981 pp. 510-28; see also 
BCAF June 1911 'Les^ihdesirables de l1 AOF'
(2) R. Cruise O'Brien White Society in Black Africa.
The French of Senegal London, 1972 pp. 42, 49-54.
202
one Abdul Karim Mourad, a Moroccan who had been 
trading along the West African coast for several 
years. In August 1911 the Lt. Governor of the 
Ivory Coast wrote to Ponty to warn him that Abdul 
had left Abidjan for Dakar. Ponty passed the 
information on to the Lt. Governor of Senegal, who 
wrote back to Ponty in October to inform him of 
Abdul's arrival. 'I do not believe1, he said,
'that this Moroccan can be considered as a disturber 
of public order and I do not believe that he has 
ever taken part in any anti-European propaganda but 
I consider that he should, in the words of Monsieur 
le Commissaire Central de Dakar, be considered as 
an 'undesirable'.' He proposed to make use of the 
fact that his immigration cards were not in order 
to expel him from the colony. Ponty wrote to the 
Lt. Governor of the Ivory Coast to warn him that 
this unfortunate trader might be back after a stay 
in Senegal in which 'under the cover of commercial 
operations he has in reality been taking part in 
active Muslim propaganda, very probably of an 
anti-European nature'.(1) This exchange is
(1) ANS 19 G 5 Lt.-Gov. I. Coast to Gov.-Gen. ACF
7.8.1911; Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Sen. 24.8.1911;
Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 14.10.1911;
Gov-Gen. ACF to Lt.-Gov. I. Coast 31.10.1911.
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interesting as evidence not only of the existence 
of a relatively efficient intelligence service but 
also of the quite arbitrary way in which that service 
worked. On the admission of both the Lt. Governors 
of Senegal and the Ivory Coast Abdul Karim Mourad 
was probably innocent yet Ponty portrayed him, 
relying more on innuendo than fact, as a subversive 
character. His real crime was to have been a 
'foreign' Muslim who travelled widely.
3. Surveillance of Islam
Perhaps the most striking theme running through 
not only Ponty's circulars but throughout all 
administrative thinking was the importance attached 
to 'knowing thine enemy'. Ignorance about Islam 
in Africa was profound. Lt-Col Leve, the first 
head of the Service des Affaires Musulmanes in the 
Colonial Ministry wrote a memorandum about pan- 
Islamism from which we have already quoted. In the 
section devoted to Africa he said that there were
6.100.000 Muslims in West Africa of whom all but
100.000 'Sierra Leoneans' lived in 'Senegambia'.
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In 'Central Africa' there were some 46,000,000 
Muslims of whom 16,000,000 lived in 'Central 
Africa' (sic) and 30,000,000 in the 'Sahara*.^ 
Statistics and geography that were hardly calculated 
to enlighten! It was to improve on this ignorance 
that Roume started the systematic collection of 
files on Muslim personalities. Ponty promoted 
Arnaud by appointing him to his cabinet to allow 
him greater freedom to pursue his investigations 
into Islam and because he was such an important 
adviser for the cabinet.(2) in Mauritania local 
administrators were exhorted to befriend religious 
leaders because:
Every scheickh is a precious intelligence 
agent [for] a religious chief has disciples 
scattered throughout the desert ... A 
representative of France in Mauritania must 
have a wide outlook and in the extreme 
complexity of Muslim politics he should 
manage to move about, ... mobile as the 
nomads themselves, he will not stay placed 
in a post but will move around with his 
tent from tribe to tribe, seeking out 
gatherings, arriving without warning at camps
(1) IC fr 378 i (Levd) 'Note au sujet du 
mouvement pan-islamique' 1906.
(2) ANS 17 G 37 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col.
30.8.1907. Amaud was not allowed to 
publish anything official without the 
formal permission of the Gov. Gen.
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at the time of day when the djerma assembles, 
taking part in discussions, ... avoiding 
taking sides in divisions but prepared to 
make use of them later in order to govern.(1)
But this picture of industry and commitment was an 
ideal. In 1911 Ponty complained to Clozel that 
he had received very few of the personal files that 
had been requested by Roume in 1 9 0 6 .(2 ) He 
therefore had to repeat the request in the circular 
of 26.12.1911. Information was lacking not only 
because administrators were lazy but also because 
quite simply they did not know what to look for, 
and in future requests for information were 
accompanied with brief explanatory notes explaining 
what to look out for and what sort of information 
was required. Until local administrators had access 
to more sophisticated information on Islam than was 
available their concept of Islam was necessarily of 
the most impressionistic kind based on casual 
observation and hearsay. The local administrator 
was given very little guidance from Dakar where at the 
seat of government even experts appeared in at least 
two minds about what Islam in AOF actually amounted 
to. Arnaud in his novels painted a confusing picture
(1) ANS 9 G 26 E. Sabatier 'Etude sur 1'organisation 
administrative de la Mauritanie1 30.10.1909.
(2) ANS 15 G 103 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. HSN 
Sept. 1911.
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of Islam in Africa sometimes equating it to the 
Islam of the Maghreb, sometimes dismissing it as 
a barely altered village totemism. This confusion 
and uncertainty was in part an accurate reflection 
of the diversity of Islamic worship within AOF but 
it also reflected genuine ignorance. (1) In such 
circumstances it is easy to understand how, when 
the metropolitan press was full of German intrigues 
in the casbahs of Cairo Islam could grow into the 
monster it was sometimes seen as, a somewhat surreal 
monster that could only be tamed with the distinctly 
odd remedy of pinning up engravings of the 
interior views of French factories all over West 
Africa.
(1) ANS 5 G 63 Lt.-Gov. I. Coast to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
26.11.1912 reporting that the ccrnnt. de oercle 
of Haut Sassandra had found a piece of Arabic 
writing attached to an amulet and requesting 
a translation. Gov.-Gen. replied (30.12.1912) 
that the writing consisted of a few prayers 
and magic squares and that it was of no 
political interest - a small example of the 
awe and suspicion arising frcrn ignorance 
with which even senior administrators regarded 
such canmonplace items as an amulet.
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Amusing as the poster campaign seems in retrospect 
and as illuminating as it undoubtedly is about the 
extent of French preoccupations it should not 
obscure the fact that the principal object of 
vilification during these years was the domestic 
marabout. Reading Ponty's circulars on the 
surveillance of marabouts one cannot mistake the 
violence of the language. The reasoning, 
furthermore, was plainly unfair, reminiscent of 
a medieval witch-hunt in which it was impossible 
for the accused to prove his innocence. The 
passion behind the denunciation of the marabouts 
can only be understood in the context of 
metropolitan French political and intellectual 
life - the Dreyfus affair, the election of a 
Republican and anti-clerical government, the 
advances of the social sciences and a climate of 
the intensest mutal suspicion between rival 
political and ideological groups were as much the 
backdrop to French attitudes to Islam as were the 
recent memories of war with al hajj 'Umar and 
Samori. One issue in particular, education, 
served as a focus for all the hopes and suspicions 
of the rival factions, and it is with the subject 
of Qur'anic education that the following chapter 
will be concerned.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FRENCH EDUCATION POLICY AND ISLAM
Education has always played a peculiarly important
role in French society and politics (1) and it is
not surprising that the establishment of an
educational system in AOF preceded the final
administrative organisation of the federation
itself. The various arret^s of November 1903
provided a structured system of education, from
the village schools at the bottom to the Ecole
Normale de St Louis at the top with curriculum
and personnel appropriate to each type of school. (2) 
Until these reforms French education had been left
to private - mainly missionary initiative but the
combined pressure of metropolitan secularisation
laws and the growing realisation of the urgency
of finding new alternatives to military conquest
(1) See T. Zeldin France 1848-1945: Intellect and
Pride Oxford, 1980 ch. 4 for a survey of the 
importance of education in French society.
(2) D. Bouche L 1 Enseignement dans les territoires 
francpis de llAfricrue occldentale de 1817 a 1920; 
mission civilisatrice ou formation d'une 61ite 
Paris, 1975, vol.’2 pp. 500-1. See also her 
article VL'Ecole franchise et les musulmans au 
Sdndgal de 1850 a 1920' RFHOM 1974 pp. 218-35
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forced the colonial authorities to take a more 
active part in the education of its newly conquered 
subjects. The moral conquest of the Africans had 
explicit political and economic aims: Governor-
General Clozel's preface to a book by Georges Hardy, 
the Inspector of Education in AOF, stated plainly 
that 'The first requirement of the education which 
we give in our colonies should be one of practical 
utility, first of all for us and then for the 
natives'. (1) In an earlier survey of the colony 
of Niger it was argued that 'To instruct the 
natives is to augment their economic value'.(2)
In no case was the political aspect of education 
reform more clear than in the question of Muslim 
education. Camille Guy, who as Lt Governor of 
Senegal appreciated the low cost of mission 
education, was reluctant to allow the traditional 
Qur'anic schools to go untouched whilst at the 
same time being forced to close down the mission 
schools (3) and in July 1903, along with his
(1) G. Hardy Une Conquete morale: l'Enseicmement en
AOF Paris, 1917 p.iii
(2) F. Dubois Notre beau Niger Paris, 1911 p. 208.
(3) Boucne L'Enseignement vol. 2 pp. 704-46
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Inspector of Education, Risson, he drew up a decree 
designed to control and restrict the number of 
Qur'anic schools. Schools with less than 20 
pupils were outlawed, the pupils were not allowed 
to beg, teaching during French school hours was 
forbidden and evidence of pupils attendance at a 
French school became an essential requirement if 
the marabout was to be allowed to continue teaching. 
Finally, the marabout's competence to teach was to 
be examined by local Muslim scholars. In the 
Four Communes only 51 of the 202 marabouts 
recognised by the French authorities as directing 
Qur'anic schools were authorised to continue.
In the rest of Senegal only 28 of the 95 teacher 
marabouts received official authorisation.(1)
A year after the arrete was issued Guy wrote 
triumphantly to Roume that the question of 
Qur'anic schools 'can finally be considered as 
closed in Senegal'. (2)
However, the triumph - if triumph it was - was more 
apparent than real. In reality the French
(1) ibid pp. 704-47
(2) ANS J 86 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 29.7.1907.
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authorities were wholly incapable of regulating 
Qur'anic schools - a huge task even for a large 
and dedicated administration. As later reports 
recognised the existing administration could not 
seriously hope to restrict or even control 
Qur'anic schools. (1)
In any case Guy's views on the relative merits of 
mission and Qur'anic education were not universally 
shared. Mairot, the Algerian-born Inspector of 
Education in AOF (2) was not impressed with the 
standard of mission education:
What decadence. What apathy!' he wrote 
to Roume early in 1905, 'have I seen in 
the schools directed by the missionaries 
in the Soudan. Classrooms, dormitories, 
they all breathe of neglect. In Kita 
the children have classes at most one 
hour a day. ... So the general results 
are not as satisfactory as those obtained 
in the modest official school directed by 
native monitors (3)
(1) See below ch. 6
(2) For his c.v. see Bouche L 'Enseignement
vol. 2 p. 718fn
(3) ANS J 11 Mairot to Gov.-Gen. AOF n.d.
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Ponty also thought that the educational achievements 
of the Peres Blancs had been paltry and scarcely 
justified further official subsidies.(1)
A more serious objection raised by both Mairot and 
Ponty was that the mission schools created a barrier 
between France and her African Muslim subjects.
It is difficult for them, Ponty wrote, 
to believe in our religious tolerance 
and our respect for freedom of conscience 
as long as we appear to favour the 
proselytism of the missionaries.(2)
Mairot made a similar point and warned Roume that:
Wherever the Muslim natives - more 
intelligent than the fetishists - 
dominate, the country remains 
absolutely hostile to all forms of 
religious proselytism attempted by 
the missionaries ... What an error 
it would be, and perhaps also what a 
danger if the government favoured 
Christian teaching in Muslim country, 
if they also let it be supposed that 
in making common cause with the 
missionaries they were also encouraging 
the spread of Christianity. (3)
(1) ANS 17 G 33 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
30.1.1904; same to same 9.9.1904.
(2) ANSQM Soudan I/II bis Ponty 'Note sur la 
colonie du Haut Senegal et Niger1 25.6.1905.
(3) ANS J 11 Mairot to Gov.-Gen. AOF n.d.
/ „
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Coppolani had spcken optimistically of what could 
be achieved by a policy of co-operation with the 
Qur'anic schools, (1) and Mairot wholeheartedly 
agreed. In an official report he urged the French 
not to underestimate and despise traditional 
Qur'anic education but rather regard it as a 
'moral force' which should be exploited.
France, he continued, the natural 
guardian of her Muslim subjects in 
Africa, has always protected their 
doctrines and their customs ...
In AOF the Peuhls, Toucouleurs and 
the Woloffs represent an intellectual 
and military elite who would be glad 
to see the local government interest 
themselves in the doctrines of Islam.
Let us raise their children in sentiments 
of respect towards France. Let us 
collaborate with the marabouts in the 
education of the Muslim youths ... Let 
us make our collaboration serve the 
development of French influence, otherwise 
the Muslims will continue to raise their 
children away from us and left to 
themselves the Qur'anic schools will 
conserve their predominantly religious 
influence. To suppress the schools 
would be dangerous, to abandon them 
to themselves would be folly.(2)
(1) See conclusion to Depont & Coppolani 
les Confreries and ANS J 91 Coppolani 
'Note ... au sujet de l'enseignement 
a donner aux indigenes musulmans'.
(2) JCAOF 22.7.1905 pp. 371-75 Mairot 'Etude 
sur les ecoles coraniques de l'AOF'
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So although the Qur'anic schools continued to 
irritate the French - one of the most unchanging 
features of colonial rule were the derogatory 
adjectives used to describe the schools - no 
serious effort was made to close them down. The 
French could not afford to do so, they were not 
able to do so and they had nothing to put in 
their place. (1) Furthermore they were left 
untouched by the various secularisation laws that 
had been passed in France.
The secularisation laws were a central plank 
of the Radical and Republican programmes and were 
the most important and controversial pieces of 
legislation of the governments of Waldeck-Rousseau 
(1899-1902) and the Bloc Republicaln of 
Emile Combes (1902-5) and Maurice Rouvier (1905-6).
(1) ANS J 10 Inspecteur de 1' enseignement
1 Statistiques relatives a l1 enseignement'
5.5.1907 - Quelle que soit 1'importance 
des sacrifices budgetaires et quel que 
puis sent etre le devouement et 1' activitd 
des maitres, il n'est malheureusement pas 
possible de re<jevoir dans les ecoles 
publiques tous les enfants qui ont 
atteint l'age de scolaritd.1
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In July 1901 the attack on the clerics was opened 
with a law (Loi sur les Associations 1.7.1901) 
designed to regulate the religious orders whose 
wealth and power had increased greatly over the 
last quarter of a century and whose schools were 
attracting increasing numbers of pupils. However, 
the law was without a cutting-edge until a series 
of ministerial decrees in June and August 1902 led 
directly to the closure of over a hundred 
Congregational institutions. In 1904 
Congregational education was outlawed. Finally, 
under pressure from the Free-Thinkers and the 
Socialists and incensed by the apparent desire 
of the Vatican to interfere with the government's 
religious policies the government took the decision 
to proceed to the dissolution of the Napoleonic 
'Concordat' between the Roman church and the 
secular government and to promulgate the separation 
of the Church from the State. The law of 
1st December 1905 promised to assure freedom of 
conscience and declared that the government would 
neither subsidise, recognise nor pay the officers 
of any religious belief. (1)
(1) For good summary of issues see M. Riberioux 
La R^publique radicale? 1898-1914 Paris,
1975 pp. 65-71.
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In April of 1905 Clementel, the Minister of 
Colonies, wrote to the various Governor-Generals 
for information on 'native associations and secret 
societies - especially Chinese Congregations and 
Muslim Brotherhoods' and for suggestions as to how 
these institutions should be treated legally. 
Roume, having consulted with the colonies of 
the Federation, replied that the secularisation 
laws should be applied with little modification 
to AOF where despite the fact that missionaries 
did some good work their presence aroused the 
suspicions of Muslims and made the task of 
recruiting Muslim pupils for French public schools 
very difficult.(1) In reply to a later question 
about the applicability to. Senegal of the law 
separating Church and State, the Lt-Governor of 
Senegal told Roume that with a few qualifications 
the law could be applied in Senegal and that 
within four years all state financing of priests
(1) ANS 17 G 33 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
15.4.1905; Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 
n.d.; Gov.-Gen. AOF to colonies June 1905.
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could be withdrawn. (1)
However, the Lt-Governor emphasised that the law 
was entirely inapplicable to Islam:
The Muslim religion has been in Senegal 
since time immemorial. Almost all the 
natives practise it with a fervour 
bordering on fanaticism. The Muslim cult 
does not have any clergy ... The 
pecuniary resources of the Muslim cult 
in Senegal are almost nil; they are made 
up of offerings by the faithful and 
are used for the benefit of the needy 
amongst their fellow Muslims. (2)
The description of Islam as a poor and rather 
humble religion which used what money it did have 
for the relief of the needy contrasts sharply with 
the far more commonly expressed opinion that Islam
(1) The main qualification related to the lack of 
funds available for carrying out surveys of 
Church property and the need to continue 
support for the charitable mission institutions 
such as orphanages and dispensaries. In 1905 
the colony paid 47,200 francs in salaries for 
Christian clergy plus 4,625 francs to the 
Muslim Tamsir of St Louis. The Tamsir, unlike 
the priests, was to retain his stipend as he 
was considered as more of a judge than a priest. 
ANS 4 E 2 Lt.-Gov. Senegal to CfcvrGai.March 1906.
(2) ANS 4 E 2 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF March 1906.
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enabled a handful of corrupt and scheming marabouts 
to exploit the poor, not help them. Evidence 
perhaps of pro-Islamic anti-clerical colonial 
officials? Roume echoed the Senegalese Governor's 
doubts about the applicability of the Separation Law 
to Islam. He told the Minister of Colonies that:
The Muslim brotherhoods which exist in 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and in 
Haut-Senegal et Niger exhibit, like 
those of Senegal the same characteristics 
which clearly differentiate them from any 
other religion ... Furthermore, reasons 
of a political nature oblige us not to 
apply the law of 9th December 1905 to the 
Muslims. These people, particularly 
secretive in their faith ... would 
misconstrue the measures laid down in 
this text and would see in it an attack 
on their secular traditions.(1)
Those opposed to the secularisation laws in France 
saw in them the hand of 'satanic Free-Masonry1 
(the phrase is taken from the Papal encyclical of 
Leo XIII Humanum Genus (1884) ) and the subsequent 
decision that in the colonies Islam was to be 
spared confirmed opponents of the laws in their 
belief that the priests were being victimised by an 
anti-clerical, atheistic even, colonial 
administration. The belief was a strong one which
(1) ANS 17 G 35 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 26.5.1906.
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was restated at regular intervals over the next 
decades. In a series of lectures delivered at 
the 1Institut Catholique' in 19 33, J. Maze, a 'Pere 
blanc' denounced French colonial education policy 
again and again speaking of,
The monstrosity of the fact that in the 
French colonies the conversion of a Pagan 
or a Muslim to the Catholic religion is 
considered as an act of rebellion against 
France ... France, alone amongst the 
great colonial powers, rejects the help of 
the missionary church in the so difficult 
and yet so important task of the education 
of the natives. (1)
Another P&re blanc accused the Education 
Inspectorate of being run by anti-clerical 
freemasons and argued that,
This islamophile position was convenient for 
all those who did not want the Catholic 
religion to spread in our colonies. At this 
time of most violent anti-clericalism in France, 
in the colonies even if administrators felt 
closer to the missionaries because of the small 
numbers of Frenchmen nonetheless they were happy 
to seize a supposedly scientific reason to 
refuse them all support. (2)
(1) J. Maze La Collaboration soolaire des 
gouvemements ooloniaux et des missions 
Algiers, 1933 pp. 151-52 & passim
(2) A Prost Les Missions des Peres blancs 
(Xiagadougou n.d. p. 79.
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Mgr. Bazin, the head of the Peres blancs in AOF 
in 1908, warned dramatically that 'Islam is the 
sin of Europe in Africa. She may well yet pay 
a high price for it. (1)
The 'Islamophilia' of the administration was, and 
still is, greatly exaggerated. Whilst it is true 
that there were Free-Masons and anti-clericists in 
the colonial administration, perhaps especially in 
the Educational Inspectorate, it should not be 
imagined that this automatically meant that they 
were in any way pro-Islam. It has often been 
said that some administrators favoured Islam 
'pour embeter les cures' but in practice this was 
seldom the case. If an anti-clerical administrator 
wanted to annoy priests there were far simpler ways 
of doing so as the complicated etiquette of 
colonial 'society' afforded ample scope for 
discrete social snubs. Most anti-clerical 
administrators regarded marabouts as being just 
as offensive as Catholic priests and, as we shall 
see. did as much as they could to combat them.
It is understandable that the Church made the
(1) Cited in J. Audoin & R. Deniel L'Islam en Haute 
Volta a l'epogue ooloniale Paris & Abidjan, 1978 
p. 87.
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accusations it did for the Secularisation laws 
in France were an ideological and divisive piece 
of legislation. However, the decision not to 
apply them to Islam was based on raison d'etat 
and nothing more.
Neither Mairot nor Ponty approved of simply giving
I
the marabouts carte blance in the field of
4 \
education. Mairot argued strongly in favour of 
creating the post of Inspector of Muslim Education 
and the inclusion of 'French' subjects such as 
'theory of agriculture and elementary notions of 
social hygiene' in the curriculum of the Qur'anic 
schools. (1) However, a scheme in 1906 to 
encourage the teaching of French in Qur'anic 
schools by offering a small financial incentive of 
not more than 300 francs per annum to marabouts 
who gave two hours of French instruction a day 
failed to attract any support. Camille Guy, the 
architect of the scheme, reissued the relative 
arrete the following year, but again there were 
no takers. (2)
(1) JQAGF 1905 Mairot report 22.7.1905.
(2) ANS J 86 'Arrete accordant des subventions aux 
professeurs libres d'arabe qui enseignent le 
francais dans les ecoles' 12.6.1906. T M s  arrete 
was reissued 26.2.1907. See also Boudhe
L'Enseignement vol. 2 p. 725.
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However, the idea of offering a reward to marabouts 
who taught French was not entirely abandoned.
In August 1910 Ponty wrote that,
We cannot subsidise Koranic schools and 
we should avoid the appearance of 
encouraging the development of a religion 
whose followers to say the least are not 
always favourable to our influence or to 
the new ideas of which we are here the 
representatives. But if we are obliged 
to continue observing the strictest 
confessional neutrality we should not 
abstain from rewarding the efforts of the 
teachers who wish to help us. Not all the 
marabouts are hostile to us and I even believe 
that there are some amongst them who ask for 
nothing more than to get along with us and 
who would willingly send their pupils to our 
schools and take lessons in French 
themselves. (1)
Coppolani's plan for Franco-Arabic universities 
was more realistic based on the experience of 
similar institutions known as medersas in Algeria.
In 1906 Clozel was sent to Algeria on a mission to 
study the workings of the medersas. In his final 
report he included a copy of the lengthy (300+ pages) 
report made in 1891 by the then Senator Emile Combes 
who had argued that the medersas should seek not just 
to train Muslim administrators but that they should
(1) ANS J 93 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Sen. 22.8.1910.
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also act as 'an effective instrument of 
pacification and rapprochement1. If France was 
prepared to act resolutely, he concluded, these 
institutions would assure France control of 
Algerian Muslims as their leaders would no longer 
have to leave the colony in order to complete 
their studies. Clozel agreed that providing a 
suitable balance was kept in the curriculum between, 
on the one hand science and French and, on the
other, Islamic doctrine and law, the medersa
should be introduced to AOF as well. (1)
The first medersa to be formally opened in AOF was
in Djenne, in the colony of Haut-Senegal et Niger 
where Ponty wTas an enthusiastic supporter of the 
idea. The medersa had two aims specifically 
stated in the arrdte by which it was founded.
It had firstly 'To develop higher Muslim education 
and train the teachers of Koranic schools' and 
secondly 'To teach an elite of young Muslims how 
to speak and write in French and at the same time 
to give them proper views on the civilising role 
of France in Africa'. (2) At the end of the year
(1) ANS J 91 contains both Combe's and Clozel's 
reports.
(2) ANS J 94 Arrete 4.7.1906.
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Roume reported optimistically to Paris that, 'The 
young men who are educated in this establishment 
will be able in a few years time to expose the 
marabout preachers of holy war and to reveal their 
true nature to the credulous mass of natives.
The 'medersa' at Djenne will be our most effective 
answer to Islamic propaganda. (1)
The first year's recruitment was not easy, and 
Ponty regretted that of the 30 pupils admitted 
only six had had experience of schools other than 
traditional Qur'anic education. Nevertheless he 
remained optimistic that 'in a few years time the 
'medersa's' [education] will deservedly be respected 
by all the Muslim population of the colony and 
that it will contribute immensely to the raising 
of the moral level of our natives, enlightening 
them on the dangers of fanaticism and showing 
them that the duties of a good Muslim are not in 
the least incompatible with their duties as French 
subjects'. (2) Mariani, the Inspector of Muslim
(1) ANSQM Soudan I/I I 'Rapport politique. ACF.
2eme Trimestre' 1906.
(2) ANS J 94 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AOF 11.5.1907.
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Education, reported that initially many of the 
locals had been hostile to the project as there 
had been widespread rumours that its first
director, Mohammed Merzouk, the 22 year old
, *
Algerian repetiteur of the Ecole des Langues
Orientales Vivantes in Paris, was a Christian, but
that now that the rumour had been scotched 'The
Djenninkes ... are starting to show pride in their
'medersa'.1 He warned that with the limited
resources available the French should not try and
make the medersa a carbon-copy of the Algerian
medersa but rather they should more modestly seek
to 'Train according to our methods young men
capable of giving a liberal interpretation of the
Koran and of spreading in our language our ideas
of justice and of tolerance'. (1)
In St Louis the possibility of creating a medersa
/
to complement the existing 'Ecole de Fils des Chefs' 
and the 'Ecole Normale' had been discussed since 
1906 (2) but it was not until 1908 that it was 
finally created. The 'Ecole de Fils des Chefs' 
appeared incapable of training Arabic interpreters,
(1) ANSQM Soudan X/7 Insp. Ens. musulman to Gov.-Gen. 
AOF Jan. 1908
(2) ANS J 92 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF April 1906.
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and in 1906 only three of the 18 candidates for 
the final exam - introduced for the first time 
that year and consisting of a simple translation 
from Arabic to French - achieved a reasonable 
standard. Roume wrote to the director of the 
school when he heard of these results to 
emphasise the importance of Arabic instruction 
and asked him 'To neglect nothing that might raise 
the level of Arabic studies in the minds of the 
pupils and of your colleagues'. (D Mariani also 
urged Roume to create a medersa at St Louis arguing 
that it was the best way of combatting the 
marabouts. He stressed that the medersa should 
not just be a centre of Islamic learning but that 
rather the 'French spirit must give it life. 
Conceived in the manner of the reformers Combes 
and Houdas ... the 'medersa' will always be the 
most logical form of education in Muslim country, 
the only one capable of usefully serving our policy 
whilst at the same time flattering the vanity of 
the natives.'(2) A measure of the life-giving
(1) ANS J 91 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Directeur de 1'Ecole 
Normale a St Louis 26.11.1906.
(2) ANS J 92 Insp. Ens. musulman to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
10.11.1906.
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French spirit can be seen in the proposed curriculum 
for the 'medersa'. In addition to traditional Islamic 
subjects, first year pupils were to be given 
elementary French language lessons including 
explanations of such mysteries as white men's 
houses, the postal system, work, travel, hunting 
and fishing. The 2nd year pupils were to learn 
about agriculture and hygiene and the 3rd years 
about the geography of the colony, AOF, France, 
the countries of Islam and a history of the French 
conquest. (1)
In the first years of its existence the medersa 
underwent something of an identity crisis as it was 
not clear whether it was intended to supplant or to 
complement the existing 'Ecole de Fils des Chefs'. 
Initially pupils were recruited by means of an exam 
but following the decision to close the 'Ecole' in 
1909 exam entry became less common and pupils were 
recruited on the same basis as had been used for the 
'Ecole de Fils des Chefs'. At the same time the 
period of study was lengthened to four years and 
there were some changes in the curriculum - tacit
(1) ANS J 93 'Enseignement francais: curriculum de
la medersa de St louis' 1906.
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admissions perhaps of the lower standards of the new 
intake. (1)
In 1910 there were 56 pupils at the medersa of whom 
23 were the sons of chiefs, five sons of cadis, 13 
sons of marabouts or Arabic teachers, three sons of 
traders, six sons of farmers and six from other 
backgrounds. Over half were in their early
twenties. 45 came from Senegal, nine from 
Mauritania and two from Haut-Senegal et Niger.
Most of the Senegalese received a grant (32 full 
grants) but the non-Senegalese had to fend for 
themselves. (2) These figures reveal the 
uncertainty in French minds about whom the medersa 
was supposed to educate in these early days of its 
existence.
But whether the pupils were sons of chiefs or sons 
of traders the pupils were to learn the same basic 
lessons that loyalty to France need not be at the 
expense of abandoning the duties of a good Muslim.
As important as encouraging loyalty to France it was 
also hoped that the medersa would encourage the
(1) ANS J 92 Arrete ... reorganisation de la 'medersa' 
de St Louis 28.10.1909; Bouche L 'Enseignement 
pp. 741-42.
(2) ANS J 92 Insp. Ens. musulman to Gov.-Gen. AOF
19.4.1910.
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development of a more 'progressive' Islam open 
to the latest discoveries in science. (1) Mariani 
wrote that he considered, 'The installation of 
medersas in AOF as a laicisation of Muslim 
education' (2) - in other words that the obscurantist 
marabouts would be replaced by a new generation of 
open minded free-thinking Muslim teachers (3) 
just as in France the village schoolteacher was 
replacing the village priest as the spiritual guide 
of the nation's youth.
The medersa was intended both to diffuse the Islamic 
threat and to give the French some control over the 
Muslim leadership. Mariani was concerned about 
the inability of the French to contain the increase 
in the number of Qur'anic. schools. In the Soudan 
he observed that, 'The attendance of the Qur'anic 
schools has become increasingly significant in
(1) ibid.
(2) ANS J 12 Insp. Ens. musulman 'Note sur
1'enseignement musulman en Guin6e francaise'
20.4.1907. ’
(3) Che of the ocmmon Muslim 'types' encountered in 
the novels of Randau is such an enlightened, 
French-educated Muslim whose hallmark is a 
subscription to the Revue des Deux Mondes - and, 
of course, an intimate acquaintance with the 
complete works of Robert Randau.
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Tombouctou and in the region of Djenne. This 
situation concerns us for, if Islam represents 
a progress from fetishism, Muslims in general are 
difficult to handle and they have a tendency to 
consider themselves superior even to us, simply 
because they were born Muslims'. His solution 
to the problem was to propose the creation of 
another medersa in Timbuktu for he argued that 
money spent on the clergy (in December 1908 the 
Conseil General voted to renew the allowance of
38.000 francs to the Catholic clergy with a further
2.000 for the Protestants and 3,000 for the Tamsir 
of St Louis) would be better spent on teaching 
French. 'The study of a living Christian language 
is the most effective remedy to Muslim fanaticism ... 
The Mahommetans who know French or English are
less fanatical and less dangerous than their 
coreligionists who can only speak Arabic, Berber 
or Turkish'. (1) Two years later he argued that 
'Knowledge of the French language is the most 
effective antidote against the danger of a
(1) ANSCM Soudan X/7 Insp. Ens. musulman to Gov.-Gen.
AOF 15.1.1908.
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retrograde Islam'. (1) Thus it was hoped that the 
medersas would be a step towards the creation of a 
liberal pro-French Islam in Black Africa.
However, such developments could only be in the 
long term. In the short term the medersas were 
intended to train a pro-French Muslim elite who on 
completion of their studies were intended to take 
up positions in the administration. (2) However, 
the French could not guarantee that there would be 
jobs available. At first Ponty believed that 
former pupils of medersas should not be given 
automatic preference for jobs over other candidates 
but when he learned that only two of the seven pupils 
who had left the St Louis medersa in 1910 had found 
jobs he became anxious and asked the Lt-Governor of 
Senegal if the other five graduates could not be 
made monitors in schools. The Lt-Governor regretted 
that the colony's education budget was insufficient 
to make this solution possible but he believed that 
in time suitable jobs would be found. Ponty was not 
satisfied and thought that the time had come to give
(1) ANS J 86 Insp. Ens. Musulman to Gov.-Gen. AOF
24.4.1910.
(2) ibid
232
pupils of official French schools some help in 
their search for jobs and issued a circular stating 
that henceforward all candidates for administrative 
jobs were to provide proof of two years consecutive 
study in an official French school.(1)
As we shall see the concept behind the medersa was 
by no means universally accepted. The decision 
not to attempt to apply the laicisation laws to 
Islam and at the same time to create official 
schools where religious instruction inevitably took 
up a large part of the time might appear 
incongruous from an administration which otherwise 
appeared to identify Islam as the greatest threat 
to French security in AOF. Some saw in this 
educational policy the cynical hand of free-masonry. 
More accurately it represented a combination of 
raison d'etat and wishful thinking. Raison d'etat 
because to have assimilated the position of Islam 
in AOF to that of the Catholic church in 
metropolitan France would have been not merely
(1) ANS J 93 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Sen. 22.8.1910 
same to same 6.10.1910; Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. 
AOF 24.10.1910; Gov.-Gen. AOF circular 'Emplois 
dans les services publics a reserver aux indigenes 
anciens eleves des ecoles officielles' 31.10.1910.
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inaccurate but also extremely foolish. Wishful 
thinking because the French never ceased to think 
of themselves as 'the natural guardians of Islam'. 
The logic behind this belief was perverse and based 
on the fact that by a process of often bloody 
conquest France ruled over the Muslim population 
of Algeria. France was thus a 'Muslim power' with 
not only a right but also a duty, so the theory ran, 
to direct the evolution of its Muslim subjects. In 
Black Africa this often meant that the French had a 
duty to 'purify' Islam noir - and the place to start 
this was in the medersa. (1)
(1) See Ccmbe's report on medersas (in ANS J 91 
for statement of France as a Muslim power - a 
point which is also forcefully stated by 
Le Chatelier in his various articles. France's 
sanetime political identification had a spiritual 
equivalent in Iouis Massignon. Massignon, a 
Catholic mystic, whose thesis was on the Muslim 
mystic al-Hallaj identified very personally with 
Islamic mysticism and regarded it as a French 
duty to help Muslims rediscover their 
traditional culture. Such an intense personal 
identification with Islam - or at least a 
certain view of Islam - seem to be a 
peculiarly French tradition. Few British 
Islamicists seem to have been capable of 
equalling the personal carmitments of scholars 
such as Massignon, Rodinson, Berque, MDnteil and 
Giraudy - the last twc have carried this 
carmitment to the extent of conversion to Islam.
Qi Massignon see Waardenburg L'Islam dans le miroir 
de 1'Occident passim ... Said wrote 'It became 
France' s obligation ... to defend Muslim 
traditional culture, the rule of their dynastic 
life, and the patrimony of believers'.
Orientalism p.271.
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The medersas were, however, only one part of 
French educational policy towards Islam.
Whatever encouragement may have been given to the 
higher level of Muslim education, at the other 
end of the scale, attitudes to the mass of 
Qur'anic schools remained suspicious and hostile.
In April 1907 Roume, prompted by information which 
'leaves no doubt about the organising effort of the 
muslim brotherhoods in AOF' issued a circular 
requesting details of Qur'anic schools.
It is important, he wrote, to be informed 
exactly on the number of schools. (These 
schools disseminate religious doctrines 
and the political suggestions issued 
unknown to us by the more or less secret 
agents of the big religious orders.)
It is also important to make enquiries 
about the very personality of the marabouts 
who teach in the schools so that we know 
something of their origins, degree of 
learning, their means of instruction, 
their local influence and of any contact 
they may have kept with their former 
teachers ... From another point of view 
the Administration wishes to know what 
subjects are being taught, what books are 
used and what categories of pupils the 
schools are designed for (children, 
adolescents, adults). And when a French 
school exists in the locality, or in a 
neighbouring one, it is necessary to find 
out whether the pupils of the Qur'anic 
schools come to complement their religious 
education or, if they do not attend the 
European school, to discover the reason 
for their refusal to attend.
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The task required a great deal of tact on the part 
of the researcher but it was a very important task 
which would enable the administration to establish 
as accurately as possible 'the size of the forces 
at the disDOsal of the brotherhoods and the means 
of action thev have available through the 
intermediary of the teaching and preaching 
marabouts'. The results were to be sent to the 
Governor-General marked 'Very Confidential' (1)
The attitudes expressed in the circular were 
entirely in keeping with the administration's 
anxieties about Islam at this time as the Qur'anic 
schools were suspected of being the crucial link 
between the foreign directors of the brotherhoods 
and the mass of credulous African Muslims. The 
role of French administrators making discrete 
enquiries for their very confidential reports was 
almost as mysterious and as exotic as that of the 
'more or less secret agents' of the brotherhoods. 
The reality was no doubt more prosaic. However, 
at the time the French felt a great need to have 
as much information as possible on Islam.
(1) ANS 0 85 Gov.-Gen. AOF circular to colonies
18.4.1907.
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The practical results of the survey of the 
Qur'anic schools are hard to gauge but if nothing 
else the piles of statistics which were sent at 
regular intervals over the following decades to the 
Governor-General must have been reassuring - 
evidence, perhaps, that the secret agents were 
becoming less and less secret.
Less spectacularly the Qur'anic schools continued to 
be accused of severe pedagogical shortcomings.
Cor, Lt-Governor of Senegal from 1911 to 1914, 
declared that:
Nobody is unaware of the unfortunate 
effects which these schools have from 
both a social and a political point of 
view, on the one hand depriving the 
numerous pupils who frequent them of 
the benefits of French instruction and, 
on the other hand, as a result of the 
confessional education, raising a 
veritable barrier between the young 
generation and ourselves.
He commissioned Souleyman Seek, the Arabic teacher 
at the St Louis medersa and M. Zanetacci, also 
from the medersa, to make an inspection of the 
Qur'anic schools of St Louis. They described a 
'typical' school where children were taught all 
about the Muslim obligation to wage Holy War in
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physical surroundings of the most extreme squalor:
Cows, calves, sheep and goats graze 
peacefully beside the pupils who 
frequently have to brush away the 
accumulated excrement of several 
months, even years, before sitting 
down. Flies and insects of all 
kinds go from one dirty child, 
stricken with leprosy or scabies 
to a clean and healthy child ... 
and all this little world lives, 
unconscious of the dangers surrounding 
it, mechanically repeating to each 
other words of a language which is 
not theirs and which they can only 
memorise with the greatest 
difficulty.
Cor wrote to Ponty that, 'These revelations show 
a most critical situation which the public 
authorities cannot ignore any longer' and he drew 
up a proposal of legislation designed to regulate
I the schools, introducing minimum standards of
i
hygiene etc. However, Ponty noted in the margin 
to the letter that he considered the proposals 
'utterly impossible - especially at the moment
I
j this measure would not be wise because it would
I
be considered as the start of a persecution.
I That is what we must above all avoid. I repeat,
| especially at the moment.* (D The events to which
(1) ANS J 86 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 6.5.1911. 
Hiis letter included the Seek & Zanetacci report.
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Ponty referred which made Cor's proposals so 
inappropriate were those that had taken place a 
few months earlier in the Futa Jallon in Guinea 
and it is with these events that the next chapter 
is concerned.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FRENCH ISLAMIC POLICY IN CRISIS:
THE FUTA JALLON, 1909-11
The Futa Jallon region of the modern state of 
Guinea (Conakry) has a rich and important history. 
It is the most mountainous area of the western 
Sudan and, indeed, it is in its hills that the 
two great rivers of West Africa - the Senegal and 
the Niger - have their source. The two dominant 
ethnic groups are the Fulbe and the various 
Mandinka groups known collectively as the Jallonke 
from whom the region gets its name. (D The 
Jallonke agriculturalists invaded and settled on 
the plateau of the Futa between the eleventh and 
thirteenth centuries. Between the fourteenth and 
sixteenth centuries animist Fulbe pastoralists 
followed but, preferring to graze their livestock 
on the higher hills, did not seriously clash with 
the Jallonke. In the seventeenth century Muslim 
Fulbe coming from either Macina or the Futa Toro
(1) The Mandinka groups included: Baga, Sussu,
Landuna and Malinke-Bambara.
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defeated both the Jallonke and the animist Fulbe 
and imposed their suzerainty over the area exacting 
tribute and taking slaves from the defeated tribes. 
Despite their great numerical inferiority they 
succeeded in imposing themselves as the dominant 
political force in the region in the course of the 
century. A further grouping which deserves 
comment were the Jakhanke, a clerical group 
belonging to the Soninke people, who settled in the 
Futa in the eleventh century and founded the town 
of Tuba which acquired a reputation as a centre for 
Islamic learning, attracting visitors from all 
over West Africa. (1)
Towards the middle of the eighteenth century the 
chief or almamy of the Futa, Karamoko Alfa, 
organised the Futa into seven provinces or diwal
(1) See T. Diallo Les Institutions Folitiques du
Fouta Dyallon au XIXe siecle Dakar, 1972, pp. 27-35, 
P. Marty L 1 Islam en Guinee: Fouta Diallon Paris
1921 pp. 2-6; N. Levtzion 'Notes sur les 
origines de l'islam militant au Fouta Djallon'
Notes Africaines (1971); L.O. Sanneh The Jakhanke: 
the history of an Islamic clerical people of the 
Senegambia, London 1979? J. Suret-Canale 'Tbuba, 
Holy Place of Islam* in C. Allen & R.W. Johnson 
(eds) African Perspectives Cambridge, 1970 
pp. 53-82.
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Administrative map of Guinea
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each of which had its own chief and which together 
formed the Futa Jallon federation which lasted more 
or less successfully until the French conquest.
When Karamoko Alfa was forced to give up through 
ill health in 1751 the 'Council of Elders' elected 
a relation, Ibrahim Sori Mawdo, to be almamy as 
Karamoko Alfa's son, Alfa Saadibu, was too young. 
This decision led to disputes between the two 
families known henceforward as the Alfya and 
Soriya. The dispute was eventually settled by 
an arrangement whereby an almamy was chosen from 
each family, the two of them taking it in turn to 
reign for a period of two years at a time. This 
original system lasted a remarkably long time and 
it was not until 1888 that it finally collapsed.
T. Diallo, a Guinean historian, described the 
period when the system worked properly as the 
'most glorious of nineteenth century Fuuta 
history'. Marty, although less enthusiastic 
argued that the Futa federation was a more 
impressive state than those of either Ashanti or 
Dahomey.A)
(1) Diallo Institutions politicrues pp. 35-55, 
Marty Guin6e p. 21.
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Religion, ethnicity and force all cemented the
federation, and religion was also the most
important factor in its political relations with
its neighbours. On the whole relations with other
Muslims were good but throughout the nineteenth
century there was almost constant war with
neighbouring animists, in particular the Sussu. CD 
The rulers of the Futa were then a theocratic
aristocracy whose wealth derived from the efforts
of its very large slave population which it was
able to capture and control through a remarkably
effective political system. The federation was
neatly described by Marty as 'A confederation of
small states under a sovereignty of religious
origin but which was rapidly transformed into a
political power*. (2)
(1) Diallo Institutions politigues, p.46.
(2) Marty Guinee p.20; c.f. also Rene Caille *Le 
Fouta-Dhiallon est gouveme par un almamy 
norrme par les principaux de l'dtat; ils se 
rassemblent a cet effet, et ont egalement
le droit de le deposer, si le peuple n*est 
pas content de sa conduite: le gouvemonent
est th^ocratique.' Voyage a Tcrnbouctou (.1830) 
reprinted Paris, 1982, vol 1. p.267
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The intense factionalism which was a constant 
feature of the political life of the Futa and 
the increasing attentions of the European powers 
finally made the system of alternating almamys 
unworkable. In 1888 the almamy designate of the 
Soriya family, Mamadu Paathe, was ousted by his 
younger brother, Bokar Biro, who reigned with the 
Alfya almamy Ahmaadi Ahmaadu until 1895, when the 
regional chiefs rebelled against Bokar Biro. At 
the same time the French were also trying to win 
control of the federation and had signed numerous 
treaties with the various almamys but, unable to 
make Bokar Biro come to terms they eventually 
decided on the use of force. In 1896 Bokar Biro 
was defeated and subsequently killed in a battle 
against an alliance of the French and regional 
chiefs. By the Protectorate Treaty signed in 
189 7 France agreed to recognise the heads of the 
two ruling families of the Futa, Umaru Bademba 
for the Alfya and Sori Illili for the Soriya, 
and to respect the original constitution of the 
Federation. However, this latter promise was 
soon neglected as the French decided to divide the 
Futa into two provinces, Timbo and Mamu, under 
the leadership of Sori Illili and Umaru Bademba 
respectively. The chiefs who had fought alongside
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the French were similarly rewarded with recognition 
of the 'permanent' quality of their chiefships. (D
Writing to the Colonial Minister to report on his 
recent visit to the Futa the Governor-General 
explained his policy of indirect rule and respect 
for the status quo. In Timbo he was met by a 
delegation of chiefs, who, he said, all expressed 
themselves enthusiastic supporters of the French:
I would even go as far as to say, 
he continued, that if I had pressed 
them it would have been easy to make 
the Malinkes, who constitute the base 
of the working population of the Fouta 
say 'Free us from the Foulahs', to make 
the Foulahs say 'Free us from the chiefs', 
the chiefs say 'Free us from the almamys'. 
But the moment is not ripe for such a 
radical social revolution and I believe 
that we should govern the Fouta Djallon 
with the social organisation that we found 
there. Without in appearance changing 
the actual institutions we will remain 
the only masters of the country through
(1) For history 1888-1897 see Diallo
Institutions politicrues, Marty Guinee,
A. Arcin Histoire de la Guinee Francaise 
Paris 1911, W. McGowan 'Foula resistance 
to French expansion into the Futa 
Jallon, 1889-1896' JAH 1981, pp. 245-61. 
For account of French relations with 
Bokar Biro, see ANSOM Guinee IV/6 
Gen. Boileve, charge de 1'expedition des 
Affairs Militaires du GG to Min. Col. 
17.1.1897.
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the intermediary of the almamys who 
can only remain in power thanks to 
us and who will succeed in place of 
us in doing the police work necessary 
to maintain the tranquility of the 
populations and the security of the 
roads. (1)
That such a policy involved turning a blind eye to 
despotism cannot be doubted. For example, Alfa 
Yaya who was confirmed as chief of Labe, Kade and 
Gabu after the defeat of Bokar Biro enjoyed two 
years of absolute rule:
During these years, Marty later wrote, 
when Alfa Yaya was the uncontested master 
of Labe he earned himself the reputation 
of a prize tyrant and bandit which has 
perhaps been exaggerated. Like all 
African potentates, Alfa Yaya didn't 
hesitate to cut off a few heads and to 
seize the goods of his victims but at 
the same time he introduced order and 
tranquility into the country, encouraged 
agriculture and kept war outside his 
frontiers. These procedures of summary 
justice ... the very product of the 
feudal organisation of the Fouta should 
be judged with the indulgence required 
of the surroundings.
Furthermore, tax receipts between 189 8 and 1903 
increased from 250,000 francs to over a million -
(1) ANSQM Guinee IV/6 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col.
18.2.1897.
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and for this the French would forgive anything, 
as Marty admitted: 'We were very happy with the
financial results and we didn't attempt to discover 
by what methods ... the tax was collected.' (1)
Umaru Bademba who had been made sole almamy of 
Mamu appears to have gone too far even for the 
indulgent French administration: 'His countless
exactions, his abuses of power and his acts of 
cruelty were such that he had to be deposed in 
1900.' (2)
However, the wisdom of using the existing chiefs 
soon came to be doubted. The accession of Frezouls, 
a Radical Republican, to the Lt.-Governorship of 
Guinea in 1904 played a part in this change of 
heart. &) Certainly in the case of Alfa Yaya it 
was reported that he felt vulnerable as a result 
of changes in Conakry. (4) But Alfa Yaya's
(1) Marty Guinee p. 41.
(2) ibid p. 22
(3) See J. Suret-Canale 'Un aspect de la politique 
coloniale francaise en Guinee: le rnythe du
"ccmplot feodal et islamique" de 1911'
Bulletin de la Societe d'Histoire Mpdeme 1970 
pp. 13-19 and R. Comevin 'Alfa Yaya Diallo 
fut-il un h&ros national de Guinee ou 1' innocente 
victime d'un reglement de coirpte entre gouvemeurs?' 
REHQM 1970 pp. 288-96.
(4) ANS 7 G 95 Billault, Comm’t de Lab6 to Gov. Guinee
26.4.1905.
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unpopularity with the French was, it seems, as much 
due to his claim to one tenth of all tax receipts and 
to suspicions that he was intriguing with the 
Portuguese, who, under new boundary arrangements, had 
been given control over a large section of Labe, as 
it was to the arrival of new Radical Republican 
ideals in Conakry. (1)
In October 1905 Alfa Yaya was arrested on charges of 
plotting against France and sentenced to five years 
internment in Abomey.(2) h o w  much can this be 
imputed to Frezouls1 Republicanism? Frezouls was 
not the first person to clash with Alfa Yaya. As 
early as 1896 de Beeckman, the administrator who 
had been given the task of drawing up the treaties 
with the chiefs of the Futa Jallon was accused by 
Cousturier, the Governor of Guinea, of pursuing a 
personal attack against the chief of Labe.
(1) Marty Guinee pp. 41-4
(2) ANS 7 G 96 Frezouls bo Gov.-Gen. AQF 25.10.1905, 
same to same 31.10.1905, Gov.-Gen. to Min. Col.
28.11.1905, Marty Guinee p. 44
(3) ANSCM Guinee IV/6 Cousturier margin note in 
de Beeckman to Cousturier, 9.11.1896.
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Nor was Frezouls exactly consistent in his treatment 
of the chiefs of the Futa. In the same year that 
Alfa Yaya was deported, Umaru Bademba the 
deposed almamy of Mamu, was made chief of Dare,
Telike and Pale Sara. ^  So one should be wary 
of imagining that the arrival of a good Republican 
as Lt.-Governor of Guinea automatically spelt the 
end of an era for the chiefs of the Futa. In 
practice such changes as occurred in chiefship 
depended on a host of factors which combined to 
form the political make-up of the colony, of which 
the chiefs were themselves an important part and 
not just the more or less passive victims of 
changing ideological currents in Paris or even 
Conakry.
In purely ideological terms Radicalism, in any case, 
was probably not as important as the ideas held by 
the administration on religion and race. Such ideas 
were particularly strong in relation to the Fulbe of 
the Futa Jallon. Early European travellers were 
struck by the fairer skins, fine features and 
apparently higher social and political organisation 
of the Fulbe. Caillie, for example, was very
(1) Marty Guinde p.22
impressed but he added that 'The Foulahs are 
proud, suspicious and liars'. These same
characteristics of on the one hand an 
apparently superior intelligence and on the 
other of a passion for intrigue and an 
abhorrence of work continued to impress 
European observers. By the first decade of 
the twentieth century early ethnologists had 
drawn up a hierarchy of African ethnic groups, 
and although opinions differed about the exact 
ordering and about what criteria should be used 
for judging all agreed that the Fulbe came at
(1) Cailli£ Voyage I p. 269.
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the top of the black African races.
(1) c.f. ANSCM AP/170/3 'Rapport a la commission 
extra-parlementaire et administrative pour la 
protection et la sauvegarde des populations 
indigenes.' presente par N. Duchene 6.7.1909.
This classification went from: i) Berber &
Arabs of white origin, ii) Peuhl - Semitic 
traces, iii) Hausa, Songhay, Wolof & Soninke - 
destined for better things, iv) Mandingos,
Bambara, Malinke, Sous sou, Agni, Nagos 
'although retaining the crudeness of the 
primitive customs, distinguish themselves by 
their relative intelligence and energy', 
v) Serers, Dioulas, Balankes, Habes, 'a state 
of primitive savagery' • See also L. Tauxier 
Le Noir de la Guinee Paris 1908 (Bulletin de 
la societe intemationale de la science sociale 
suivant la methode d' observation.) which likewise 
has 5 categories. At the bottom the 'Primitives - 
or the relatively primitive, for the absolute 
primitives ... where are they to be found?' 
then the 'Inferior pre-Mandingos' the losers, 
defeated because of their lack of social 
political organisation, e.g. Mendes, Baga, then 
the 'Superior pre-Mandingos' - Nalous, Landoumans - 
then the 'Mande-Mandingo' - Bambara, Malinke, 
Diallonke, Sous sou and finally at the top the 
'Foulahs', including the Soninke. See also 
M. Park Travels in the Interior Districts of 
Africa, London, 1816, pp. 87-8 'The Foulahs of 
Bondou ... consider all the Negro natives as 
their inferiors and when talking of different 
nations always rank themselves among the white 
people.'
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The classification was both 'scientific' (i.e. 
based on observation of physical characteristics) 
and moralistic for although the Fulbe were regarded 
as being beautiful and clever(Fulbe women were 
particularly recommended as native wives for French 
administrators for both these reasons) there was 
also a sense in which they were seen to be too 
clever for their or anybody else's good.
Frobenius was the least equivocal of the moralisers 
as he drew a sharp distinction between the state-
forming but lazy 'Hamitic' peoples and the non-
state-forming but hard-working 'Ethiopic' peoples. (2) 
Others made: similar judgements. Tauxier, for 
example, writing in a journal pioneering the 'method 
of observation' in the infant social sciences 
declared that:
The Foulah is cunning and two-faced; 
superficially he will show a deferent, 
even obsequious submission to the French 
authority, but inside he will be determined 
to do nothing that he is commanded to do.
(1) Barot Guide pratique p. 330
(2) J.M. Ita 'Frobenius in West African History' 
JAH (4), 1972 pp. 673-88.
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He makes a lot of promises but keeps 
none of them. By contrast the ordinary 
black obeys and once he has promised, keeps 
his word ... In short, the Mande makes 
less objections to our authority and gives
us better services ...... The Foulah is
more intelligent and scholarly as a result 
of the superiority of his blood and the 
nordic (sic) influence ... He is more 
authoritarian and knows how to command in 
his family and in his state. This Foulah 
who is so intolerant of our authority, is 
very authoritarian in his own home ....
It is this quality which has made the 
Foulah capable of founding a small empire 
in the Fouta Djallon and which has made 
them dominate politically and militarily 
over their Mande neighbours.(1)
In a history of Guinea, published in 1911, the 
author described the pre-colonial administration of 
the Futa Djallon in the most unflattering way:
The shameful exploitation of the people 
became the principle of an administration 
which had forgotten that its primary task 
was the defence of the tribe. To this 
abuse of power the Peuhl replied with 
perfidy, lies and inertia all of which he 
considered as qualities. Intrigues, 
armed struggles and assassinations became 
increasingly frequent ... Thus Dochard 
could write of the feudal inhabitants of 
the Fouta-Djallon in 1817 that 'their 
distinctive character is cunning and two- 
facedness'. (2)
(1) Tauxier Le Noir pp. 191-92.
(2) Arcin Histoire de Guinee pp. 98-99
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The ability of the Fulbe to form states commanded 
respect from the French but their admiration was 
qualified by their insistence of on the one hand 
the near anarchy of the states and on the other 
of the Machiavellian virtues by which the state 
was created. Witness a monograph on the history 
of the cercle of Timbo written in 1908:
During all this history of the Fouta 
Djallon ... anarchy ruled supreme.
As a result of circumstance however, 
and partly due to the influence of an 
advanced religion, customs and traditions 
established themselves which finished by 
giving this society an organisation 
which was less rudimentary than those of 
other native peoples. Moreover there 
was nothing surprising in this; less 
primitive than most of the blacks, 
intelligent and double-dealing, as lazy 
as he is proud and greedy the Foula was 
bound to reserve an important place in 
his life for political affairs. (1)
The Fulbe were also generally described as being 
fervent Muslims. P. Guebhard, whilst the interim 
commandant of the cercle of Timbo wrote that 'The 
greatest part of the existence of a foulah is 
passed with the Coran in his hand, whether as a 
child bleating out verses, or as a talibe ...
(1) IFAN Fds Vieillard (F-D) 30 M. Maillet 
'Mcnographie du cercle Timbo' 1908.
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or finally as an old man thumbing through the 
yellowing pages of the family book in between the 
hours of prayer'. CD
Another French administrator wrote that;
All travellers to the Fouta have been 
struck by the depressive influence that 
religious practice seems to have on the 
Peuhl. Go to the mosque when the 
'calyo' calls the faithful to prayer.
You will see the natives going there 
walking slowly, muscles languid, back 
bent, shoulders hung and head low.
The expression on the face is fixed, 
the eye is dull and the mouth (Oh, 
that mouth I )  always open. It seems as 
though the blood has been drawn from their 
veins ... Look at them pray. Whether 
they say the words out loud or whether 
they whisper them ... not a muscle on 
their face moves. And when they tell 
their beads nothing can disturb them from 
their imperturbable gravity of thought. 
Truly they give the impression of being 
saintly men. (2)
(1) ANS 7 G 68 Guebhard to Canm't 
de la region du F-D 15.7.1903.
(2) C. Dupuch 'Essai sur 1'emprise 
religieuse chsz les Peulh du Fouta- 
Djallon' Annuare du Ccmite des Etudes 
Scientificrues et Historicrues de l'AOF 
1917 pp. 291-92, c.f. also
M.P. Delmond 'Un aspect de 1'Islam 
Peuhl :Dori' CHEAM (R) 1103, 1947 
who argued that the contemplative nature 
of the Fulbe was similar to that of the 
Bedouin.
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Some suggested that this attachment to Islam 
constituted a threat to the French. Capt. Normand, 
writing in 1902, warned that 'The marabout is slowly
creating a force which can only be hostile to us
and which to my mind will always be a worry for 
the future of French Africa. For let us not
forget the words of Bugeaud: 'Boil up the head of
a Christian and the head of a Muslim together for 
a week, the stocks will never mix.' (D
However, it should be said that the Fulbe of the 
Fouta Jallon were not invariably accused of 
religious fanaticism. Another essay written soon 
after the establishment of French rule noted that 
although music and singing were rare in the Futa 
this was not so much a result of fanaticism but 
rather of the puritanism of the Fulbe character. 
'Respectability' the author argued was one of the 
distinguishing features of a Fulbe village. (2)
(1) Capt. Normand, 'Notes sur la Guinee francaise*
RCBCAF 1902 p. 146. 5
(.2) J. Machat Les Rivieres du Sud et le Fouta-Di allon 
Paris, 1906 pp. 293-94; on respectability see 
also Caillie Vovaae I pp. 268-9 for an early 
description.
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According to the official guidebook to Guinea 
produced for the 1906 Marseilles colonial 
exhibition the Fulbe of the Futa were not in the 
least bit fanatical in their religion, and the 
author was pleased to note that the almamy openly 
drank wine and alcohol and enjoyed talking 
religion with Christians. Cl)
Finally a word should be said about the way in 
which the political organisation of the Futa 
Jallon as a whole was regarded by the French.
The existence of a military and religious 
aristocracy of a minority ethnic group, the Fulbe, 
alongside a subordinate and often completely 
enslaved population who performed all the manual 
labour not unreasonably reminded contemporary 
observers of what can loosely be called feudal 
society. It would perhaps be more accurate to 
say that they likened it to the pre-1789 situation 
in France - Marty, for example, entitled his 
chapter on the nineteenth century Futa Jallon the 
Ancien Regime. A positivist view of history
Cl) F. Rouget La Guinee, Corbeil, 1906 p. 172. c.f. 
see also Randau novels for warm approval 
for wine-drinking marabouts.
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demanded that there should be a 'third estate' 
to secure the progression of society from the 
absolutism of the Fulbe aristocracy to a more 
just system based on self-determination. However, 
in the absence of an obvious candidate for the 
third estate the French took it upon themselves 
to play the part, and the most explicit statement 
of such a doctrine is to be found in Ponty's 
politique des races circular. As we have seen in 
1897 the French - or at least the Governor-General - 
did not think that the time had come to introduce 
a social revolution into the affairs of the Futa 
Jallon. Ten years later official policy had 
changed - though as has been emphasised this did 
not necessarily mean that all chiefs of the 
Ancien Regime were out of a job - far from it. 
Nonetheless there existed at this time a very 
special sense of the mission civilisatrice - much 
more fundamental than the construction of schools, 
hospitals etc. - which related to the wish to 
engineer a social revolution in Africa, to bring 
in other words 1789 to the Futa Jallon.
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This has been a lengthy but necessary introduction 
to the events of 1909-11. Two main themes should 
be emphasised. Firstly, whatever may be said 
of the anarchy of th_e pre-colonial Futa Jallon it 
was a powerful and well organised state which the 
French had never conquered but which they had been 
able to control only by entering into the local 
power struggle against Bokar Biro. The loyalty 
and the value of their alliances were as a result 
far from certain, and, indeed, the French were very 
suspicious of many of their allies, especially 
Alfa Yaya. Secondly, there existed a whole string 
of stereotypes, based no doubt on reality but 
which also like all stereotypes ultimately confused 
rather than illuminated.
As early as 1899 the government in Guinea had been 
alerted to the possibility of an Islamic uprising. 
Noirot, the resident in the Futa Jallon, warned 
the Governor that Tierno Ibrahim, the Wali of 
N'Dama CD who had been given an important position 
by the Senegalese administration was causing Alfa 
Yaya trouble in Labe and that in the tradition of 
al Ha jj Umar, Ma Ba Diakhu and Mahmadu Lamine he
Cl) On Thiemo Ibrahim see Marty Guinee pp. 64-65.
He was exiled to Gabon in 1902.
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was planning to wage holy war against the French.(1) 
Again in 1900 the Governor was worried by rumours of 
Islamic rebellion in Kankan, rumours that were 
especially worrying in view of the labour 
difficulties on the recently started Conakry to 
Niger railway. (2) However, the administration must 
have been reassured in 1903 by answers it received 
from commandants de cercle to questions it had sent 
out concerning the state of Islam. Almost without 
exception the local commandants replied that Islam 
was not a serious threat to the French. (3)
However, in March 1909 a French administrator,
M. Bastie, was killed in an ambush and as a result 
the French became less complacent about Islam.
(1) ANS0M Guinee IV/6 Noirot to Lt. Gov. Guinee
26.5.1899.
(2) ANS 17 G 35 Lt. Gov. Guinee to Gov. Gen. A0F
30.6.1900. In two months in 1901 there were 
c. 4,000 deserters from the workforce for the 
railway, whose supervisors were accused of 
great brutality in their methods. See
J. Mangolte 'Le chemin de fer de Konakry au 
Niger' KFHQM 1968 pp. 37-105.
(3) ANS 7 G 68 Circular 1 Renseignements conoemant 
le mouvement musulman' n.d; replies frcm 
comnandants dated June and July 1903.
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The murder itself had a traumatic effect on the 
Europeans in Guinea. Marty described it as 'a 
unique event' in the history of the colony. (1)
At first it was assumed that the murder was 
committed for personal reasons as Bastie was a man 
of violent temperament, disliked the Fulbe and was 
willing to take bribes. However, personal vendetta 
was ruled out as a motive for the murder, which 
quickly came to be seen as an act inspired by 
religious fanaticism as suspicion fell on a 
marabout, Tierno Amadou Tijani, a member of the 
religious community of Missidi in the province of 
Goumba. (2)
The person most responsible for this line of 
argument was Mariani, the Inspector of Education, 
who happened to be on a mission in the Futa Jallon 
at the time. In particular he accused Tierno 
Aliou, the Wali, or saint, of Goumba of master­
minding an anti-French conspiracy throughout the 
Futa Jallon. Born around 1820, Tierno Aliou was 
an elderly man and apparently nearly blind when 
the Bastie murder took place. (3) He was born in
(1) Marty Guinee p. 77 & ANSOM Guin6e IV/9 'Rapport 
Pherivong' (1911.)
(2) ANSCM Guinee IV/9 'Rapport Bobichon' 16.6.1909.
(3) Marty Guinee pp. 69-77. The following paragraph 
is based on this account.
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the province of Ditinn in the Futa Jallon and was 
initiated into the Chadeliyya which had been 
introduced into the Futa by 'Ali le Soufi', a 
Fulbe from Labe, and which in the nineteenth 
century was the tariga with the largest following 
in the Futa. However by the beginning of the 
twentieth century it had lost ground both to the 
Qadiriyya and to the Umarien Tijaniyya. Having
got involved in the political in-fighting of the 
mid-nineteenth century Futa, Tierno Aliou moved 
from the centre of the Futa and around 1880 settled 
in Kindia where, bringing men and cattle, he was 
welcomed. His first contacts with the French 
date back to 1885 and from the start he was on the 
best of terms with the Europeans in Conakry. He 
then moved, with French permission, to Goumba where 
he attracted a large following especially from 
amongst the Hubbus - a disparate collection of 
people who for one reason or another had refused to 
integrate fully into the Futa state. This
!
following earned him the hostility of the local 
almamy of Timbo who intrigued with the Sussu 
against Tierno Aliou. However, benefitting from 
the French alliance Tierno Aliou was able to beat
(1) ibid pp. 57-60
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off the Sussu attacks, and the last decade of the 
nineteenth century was something of a golden age 
for the zawiya of Goumba. The missidi constructed 
by Tierno Aliou (1) and his followers became a 
religious centre for Lower Guinea and in a monastic 
atmosphere the daily routine in Goumba was dedicated 
to prayer and agriculture. From 1900 onwards 
Tierno Aliou was acknowledged as a saint - hence 
the name by which he was most commonly known, the 
'Wali of Goumba.'
The fact that he enjoyed good relations with the 
French seemed to be proven once again when he quickly 
handed over his disciple, Tierno Amadou Tijani, 
whom the French had identified as the murderer of 
Bastie. However, Mariani saw only fanaticism and 
intrigue at work in Goumba. A week after Bastie's 
murder he warned the commandant of Kindia that:
(1) Missidi in Fufulde means a place of prayer, 
c.f. IFAN Fds. Vieillard 'Monographie du 
cercle de Timbo' (1908) missidi ...
'une unit£ religieuse' & IFAN Fds. Vieillard (F-D) 
12 Vieillard notes 'Marga c'est la ou on mange ... 
C'est le marga qui est le lieu de nourriture, 
la missidi c'est la lieu de devotion envers Dieu.' 
Missidi was also the name of a village.
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| Although the people of this country are
very docile, unfortunately they all become 
dangerous and incapable of reason when 
under the pretext of religion they are 
encouraged to wage holy war against the 
infidel. Now the marabout of Goumbo 
is a past master of egging men on.
On leaving my residence yesterday he 
didn't stop shouting 'Allah Akhbar' in 
a loud voice as if he was leaving for 
holy war. Three times a day the vaults 
of the vast mosque echo with chants in 
honour of the prophet. I haven't come 
across anything like it elsewhere in AOF.
| To conclude, I tell you, something is
going on in the missidi. The Ouali's 
intentions may momentarily change but he 
must be closely watched. You must be 
careful of such a man agitating in such 
a fanatical environment where everybody 
obeys him blindly.(1)
The following day in another letter to the 
commandant of Kindia he regretted that the French 
'had foolishly allowed a sort of theocracy to 
develop in Missidi ... Death alone will rid us of 
this astute saint who is already very old and it's 
only after his death that we can seriously go about 
reducing the prestige and influence of his successors.' 
However, such prudence was not necessary outside the 
missidi and in other areas Mariani concluded, 'It 
is up to us to ruin his good reputation completely'. 
Such warnings were also telegrammed to the 
authorities in Conakry and Dakar.
(1) ANS 7 G 86 Mariani to Ooirm't Kindia 20.3.1909.
(2) ANS 7 G 86 Mariani to Ocmm't Kindia 21.3.1909, 
Mariani to Lt. Gov. Guin£e 10.4.1909, same to 
same 22.4.1909, see also 7 G 69 Mariani to 
Ponty 23.5.1909.
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In the wake of the Bastie murder, Liotard the 
Lt. Governor of Guinea, decided to send Bobichon, 
the Inspector of Native and Political Affairs on a 
tour of the cercles of Ditinn, Timbis, Labe and 
Yambering. Bobichon agreed that the missidi of 
the Wali of Goumba was a centre of religious 
fanaticism but he maintained that the murder of 
Bastie was the isolated act of a fanatical individual 
for which Tierno Aliou could not be held responsible. 
He further emphasised the uneasy relations based on 
fear and mutual suspicion which had developed 
between the French and the religious leaders of the 
Futa since the murder of Basti6. Liotard issued 
a circular to the local commandants asking for more 
information on the state of Islam and forwarded 
Bobichon's findings to Ponty, adding that he agreed 
with Bobichon's analysis, although he also stressed 
that Islam was more fervently practised and better 
organised in the Futa Jallon than in other parts 
of AOF.
Mariani, however, continued to be very preoccupied 
with the question of Islam in the Futa Jallon.
(1) ANS 7 G 86 Bobichon 'Rapport sur la mission 
politique dans la F-D' 16.6.1909, Lt. Gov.
Guinee July 1909.
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In two letters written at the end of July to the 
Governor-General he again stated his beliefs and 
fears. There was, he argued, no real danger in 
Guinea or anywhere else in AOF of a serious pan- 
Islamic revolt organised by the brotherhoods but, 
nonetheless, Islam could be a nuisance in the hands 
of certain individuals. 'In this time of social 
changes', he said, 'one would be wrong not to try 
and discover the political, economic or religious 
reasons which can lead men such as the Ouali of 
Goumba into becoming or attempting to become at 
once a temporal and a spiritual chief'. According 
to Mariani Islam was on the increase in Kindia as 
the Bambara and Sussu were forsaking their 
ancestral religions. Any satisfaction which the 
French may have felt about the moral and social 
improvement which, said Mariani, attended conversion 
to Islam soon went when 'entering the Missidi one 
realises with what little regard we are viewed by 
the natives who only have as much respect for us as 
the Ouali chooses to allow'. Mariani concluded 
that there were two imperatives: to create a 
medersa in Labe and to give more power to 
traditional chiefs to act as a counterweight to the 
likes of the Wali of Goumba.
(1) ANS 7 G 69 Mariani to Gov. Gen. AOF 28.7.1909 &
Mariani 'Notes sur 1'Islam en AOF. Les marabouts 
du cercle de Kindia.' 30.7.1909.
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Mariani's analysis of the social situation in the 
Futa struck a chord with the administration in 
Dakar. On the advice of Fournier, the head of 
the Bureau of Native Affairs, Ponty wrote to the 
Lt-Governor of Guinea about the issues raised by 
Mariani. He argued that what was happening to the 
Muslim populations of Guinea was similar to the 
pattern elsewhere in AOF where, he said, the 
French were attacking the position of certain 
privileged minorities who lived at the expense of 
the masses. The Muslim question was therefore 
a social question which required a great deal of 
thought and attention. A month later Ponty wrote 
again to Liotard to emphasise his view: 'To
maintain in the Futa Jallon the hegemony of the 
peuhl race is', he argued, 'to maintain with all 
its inconveniences the existence of the kingdom of 
the Almamys' . France needed to fight the
alliance of the aristocracy and the marabouts, and 
the most effective weapon available to the French 
was to eradicate slavery, the basis of the 
aristocratic and maraboutic wealth. Deprived of 
their wealth the grands commandements of the Fulbe
i
almamys would no longer be able to maintain their 
political hegemony, and each race would become 
its own master. Islam had been the only factor
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which had been able to unify the almamys ? but it was, 
said Ponty,
Islam based on slavery and we cannot allow 
it to prevail. The Islam which we protect, 
without actually helping its propaganda, is 
the modern Islam which does not permit 
tyranny and which abolishes captivity. (1)
All this was of course a familiar argument of the 
Ponty administration and was the essential feature 
of the stereotype of the mission civilisatrice 
discussed above. Superficially attractive, both 
as a description of the state of affairs and as a 
prescription for the remedy of social inequality, 
it was as we shall see deeply flawed in both 
respects.
(1) ANS 7 G 86 Fournier 'Note pour M. le Gov. Gen. 
de l'AOF' 15.9.1909, Ponty to Lt. Gov. Guinea
25.9.1909. For a discussion of slavery in the 
Futa Jallon see Sanneh Jakhanke chapters 6 & 9 
and Suret-Canale 'Tbuba' pp. 64-66. Touba's 
population fell by several thousand as a result 
of slave exoduses in the first decade of the 
century.
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Islam continued to be a major preoccupation in
1910. In April the political report from the 
cercle of Mamu warned of 'A veritable clerical
peril which has found a well prepared terrain in 
the hostile dispositions of the foula leaders, 
discontented by our intervention'. The marabouts - 
led by the Wali of Goumba - were all in regular 
correspondence and often read out each other's 
letters at Friday prayers. Even if the contents 
of the letters were not subversive they were still 
dangerous simply because, the argument ran, the 
native Africans held the written word in such 
reverence. 'The letters open the door to 
excitement or crime, to insurrection, to the 
preaching of holy war. That's why one cannot be 
too careful about maraboutism and even if it is 
true that black Muslims, even the foula, are not 
fanatics, the same cannot be said of the 
professional marabouts'. ^  Ponty warned the 
Lt. Governor of Guinea that, 'The example of two 
or three major Mauritanian marabouts whose very 
real services to us are known throughout AOF, 
should not delude us about the temporal role that 
certain religious notables, profiting from what
(1) ANS 7 G 69 'Rapport politique mois d'Avril, 
cercle Mamou 1910'
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they imagine to be weakness on our part and which 
in reality is tolerance, would like to play, serving 
as intermediaries between us and the mass of 
natives.' (1) In his instructions to Guy, the 
new Lt. Governor of Guinea, Ponty spoke of the 
reported maraboutic activity in the cercle of 
Mamu and continued:
We must put an end to this Islamic 
clericalism, which is a vulgar 
deformation of the Muslim doctrine.
Responsible for the assassination of 
the Administrator Bastie, it will cause 
a lot of damage if we leave it free.
Of course, we shouldn't imagine that it 
will cause a generalised movement 
against the French but it does increase 
the natural suspicion of the native.
Through the contagiousness of the 
fanaticism it inspires it could, if we 
don't take it seriously, cause numerous 
local troubles. (2)
Specifically French attention was directed at 
Missidi and on the ageing Wali of Goumba whose 
every action was now being ascribed a sinister 
ulterior motive. Marty wrote later that 'The 
most ordinary and benign statements of the 
marabout were interpreted in a tendentious way'. (3)
(1) ANS 7 G 99 Gov. Gen. AOF to Lt. Gov. Guinee.
17.10.1910.
(2) ANSCM 5 PA Gov. Gen. AOF to Lt. Gov. Guinee
1.11.1910.
(3) Marty Guinee p. 79.
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Yet there was really very little evidence that 
Tierno Aliou had moved from his life-long position
as a supporter of the French. Indeed, M. Sasias,
i
l
■ the commandant of Kindia who at the end of 1910 was
sent to investigate the Missidi of Goumba admitted
I
i
! that,
I
|
| I have never had the proof that he has acted
\ against us or that he took part whatsoever
in the assassination of M. Bastie ... The
I foulah of Goumba seem absolutely tranquil,
and the Wali whose body is covered with 
ulcerated wounds finds it impossible to 
leave his house or even to get up. His
health is very poor and in the Missidi every
one expects him to die soon. Certainly no 
one has been able to give me information as 
to his intentions but I doubt that having 
been in such pain for so long he has thought 
about stirring up agitation amongst the 
foulah of this and of neighbouring cercles.
But Sasias added as a qualification, 'It seems 
that he is surrounded by six or seven thousand men, 
all well armed and ready to march and that he 
possesses large numbers of weapons. Finally I 
have seen for myself the swiftness with which the 
smallest orders are carried out'. (1) Sasias made 
a further visit - taking all his family - and again 
found the Wali apparently loyal to the French.
(1) ANSQM 5 PA Sasias to Lt. Gov. Guinee 14.1.1910.
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In July the assistant administrator of Kindia, 
Roberty, went to investigate rumours of arms 
purchases and reported that the Wali was friendly 
but suffering from bronchitis and a thigh wound 
that wouldn't heal. ^
However, French anxieties increased as the year 
drew on and the date of Alfa Yaya's return from 
exile drew nearer. The administration in Conakry 
would have preferred to have postponed Alfa Yaya's 
return, but to each of their letters making this 
request Ponty replied that a postponement was not 
possible for legal reasons. it should be
remembered that 1910 was a year of serious economic 
and political crisis in Guinea. The collapse of 
wild rubber deprived the colony of a major source 
of wealth. French traders' resentment was 
focussed on the Lebanese community whose political 
attitudes were also suspected by Ponty and Guy.
It is against this background of widespread anxiety 
and uncertainty that the fears relating to Alfa Yaya
(1) M. Verdat 'Le Ouali de Goumba' Etudes Guineennes,
3, 1949, pp. 33-35.
(2) See correspondence in ANS 7 G 97.
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and his son Aguibu should be seen. (1)
In December 1910 Ponty was in Guinea, and Tierno 
Aliou was summoned to appear before the Governor- 
General and Guy in Kindia, but he refused. Just 
as Cheikh Amadu Bamba's refusal to pay his respects 
to the Governor had been interpreted as a sign of 
open revolt so too was Tierno Aliou's action 
interpreted in the most sinister way p o s s i b l e . (2)
For Marty, too, it represented a turning point:
'It is at this moment and at this moment only that 
I would place the abandon by Tierno Aliou of his 
traditional policy of friendship and collaboration 
with the French. The latter abandoned him and even 
let it be understood that they were about to deal
(1) On wild rubber see P.A. Mark 'Economic and 
religious change among the Diola of Boulot 
(Casamanoe) ' unpublished Ph D thesis, Yale, 1976 
pp. 81-90 & on attitudes to Lebanese see 0. Goerg 
1 Echanges, reseaux, marches. L'impact colonial 
en Guinee (mi-XIXeme-1913) 1 These de 3eme cycle, 
Paris VII, 1981 p. 525.
(2) ANSCM Guinde IV/6 Pherivong 'Rapport ...'
274
with him very severely1. Certainly from
December events developed rapidly.
By chance Mariani, who had been chiefly responsible 
for sowing doubts about the loyalty of the Wali of 
Goumba in 1909, was once again on a mission of 
inspection in the Futa Jallon and once again he 
painted a disturbing picture of the situation. 
Sensibly he recognised that one of the major problems 
was lack of contact between the French administration 
and their subjects. 'In general', he wrote, 'the 
population of the Fouta, indeed the population of 
Guinea hardly know us at all. That Mariani
contributed to a better mutual understanding is 
doubtful. He was disturbed by the fact that his 
porters carried him from town to town singing the 
praises of the Prophet Mohammed.(3) On another 
occasion he argued that,
(1) Marty Guinee, p. 81.
(2) ANS J 12 'Rapport de m. l'Inspecteur sur les cercles 
de Ditinn & Pita.' 8.12.1910.
(3) ANS 7 G 69 'Extrait d'un rapport de m. Mariani en 
mission en Guinee, 21.11.1910.
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In adopting the Muslim religion the 
blacks of Guinea have in large measure 
renounced the amusements of their 
ancestors and since I left Kindia I have 
very rarely heard music being played ... 
Only exceptionally in the isolated hamlets 
do the Foulah still enjoy themselves and 
the youngsters take pleasure in disturbing 
the peace of the household with their 
joyous songs ... Above all it is the 
sound of the muezzin and the recitation 
of prayers which troubles the silence 
of the Fouta night.
Mariani was also distressed to learn how popular 
Samori still was after his stay in Kankan.(1)
The following month he reported to Ponty that,
'The action of the marabouts is seldom favourable 
to us and those amongst them who would like to help 
us in our efforts would gradually lose their 
prestige if they did so ... I do not see in the 
loyalty to us of which some give proof anything 
other than a desire to obtain a few a d v a n t a g e s ' .  (2)
Mariani, however, had an axe to grind. As 
Inspector of Public and Muslim Education he was a 
firm believer in the importance of French secular
(1) ANS J 12 'Rapport de M. L'Inspecteur sur 
Kouroussa ... ' 19.1.1911.
(2) ANS J 91 Mariani to Gov. Gen. AOF, 10.2.1911.
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education and of the medersa. Just as his 
frequent polemics against the mission schools 
should be seen as part of the campaign for 
secular schools so too should his tirades against 
the Muslim leaders of the Futa Jallon be seen as 
a means of highlighting the urgent need for a 
medersa in the Futa Jallon. The medersa was
proposed as the only solution to a problem, (i.e. 
the spread of Islam) which French negligence had 
already allowed to go too far. Having visited 
the cercles of Pita and Ditinn Mariani concluded 
that, 'Unable to eradicate Islam we should try to 
channel it, and the present moment would seem to 
be the most opportune to create a"medersa"
However, Ponty and Mariani could not agree on 
a suitable location for the new medersa, and the 
scheme was forgotten. (2)
(1) ANS J 12 Mariani 'Rapport sur les cercles 
de Ditinn & Pita' 8.12.1910.
(2) ANS 7 G 69 Fournier 'Note pour M. le GG' 4.8.1909, 
Ponty to Lt. Gov. Guinea 25.8.1909; 'Note pour 
M. le chef du cabinet du GG' March 1910.
Mariani wanted the medersa in Labe but Ponty
and Fournier favoured the Jahkanke centre of 
Touba, whose scholarly atmosphere they ccmpaned 
to the medieval Sorbonne.
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Despite official misgivings Alfa Yaya returned to 
his native Guinea in December of 1910 and swore an 
oath of loyalty to France. In return he was 
accorded a pension and allowed to reside in Labe.
At first the administration thought that the ex-king 
of Labe would not cause any trouble but when his 
son, Modi Aguibu, returned from exile at the end 
of the year Alfa Yaya's attitude appeared to change. 
In January he protested at not being reinstated as 
chief of Labe and he was suspected of getting in 
contact with leading marabouts and chiefs from 
neighbouring Sierra Leone and to be plotting against 
the French. So, early in February Alfa Yaya 
together with his son Modi Aguibu and his 
counsellor Umaru Koumba were all arrested.
Alfa Yaya was shortly afterwards sentenced to a 
ten year prison sentence in exile. As Guy 
explained to Ponty Alfa Yaya's return in 1910 was a 
major political event in the colony:
His return preoccupied not only Alfa Yaya's 
family but also the aristocracy of the entire 
country, who anticipated it eagerly. The 
Foulahs saw in their ex-chief a power whom 
they could use as a counter-weight to our 
authority. For his parents and friends he 
was a protector. The notables found in his 
return yet another element for their 
perpetual intrigues. The marabouts, despite 
taking care to disguise their opinions
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favoured him and it is certain that it 
is on them that Alfa Yaya's party would 
rely, in order to recover their sovereignty.^)
Ponty reported to Paris that:
Alfa Yaya, blinded by his religious 
fanaticism and his feudal mind learnt 
nothing from his contact with us in 
Dahomey ... It is therefore of the highest 
political importance for us to eject from 
the Fouta Djallon all the militant elements 
liable to obstruct the work of emancipation 
that we are undertaking in this country. 
Given the nature of Islam in the Fouta, 
the excessive credulity and social 
nervousness of the Peuhl and the existence 
of links between Muslim groups from one end 
to the other of AOF, the presence of Alfa 
Yahia and his son Aguibou, not just in 
Guinea but even in AOF would enable his 
partisans to maintain their secretive 
agitation ... A moral embarrassment would 
continue to weigh down upon the populations 
who are quite willing to rally to our 
cause if we protect them against their 
credulity. (2)
Thus the peculiar logic of the French vision of the 
civilising mission spiced up with more general 
anxieties about the international situation, 
particularly the course of events in Morocco, was 
leading to a situation in which conflict between
(1) ANSCM 5 PA Guy to Ponty 21.2.1911. see also 
Marty Guinee pp. 49-51.
(2) ANS 7 G 97 Ponty to Min. Col. 7.4.1911.
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the French and the former ruling elite of the 
Futa Jallon would soon be inevitable.
Soon after Alfa Yaya and Aguibu were exiled for 
the second time, M. Pherivong, the Inspector 
General of the Colonies who also happened to be in 
Guinea on a mission, published a lengthy report 
containing his views on French policy in the past 
towards Alfa Yaya and the marabouts. (1) Pherivong 
went back to Bastie's murder describing how French 
suspicions came to light on Tierno Aliou. He 
criticised Liotard for not having instructed 
Bobichon to look specifically for the responsibility 
of religious elements in Bastie's murder - Bobichon, 
it will be recalled concluded that the murder was an 
isolated act of religious fanaticism and not part 
of an orchestrated campaign against the French. 
Luckily, according to M. Pherivong, Mariani was in 
the area at the time and he could not believe that 
the murder was a simple act of fanaticism. Mariani 
pointed the finger at the ageing Wali of Goumba. 
Seemingly innocent actions now took on a sinister 
light. It was recalled that shortly before the
(1) ANS 4 G 12 'Rapport ... concemant la situation
politique de la Guinee a l'epoque du 25 Fevrier
1911.
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murder Tierno Aliou had asked for permission for 
armed men to assemble in Goumba in order to go 
elephant hunting - permission which had readily- 
been granted at the time but it was now realised 
that the elephant hunt was a ruse, a cunning way 
of assembling armed men in order to attack the 
French. Tierno Aliou denounced Amadu Tijani, 
the man suspected of killing Bastie, but this 
again was simply in order to fool the French.
Tierno Aliou was always the first to pay his taxes 
but he did so out of cunning not loyalty. He
refused to go and pay his respects to the 
Governor-General in Kindia and through his disciples 
who worked as interpreters and secretaries in the 
French administration he was able to spy upon the 
French and keep one step ahead of their moves. 
Pherivong noted that, 'If all the other Karamokos 
are of the same metal one can see with what 
dangerous men the administration, whose only 
auxiliaries are of dubious loyalty, has to deal'.
The situation was exacerbated by the return of 
Alfa Yaya. Almost immediately he started 
organising the import of arms and soon 50 guns a 
day were reported to be pouring into Guinea from 
across the border with Haute-Gambie in Senegal.
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The arms were hidden by the marabouts,
who were said to have formed an 
association which was designed to 
combat the French influence, whose 
final demise had long been prophesied, 
and which would profit from the return 
of Alfa Yaya to realise its goal. 
Secret meetings called by emissaries 
from Touba were said to have been 
held as far away as Rio de Nunez to 
persuade the Muslims to fight. But 
they refused. All the documents 
agree on the fact that Guinea was 
being worked by Islamic propaganda.
Mariani, said Pherivong, explained how the marabout 
network functioned, but his warnings were not taken 
seriously until the return of Alfa Yaya in 
December 1910 and the appearance of fresh evidence 
of an Islamic conspiracy. Pherivong concluded 
therefore that the unrest of February 1911 was 
without doubt a continuation of the unrest of 
March 1909.
Guy wholeheartedly agreed with the conclusions of 
the Inspector and in the space made available for 
his comments on the report he restated in the 
clearest and most unequivocal terms the way in 
which his administration viewed the situation in 
the Fouta. It is worth quoting at length for it
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summarises many of the themes discussed so far in 
this chapter:
Indeed, wrote Guy, it is not a question of 
isolated acts perpetrated by the members 
of the Foulah aristocracy who regret the 
disappearance of their former power, but 
rather it is an organised movement in 
which are involved all the karamokos and 
the marabouts of the country, whose 
boundaries unfortunately are not just 
those of French Guinea ... and if one 
wants to go back to the mysterious sources 
of this permanent conspiracy one should 
recognise the commands which the Muslim 
prophets receive from Mauritania and 
from even further afield, Morocco and 
Tibesti. The generosity we showed 
towards the Ouali of Goumba at the time 
of Bastie's assassination has made this 
redoubtable and hypocritical chief into 
a powerful enemy who thinks to deal as an 
equal with the Governor-General, and 
consents, whilst biding his time before 
showing his true colours, to execute 
his orders on condition that he doesn't 
have to enter into direct relations with 
him. Such a situation cannot carry on 
without giving the population of the 
Fouta-Djallon ... the impression that we 
are afraid of them and that we do not 
dare to act. Indeed, the population 
of the Fouta Djallon have never been easy 
to handle because they have never been 
made aware of our strength and they have 
never seen our soldiers. Our policy 
which since the beginning of our 
installation has consisted of obtaining 
their submission and getting them to pay 
taxes through the intermediary of a big 
chief, grossly overpaid for his services 
and assured that all his crimes would go 
unpunished, has been a disastrous policy. 
Acting thus we have gained time but there 
comes a time and that time is now when 
appetites reveal themselves and ambitions 
stir and when uprisings are prepared in the 
shadows.
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I therefore believe that the Fouta should 
be occupied militarily, that the leaders 
of this movement should be arrested without 
weakness, and then when we have struck down 
the leaders that we should penetrate not 
just the country but the souls of the 
natives as well by means of the doctor, 
schoolteacher, roads and railways and 
finally by means of a more numerous and 
active administration than exists today 
in this almost unknown country. In doing 
so we will avoid the pain of having at a 
certain moment, perhaps not so far away, 
of having to repress a full-blooded revolt 
against our poorly understood and 
mistrusted authority. (1)
Recruitment of schoolteachers and doctors could only 
be increased slowly but Guy was already poised to 
strike the first blow for the French Revolution in 
Guinea by arresting the chiefs of this 'permanent 
conspiracy' in the Futa Jallon. The time of 
pussyfooting with hypocritical marabouts was over, 
now there was going to be a bit of action.
On 7th March Guy gave the following instructions to 
Capt. Tallay of the 7th Company of the 2nd Regiment 
of Tirailleurs;
The Fouta-Djallon is a mountainous area 
inhabited by natives of the Peuhl race, 
known under the name of Foulah in the
(1) ANS 4 G 12 'Rapport Pherivong ... Suite donne 
a la verification par le Gouv. Guy' 26.2.1911.
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colony. This population is Muslim and its 
religious faith, its hope in the definitive 
and imminent triumph of the laws of the 
prophet and, in consequence, their aversion - 
often even their hatred - for whites who do 
not have the same beliefs, are all carefully 
nourished by numerous marabouts whose 
influence is sometimes considerable.
Since Alfa Yaya's return, Guy continued, the 
situation had progressively deteriorated to the 
point that it was now necessary to arrest the 
ringleaders, namely Karamoko Sankoun and Ba Gassama 
in Touba and Tierno Aliou, the Wali of Goumba.
From Guy's subsequent description of the Wali 
if appeared that his health had improved 
dramatically, for this man who had recently been 
described as being on his deathbed was now 
portrayed as 'an alert old man who goes horseriding 
daily and who would be capable of riding 50 to 60 kms 
in one stretch if his safety depended on it.' On 
22nd March Tallay was warned that the Wali was 
surrounded by a force of 500 able-bodied men in 
the Missidi which had been specially fortified in 
anticipation of an imminent attack and that, 
therefore, the greatest care should be taken in 
making the arrests. On 29th March on the eve of 
the planned arrest there were three detachments of 
76, 53 and 38 men camped around the Missidi ready
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to make the arrest early the next day. However, 
the following morning Capt. Tallay decided on 
impulse to arrest the Wali using only a small force 
of men, but once inside the encampment he and 
twelve of his men were all killed. There was then 
a fierce three and a half hour battle between the 
rest of the 7th Company and the defenders of the 
Missidi. The battle was finally ended after a 
French sergeant 'showing heroic courage' set fire 
to the village which was completely destroyed.
The French forces did not suffer any further 
casualties but over 300 of their opponents were 
killed. U)
It is not certain that the Wali was in the village 
at the time of the attack (2) but a price was 
immediately put on his head and Sussu chiefs were 
employed by Guy to help the French track down the
(1) ANS 1 D 174 'Rapport d'ensemble etabli par le 
Capt. Lanssu, de 1'infant, coloniale a la suite 
de 1'affaire de Goumba, le 30.3.1911'contains 
detailed account of military proceedings, 
including copies of all Guy's instructions, 
see ANSOM Guinee IV/9 Guy to Ponty for 'heroic 
courage' & description of battle.
(2) Verdat 'Le Ouali de Goumba'
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Wali and his followers. Ponty sent Guy an extra
company of tirailleurs to contribute to the show 
of strength and a police tour of the Futa J a l l o n .  ( 2 )  
However, Ponty emphasised to the Colonial Ministry 
that the importance of the incident should not be 
exaggerated and that it was due to clumsiness and 
lack of caution on the part of Capt. Tallay. A 
few days later he again played down the incident. 
Although he did not think that it would have a 
serious repercussion it was nonetheless, he said, 
yet another example of the problem of religious 
fanaticism in West Africa:
One must not forget that religious 
fanaticism pushed as far as the complete 
destruction of the personality puts in 
the hands of the marabouts men who obey 
them blindly and who are prepared, if 
ordered, to sacrifice themselves. Very 
fortunately the rivalry which exists 
between the religious chiefs forces them 
to act in isolation. There is no doubt 
that a suitable policy can win us the 
support of the least compromised. For 
if for the mass of the foulahs only the 
religious question is at stake, for the 
marabouts it is really a question of 
ameliorating or at least of maintaining 
their material situation which has 
inevitably been affected by our domination. 
We can furthermore count on the devotion 
of the Soussou population, the enemies 
of the Foulah.
(1) ANS 1 D 174 'Rapport d1 ensemble ... du chef de 
bataillon, Boin' 18.7.1911 for details of 
police tour. The report argued in favour of
a policy of divide and rule & supporting younger 
chiefs against older ones.
(2) ANSCM Guinee IV/9 Ponty to Min. Col. 31.3.1911, 
and same to same 7.4.1911.
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There should not have been any real danger of the 
colonial Ministry forgetting the problem of 
religious fanaticism or the official explanation 
of why the marabouts were hostile to the French 
for they were arguments that were regularly 
rehearsed at every available occasion.
In Guinea, however, the situation was more 
complicated than the description given to Paris by 
Ponty. The deaths of the two European officers, 
Capt. Tallay and Lt. Bornand, deeply worried the 
European population of the colony. Guy, who 
arrived in Goumba in the middle of the battle, and 
who accompanied the corpses back to Conakry 
reported that at the station of Kindia, 'All the 
European population ... were waiting on the 
platform in order to show their solidarity in such 
painful circumstances 1. The dead African 
tirailleurs were buried in Kindia but the bodies
of the European officers were taken on for burial 
in Conakry where once again crowds of Europeans 
gathered to pay their r e s p e c t s H o w e v e r ,  European 
mourning soon acquired political overtones. On 
15th April a Conakry-based paper published an 
editorial article under the title of 'The Truth 
about the Fouta-Djallon Affair'. Having stated
(1) ANSCM Guinee IV/9 Guy to Ponty 1.4.1911.
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that the 'Goumba massacre is merely a tragic 
episode in the Alpha Yaya affair, whose beginnings 
take us back five years' the article went on to 
comment on the succession of L t .-Governors who had 
passed through the colony. Frezouls was praised 
for having exiled Alfa Yaya and for having laid 
the foundations of 'une Guinee saine, grande et 
prospere' but Roume, so the article ran, under­
estimated the 'Foulah peril', obstructed Frezouls 
so that 'the results of the personal policy of the 
Governor-General are so nefarious that five years 
later, all our Fouta is up in arms and the commerce 
of the colony brought to a standstill' . Frezouls* 
successor, Richard, was dismissed as a lackey of 
Roume. Poulet, the interim successor, did not 
have time to realise his good intentions and Liotard 
had been too hesitant towards Alfa Yaya and was 
partly responsible for the Goumba massacre. Guy was 
credited with having started well and acted against 
the Muslims with courage.^ Guy was not, however, 
treated so kindly by two articles appearing in May 
in Annales Coloniales in which he was accused of
having given Tallay last minute instructions to go
(1) ANSOM Guinee IV/9 L'ACF: L'Echo de la Cote
Occidentale d 'Afrique.' 15.4.1911. The article 
was written by the paper's editor, L. Temaux.
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unarmed into the Missidi and so to a near certain 
death, d) Similar charges appeared the following 
month in another Paris-based weekly La France 
d 1Outre-Mer in which under the heading of 'The 
Truth about the Goumba Massacre: The Balance
Sheet of a Whimsical and Arbitrary Administration 
in French Guinea1 it accused Guy, without actually 
ever naming him, of short sightedness and of 
having been in complicity with Tierno Aliou. The
accusations against Guy were peculiarly virulent 
and it called for Guy's removal. (2) The 
investigations into the 'Goumba affair' were 
causing embarrassment all round and everybody was 
looking hard for a scapegoat. Guy for his part 
was not without his supporters. The articles 
written in Annales Coloniales met with a swift 
protest from, amongst others, the Conakry 'Comite 
Union Sportive', the members of the'Cercle de Conakry', 
the Conakry 'Grand Orient', the Conakry Chamber of 
Commerce and from all the members of the 'Commission 
Municipale' all of whom sent telegrams in defence of 
Guy. (3) Guy also counted Ponty, Pherivong, the
(1) ANSQM 5 PA Annales Coloniales 12.5.1911 & 19.5.1911.
(2) ANSQM Guinee IV/9 France d'Outre-Mer 13.6.1911 &
20.6.1911.
(3) Telegrams in ANSCM 6 PA.
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Conakry paper L 1AOF and August Terrier, chairman of 
the 'Comite de l'Afrique francaise' amongst his 
supporters and claimed that the campaign against him 
was being orchestrated by Poulet, Bobichon and the 
paper Annales Coloniales. Guy's defence proved
effective and towards the end of the year he was not 
only promoted but also made an Officer of the Legion 
of Honour, a sign which he took as final proof that 
his job was safe. (2)
The personal campaign against Guy is yet another 
factor which has to be included in the Goumba affair 
and serves as a reminder of the omnipresence of 
politics - both high and low. France and Islam are 
the two main protagonists in this thesis but within 
'France' and within 'Islam' there were a multitude of 
conflicts.
Tierno Aliou/ meanwhile, having fled to the 
neighbouring colony of Sierra Leone, was arrested 
by the British authorities in the second week of
(1) IF Terrier Guy to Terrier 5.6.1911, 3.7.1911, 30.10.1911 
See also ANSCM Guinfee IV/9 Ponty to Min. Ool. 11.7.1911 
for defence of Guy against accusations frcm the military
(2) IF Terrier 5900 Guy to Terrier 30.10.1911.
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April and by the end of June all the extradition 
formalities had been accomplished so that the 
Wali of Goumba could be brought to trial in 
Conakry, d)
Concrete evidence against Tierno Aliou was lacking.
A prisoner captured after the destruction of the 
Missidi was reported to have been carrying a message 
written by Tierno Aliou urging the murder of 
Europeans, and, when pressed, the prisoner also 
admitted that Tierno Aliou had an efficient spy 
network based on loyal disciples in the employ of 
the French administration. (2) Such confessions 
seemed to confirm the conclusions reached in 
Pherivong's report in February. However, as in 
other attempts to prove the existence of an Islamic 
conspiracy proofs were in short supply. Instead 
the French relied on innuendo, and chief amongst 
the basic suppositions behind French thinking was 
the belief that the Fulbe were not to be trusted.
In his political report for the month of April the 
administrator of the poste of Touba wondered,
(1) ANSQM Guinee IV/9 Ponty to Min. Col. 11.4.1911 
& same to same 29.6.1911.
(2) ANSQM 5 PA Ccnm11 cercle Ditinn to Guy 3.4.1911.
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'What goes on in their minds? ... One can never say - 
Hypocritical and cunning they know how to hide their 
feelings', d) Sasias explained how he and all 
his predecessors had been taken in by Tierno Aliou's 
show of loyalty: 'With all the cunning of which
a foulah is capable he was able to fool the 
commandants de cercles, make himself appear harmless 
and so spread his influence throughout the region'.
In retrospect Sasias could clearly see that the 
Wali of Goumba's elephant hunt and his swift 
denunciation of the murderer of Bastie were mere 
ruses, and although Sasias was still surprised that 
the murderer, even when under interrogation, had 
never even indirectly implicated his old master 
in the crime, nonetheless he was now sure that the 
Wali was 'the true instigator of Bastie's murder'. d)
The other basic supposition in French thinking was 
that there was a widespread Islamic conspiracy 
generally and that specifically in the Futa Jallon 
Islam was peculiarly hostile to the French. Thus
(1) ANS 7 G 99 'Rap. pol. ' Avril, cercle Kade, 
poste de Tbuba.'
(2) ANSCM 5 PA 'Rapport de m. le conm't de cercle
de Kindia sur les evenements qui se sort produits 
dans le Goumba foulah ...' 15.5.1911.
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in the April report from Touba the administrator 
wrote that,
The Foulah is in general very superstitious.
They have a blind confidence in the gris-gris 
which are confected by the marabouts, who 
make a fortune from them. The influence 
of the marabout is limitless. For us he is 
an irreducible enemy whom we must put in a 
position where he cannot possibly do us any 
harm.
Guy recalled the warnings he had been given by Ponty 
about the circulation of Mauritanian marabouts and 
the increasingly widespread dissemination of 
pamphlets in Arabic. 'The pamphlets are generally 
written in vague terms but all prophesy the arrival 
of an unknown Mahdi, and for the natives of the 
Fouta Djallon this, as they were told each Friday 
in the mosques, could be no other than Tierno Aliou, 
the famous Ouali of Goumba'. An article in the
newspaper L 1AOF gave a melodramatic account of the 
events of 30th March for which the reader was given 
as 'general background information' the astonishing 
fact that 'The disciples of Scheck Saad Bou form a 
vast brotherhood in West Africa. The hatred of the
(1) ANS 7 G 99 'Rap. pol. Avril, cercle Kade, poste Touba.
(2) ANSCM 5 PA Guy to GGAOF 8.6.1911.
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white man is the unique aim of their activities'. 
Tierno Aliou, the article continued, thanks to 
his spy network knew all about the plans to arrest 
him and so he laid a carefully-planned ambush.
When Capt. Tallay and his men entered the Missidi,
'All the village shouts "Allah-ou-Akhbar" with 
great fervour; that's the war hymn ... there is a 
precipitous rush onto the whites; its holy war.
The officers' bodies are mutilated, their mouths 
are stuffed with their cut-off sexual parts. The 
tirailleurs are also wounded horrendously'. (1)
Pherivong, still in the colony, reported to his 
superiors in the rue Oudinot that the recent events 
showed that it was no longer possible to deny the 
existence of an Islamic problem. He argued that 
the surest solution lay in the spread of the French 
language, 'the best method of combatting the 
activities of the marabouts about whom we are poorly 
informed since between them and us there is no contact 
except through interpreters who are their own 
pupils.'(2) Nowhere was the insecurity of the French
(1) ANS 7 G 99 'Reconstruction inedite du massacre de
Goumba' L'AOF 27.5.1911 casualty figures given
in this article. French killed 15, Fulbe 1,028.
(2) ANSQM Guinee IV/9 Pherivong to Min.Col. 14.6.1911.
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more obvious than in their fears about having to 
rely on untrustworthy, even downright hostile, 
intermediaries. The role of interpreters in the 
Goumba affair was an important one: it matters
little in the end whether or not the French were 
being spied upon - it was certainly very possible - 
what really counts is that they believed they were.
The Goumba affair reached its climax in the trial 
of Tierno Aliou in September in the Palais de 
Justice in Conakry. Unfortunately the only records 
available of the case are the press reports in the 
Conakry paper L 1AOF (D As we have already seen 
this paper was much given to journalistic flourish, 
often at the expense of the truth. If it is not 
too heretical for an historian to say so the * truth' 
in this particular court case does not much matter, 
it is the atmosphere that matters. Thus we learn 
that at the opening of the trial ... 'On the balcony 
of the Palais de Justice are the ladies, come to
(1) The fact that the newspaper accounts are the sole 
source is confirmed by Verdat 'Le Ouali' p.60. 
Verdat was a former archivist and presumably had 
free access to archives. The following account 
is based on newspaper reports 20.9.1911 - 
30.9.1911 which can be found in ANS 7 G 99 &
ANSQM Guinee IV/9
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witness this spectacle. Despite the fact that it 
is morning, they are very well dressed. If the 
object of their curiosity was not so solemn, one 
could believe that one was at a revue or some sort 
of show'. In the next few days the prosecution 
based their case on the official reports from 
which we have already quoted. Mariani's reports, 
in particular, were of crucial importance. Sasias 
gave evidence that he had always distrusted 
Tierno Aliou saying that he had always considered 
him a stirrer. The judge consistently refused 
to accept evidence that pointed to the Wali's 
innocence. On the last day of the trial the 
courtroom was again full - 200 Europeans including 
60 'Ladies' - had come to hear the verdict. The 
Chief Prosecutor summed up his case. 'He was', 
the paper reported, 'by turn moving, ironical, biting 
and always eloquent. A merciless accuser, he put 
his long experience of criminal affairs, at the 
service of the society which he represented and 
which he sought to defend'. M. Facciendi, the 
Counsel for the Defence and a young lawyer, 'put 
his case splendidly. He was as eloquent as one 
could hope for and right to the end, right to the 
very last minute he put all his efforts into saving 
his client. He pleaded with an energetic desire
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to win and truly it required an unshakeable 
conviction on the part of the court for it not to 
be convinced1. Facciendi decried the press 
campaign against the Fulbe and the lack of positive 
proof against Tierno Aliou who had paid his taxes 
right up to 28th March. He had only been appointed 
as lawyer six days before the trial began and so, 
arguing that his client had acted in self-defence 
when he saw that a whole company of tirailleurs had 
been sent to arrest him, he demanded an acquittal.
In order to dispel doubts about his loyalties,
M. Facciendi ended by declaiming that 'I am not a 
lover of Negroes but a lover of justice for 
Negroes'. He pleaded in vain, and the Wali was 
sentenced to death.
That the trial was a mockery is, of course, beyond 
doubt. It is rather pathetic to think of Tierno 
Aliouf a man in his eighties who had spent most 
of the latter part of his life as a loyal and 
dutiful French subject, being brought to trial in 
the pomp and splendour of the Palais de Justice for 
a crime which he may not have committed and without 
any chance of defending himself, for anything that 
he said or was said on his behalf, simply would not 
have been believed, because, as everybody knew, the
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Fulbe were cunning schemers and not to be 
trusted. It is also shocking to realise the 
extent of the French 'overkill' during their 
counter-attack on the Missidi, but such responses 
were common in this early colonial period. (1)
What was perhaps less common was to stage a full- 
scale European-style trial in order to judge the 
accused whose guilt in the nature of things was 
a pre-established and known 'fact'. Why bother?
Mock trials like sham elections clearly serve a 
basic function of providing at least an appearance 
of justice - o r ,  as the case may be, democracy - 
which the conventions of 'civilisation' require 
to be preserved.
But the trial of the Wali of Goumba was more than 
a mere exercise of cosmetic justice cooked up for 
metropolitan consumption. It was also an act of 
ritual. Just as the Europeans all came to the 
station platform in Kindia and in Conakry to meet 
the train carrying the bodies of the two dead officers, 
so too did they now flock to the Palais de Justice to 
see that justice was being done. But the justice
(1) On other overkills see Weiskel Baule Resistance 
and collaboration on the Baule revolt & Iliffe 
Tanganyika ch. 6 far the German suppression of 
the Maji Maji rebellion.
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was emphatically not the summary justice of the 
battlefield, but rather the elaborate and civilised 
affair of the French judicial system. One had to 
dress up for it, and it was a fitting spectacle for 
ladies. Lawyers pleaded their case eloquently and 
wittily - just like in France. The defendant - 
this curious Wali of Goumba - played a suitably 
passive part, no unseemly outbursts or violent 
physical attacks on his captors, in short, he had 
been tamed. And whilst Europeans may have squabbled 
amongst themselves and used this incident to settle 
some old scores with their colleagues and 
compatriots, here in the courtroom they were all 
united in solidarity with the dead officers, in 
abhorence of the Islamic peril and in a shared 
feeling of relief. The trial was homely and 
reassuring, but also quite exciting really. All in 
all not so very different from a good melodrama in 
a provincial theatre.
What then was the significance of the Goumba affair? 
Firstly it is perhaps the clearest example of how 
Ponty's 'politique des races' could work in practice. 
Ponty's policy was based on the observation of 
profound inequalities in African societies, 
inequalities both between and within different ethnic
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groups. Such an observation was based on reality 
as few people today would seek to deny the existence 
of such inequalities in pre-colonial African 
societies. However, the inequalities were 
complicated inequalities and it was these 
complications which Ponty and his colleagues tended 
to gloss over. ^  Nowhere was this more evident 
than in their attitude to the Wali of Goumba. The 
Wali's position in the Futa Jallon was very 
particular. He had quarrelled with the Almamy of 
Timbo and was forced to move literally and 
metaphorically to the periphery of the federation 
and found a new settlement away from the 
established political and religious centres. The 
following that he attracted was recruited from a 
wide assortment of social backgrounds including 
ex-slaves. The Wali, himself, was on excellent 
relations with the French for most of his life. 
However, the combined beliefs that the Futa Jallon 
was a feudal society and that the greatest obstacle
(1) For discussion of sane of these complexities see 
F. Cooper 'The problem of slavery in African 
studies' JAH 20 (1) 1979 pp. 103-25; Love joy 
Transformations in Slavery passim; Klein and 
Roberts ' Banamba slave exodus'.
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to French progress in Africa was an alliance 
between feudal slave-owning chiefs and a religious 
caste more interested in its own temporal welfare 
than in ministering to the spiritual needs of its 
followers required a revision to be made of the 
portrait of the Wali. Thus a man whose followers 
included many former slaves and who had quarrelled 
with the local chiefs and who was quite content 
with the French presence was now portrayed as 
somebody who inevitably was hostile to the French. 
Thus when Mariani began to sow doubts in the minds 
of the administration about the loyalty of the 
Wali, conflict between him and the French became 
a self-fulfilling prophesy as the French, prisoners 
of their own republican rhetoric and blinded by 
their stereotypes of the Fulbe character, came more 
and more to suspect their erstwhile ally to the point 
of sending an entire armed company to arrest him. 
Given this treatment by a power whom he had loyally 
served for most of his life it is not surprising that 
the Wali and his supporters attacked the soldiers 
sent to arrest him.
Secondly, the Goumba affair highlights the importance 
of stereotypes. In this Mariani's role was 
particularly important as it was he more than anybody
302
else who by playing on the stereotype of the Fulbe 
character managed to discredit Tierno Aliou in the 
eyes of the French. In the end the stereotype 
proved more powerful than the empirical evidence, 
and Tierno Aliou was guilty of nothing so much as 
being a Fulbe marabout and all that that implied.
We ourselves should be wary of type-casting the 
French. The French were divided amongst themselves 
and far from confident that their Gallic birthright 
would protect them against all misfortune. The 
deaths of Bastie, Tallay and Bornand were all 
unnerving experiences. Once again we have to 
include fear and insecurity in our description of 
the French psychological make-up. The good 
Republican liberator is clearly as inadequate as 
the double-dealing Fulbe.
Thirdly, it is important to note that much of 
French insecurity stemmed from the fact that Futa 
Jallon had never been conquered, that its people had 
never been made aware of the reality of French force. 
The French always felt uneasy about their choice of 
intermediaries and suspected them constantly of 
plotting against them. It is significant that 
chief amongst Guy's proposals for policy reform in 
the Futa Jallon was a military occupation.
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Fourthly, a lesson was learned from the episode, 
and there seems to have been a tacit admission from 
the French that they had overreacted. Marty's 
account of the whole affair is explicitly critical 
of the way in which both Tierno Aliou and the 
Jahkanke marabout, Karamoko Sankoun, were treated 
by the French. He ridiculed the attribution of 
ulterior motives to the Wali1s slightest gesture 
and thought that the French had acted clumsily in 
the whole affair. The violence was unnecessary, 
he argued, because, 'Right up to the eve of the 
conflict the relations and the attitude of the 
Ouali have always born witness of his desire to 
return to his first loves ... There are numerous 
facts of all kinds which suggest that even at the 
start of 1911 this old man of eighty years desired 
at bottom only his own tranquility'. About Karamoko 
Sankoun he wondered, 'By what chain of circumstances 
did one manage to make of this sympathetic marabout 
and conciliatory magistrate the deportee of Port 
Etienne?' French fears of a St Bartholomew Day 
massacre instigated by the marabouts were' ... pure 
imagination. Through an unreasonable sentiment of 
fear one wanted to capture in one sweep of the net all 
the Islamic notables of the Fouta'. The French were 
unable to discover the huge arms caches whose existence
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had been reported so confidently before the Goumba 
affair. To a certain extent the affair marked
the end of a period in terms of French attitudes to 
Islam, a period characterised by exaggerated fears 
and belief in the 'permanent conspiracy1 of Islam.
The Wali of Goumba was the clearest victim of this 
understanding of Islam. Condemned to death by 
the judge in Conakry he died naturally of illness 
whilst awaiting execution on 3rd April 1912. The 
French authorities felt cheated that he had escaped 
his punishment and were worried that the population 
of Guinea would interpret it as an indication either 
that the French did not dare execute him or that 
Allah had intervened to prevent the Wali suffering 
the indignity of the guillotine. However, an 
official investigation in June revealed that Tierno 
Aliou was largely forgotten by the Fulbe.
(1) Marty Guinee pp. 86, 117
(2) ANSCM Guinee IV/0 Gov. Gen. p.i. AOF
to Min. Col. 7.5.1912.
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PART TWO: 1913-1920: FRENCH SCHOLARSHIP AND THE
DEFINITION OF ISLAM NOIR
Va dire au Gouverneur que nous lui 
obeissons. Que nous executerions 
ses ordres et que nous respecterons 
ses depenses.
Et que nous n'opposerons pas aux 
oeuvres enterprises par lui, a ce 
qu'il nous commandera d 1important 
ou de minime, ses moindres ordres 
seront obeis.
Je me confie a Dieu contre tous les 
maux du Si&cle.
(Verses frcm the poem of Cheih Sankoum 
of Tuba (Guinea)
'Sur la Puissance des Chretiens'
(1912) )
This is the translation frcm the 
original Arabic made by the French 
administrator Gilbert Vieillard who 
made a lifelong study of Fulbe custan 
and culture. This and other 
manuscripts which he collected can be 
found in the archives of IFAN (Fonds 
Vieillard)
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You are an intelligent fellow, and you 
will ask how a Polish adventurer, meaning 
Enver, and a collection of Jews and 
Gipsies should have got control of a proud 
race. The ordinary man will tell you 
that it was German organization backed up 
with German money and German arms. You 
will enquire again how, since Turkey 
is primarily a religious power, Islam 
has played so small a part in it all.
The Sheikh-ul-Islam is neglected, and 
though the Kaiser proclaims a Holy War 
and calls himself Hadji Mohammed Guillimmo, 
and says the Hohenzollerns are descended 
from the Prophet, that seems to have fallen 
pretty flat. The ordinary man again will 
answer that Islam in Turkey is becoming 
a back number, and that Krupp guns are 
the new gods. Yet - I don't know.
I do not quite believe in Islam becoming 
a back number.
John Buchan Greenmantle (1916)
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I n tr o du c t i o n
After the fiasco of the 'Goumba affair' both the 
French and, as Cheik Sankoum's poem bears witness, 
the Fulbe appear to have gone in for some soul- 
searching, The second part of this thesis 
describes the first wave of considered 
intellectual reflexion by the French about the 
nature of their presence in West African society.
By the First World War some French administrators 
had acquired considerable respect for indigenous 
societies and during the war years themselves 
French knowledge of African societies increased 
beyond all reasonable expectation. This burst 
of intellectual activity is associated with 
three men in particular: Francois Clozel and
Maurice Delafosse - both old hands on the West 
African scene - and above all with Paul Marty, a 
newcomer. Although all three operated within and 
for the benefit of the colonial system all 
nonetheless to a greater or lesser degree provided 
insights into West African society that continue to 
command respect.
However, these intellectual advances coincided with 
years in which the burden of colonial rule grew
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heavier than ever before as Africans were 
enrolled into supporting both directly and 
indirectly the allied war effort in Western 
Europe. Inevitably the strain which these 
demands caused were profound, resulting in a 
number of major revolts and widespread migration 
across colonial frontiers. Furthermore, the 
fact that the Allies were also at war with the 
Ottoman Empire ensured that the conclusions of 
French scholars regarding the nature of Islam 
in West Africa acquired a special significance. 
Although the view of the scholars was increasingly 
at odds with the perspective and priorities of the 
Paris strategists it was clear that neither group 
regarded Islam as 'a back number'.
309
CHAPTER SIX: THE DEFINITION OF ISLAM NOTR:
THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLOZEL, 
DELAFOSSE AND MARTY
The Futa Jallon was not the only area in which 
the French feared an Islamic rebellion in 1911.
In March Clozel, the Lt-Governor of Haut-Senegal 
et Niger, telegrammed Ponty warning him of three 
marabouts recently returned from Mecca and who 
were rumoured to be plotting against the French. 
Neither Ponty nor Clozel thought there was much 
substance to the rumours but, nonetheless both 
thought that in view of recent events in Futa 
Jallon it would be wise to take precautions.
Ponty immediately wrote to the Governors of 
Senegal, Mauritania and Guinea informing them of 
the rumours and asking them to make discrete 
enquiries. He thought it necessary, however, to 
ask the Governors 'to moderate ... the zeal of 
certain administrators who might be tempted to 
make premature arrests whose only results would be 
to excite fanaticism and perhaps unleash local
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movements against us'. ^  In Senegal, recruit­
ment for the Moroccan campaign and fears of a 
renewed yellow fever epidemic, made the 
authorities particularly apprehensive. In June 
Cor, the Lt-Governor, wrote to Ponty that 
'Circumstances have never been as favourable for 
an Islamic rebellion as they now are in the 
colony ... Those who watch from the side of 
Islam - and they are still numerous - are aware 
of the circumstances which would make it very 
difficult for us to repress troubles were they 
to occur1. Cor proposed to conduct an 
investigation into the state of Islam in the 
cercles of the Fleuve, Niani-Ouli and Haute 
Gambie. The investigations were to be made by 
two trustworthy 'native agents', Soce So and 
Bakhane Diop, chiefs of Diambour and Goe-Joal 
respectively supervised by M. Brunot and 
M. Bonnassies, two of the very limited number of 
administrators whom Cor thought were competent on 
Islamic issues in the colony. Cor also 
increased the number of guards in the cercles 
where he most feared an Islamic uprising and made
(1) ANS 13 G 67 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AQF
31.5.1911; Gov.lGen. ACE1 to Lt.-Gov. Sen,
Guinea, Mauritania 31.5.1911.
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arrangements for an extra 1,496 rifles and 
134,500 cartridges to be sent to these cercles. 
However, the enquiry which he commissioned 
revealed no trace of a plot, but it did show 'a 
certain effervescence in maraboutic cercles'.
All in all Cor was confident that 'the severe 
repression of Goumba' had introduced a certain 
'salutary fear in the maraboutic milieux'. ^
In August Mariani reported rumours of a meeting of 
marabouts from all over AOF in N'Diawara on the 
right bank of the River Senegal to discuss a 
movement against the French. The rumours were, 
he admitted, impossible to verify but nonetheless 
he believed that, 'The marabouts ... are 
organising a silent conspiracy against us or else 
they are giving unsolicited, but false, information 
designed to mislead us in our research'. (2) In 
September a Soninke marabout, Fode Ismaila, who 
had recently returned from Mecca was exiled with 
four other marabouts and chiefs for having caused 
anti-French unrest by proclaiming to enthusiastic
(1) ANS 13 G 67 Lt.-Gov. HSN to Gov.-Gen. AQF 
11.6.1911; same to same 19.7.1911.
(2) ANS 9 G 28 Mariani to Gov.-Gen. AGF 27.8.1911.
crowds the news that the French were about to 
withdraw. (1)
In the same month the Italians declared war on 
the Ottomans and invaded Cyrenaica. With vastly 
superior forces the Italians were able to inflict 
heavy losses on the Ottoman forces but their 
initial calculation that the Sanusiyya would not 
support the Ottomans proved wrong. Even after 
various treaties between the Italians and the 
Ottomans had been signed the Sanusiyya continued 
to resist the European invaders and by using 
guerilla tactics were able to tie down the 
Italians with great effect. ^  The war was 
watched with great interest by the French 
authorities south of the Sahara. The interim 
Governor of Haut Sendgal et Niger was worried by 
the contents of correspondence from Tripoli which 
had been seized by the postal service of his colony
(1) ANS 9 G 28 Golcmbani, (Res. Guidimaka) to
Oormnissaire du Gov.-Gen. en Mauritanie 7.9.1911; 
Gcmnission permanente en conseil to Gov.-Gen.
AQF 29.9.1911; arrete 30.9.1911.
(2) See E. Evans-Pritchard The Sanusi of Cyrenaica
Oxford, 1948 ch. 5 'The First Italian-Sanusi War1
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The general tone of these letters is of 
an exaggerated optimism. Losses on the 
Italian side are said to be enormous and 
minimal on the Turkish ... But the real 
danger lies above all in the accounts 
of the efforts made by the Faithful of 
all nationalities ... to achieve unity 
against the Foreigner. (1)
In June 1911 an Interministerial Commission on 
Muslim Affairs was created in Paris whose task was, 
'To determine the means of our Muslim policy and 
to look for a solution to the problems common 
to different departments concerned with the 
Muslim question' . in October the Colonial 
Ministry nominated three of its most senior 
officials - You, Marchand and Commt. Julien - to 
the Commission. One of its first policy documents 
stated that:
Without doubt Islam with its moral 
precepts and its rudimentary social 
organisation constitutes a superior principle 
of civilisation for primitive peoples. But 
its doctrines, so simple in appearance 
contain some abstractions which the humble 
mentality of the recently-converted Blacks 
and the uneducated Arabo-Berbers cannot 
assimilate. As a result the suggestions of 
the Islamic faith cause ... a sentiment of 
religious exaltation that is always lively 
and which consequently make the handling of 
native Muslims singularly delicate.
(1) ANS 19 G 4 Lt.-Gov. p.i. HSN to Gov.-Gen. 
AOF 23.3.1912.
(2) ANSCM AP 913/1 Decree 25.6.1911.
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Explosions of fanaticism are always to be 
feared ... It seems that African Islam is 
never stable. (1)
Felix Chautemps warned in a newspaper article 
published the following year that 'The awakening 
of Islam is not a vain formula. It is an 
undeniable fact. Muslims are agitating on all 
sides with certain cohesion ... either at war with 
the infidel or simply in rebellion against their 
foreign protectors 1. Chautemps therefore welcomed 
the creation of the Interministerial Commission and 
urged that it should be taken seriously.(2)
But what relevance had the Commission for West 
Africa? It would appear very little. The most 
consistent activity of the Commission was to publish 
a regular review of the Muslim press, copies of 
which were sent to Dakar where they were regularly 
left unread and are even today available in neat, 
dusty piles arranged in exact chronological order in 
the archives. As far as I am aware it is the most 
complete series in the archives. Unfortunately
(1) ANSCM AP 913/7 'Note sur la politique musulmane et 
la carcnission inteministerielle des affaires 
musulmanes n.d.
(2) IF fds Terrier 5917 'La connission des Affaires 
musulmanes' L'Action 16.1.1912.
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its completeness seems to be in inverse proportion 
to its value and interest, not only to the 
contemporary French administrator but also to 
the present researcher on Islam in West Africa. (1) 
Increasingly Paris and Dakar came to have two very 
different perceptions of Islam. Although pan- 
Islamism did not disappear from the nightmares of 
administrators in West Africa, the more internation­
alist perspective of Paris gave way to a localised 
view which caused fewer anxieties. The shift in 
perspective did not, of course, take place over 
night.
The localised view of Islam developed from a 
remarkable series of studies carried out between 
1912 and 1921. These studies themselves developed 
from a series of government directives to local 
commandants to send in information about Muslim
notables and Qur'anic schools to Dakar. However, 
such requests, made initially in 1906 met with a 
mixed response. In 1911 Ponty complained that he 
had received very few of the personal files that 
Roume had asked for in 1906. and so he repeated
(1) The reviews are filed in ANS 9 G
(2) ANS 15 G 103 Gov.-Gen. AGF to Lt.-Gov. HSN 
Sept. 1911.
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the demand in another strongly worded circular 
at the end of the year. He warned that Muslim 
agitators were making use of modern methods of 
propaganda such as the printing press and that the 
need to be informed about their activities was 
more urgent than ever. ^  In his instructions 
for his interim replacement Ponty described the 
circular as having created 'a central Muslim 
information service for all the colonies of the 
group' and he stressed that 'an essential 
condition' of France's successful action in AOF 
was finding 'a solution to the problems posed by 
the incontestable development ... of Koranic 
doctrines'. &) jt is from around this time that 
one can begin to talk of the existence of a special 
Muslim department in the federal administration 
though it was not until 1913 that such a department 
was formally instituted as part of wider 
administrative changes.(3)
In 1912 Robert Arnaud in his last year as chief 
adviser on Muslim affairs (although he stayed in the
(1) ANS 19 G 1 Ponty circular 26.12.1911. See Appendix 
VIII.
(2) ANS 17 G 39 Ponty to Gov.-Gen. p.i. AGF 12.1912.
(3) See below p. 350
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Governor-General1s ‘Service des Affaires Civiles' 
until 1914.(1) ) published an account of French 
Muslim policy which can in some sense be seen 
as a bridge between a view of Islam obsessed with 
brotherhoods and conspiracies and a more pragmatic 
view. Unlike his 1906 book this work was concerned 
with the whole of West Africa and not just 
Mauritania. The tone of the book was as a result 
much more patronising and paternalist. The African 
Muslim, we learn on the first page 'is still like 
a child who has just learnt his catechism'. (2) 
Nonetheless they could still be a nuisance, and 
Arnaud proceeded to give a summary of the Islamic 
rebellions - major and minor - that had taken place 
since 1905 and which we have discussed in previous 
chapters.(3) Arnaud, like Ponty, saw Islam as a 
social issue, intimately associated with the 
indigenous African aristocracy. In the case of 
the Wolof he argued that the original Islamisation 
had been 'A veritable social revolution ... the 
opposition of the proleterian caste to the
(1) See Annuaire du Senegal (1914)
(2) R. Arnaud 'L'Islam et la politique musulmane 
francaise en Afrique occidentale' BCAF 1912.
(3) ibid pp. 5-8.
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the grands marabouts who were to become the focus 
of French Islamic policy during and after the First 
World War. (D Arnaud concluded that France should 
ensure that 'Islam should never be anything other 
than a religious belief' (2) and that, 'Still half 
confused with fetishism Islam must not evolve in 
the sense of Turko-Egyptian nationalism nor in 
the political traditions of Muslim states, but in 
the sense of French ideas '.(3)
It would be exaggerating to claim that this series 
of articles amounted to a major shift in perception 
from, say, the 1906 book. Clearly it was much 
influenced by Ponty's thinking on the relationship 
between Islam, a 'feudal' aristocracy and slavery.
This view was shared by most other contemporaries 
including Clozel, Delafosse and Marty, and it is 
with these three that this chapter is concerned.
(1) Ibid pp. 117-19
(2) Ibid p. 144
(3) Ibid pp. 144-49
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aristocracy, a class struggle' but that since 
then Islam had been assimilated by the aristocracy 
who had made it the hand-tool of their own 
political supremacy.(1) Arnaud therefore whole­
heartedly endorsed Ponty's commitment to religious 
neutrality and his 'politique des races'. His 
main fear about Islam was that:
The Black in becoming a Mahommetan has 
less admiration for us since he knows 
that knowledge and wealth come from God.
He has even a feeling of the 
superiority which God gives to the 
believer over the infidel. He believes 
that our paradise, created by our own 
effort is of this transitory world whereas 
he will enjoy his, created by prayer, 
throughout eternity. (2)
The Sufi brotherhoods were no longer seen as the 
powerful and well-organised institutions that he 
had portrayed them as in 1906. Indeed he even 
suggested that the French exaggerated the 
xenophobic tendencies of the Sanusiyya. Arnaud 
specifically rejected the idea of following the 
Algerian example of providing financial support for 
the mosques* ^  More importance was attached to
(1) Ibid p.9.
(2) Ibid p.121.
(3) Ibid p.150
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Clozel
Marie-Francois Joseph Clozel was born in 1860 
in the Ardeche. In 1881-82 he did his
military service with the 1st Regiment of Zouaves 
(the mixed Franco-Algerian troops) in Algeria 
where he also worked between 1885 and 1886 as an 
interpreter in the Native Hygiene Service. In 
1892 he was a memb er of the Maistre mission which 
explored Central Africa between the Congo and the 
Niger and the following year he himself led an 
ethnographic mission in Adamawa and Chad. In 
1896 he was posted to the Ivory Coast where he 
remained for ten years.
He arrived in the Ivory Coast at a time when the 
military were being forced to withdraw by a 
coalition of interests between the Treasury 
Department in Paris and local traders, anxious to 
increase trade with the prosperous Baule r e g i o n . (2)
(1) I am grateful to the archivists in the rue Oudinot 
for showing me a copy of Clozel's official c.v.
on which the following paragraph is based.
(2) T.C. Weiskel French Colonial Rule and the Baule 
Peoples: resistance and collaboration Oxford,
1980 ch. 3.
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In contrast to the military view the civilian 
administration under the governorship of Louis 
Gustave Binger preferred the Muslim Dynla traders 
to the animist populations of the colony, and this 
preference was reflected in the writing of Binger 
and Clozel. In order to rule the colony without 
soldiers it was decided, as in the Futa Jallon, to 
make use of existing social structures but, unlike 
in the Futa, a serious attempt was made to 
understand the customs and institutions of the 
indigenous population. Early in 1901 Clozel, now 
the interim Lt. Governor of the colony, issued a 
circular to the local administrators requesting 
ethnographic details, especially details of local 
customs relating to legal procedures. He 
included a detailed questionnaire to help the 
administrators. The circular and its replies 
were published in a 600 page volume the following
V
year under the title of Les Coutumes Indigenes 
de la Cote d'Ivoire. ^  It was in his 
introduction to this volume that Clozel spoke most 
positively of Islam:
(1) F. Clozel & R. Villamur Las Coutumes indigenes de 
la Cote d ’Ivoire Paris, 1902.
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[Europeans] will obtain faster and more 
satisfying results from the Muslims than 
from the Pagans because their very religion, 
their special but undeniable civilisation 
makes them less distant than the fetishists 
and more able to understand what it is that 
we require of them ... Binger, in the 
course of his great journey in the Niger 
Bend seems also to have experienced on his 
arrival in Kong the same feeling of relief 
and well-being that I myself felt when, as 
part of the Maistre mission, we arrived in 
Muslim Adamaoua after eleven months of 
travel amongst pagan peoples. (1)
Clozel reserved especially warm words for the 
Dyula for, as traders, 'They consider as the 
greatest of goods peace and the security of the 
roads ... and so they willingly accept the 
foreign authority which assures them these 
advantages'. (2) He concluded with a plea for a 
less prejudiced view of African society based on 
deeper understanding which would permit good and 
efficient government. (3) Pride of place amongst 
the ethnographic studies went to Delafosse's work 
on the Baule. It has recently been argued that 
the quality of this work led to 'a premature 
sophistication' of French understanding of the Baule
(1) Ibid p.41
(2) Ibid p.46
(3) Ibid pp. 68-72
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'Once [ administrators]had read Delafosse's 
writings on Baule history and customs and 
memorised a few key words from his published 
vocabulary lists they felt sufficiently 
introduced to the Baule to handle administrative 
affairs with confidence'. (1) The author of these 
comments goes on to show how in the context of a 
rapidly-changing economic system (Baule prosperity 
was based on the slave trade with Samori and on 
the rubber and palm oil booms all of which 
suffered greatly in the 1900s) this confidence 
was misplaced. More interesting for our purposes 
is the fact that such studies changed people's 
perception of the 'primitiveness' of animist 
cultures. Clozel himself was the most obvious 
case of such a change, to the extent that one may 
almost speak of his 'discovery' of animism as a 
coherent and well-structured system of beliefs 
and institutions. Certainly by the time that 
he moved on to take charge of Haut Senegal et Niger 
in 1908 he had acquired great respect for 
traditional African religion and, at the same time, 
had lost his early admiration for Islam.
(1) Weiskel Baule p. 152n.
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The religious make-up of Haut Sdndgal et Niger 
was more balanced than that of the Ivory Coast.
The Muslim Tukolor and Moors lived alongside 
(though not always peacefully) the animist Bambara 
and, further south, Mossi whose preservation from 
Islam was to become one of the main concerns of 
French policy.
In Haut Sdndgal et Niger Clozel again emphasised 
the role of the Dyula traders as the most effective 
agents of Islamisation but he now saw their role in 
a less positive light describing the trader as 'a
sort of religious travelling rep who earns his way
to heaven by paying for it handsomely on earth'.
The suppression of the slave trade had, he said, 
destroyed the basis of their economic wealth and 
consequently they were anxious to take their revenge 
on the French.(1) But above all he was struck by 
the influence of ancestral beliefs on African Islam:
(1) ANS 15 G 103 Clozel 'Note sur l'etat social des
indigenes et sur la situation presente de l'islam 
au Soudan franqais' 1908. It is interesting to 
contrast Clozel's attitudes to slavery in the French
Sudan with his earlier more indulgent view of the
same institution in the animist Ivory Coast where 
he was above all concerned to maintain good 
relations with the (slave-owning) Baule chiefs.
See Weiskel Baule p. 151.
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The fetishist convert in uttering the 
ritual formula does not acquire the 
mentality of the Arab or Berber. His 
psychic constitution is in no way upset 
by this fact. The survival of local 
superstitions, belief in spirits and 
in an order of ideas, customs and 
traditions which are often contrary 
to the rules of the Koran show that the 
man has made a gesture only, that he has 
given up nothing of his personality. 
Sudanic Islam seems to be profoundly 
stained with fetishism. It is a mixed 
religion, the product of two different 
original beliefs. (1)
One of the most striking aspects of Clozel's 
character was his bookishness. There is no doubt 
that he was a man of great learning and of great 
commitment to learning. He appears to have had 
little time for the military with whom he clashed 
in both the Ivory Coast and the S o u d a n . (2) Typical 
of his intellectual approach was a letter to Ponty 
in October 1909 in which he reported that: 'Islam
is losing ground amongst the arable farmers but is 
expanding slightly amongst the pastoralists.' This 
fitted in well with Renan's theory on the origins of 
monotheism amongst Semitic peoples which he 
summarised thus:
(1) ANS 15 G 103 Clozel 'Note sur l'etat social ... '
(2) See IF Fds Terrier Clozel to Terrier 22.4.1911 for 
Clozel's criticism of the military. See also 
Weiskel Baule pp. 152-56.
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The nomad, constantly aware of the immensity 
of his surroundings, is naturally carried 
towards contemplation and meditation which 
give birth in his uncultured spirit ... 
to the idea of a divine power, the unique 
dispenser of laws ... and sovereign mistress 
of human destinies ... The arable farmer, 
constantly bent over the nourishing soil 
whose inexhaustable fecundity ... has for 
infinite generations assured him the good 
fortune of being able to live without 
fatiguenor constraint of any kind, naturally 
envisages his future destiny in a comfortable 
and agreeable light entirely lacking in 
metaphysical speculation. His present 
divinity and faith are contained in this 
natural world which feeds him, which 
supplies all his needs and whose 
magnificence and mysterious power ... are 
sufficient for his spiritual aspirations.
Slavery, he went on to argue, in freeing a Negro 
from the obligation of manual labour on the soil 
encouraged Islam through allowing more time for 
contemplation of the eternal and universal verities 
of life. Thus Clozel arrived at the formula:
'Islam has always prospered and continues to prosper
%
in countries ravaged by slavery and in towns 
inhabited by non-farming elements of the black 
population'. (D Whereas the initial argument about 
the relationship of monotheism to the type of life­
style commands respect and bears obvious similarities 
to more recent theories of conversion, and although
(1) ANS 15 G 103 Clozel to Gov.-Gen. AQF 1.10.1909.
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there was a close relationship between Islam and 
slavery, the attempt to relate these facts to 
hard and fast rules about slavery and Islam appears 
contrived. As we have seen the belief in an 
intimate and almost exclusive link between Islam 
and slavery was one of the cornerstones of French 
Islamic policy at this time.
Clozel did make a serious effort to document the 
precise state of Islam in his colony. In August 
1911 he issued a circular to the local administrators 
asking them each to make an annual report on the 
Islamic situation in their cercle. (1) The circular 
contained a long preamble in which Clozel outlined 
his belief of how the French conquest had altered 
the religious balance in the colony:
Fetishist society, deprived of its chiefs 
and no longer able to exclude the Muslim 
element from its bosom has been without 
defence against ... the marabouts and 
Dioulas who, using sweetness and persuasion 
and often presenting themselves as our 
auxiliaries, have ... gradually obtained 
results which have been as successful as 
those of the savage conquering prophets.
(1) ANS 15 G 103 'circulaire au sujet de la
politique musulmane dans le Haut Senegal & 
Niger' 12.8.1911.
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In contemporary West African society there was, 
he suggested, a new solidarity between the Muslim 
Fulbe, Tukolor and Soninke:
Thus it is certain that not only rivalries 
between Muslims of all nationalities will 
die down but that also a Muslim nationality 
that transcends all ethnic differences will 
one day constitute itself. The religious 
ideal will cement all the diverse groups 
which in the past were separate. One 
can thus state that we are witnessing on 
the one hand the breakdown of fetishist 
society and on the other the concentration 
of Muslim forces which are profiting from 
the social transformation resulting from 
the French conquest.
This conquest had been made easy by the very 
divisions along ethnic and religious lines which 
were now in danger of disappearing. 'We have, 
therefore, he wrote, a primordial interest 
ourselves in maintaining these divisions, the 
religious ones at least, and in opposing the 
invasive Islam with a strong centralised and self- 
conscious fetishism. This concept is ... the pivot 
of the native policy of our colony.' Clozel then 
proceeded to a distinction between Muslims and 
Animists which was to be heard frequently over the 
next few years:
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Everywhere the fetishists appear to us 
as submitted, devoted and open without 
any malicious thoughts about the fertile 
influences of our civilisation. One 
should note that these excellent 
dispositions have been fortified by 
the liberation of captives from which 
animists have greatly profited. Islam, 
by contrast, shows itself to be 
unjustifiably reserved ... and if we 
have sometimes found amongst its votaries 
loyal and convinced partisans, how many 
on the other hand have borne a sneaking 
grudge against us, considering us as 
infidels who must be suffered until they 
can get their revenge?
In order to prevent the breakdown of animist society 
Clozel reminded his local administrators of the 
importance of using local customary law in 
preference to Muslim law:
You will be aware of how much our subjects 
of non-Muslim status (de statut coutumier) 
are attached to their ancestral traditions. 
Having studied them, you also know how 
logical, just and respectable these 
traditions are. ... These customs are 
the corner stones of fetishism and it is 
around them that we should group the 
scattered elements of this society which 
is in danger of falling apart.
However, the task did not end there: 'At the same
time as we build up the defences of fetishism 
against the Muslim contamination we should ensure 
that we can follow, day by day, the developments of 
Islam1. So in view of recent events in the
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Futa Jallon Clozel proposed to create 'a Muslim 
police force1 which would be able to force local 
chiefs to declare the names of all the marabouts, 
imams and karamokos resident in his area and which, 
through a network of informants, would be able to 
spy on the activities of the Muslim leaders.(1)
The following year Clozel received a flood of 
reports in response to the circular. Most of the 
reports contained little more than repetitions of 
ethnic and religious stereotypes, padded out with 
tables and statistics of doubtful value. Others 
were more interesting. In the cercle of Segou the 
commandant claimed to have made extensive tours in 
the bush and to have held many 'palavers' with 
local chiefs whom he exhorted to remain faithful 
to their traditional customs, providing that these 
were not contrary to civilisation. One of his local 
agents was proving invaluable, he said, because as 
he could write in Arabic he was able to write down 
conversations before he forgot them - an interesting 
comment on the general standard of agents, perhaps.
(1) Ibid (emphasis added)
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In Nioro, however, despite the efforts of the 
local administration it was reported that,
'fetishism is unfortunately disappearing, its 
followers lost in the great Islamic family'.
Clozel's most comprehensive statement on Islam and 
what French policies towards it should be is 
contained in his 'Lettre de Korbous' published 
in 1913 and which Delafosse later described as 
'perhaps the best summary of Muslim policy ever 
made'. Clozel repeated the arguments about
the need to protect animism from Islam whose 
followers in any case, he claimed, accounted for 
a mere fifth of the total of the Soudan. He did 
not deny that conversion to Islam represented 
'a real progress' for animists but he said that,
'Once this first step has been taken the people 
become less willing to take the second step'. ^  
However, the originality of the account lay in his 
attempt to define Islam by ethnic group, and most of 
his article was taken up with a consideration of the 
different ethnic types of Islam: the Wolof community
(1) Replies are filed in AMS 15 G 103.
(2) F. Clozel 'Lettre de Korbous: politique musulmane 
au Soudan. Pacification du Sahara francais' BCAF 
1913 pp. 60-2; 106-9; 149-52; 182-85. Delafosse 
writing in BCAF 1918 p. 81.
(3) Clozel 'Korbous' p. 61.
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in the Soudan was proud and religious and a 
potential threat, the Soninke and the Fulbe, 
despite their fanaticism could easily be bought 
off. Education would rid the Songhay and the 
Moors of their fanaticism, and for the warlike 
Tuareg Clozel believed that the best hope of 
winning their allegiance was to recruit them into 
the French army. ^  Clozel's work clearly bore 
the stamp of an ethnologist. It was also an 
approach which had much in common with later 
British attempts to adopt a 'tribal' policy for 
its administration. it was, of course, also
in keeping with the underlying principles of Ponty's 
politique des races.
As something of an intellectual it is not surprising 
that Clozel took a keen interest in education. 
Indeed, it was he who was chosen to undertake the 
mission to Algeria in 1906 to study the working of 
the medersas. Although he had then reported in 
favour of applying the medersa system south of the 
Sahara, within a few years he had become much more
(1) Ibid pp. 106-9, 149-52.
(2) See, for example, Iliffe Tanganyika ch. 10 'Ihe
creation of tribes under Sir D. Cameron, 1925-31'.
Clozel was also an admirer of British policy in 
West Africa, see Vfeiskel Baule 15In.
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sceptical about their value in black African 
society. He was worried that they might give 
new life to a religion which he hoped had lost 
much of its earlier vitality. He now argued 
that all the French should seek to do was to 
'channel' Islamic belief. He was accordingly 
in favour of creating a medersa in Timbuktu 
which, with a curriculum that allotted a large 
place for French, would, he hoped, help to win 
over the Songhay population. ^  -He stressed, 
however, that the medersa should not try to emulate 
the Algerian model. When Mariani, inspecting the 
new medersa, argued that not enough attention was 
being given to training Muslims for administrative 
functions Clozel was incensed:
I protest against this tendency,' he wrote 
to the Governor-General, 'which is all too 
common amongst our administrators raised 
in Algeria, of assimilating the races and 
institutions of the Soudan to those which 
they have got to know in our great colony 
in North Africa. There is absolutely no 
a priori reason for such a comparison.
We should simply try and give our Nigerian 
population the institutions which suit 
them without worrying ourselves about 
those that exist in Algeria or Tunisia.
If I have not chosen to make the Tombouctou 
medersa into a nursery for administrators it 
is because I believe that in the Soudan, 
unlike in Algeria, we are not under the 
obligation to create administrative openings 
for an entirely Muslim population ... I 
believe we have done enough for Islam - 
perhaps too much - in creating the medersa
(1) ANS J 94 Clozel to Gov.-Gen. AQF 14.10.1910.
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at Djenne and that it would be both 
pointless and dangerous to open a similar 
institution in Tombouctou. My aim, 
uniquely political, has been to control 
indirectly the action of the native teachers 
of Tombouctou and to create a place for 
French influence in the intellectual 
education of the young pupils ... In a 
word my concern was political and not 
pedagogical.
Mariani defended himself by denying (rightly) 
that Islam was declining and arguing that the 
medersa a l'alg^rienne was a tried and tested 
system. (1) However, Mariani1s star was waning 
and in 1913 he was replaced by a new Inspector 
of Education, Georges Hardy.
Delafosse
Maurice Delafosse, whose career spans most of this 
thesis, was born in 1870 in a small town in the 
middle of France. ^  It is thought that at the 
age of eighteen he entered a seminary but,
(1) ANS J 94 Mariani 'Rapport ... sur la medersa de 
Tcmbouctou1 March 1911; Clozel to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
14.5.1911; Mariani to Gov-Gen. AOF 10.11.1911.
(2) The best account of Delafosse's career is his 
daughter's biography: L. Delafosse Maurice
Delafosse, le berrichon conquis par l'Afrique
Paris, 1976. Except where otherwise indicated 
biographical detail is taken frcm this source.
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realising that he had no vocation, he left after 
nine months in order to study medicine. As a 
student in Paris he was introduced into colonial 
circles and began to think about a teaching career 
in Senegal. To this end he started to attend 
Arabic lessons with Octave Houdas, one of the most 
respected of French orientalists and whose daughter 
Delafosse was later to marry. As his Arabic 
interests increasingly dominated his medical 
studies Delafosse came into contact with the work 
of Cardinal Lavigerie, who had recently founded 
a quasi-monastic anti-slavery society - L 1Institut 
des Freres Armes du Sahara - which was intended to
complement the work of French troops in the Sahara. (1) 
The Institut was to be based in one of the oases 
on the caravan trade routes and, using arms if 
necessary, would free any slaves carried by caravans
(1) See Renault Laviqerie, l'esclavage et l'islam
pp. 388-409. The order was a controlversial one, 
chiefly because the brothers carried aims.
Cambon thought they should be confined to areas 
where France was already firmly in control. The 
Radical press was hostile: for example, the
Lyons Republicain wrote 'N'6coutons pas trop m. 
Lavigerie et ne nous brouillons pas trop avec 
Allah' (cited in Renault op cit p. 398)
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stopping in the oasis. Delafosse was impressed 
by the idea and was one of the first volunteers 
when he joined up in the winter of 1890-91. 
However, the Institut was a disappointment for 
him: the romantic vision of freeing slaves in
far-flung oases was unfulfilled as the young 
volunteers were simply used, it seems, as 
gardeners and domestics for the full-time 
missionaries. Within a year Delafosse had left 
the Institut and started his military service 
as a zouave in Biskra. His military career, 
however, was brought to a premature end through 
illness.
In September 1892 he returned to his studies at 
the Ecole des Langues Orientales where he 
specialised in Hausa, still with a view to 
teaching in Senegal. However, in 1894 Binger, 
whom he had got to know in Paris, offered him 
a post as a Native Affairs Officer in the newly- 
created colony of the Ivory Coast. It was in 
the Ivory Coast that Delafosse struck up his 
partnership with Clozel and where he conducted 
his first serious ethnological research. It is 
interesting and important to note the link between 
the anti-slavery movement and ethnology.
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Charles Monteil, another of the early group of 
ethnologists who worked alongside Clozel and 
Delafosse in the Ivory Coast and the Soudan, 
cites an article published in 1913 in L'Afrique 
libre, a French anti-slavery journal, in which 
the relationship is clearly spelt out: 'As long
as the natives do not enjoy tutelary institutions 
they will not be truly free, and their fate will 
not improve noticeably. But such institutions 
do not improvise themselves. We first have to 
know the mores, customs and traditions of the 
population.' The link between the anti-slavery
movement and ethnology is personified in Delafosse, 
a member of the French Anti-Slavery Committee and 
one of the most respected and influential of the 
early ethnologists.
After Clozel left the Ivory Coast Delafosse 
quarrelled with the new Governor, Angoulvant, who 
supported the military in their wish to deal with 
unrest amongst the Baule by force of arms.
Delafosse left the colony to join Clozel in the 
Soudan. He did not stay long there and by the end 
of 1908 he was back in Paris where he was given 
charge of a course at the Ecole Coloniale on
(1) C. Monteil Les Khassonke. Monographic d'une peuplade 
da Soudan francais Paris, 1915 p.8.
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'African Languages and Culture1 - a course which 
he taught until the war. Shortly before his 
return to France Delafosse lost his faith. He 
wrote to his wife, *1 am not a hypocrite and I
would hate to pretend to practise a religion in
whose divine character my reason forbids me to 
believe1. ^  In the next two years he 
published three short articles on the subject of 
Islam in which his own personal religious neutrality 
and a certain disillusion with the French colonial
effort are apparent. In the first and most
interesting of the articles he argued that Islam was 
a better influence on Black Africa than either 
Christianity or 'Europeanisation' and that France 
was no more threatened by Muslims than by animists 
as both were equally unenthusiastic about the French 
presence. (2) He argued that Islam in West Africa 
was almost always the product of a mixture between 
traditional religions and orthodox Islam and that 
the Sufi turug were much less powerful and less 
organised in West Africa than in the Maghreb. (3)
(1) Delafosse letter 23.5.1909, cited in Delafosse 
Berrichon p.270.
(2) M. Delafosse 'L'Etat actuel de l'islam dans l'AOF'
EMM xi 1910 pp. 32-54.
(3) M. Delafosse 'Le Clerge musulman de 1'Afrique occidentale' 
EMM xi 1910 pp. 177-206; 'Les Oonfreries musulmanes et 
le maraboutisine dans les pays du Senegal et du Niger' 
RCBCAF (4) 1911 pp. 81-90.
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However, Delafosse's principal publication whilst 
he was in France was his three volume account of 
the country, people, languages, history and 
civilisation of the colony of Haut-Senegal et 
Niger. (1) The work was proposed by Clozel who 
had laid the foundations with a circular in 
January 1909 (reprinted in the introduction to 
the work) outlining to his administrators a 
proposed study for his favourite subject of 
indigenous customary law.- Delafosse based his 
work on personal observation, conversation and 
correspondence with like-minded administrators - 
notably Gaden (who devoted his life's work to 
a study of the Fulbe) and Monteil - and a truly 
impressive amount of reading as the nine page 
bibliography at the end of volume three testifies. 
The originality of the work lay in the fact that 
it should have been written at all for the idea 
that it was actually possible to fill three 
volumes on the culture and history of such an 
area was in the early twentieth century a 
revolutionary one. The manifesto of the book 
is contained in the last section on 'Civilisation':
(1) M. Delafosse Haut-Senegal & Niger (3 vols) 
Paris, 1912.
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If by 'civilisation' one understands the 
state of social, moral and material culture 
attained by the great nations of Europe 
and America, it is certain that one is 
forced to consider the natives of the 
Soudan as not being members of what is 
commonly called 'the civilised world'.
But if one gives to the word 'civilisation' 
its true meaning, that is if one understands 
by this word the present state of culture 
of any society or nation, if, in other words, 
one speaks not of 'the civilisation' but of 
'civilisations' ... one is forced to admit 
that although they have a social state that 
is very different from ours, the 
inhabitants of the Soudan nonetheless have 
themselves civilisations which are worth 
the trouble of studying and describing.
They are constructed by a group of customs 
which although only transmitted by 
tradition have an effect on the life of the 
people as considerable as our customs 
augmented by our laws have on our life.
Although these customs varied in detail from village 
to village nonetheless said Delafosse, 'the guiding 
principles of custom law are the same'.
Delafosse applied the same argument to religion as 
he attempted to show that for all the local 
variations, 'animism' constituted a coherent religion 
in its own right and one which was practised 
throughout Africa:
(1) Ibid (vol. Ill) pp. 1-2
341
In reality the non-Muslim blacks have a 
true religion, which is in general quite 
complicated, presenting itself in many 
different aspects despite a common 
source in which fetishism proper, that 
is to say the confidence accorded to 
amulets, forms only one superficial part 
without actually forming part of the 
religious belief. (1)
Most of the natives of West Africa, 
probably even all of them, believe in 
the existence of a unique God, God the 
creator, which they are not far from 
considering as a pure spirit, to which 
in any case they never give an 
anthropomorphic character but which 
they often confuse ... with the sky.(2)
The Black believes that in all natural 
phenonema and in all living beings there 
exists a spiritual power, a dynamic 
spirit ... which can exist by itself. 
From this is reached the religion of the 
spirits, personifying the natural 
forces, and that of the spirits of the 
dead, spirits that have been liberated 
by the death of their temporary human 
receptacle. To each of these genii 
or spirits the Black accords both reason 
and passion. (3)
The strength and universality of this system of 
animist belief together with the strength of local 
social systems embodied in the local civilisations 
were such, Delafosse argued, that pure Islamic 
beliefs and institutions were rare in West Africa:
(1) Ibid p. 161
(2) Ibid p.163
(3) Ibid p.165
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Whatever may. be the number of our Soudanese 
subjects converted to Islam and practising 
the religion of Mohammed ... it is very 
rare that the native Muslims have adopted 
Coranic law, at least in its entirety.
In Islamism proper, religion and law 
hold together, both deriving either from 
the Coran or from the hadith. But when 
people other, than Arabs convert to the 
Muslim religion, be they in Asia, Europe 
or in Africa, they by no means always 
adopt the Muslim code which in many cases 
clashes with secular customs and a social 
or economic state at odds with the 
proscriptions of Coranic law. ... As a 
result the official Muslim code ... is 
of very restricted use and in order to 
apply it with discernment it is 
necessary to know the principles of 
native customary law with which the 
spirit of the Muslim regions of this 
colony are strongly impregnated.(1)
In his final section on Islam Delafosse repeated 
the essential arguments contained in his earlier 
articles. He did not see that there was any 
particular reason to be either an Islamophile or an 
Islamophobe. Although Islam had put an end to 
some of the worst excesses of some animist 
societies and was a good barrier against alcoholism 
it was not, he suggested, a greatly superior social 
or political influence than was animism. In his 
final paragraph he summed up his arguments and 
briefly stated his own vision of the future.
(1) Ibid pp. 2-3
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In my opinion Islam in the Soudan should 
be regarded as neither good nor evil ...
I would say that in our political interests 
it is sometimes preferable, especially at 
the beginning of an occupation of a 
country to deal with Muslims rather than 
with animists, and that in any case the 
Islamisation of our subjects would be less 
serious than their Christianisation. But 
I would add that from a purely objective 
point of view and considering only the 
interest and future of the native races, 
even though from this angle too 
Islamisation is preferable to 
Christianisation, the best solution would 
be for the Soudanese population to limit 
themselves to perfecting the local 
religions. And, perhaps, in the end that 
would be the best solution for everybody. (1)
This benevolently paternalist and rather Voltairean 
vision of everybody cultivating their own religions 
was to be dealt a severe blow by the war in which 
Delafosse was to fall foul, both of the authorities 
in Paris, who were for the first time unashamedly and 
unequivocally decided upon extracting from West 
Africa every available resource both human and 
material, and of a Senegalese Christian and 
Europeanised elite equally anxious to use the war 
as a lever on the French with which to attain better 
recognition and representation not as Senegalese, 
still less as Wolofs or Lebus, but as Frenchmen.
(1) Ibid pp. 214-15
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However, the intellectual strength of the 
arguments contained in Haut-Senegal et Niger was 
sufficient to ensure that it survived the 
vicissitudes of war. Written at a time of 
personal spiritual crisis and disillusion with 
the colonial establishment (1) it was a remarkable 
book which implicitly raised many of the doubts 
about the 'civilising mission' that were later 
to be raised explicitly (by Delafosse amongst 
others). In the immediate context in which 
it is discussed here its importance lies in the 
added weight it gave to the view that non-Muslim 
societies deserved greater respect than they 
often received and that Muslim societies 
themselves owed as much, if not more, to pre- 
Islamic custom than to either the Qur'an or to 
the hadith.
(1) Delafosse Berrichon ch.7.
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Marty
Paul Marty was born in 1882 in Boufarik, a small 
village outside Algiers. (1) At the age of 
nineteen he volunteered for a four year commission 
in the zouaves. He soon started training as an 
interpreter and was posted to the Native Affairs 
Bureau in Tunis where he remained until 1907.
The following year he was sent to Casablanca which 
had recently been occupied by the French and from 
1909 to 1911 he was on a detachment to the 
Foreign Ministry to help and advise on Moroccan 
issues. In September 1912 he was detached to 
the Colonial Ministry and was sent to Dakar to 
advise the Governor-General on Muslim affairs.
He remained in AOF until 1921 during which time 
he was promoted to officier interprete lere classe 
and made a chevalier of the Legion of Honour.
After AOF he returned to Morocco where he was made 
Director of the Muslim College of Fez (1922-5) 
before joining the Native Affairs Department in Rabat
(1) Marty1 s papers are still subject to restrictions, 
but I am grateful to the archivist of the Service 
Historique de l'Arm^e de Terre in the Chateau de 
Vincennes for allowing me to see a copy of Marty's 
official c.v.
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of which he became the head in 1930. He was 
actively involved in the controversial Berber 
dahir. (1) In 1935 he was posted to Tunisia where 
he joined the High Command of the Tunisian troops. 
Three years later he died in the military hospital 
in Tunis. For someone whose origins appeared to 
have been humble and whose schooling was modest 
his career was an impressive one. It was above 
all his Dakar posting which established his 
reputation.
It is perhaps surprising that such an impressive 
military career has not been more widely celebrated, 
and although no-one who has worked on Islam in 
West Africa has failed to acknowledge their debt 
to the pioneering work of Marty, the man himself 
appears anonymous. Little is known of his personal 
character beyond the official description on his 
military record card of a man 1.80 metres tall, 
with grey eyes, large nose and mouth and a high 
forehead.
(1) For background to dahir see Ageron 
Folitiques ooloniales pt. 11.
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Around the time that Marty arrived in Dakar,
Ponty added the finishing, touches to the series 
of circulars and administrative changes that 
resulted in a specifically defined Muslim 
information service with Marty at its head.
In January 1913 he reminded the local administrat­
ors of the order given in December 1911 to send 
files on marabouts to Dakar.
It is impossible, he wrote, to exercise 
a real surveillance of Islam, to follow 
its development and, if necessary, to 
take suitable preventitive action, if 
one does not have an effectively 
organised information service.
More than in other Muslim countries,
Islam in West Africa takes on the form 
of anthropolatry. Superficially it 
is still the religion of Allah but above 
all it is the cult of maraboutism. 
Consequently ... the political 
surveillance of Islam primarily involves 
the surveillance of Muslim personalities. 
These people are not numerous and are very 
well known. It is easy, but delicate, to 
get information on their family, ethnic 
and religious origins. (1)
In a circular on 'Native Policy' in April Ponty 
restated the 'liberal principles' which dominated 
his politique des races and emphasised that in his 
view 'the surest factor of stability amongst the
(1) ANS 19 G 1 Gov-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Govs. Sen.
Guinea, HSN etc. 15.1.1913.
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Blacks lies in a combination of their material 
progress, justice, thoughtful generosity, well- 
wishing firmness and, to use an expression which 
I like, of apprivoisement*. (1) In August he 
reviewed his achievements and summarised his future 
concerns. The circulars of 26.12.1911 and 
15.1.1913 had, he said, established the need for 
an index of Muslim personalities but he added:
Today a larger and more complicated task 
is necessary. It is our duty to study 
the Muslim society of our colonies in 
West Africa in the minutest detail.
It is a study which demands almost a 
scientific method. It presupposes 
special studies, a previous documentation 
and a serious knowledge of the sociological 
laws of Islam which the great Orientalists 
of France and of Europe have now virtually 
succeeded in establishing ... £The study] 
will seem very attractive to many because 
of the scientific interest attached to it.
But above all it is interesting for political 
and administrative reasons. It is almost 
impossible to administer an Islamic people 
wisely, if one does not understand its 
religious faith, its judicial system and 
its social organisation which are all 
intimately connected and are strongly 
influenced by the Qoran and the prophetic 
tradition. It is this understanding of 
native society which, alone, will enable 
a peaceful and profound action on the minds 
of the people. It is, therefore, in this 
study ... that we will find the surest bases 
and the most suitable directions for our 
Muslim policy.
(1) ANS 17 G 38 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Govs Sen,
Guinea, HSN etc. April 1913.
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Ponty also included a specimen copy of a 
questionnaire to aid local administrators, guiding 
them on what sort of information was required 
through 'very discreet questioning'. ^  From 
these circulars we should emphasise three main themes. 
The first is the importance that was attached to 
acquiring more knowledge of Islam, an indication 
both of the shortcomings of Arnaud's earlier 
contribution and of the increasing awareness of the 
extent to which the 'scientist' could contribute to 
the work of the 'practical man'. The second theme 
is the emphasis placed on the need to achieve 
security through means other than force, a message 
which had long been dear to ministerial accountants 
in Paris and whose importance had been underlined 
by the Goumba affair. Thirdly they show how the 
administration had arrived at the conclusion that 
they should direct their policy at individuals rather 
than the invisible forces of society, preparing the 
way for what has been described as 'the co-option of 
the Saints'. &)
(1) ANS 19 G 1 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Govs. Sen.,
Guinea, HSN etc. 1.8.1913.
(2) D. Cruise O'Brien Saints and Politicians
ch. 3. 'Chiefs, Saints and Bureaucrats' p.90.
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In September 1913 the departments of the federal 
administration were reorganised by administrative 
decree and, for the first time, the existence of 
a Service des Affaires Musulmanes was officially 
and explicitly recognised. Its duties included 
the centralisation of information on Islam, the 
translation of Arabic documents and the study of 
Islamic developments. Paul Marty was, of course, 
in charge.(1) Although Marty's obligations were 
varied - soon after his arrival he was consulted 
on Muslim burial rites by the head doctor of the 
colonial hospital in Dakar who was anxious to 
ensure that Muslim soldiers who had failed to 
survive his treatment were at least buried 
properly (2) - there were in 1913 three issues on 
which he had to report as soon as possible. The 
issues were those of education, the Mauritanian 
conquest and the Mourides.
(1) Arrete 1.9.1913 JOAOF (1913) p. 894.
(2) ANS 19 G 2 Gov.-Gen. AOF to General Oommt. 
superieur 23.3.1913; Medecin principal, 
Gamier to Marty 18.10.1913.
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Education
Education was a major administrative preoccupation, 
and Marty was expected to address himself 
immediately to the question of what type of 
education was best suited for Muslims. In 
September he wrote to the appropriate 
administrations in Algeria and Tunisia for 
information on the systems adopted in those two 
countries (1) but in his report to Ponty in 
November it was clear that he did not believe the 
North African model was suitable for Senegal. He 
introduced his report with an account of the 
marabouts who taught in the Qur1 anic schools of 
which there were, according to official figures 
1,385 in Senegal at the end of 1912. Although he 
admitted that some marabouts taught out of piety 
he argued that their main objective was to recruit 
children to work in their fields,or, if they were 
urban traders, to open a school as proof of their 
religious zeal and thus attract favourable publicity 
using the schools, said Marty as 'a sort of religious 
advertisement'. He regretted that only a very few
(1) ANS J 85 Marty to Directeurs de l'Enseignement 
musulman, Algeria & Tunisia 2.9.1913.
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scholarly marabouts discussed non-Islamic religious 
texts because 'this religious eclecticism could 
bring about profound transformations in Black 
Islam' . The general level of scholarship was very 
poor and there were serious language problems. 
Blacks, he claimed could only pronounce 15 of the 
38 letters of the Arabic alphabet with the result 
that, 'If truly as the purists maintain Allah can 
only understand Arabic - and well pronounced 
Arabic at that - the prayers of our Senegalese 
marabouts certainly do not rise up to his throne'. 
The pupils having finished their education at the 
age of thirteen then go on to learn a trade and to 
forget most of what they had learned. For Marty 
this was a point in their favour: 'The Coranic
schools, he wrote, do not create any declasses'.
He then went on to criticise past French policy to 
the schools, reserving particularly harsh words 
for the decrees of 1903 and 1906 which he 
castigated as,
too severe ... Rules which produce the 
opposite of the desired effect ... which 
upend all customs, traditions and wishes 
of the natives. They seem to hinder the 
natives arbitrarily without any advantage 
to our administration. They have never 
been used and everywhere administrators 
have turned a blind eye ... and left things 
as they were.
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He listed all the proposals suggested by Cor and 
Risson for the reform of the Qur1anic schools, 
explaining why for the most part the reforms were 
unworkable. There was, he said, a need to 
respect tradition and so,
To forbid children to work for their 
marabout amounts to the same as wanting 
to abolish the school altogether. As 
for the begging of the children, it is 
in general discreet, it amuses the local 
people, doesn't annoy anyone and 
benefits the children as much as the 
marabout and constitutes a rather 
interesting aspect of local civilisation.
The only restriction with which Marty was in favour 
was to deny Qur'anic schools access to animist regions.
Marty argued that although the French should make 
certain improvements in the standard of education 
and that they should attempt to by-pass the use of 
Arabic by transcribing native languages into the 
latin alphabet they should not attempt to do much 
else besides:
The Coranic school such as it functions 
is riddled with faults of all kinds, 
no-one denies it. It is a purely 
religious and purely mechanical education 
which has no effect on the intellectual 
development of the time. The slow 
disappearance of local customs and its 
traditional inflexibility results in 
our Senegalese becoming islamicised
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using the same school slate as was 
used in the first century of the 
Hegire at a time when the Orient 
itself, the cradle of Islam, is 
modernising. But one must 
acknowledge that this Coranic 
education system does not cause any 
political danger ... and has no bad 
repercussion on public tranquility.
It would, therefore, be impolitic 
to upset this institution which 
satisfies those who use it or to 
remedy its unfortunate social 
consequences by opposing it with French 
schools, burdened with all sorts of 
privileges, which restrict the freedom 
of the Coranic school. (1)
The report was interesting on several counts.
It showed how quickly Marty adapted to his new 
environment, and whilst one may object to his 
insistence on the racial reasons for the 
intellectual inferiority - as he saw it - of the 
Blacks as opposed to the Arabs one should also 
applaud his willingness to recognise Qur'anic 
schools as an integral part of Senegalese society 
which met an identifiable need of the local people. 
The begging of talibes continues even to this day 
to be a very contentious issue in Senegal, and 
objections to the system are understandable, but 
Marty was correct to set it in its wider social
(1) ANS J 86 Marty 'Rapport a M. le Gov.-Gen. sur les
ecoles coraniques du Senegal1 20.11.1915.
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context, emphasising that the custom was part of 
a way of life, 'a rather interesting aspect of 
local civilisation'. Such an attitude was a 
radical one - and undoubtedly raised a few eyebrows 
at that time. (1)
In the same year the Djenn6 medersa was closed down. 
In his annual report the local commandant stated that 
initial hopes that the medersa would purify Islam had 
failed:
In our medersa it is ... ignorance that we 
cultivate ... In the future we shall do 
without the help of the marabouts and we 
shall work not actually against them but at 
least independently of them. The creation of 
the medersa seemed to bestow Islam with 
official recognition and protection. Religion 
will now be a private affair. It will rest 
in the field of conscience. Until the day 
comes when we can tame it, Islam will be a 
form of opposition to our domination. (2)
Whilst Marty would never have suggested that France 
should actually do without the help of the marabouts 
he did agree that the Djenne medersa had been a 
failure. In 1917 he reflected that,
(1) See, for example, comments of Administrateur du 
Sine Saloum to Marty 21.6.1915 in ANS 13 G 67.
(2) ANS 15 G 103 'Rapport sur la politique musulmane 
suivie par le cercle de Djenne pendant l'annde 1913'
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It is an accepted fact that medersas 
are an error in Black Africa. The veneer 
of Islam and Arabic that cover this 
faith ... is extremely superficial.
Except for a few scholars whose 
intellectual achievements are quite 
impressive total ignorance dominates 
everywhere. Most of the teachers 
don't even know the elementary catechism 
to say the simple prayers correctly.
The result is perhaps deplorable from an 
Islamic point of view but it is excellent 
from the French point of view.
Perfectly ignorant, the natives have 
never been able to understand the reason 
for the struggle of Islam against 
Christianity ... The purely Islamic 
danger has never been an issue in the 
Soudan amongst the Blacks ... It has 
required the solidly thick skulls of our 
young Blacks to resist such an education.(1)
The smugly patronising tone of these comments was 
very typical of European writing on black Africa. 
'Perfect ignorance' and 'solidly thick skulls' 
conjure up a host of European cliches about Africa. 
They also defined the limits of colonial enterprise, 
and it is within this framework that we must 
understand Marty, a man of great talent but 
nonetheless a soldier and a scholar of his time.
It is interesting to note his willingness to preserve 
'the perfect ignorance of the natives' which he
(1) AMS J.94 'La Msdersa de Djenne' 16.6.1917.
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regarded as an asset rather than a liability to 
the French. Such a view contrasts with the 
philosophy behind the medersas when they were 
introduced as a means, it was hoped, of educating 
the Muslim elite and of inculcating them with a 
better understanding of the modern world.
Mauritania
The second question to which Marty addressed himself 
was that of Mauritania. It will be recalled that 
after the death of Coppolani official backing was 
given to occupy the region of Adrar. However, even 
after this was achieved under General Gouraud in 
1909 the French were still unable to exercise 
serious control over their main enemy Cheikh Ma el 
Ainin and his son el Hiba whose operational base in 
the Seguiet el Hamra was strategically situated and 
threatened French positions both in Morocco and in 
Mauritania. In 1910 Ma el Ainin was said to have 
claimed a right to the Moroccan throne and in May he 
visited Marrakesh, but the French prevented him from 
continuing on to Fez as he had intended. Soon 
after his return to his zawiya in Tiznit he died at
358
the age of 79. (1) However, his son el Hiba took 
up the challenge and just at the time when the 
French were establishing their Protectorate over 
Morocco, succeeded in mounting effective resistance 
against the French. On 10th January 1913 his men 
ambushed and annihalated almost an entire detachment 
of the meharists at Liboirat, 175 km. N.W. of Atar. 
Lt.-Col. Mouret, the Governor of the colony, 
described it as the most serious trouble ever 
experienced in Mauritania and argued that only a 
concerted action from French forces in Morocco and 
Mauritania would be capable of defeating el Hiba.
Marty, who had been actively involved in the French 
occupation of Morocco prior to moving to Dakar, laid 
more stress on a Mauritania-orientated policy.
There were, he said, two possible ways of dealing 
with el Hiba. The first possibility was a military 
campaign, but this Marty rejected for practical and 
financial reasons and fears of political objections 
from Paris and from Spain. The second possibility
(1) B.G. Martin Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth 
Century Africa Cambridge 1976 pp. 141-45
(2) ANSCM AP 1402/20 MDuret 'Rapport politique, 
lere Trimsstre 1913'
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was to adopt a diplomatic approach using the influence 
of the elderly and pro-French Cheikh Saad Bu over his 
young nephew el Hiba. Marty argued that el Hiba 
would welcome a settlement with the French and 
proposed conceding him the command of Seguiet el Hamra. 
Marty realised that Mouret preferred to work with the 
warrior Emir of Adrar, Ould De'ida, but he stressed 
that Cheikh Saad Bu was more influential and more 
amenable than the Emir. He further denied that 
using Saad Bu in this way would make him too powerful. 
The Cheikh was an old man with no likely successor 
and any power he did obtain, argued Marty, would serve 
the French as a useful balance to the growing prestige 
of the (admittedly ultra-loyal) Cheikh Sidia. (1)
By December Marty thought the submission of el Hiba 
was 1 imminent' and along with Lyautey in Morocco he 
arged the need for a coherent French policy towards 
him. Both Marty and Lyautey agreed on the need to 
make concessions to el Hiba, However, Marty added 
that making el Hiba responsible for an area approx­
imately the same as Seguiet el Hamra was only an
(1) ANS 9 G 30 Marty 'Note a m. le Chef de Cabinet sur 
notre action politique dans les confins Maroco- 
Mauritaniens, 1913'
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interim aim and, in words that could have been 
lifted straight from Coppolani, he said that,
'The true, the only aim of our present policy, it 
is perhaps cynical to say so, is to provoke anarchy 
in order to have peace in our territory'. (1)
The Mourides
The Mouride question was curiously and indirectly 
related to the Mauritanian question but, more 
fundamentally it concerned the much broader issue 
of French perception of Islam in black Africa. The 
Mouride tariga of Ahmadu Bamba is probably the best 
known of all the west African turug and it is not 
the purpose of this thesis to describe in great 
detail what has already been described and analysed 
many times over, sometimes more eloquently and 
pertinently than others, in the scores of books 
and learned articles devoted to the tariga of Serigne
(1) ANS 9 G 30 Marty 'Note a m. le Chef de Cabinet 
sur l'eventualite de la soumission d'El Hiba'
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Ahmadu Bamba, the borom of Touba. d) Nonetheless, 
it is necessary briefly to trace the main lines of 
its history.
The French military defeat of the Wolof kingdoms of 
Kayor, Walo and Sine in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century left a vacuum in the political 
leadership of these states. The most decisive defeat 
was that of the darnel (king) of Kayor, Lat Dior, in 
1886. However, even before this defeat the 
authority of the traditional rulers was being 
undermined. For, as the Wolof rulers had grown 
increasingly autocratic allowing their slaves armies 
to terrorise the countryside, the marabouts had 
attempted to intervene and to curb the worst 
excesses of the secular authority.(2) it should be 
remembered that many of the sub-Saharan societies
(1) P. Marty Les Meurldes d1 Amadou Bamba, 1913;
D.C. O'Brien The Mourides of Senegal Oxford, 1971; 
Saints and Politicians Cambridge, 1975; C. Coulon 
Le Marabout et le Prince Paris, 1982 are the best 
introductions to the subject.
(2) Coulon Marabout. et Prince pp.59-60;
O'Brien Mcurides p.21.
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had a specific clerical caste whose function in 
theory at least was to act as adjudicators in 
disputes and generally to encourage conciliation.(1) 
The clerical caste of marabouts was then offered as 
a balance to the violent instincts of the warrior 
aristocracy. Abb6 Boilat wrote in 1853 that,
[The marabouts] preach to the people 
and generally counsel peace and 
conciliation ... The word tiedo 
is the opposite of the marabout. It 
means one who is impure, a man with 
neither faith nor probity ... Living 
only of theft and pillage, they are 
made for war ... Without belief of any 
kind the give themselves up to all
Thus when the power of French arms finally 
discredited the traditional leadership it was only 
natural that the marabouts should take their place, 
even though Wolof society was at this stage a long 
way from being thoroughly Islamised. It should 
not be imagined that the marabouts were merely 
peasant leaders. On the contrary they had close
(1) C. Stewart 'Southern Saharan scholarship and the 
Bilad al-Sudan1 JAH xvii (1) 1976 pp.73-93
(2) Abbe Boilat Esquisses sendqalaises (1853) cited 
in Coulon Marabout et Prince pp.62-63.
vices
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connections with the aristocracy for whom the 
presence of holy men at their courts added to their 
prestige and, it was hoped, helped to secure their 
protection. In this respect Ahmadu Bamba' s 
relationship with Lat Dior was crucial. Both he 
and his father were members of Lat Dior's court and, 
on the eve of the decisive battle of Dekkile in 1886 
Ahmadu Bamba blessed Lat Lior - though it should be 
stressed that the blessing was designed to bring 
peace rather than to continue the war. ^
After the battle Ahmadu Bamba returned to his family 
village of M'Backe where he began to attract large 
numbers of talibes (disciples). It was, of course, 
normal for a marabout to have a number of talibes 
but in the wake of Lat Dior's defeat there were 
exceptionally large numbers of leaderless men, mainly 
from the old slave armies, the tyeddo, who were 
looking for new leadership. As in the case of 
Tierno Aliou, the arrival of large numbers of 
strangers brought Amadu Bamba into conflict with the 
old authorities of M'Backe and within two years of 
his return he was forced to leave and settle elsewhere.
(1) Marty Les Mourides pp.4-6; O'Brien Ihe Mpurides 
pp. 19-40
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In 1888 he founded a new village, Darou Salem, not 
far from M'Backe.(1) A year later his name appeared 
for the first time in the official French 
correspondence.
In March 1889 the department of Political Affairs 
wrote to the administrator of Kayor that they were 
worried by rumours that, 'a marabout called Amadou 
Bamba' had settled between Baol and Kayor and that 
he was attracting a large following. The 
administrator was asked to make discreet enquiries. 
In April the administrator, Angot, reported that,
In the course of my mission I have made 
enquiries in several places about the 
activities of the marabout Amadou Bamba. 
Everywhere ... I've heard only good about 
him. He is a pious and tranquil man 
whose only fault is that he takes on a 
lot of good-for-nothings as pupil marabouts 
and if these people aren't watched closely 
they will gradually cause trouble. (2)
Angot was the first of several Frenchmen who thought 
that reports of Ahmadu Bamba*s fanaticism were much 
exaggerated but who was nonetheless worried by his
(1) O'Brien Mourides pp.40-41
(2) 0. Ba.Ahmadou Bamba face aux autorites coloniales 
(1889-1927) Dakar, 1982 pp.25-26.
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popularity amongst those that were considered to be 
the less desirable elements of society.
It was about this time too that Ahmadu Bamba, who 
had been initiated into the Qadiriyya, began to 
receive visions and to develop the specific doctrines 
which distinguished his teaching from that of other 
Qadiriyya marabouts. For the rest of his life Bamba 
continued to produce an impressive quantity of 
religious poems, the form in which most of his 
doctrinal work was written. (1) His following 
continued to increase. Local chiefs, who had become 
increasingly anxious, found it easy to persuade the 
French that more direct action was needed to be taken 
against Bamba who, they claimed, was preaching Holy 
war against the Europeans. Of all the local chiefs 
only one, Samba Laobe the chief of Jollof, was not 
upset by Bamba's influence. In July 1895 M. Leclerc, 
the administrator of the cercle of St Louis reported 
that Ahmadu Bamba had held a meeting attended by 700 
men, many of whom were former followers of Lat Dior.
(1) F. Dumont La Pensee religieuse d*Amadou Bamba
Dakar/Abidjan, 1975 contains a very oornprehensive 
collection and annotation of Bamba's religious 
poems.
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I do not know, he said, the exact words 
of his speeches but it is certain, as 
anybody who knows the prudence of Amadou 
Bamba will know, that nothing reprehensible 
was spoken by him. But it is no less certain 
that in the evening whilst the marabout was 
talking in his hut ... his talibes circulated 
from group to group giving instructions for 
an uprising later in the year. (1)
The following month the same M. Leclerc warned that
All the old followers of the Darnel, all the 
tiedos who lived only through war and pillage 
and whom the present administration has 
reduced to poverty have grouped around the 
Mahdi marabout, the destroyer of the white 
man ... If Amadou Bamba is cunning and 
protests his devotion to the French cause, 
his talibes are less circumspect and openly 
proclaim him Mahdi in the middle of St Louis. 
Add to these bands of discontented tiedos, 
the band of fanatics who always follow these 
preachers of Holy War and you can judge the 
size of the movement which could explode 
at a sign from Amadou Bamba.
Leclerc thought that it was unlikely that Bamba would 
try anything before the end of the hot season and so 
he thought that the French had time to prevent unrest 
by exiling Ahmadu Bamba to Gabon. This was also 
what the chiefs wanted to see. (2) The director of
(1) ANSQM Sen. & Dep. IV/127 Leclerc to Dir. Affaires 
politiques 10.7.1895
(2) ANSQM Sen. & Dep. IV/127 Leclerc to Gov. Sen. & Dep. 
15.8.1895.
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Political Affairs was worried that if the French 
did not act against Bamba they would be guilty 
of what Faidherbe, in connection with French 
attitudes to Mamadu Lamine, had called 'excessive 
tolerance'. ^  Accordingly in September, despite 
a lack of concrete evidence, the Conseil Prive 
exiled Bamba to Gabon. Samba Laobe was replaced 
as chief of Jollof by Bouna N'Diaye, a very young 
man but the product of a good 'French' education 
in the Ecole des Otages in St Louis and of the 
Alaoui college in Tunis.
Bamba's reputation was enormously enhanced by his 
period of exile in Gabon (1895-1902) and when after 
the intervention on his behalf of the Senegalese 
deputy, Carpot, Ahmadu Bamba returned to Senegal 
late in 1902 he was greeted by huge crowds, all the 
more enthusiastic as a result of the widespread 
belief that Bamba had been released through a 
miraculous divine intervention. The French 
authorities, especially M. Aliys the administrator
(1) ANSCM Sen. & Dep. Dir. Aff. pol. to Gov. Sen. & Dep.
29.8.1895
(2) O'Brien Mourides p.42; Ba Ahmadou Bamba pp.81-87
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of the cercle of Tivaouane, were worried. Aliys 
went to the extent of employing his most trusted 
secret agent, Omar Niang, to infiltrate Bamba's 
following by posing as a would-be talibe and he 
provided 300 francs for Omar to offer to Ahmadu 
Bamba as the customary present of a talibe to his 
marabout, (1) In May 1903 Bamba refused to appear 
before the French Governor in St. Louis. In June 
he was arrested again and exiled to Souet el Ma in 
Mauritania, the camp of Cheikh Sidia, whose 
tolerance and loyalty to the French would, it was 
hoped rub off on his disciple. In 1907 Bamba was 
allowed to return to Senegal but he was kept under 
administrative surveillance in the village of Cheyen 
in the Jollof region. A secret agent sent a daily
report to St. Louis with details of visitors (and
their presents) to Bamba's residence.
Despite the fact that in 1910 Bamba issued a fetwa 
justifying obedience to the French, the authorities 
remained suspicious. In his instructions to his
(1) Ba Ahmadou Bamba p. 101
(2) Ba Ahmadou Bamba pp.134-38; O'Brien Mourides
pp.44-45; Coulon Marabout et Prince pp.76-77
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interim successor Ponty summed up the basis of French 
fears about Bamba:
It seems as if it is in our oldest colony 
of the group that Islam manifests itself 
in the most mystic form to such a degree 
that we have to ask ourselves if this 
deviation which the Mourides have imprinted 
on the great and rigid traditions of the 
true faith will not finally create a sort 
of politico-religious association in which 
religious interests will merely be a 
pretext for exploiting the ignorant masses. 
That the followers of the sect rely entirely 
on their cheikh for the direction of their 
earthly life and for guarantees of their 
future one, it matters little to us.
But we cannot turn our eyes from the 
repercussion of a form of propaganda which 
concerns equally our political, administrative 
and social actions. It is undeniable that 
for the Mourlde our authority scarcely exists 
and that in matters concerning his disciples 
it is often the Cheikh who intervenes and 
decides for them. Finally ... one cannot 
disguise the fact that if the sect develops 
it will greatly disturb the economic life 
of Senegal. Under the cover of religion 
a part of the public fortune is removed 
from the colony each year. (1)
Apart from the role played by the chiefs in bringing 
Ahmadu Bamba to the attention of the authorities and 
lobbying for his banishment, French action against 
Bamba was motivated by two main concerns. One was 
political and concerned the fear that, in the words
(1) ANS 17 G 39 Ponty to Gov.-Gen. p.i. AQF 12.1.1912 
(emphasis added)
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of Coppolani, sufi turug could form 'a state within 
a state'. In the case of the Mourides the fear 
was perfectly justified as the bonds of allegiance 
that are strong between any talibe and his cheikh 
were - and still are - peculiarly strong in the 
Mouride tariga, whose doctrine emphasised the 
absolute submission of the talibe. The second base 
was economic. We have already seen the objections 
raised about the alms-collecting tours of Cheikh 
Saad Bu and similar objections were also raised 
about the gifts given to Ahmadu Bamba by a stream 
of visitors to his residence in Souet el Ma and 
Cheyen. Such fears were particularly acute in 
view of the fact that the vast majority of Bamba's 
disciples came from the area in which groundnuts 
were grown. Groundnut production in Senegal had 
expanded rapidly: 25,000 tonnes exported in
1885, 140,000 in 1900 and 508,000 in 1930. (D 
Cheikh Ibra Fall, a former tyeddo who had in 1886 
attached himself to Ahmadu Bamba pledging eternal 
and absolute devotion to the cheikh and who was 
later described by Marty as 'the Minister of
(1) Coulon Marabout et Prince p.76
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Economic Affairs' for the Mourides (1) was quick 
to see the economic potential of using his own 
devoted following - mostly ex-tyeddo like himself - 
for groundnut farming. By 1912 he was said to 
have 1,000 talibes working for him producing an 
annual income estimated at nearly 50,000 f r a n c s .(2) 
Thus Ponty had good reason to fear the economic 
might of the Mourides.
However, in the course of the next two years the 
French came to realise that neither the political 
nor the economic strength of the Mourides need 
be detrimental to their authority, that indeed, 
on the contrary, to continue regarding Ahmadu Bamba 
and his followers as enemies would be unwise and 
dangerous. Signs of a change of heart were evident 
in Ponty's comments on proposals made by 
M. Theveniaut, the administrator of Baol, for 
imprisoning Bamba and his brother Cheikh Anta who 
was also widely regarded as a schemer. (3) Ponty 
argued that,
(1) Marty Les Mcurides p.28
(2) O'Brien Saints and Politicians p. 19
(3) Marty les Mpurides p.19.
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Our policy towards the islamised native 
should make use of skill and tact rather 
than severity. This is especially 
important when dealing with an Islamic 
group which has numerous followers ... 
Furthermore, we should not forget that 
Amadou Bamba is a pupil of Cheikh Sidia, 
the most venerated chief of the country 
of the Moors. Cheikh Sidia was the 
pivot of my predecessor's policy and also 
of mv own action in Mauritania. The 
Mouride sect was started in Senegal by 
Amadou Bamba. The word 'mourid' 
properly means * disciple of the faith'. 
That is to say that Amadou Bamba is 
still under the authority of Cheikh Sidia, 
the most devoted artisan of our influence 
beyond Senegal. How would our double- 
faced policy appear to Cheikh Sidia?
On the one hand, favouring his influence 
we make use of his great authority whilst 
on the other we are persecuting his own 
pupils. ... That would be to play a 
double game from which we risk being 
ourselves the victims. It would be to 
adopt a policy which the present 
incidents are in no way sufficient to 
justify.
When dealing with Islam Ponty warned against 
following the narrow instincts of local commandants 
as he argued that action should be taken within the 
framework of French Islamic policy in AOF and in 
North Africa. So when Theveniaut wanted to 
imprison Cheikh Anta immediately before even a 
judicial enquiry was made Ponty warned against such 
haste, 'Whatever the result of the enquiry I will 
decide in good time what measures seem to me to be
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best suited to avoiding a recurrence of a new 
Ouali of Goumba affair1. (D This letter provides 
an excellent insight into how Ponty's perceptions 
and priorities were changing. It clearly shows 
the importance of Cheikh Sidia and his family in 
French calculations, and this was one of the great 
constants of French policy through from Coppolani 
to the post-Second World War era. (2) Cheikh Sidia1s
(1) ANS 13 G 12(17) Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Sen. 
13.8.1912. (emphasis added)
(2) See ANSCM AP 2258/5 'Note de m. le Gouvemeur 
Beyries' 25.7.1948. Beyries in reconrnending an 
annual allowance of 500,000 Fr CFA to the head 
of Cheikh Sidia's family wrote: 'Nous devons
nous montrer d'autant plus genereux a l'egard 
des Ahel Cheikh Sidia [i.e. the Cheikh's family] 
que le nombre des personalities marquantes de
1'Union frangaise sue qui la France peut compter 
en toutes circonstanoes n'est pas si grand.
Notre generosite n '6tonnera aucune personne de 
bonne foi parmi les musulmans de l'Afrique 
occidentale francaise; elle montrera d'une 
maniere tangible que nous savons et que nous 
pouvons aujourd'hui oomme dans le passe, 
reconnaltre dignement les services de ceux qui 
nous gardent leur confiance'. It appears that 
the Minister of Colonies wholeheartedly approved 
of the grant; see in file, Delavignette 'Note 
pour le Ministre' 31.7.1948. See also the 
undated monograph in this file written by 
M. Le Geay on history of relations between 
the Ahel Cheikh Sidia and the French.
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role was particularly important at a time when 
the Mauritanian and Moroccan issues were at the 
forefront of French preoccupations. Secondly it 
is further evidence that the Wali of Goumba affair 
came as a real shock to senior French administrators, 
and Ponty*s warning about the narrow-mindedness of 
local administrators is interesting too in this 
respect.
Cor, the Lt.-Governor of Senegal to whom Ponty's 
comments were addressed was not convinced and 
continued to provide Ponty with evidence of what 
he saw as maraboutic fanaticism. Ponty, however, 
was dismissive:
I have not been particularly struck by 
the fanaticism with which you believe 
the writings of Amadou Bamba to be filled.
They do not seem to me to indicate a 
more obviously hostile character than 
most of the writings of this genre ...
We should not be unduly alarmed.
Ponty did, however, share Cor's doubts about the 
wisdom of using Ahmadu Bamba to help in recruitment 
for the Moroccan campaign for both feared that 
this would give added weight to his prestige and 
authority. Recruitment and tax-collection were
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to be entrusted to political chiefs only.(l) Such 
then were the limits of French action in 1912. As 
we shall see the administration would soon, under 
the pressure of war, embark on a more opportunist 
policy, as Ahmadu Bamba was to become in his own 
right a pillar of French policy in Senegal.
That the French felt more confident to make use of 
him in the war was in large part due to the report 
made by Marty on the Mourides in 1913. (2) Marty 
produced the report very rapidly. It is not clear 
when he started but by August 1913 the typescript 
was in the hands of Le Chatelier, the editor of 
the Revue du Monde Musulman through whom all of 
Marty*s work in West Africa were published. (3)
(1) ANS 13 G 12 (17) Gov.-Gen. AQF to Lt.-Gov. Sen. 
8.11.1912
(2) The report was published as Les Mourides ...
(3) ANSCM Sen. & Dep. IV/133 Le Chatelier to Hardy(?)/ 
Marty (?) 25.8.1913. Le Chatelier was annoyed
with the AGF government for using the Revue du Monde 
Musulman as a cheap way of publishing its 
documentation on Islam and he hesitated for 
this reason over the publication of the Mauride 
report but decided to publish it in view of 
'its scientific importance1.
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The speed with which the report was made is 
reflected in the brisk and administrative style 
which was characteristic of all of Marty's studies. 
Marty relied heavily on local archives and it is 
not surprising to find that he repeated the official 
version of events leading up to the first and second 
exile of Ahmadu Bamba. In later years Marty became 
more critical of his sources. However, in the 
account of these early years of French contact with 
Bamba, Marty's most original contribution was to 
argue that Ahmadu Bamba should never have been 
allowed back from Gabon for whilst he was away there 
was a period of 'perfect tranquility' in the 
colony. (1) The book was intended as an 
administrative report and it proceeds from a 
consideration of the Mouride personalities in the 
various cercles of Senegal to a discussion of the 
doctrine of Ahmadu Bamba through to a more general 
consideration of its relation to indigenous judicial, 
social and economic customs and institutions. The 
report was relatively short (136 pages) with a 
further 20 pages of appendices.
(1) Marty Les Mourides pp.9-10.
Page references given in the following 
paragraphs refer to this report.
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One of Marty's strengths as a writer was an ability 
to write excellent character sketches of which a 
professional biographer would not have been ashamed. 
His descriptions of the leading personalities of the 
Mouride tariqa are as lively as any that have ever 
been drawn since. Cheikh Anta is portrayed as a 
cynical politician who has used his family position 
to build up contacts with the most important 
businessmen and politicians of the colony:
One cannot deny, writes Marty, that this 
'Minister of Foreign Affairs' as he is 
called, has acquired ... a very practical 
way of dealing with situations. He is 
certainly not bothered by scruples of 
hindering his brother's religious mission. 
Cheikh Anta, it is easy to see, has not 
believed in this mission for a long time. 
Mouridism provides him with excellent 
personal opportunities, (p.20)
Cheikh Ibra Fall, whom Marty described as 'a 
veritable black Potin' (after Felix Potin, the 
founder of a chain of groceries in France) is 
also portrayed as an astute businessman despite 
his superficial appearance of madness:
Ibra Fall has an unfortunate physique 
which does not help him. With his 
nervous tics and his wild laughter, a 
sort of delirium tremens with which 
he is afflicted, one would be tempted 
to take him for a simpleton. However,
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one should remember that he was one of 
the first disciples of Amadou Bamba 
at a time when no one suspected the 
future importance of the Serigne, 
and this shows a certain flair on 
his part. Since then he has devoted 
himself, tenaciously and intelligently, 
to the increase of his material wealth. 
He owns houses in St Louis and in Dakar, 
and has concessions in Thies, Diourbel, 
Ndaule and Kebemer. He has set up 
commerce houses at several trading posts 
and gets his disciples and wives to 
manage them. Commerce does not take 
up all his time. Under the supervision 
of one of his disciples he also gets 
his followers to cultivate enormous 
fields of groundnuts, millet and various 
other grains, and he himself skilfully 
takes care of their retail, (p. 28)
Ahmadu Bamba is the only person to emerge without 
a strong character - a reflection perhaps of the 
fact that he was a reclusive holy man lacking the 
penchant for political and economic activity in 
which his family and followers seemed to revel. 
Marty suggested that Ahmadu Bamba had had political 
ambitions in his youth but that these had been 
frustrated by the French conquest, (p* 13)
However, the most important aspect of the book was 
the way in which it contributed to a fundamental 
change in the understanding of Islam in Senegal. 
The main theme of the report was that 'mouridism' 
was a bastardised form of Islam - 'une sorte de
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religion nouvelle nee de l'Islam ... en plein 
vagabondage islamique ... l'islam a l'usage des 
Ouloffs1 (pp. 42-3) Marty showed how in doctrinal, 
judicial and economic habits Mourides differed 
from 'orthodox* Islamic teaching.
The black mentality, he wrote, is 
completely incapable of bearing the 
metaphysical concepts of the Oriental 
Semites and the ecstatic digressions 
of the Soufis. These scenes are 
nothing other than an act of common 
prayer, soon followed by dances, 
choreographed mimes and bamboulas 
of which the blacks are so fond. (p.53)
As Islam distances itself from its 
cradle ... as races and conditions 
change, it becomes increasingly 
deformed. Islamic confessions, 
be they Malaysian or Chinese, Berber 
or Negro, are no more than vulgar 
contrefacons of the religion and 
state of the sublime Koran, (pp. 123-4)
Marty believed that Bamba had been guided by the 
invisible hand of Wolof custom and that this had 
proved a more potent force than the original 
Islamic doctrine, (p. 120)
Marty, therefore, argued that the Mourides should 
not be assimilated in French minds to the Islam of 
the Arab world. This meant, for example, that 
there was no point in using Sidi Khalil as a legal
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textbook in Senegal, however cheap and convenient 
it may have been. (This was something of a 
'hobby-horse1 for Marty who devoted four pages to 
the subject in his report and mentioned it also 
in his correspondence with local administrations.) 
Instead, Marty urged native tribunals to make more 
use of Wolof customary law. (pp. 90-3) It also meant 
that the Mourides - along with most other West African 
Muslims - were immune from pan-Islamism. Marty 
said that stories of Mouride connections with the 
Ottomans or even El Hiba were 'much exaggerated'.
(pp. 113-15)
He did not suggest that the Mourides represented no 
danger at all. Indeed he emphasised that there 
were local dangers and that, whilst observing the 
strictest religious neutrality, the French should 
exercise a close watch over the activities of the 
Mourides and be prepared, in the event of crimes 'to 
act repressively, immediately and vigorously, (p.130) 
The administration should make use of family disputes 
in order to keep a balance of power, (p. 133) As for 
Ahmadu Bamba himself, Marty believed that he had 
renounced his former ambitions and that he was 
probably sincere in his protestations of loyalty.
(p. 137)
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It is clear that Marty's argument that Mouridism 
was deeply influenced by Wolof custom was not an 
original one. Right from the start of the 
development of the brotherhood the administration 
was aware of the way in which the old elements of 
Wolof society - especially the tyeddo were being 
reconstituted in the Mouride brotherhood. Both 
Clozel and Delafosse had argued that African Islam 
was heavily influenced by local traditions, that 
there were as many different types of Islam in 
West Africa as there were ethnic groups. Clozel, 
in particular, had emphasised the importance of 
local traditions and had urged the use of 
customary law by Native Tribunals. Ponty, too, 
was sympathetic to this line of argument. What 
Marty had done was to document a specific example 
of 'African Islam' with a thoroughness that was 
unique in the writing that until then existed on 
the subject. For the first time ever the French 
administration was starting to develop an official 
line on what Islam in AOF actually amounted to. 
With the publication of Marty's report the era of 
French doubts and uncertainties about Islam in 
Africa was drawing towards a close. In the next 
decade - a decade which included the First World 
War - Marty continued to document in minute detail
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the state of Islam in AOF and the next chapter 
will examine more closely his contribution to 
scholarship against the background of the war in 
Europe.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The War and Islam
The outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 and, 
more particularly, the break-off of diplomatic 
relations with the Ottoman Empire on 1st November 
inevitably caused great apprehension amongst the 
French administration. Antonetti, the interim 
Lt.-Governor of Senegal, told Ponty that the 
greatest danger of unrest in the colony came from 
the Mourides. Despite the fact that he believed 
that Ahmadu Bamba's attitude since the declaration 
of the war had been one which suggested he could 
be trusted, Antonetti argued that, 'The suppleness, 
the patience, the obsequiousness even with which 
the Mourides are acting towards us ... should not 
delude us. We can be certain that if one day 
war against the 'roumi' unbeliever is declared 
in Senegal, the declaration will come from this
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sect'. (1) Clozel was the most anxious of all 
the administrators and asked for permission for 
special emergency powers, including the declaration 
of a state of siege, in order to deal with 
troublesome marabouts in the Soudan. Ponty, 
however, thought that such powers were unnecessary. ^  
With the rupture of diplomatic relations with the 
Ottomans came a flurry of correspondence between 
Paris, Dakar and all the other administrative centres 
of AOF concerning what attitudes should be taken 
towards Ottoman subjects resident in AOF. The 
Colonial Minister counselled strict surveillance 
rather than expulsion. He later urged Ponty to 
show indu^ence to Lebanese Maronites, Syrian 
Armeniamand Catholics, Gregorian and Greek Orthodox 
Ottomans and finally francophile Syrian and Turkish 
Muslims. Ponty assured Paris that most African 
Muslims were not interested in the Ottomans and 
in any case looked to the Moroccan Cherif rather than
(1) ANS 13 G 87 Lt.-Gov. p.i. Sen. to Ponty 8.9.1914.
(2) ANS 19 G 4 Clozel to Ponty n.d.; Ponty to Clozel 
17.9.1914; Ponty circular 20.9.1914.
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the Sultan of Turkey for ultimate spiritual 
guidance. (1) The various Governors relayed 
instructions from Ponty to their commandants de 
cercles: malicious rumours were to be
suppressed and the traditional friendship between 
France and Islam was to be exalted throughout 
AOF. The successes of the French army (at this 
stage just beginning to recover from the initial 
German push into northern France) were to be 
likewise glorified. Nonetheless a careful watch 
on the marabouts was to be maintained, and a strict 
censorship of the post was to be enforced.(2)
French anxieties were not confined to fear of Muslim 
unrest. The Liberian Christian prophet Harris and 
his followers who had for some time been active in 
the Ivory Coast, was seen as posing a very similar 
sort of threat as Ahmadu Bamba. The administration 
admitted that Harris himself appeared loyal and calm 
but feared that his less restrained disciples 
might cause trouble. In view of the reduced
(1) ANSCM AP 907/3 bis Min. Col. to Govs.-Gen. Algeria, 
AOF, AEF, etc.
(2) See ANS 7 G 69 Lt.-Gov. Guinea to cercles 8.11.1914; 
SHAT AOF Niger 3/iii/d Lt.-Gov. Niger to cercles 
10.11.1914, same to same 18.11.1914.
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European personnel in the colony the Governor of 
the Ivory Coast thought it would be wise to 
persuade Harris to return to Liberia. (1) But 
clearly the German-Ottoman alliance made the question 
of Muslim loyalty one of the most immediate 
administrative preoccupations, and both French and 
British minds were set to work on finding a Muslim 
card of their own with which to trump the German's 
Ottoman ace. In the Arabian peninsula, the Levant 
and in the shadowy streets of Constantinople this 
search was, quite literally, the stuff of which 
novels are made. Richard Hannay and the weird 
'Companions of the Rosy Hours' doing battle with the 
agents of 'Hadji Mohammed Guillamo' was thrilling 
stuff - whichever side of the English Channel one 
was on. (2) But in French West Africa there was to 
be little scope for such daredevil adventure.
Just as fears in metropolitan France that the 
Socialists would oppose the war were quickly dispelled, 
so too in AOF were anxieties about Muslim resistance
(1) ANS 5 G 62 Ponty to Admin, cercle Lagunes 12.11.1914, 
Lt.-Gov. I. Coast to cercles 16.12.1914.
(2) See John Buchan Greenmantle Iondon 1916.
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in the name of the Ottoman Sultan quickly proved 
to be without foundation. Within a very short space 
of time Muslim leaders from all over AOF were inun­
dating the Governor General with assurances of 
loyalty. Ponty telegrammed the Colonial Ministry 
in November to say that 'The most reassuring news about 
the attitudes of the Muslim populations is reaching me 
from all over the colonies'. The situation in 
Mauritania was particularly promising as there was a 
virtually unanimous denunciation of the Ottoman 
Sultan. (1) Almost without exception Muslim notables 
from all over AOF wrote addresses and poems in praise 
of France and in condemnation of the Ottomans and the 
Germans. These writings were collected and published 
in two issues of the Revue du Monde Musulman. Cheikh 
Sidia was one of the first to declare his loyalty;
Through the penetration of French power into 
the countries of the Toucouleurs, the Moors 
and the Blacks God, the generous, the 
merciful, the savant and the sage has revealed 
incalculable advantages that we never knew 
before. The abandon by the tribes of the 
instruments of war, the abolition of acts 
of oppression inherited from our ancestors,
(1) ANSQM AP 907/1 Gov.-Gen. AGF to Min.Col.
22.11.1914; ANSOM AP 1420/20 Lt.-Gov.
Mauritania to Gov.-Gen. AOF 11.11.1914.
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the repression of pillage and death 
sentences ... France has also developed 
justice and security in the countries of 
all their sedentary and nomadic 
subjects. She has sunk abundant wells ... 
She has introduced capable doctors to the 
natives, rich and poor ... It is God 
whom we ask to consolidate ... this 
power and to protect it against all 
enemies. (1)
The leaders of the Senegalese Tijaniyya all showed 
their devotion to the French cause. El Hajj 
Abdullah Niasse declared in Kaolack,
We have loyal sentiments and pure affection 
for our glorious French nation which is the 
most powerful of all the European nations because 
of its justice. Why shouldn't we like France?
It is she who has made us progress from barbarity 
and savagery towards the light of civilisation. 
When she raised her Tricoleur flag in our 
country we were without a leader. We lived in 
anarchy and were cutting each other's throats.
We enslaved children and committed acts of 
brigandage on the roads. Fear and anxiety were 
widespread throughout our country. The French 
government in taking possession of Sienegal has 
punished the guilty and helped the oppressed 
until there were no brigands or thieves left in 
the country. (2)
(1) Cited in ' Les Musulmans francais et la Guerre1 
FMM 1915 p.17. *
(2) Ibid p.132.
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El Hajj Malick Sy, who said prayers for a French 
victory every Friday, gave this message to his 
talibes; 'Know, oh Muslims, ... that we must 
live on good terms with the French government and 
pray that God accords it peace and victory. For 
its happiness is our happiness. He who denies it 
is like the man who cuts his throat with his own 
hand/ The address of the notables of Timbuktu
gave a rather more legalistic reason for their 
refusal to respect or follow the Ottoman example 
in the war:
We have learned that the Turkish Sultan 
has embraced the cause of Germany against 
France. We condemn this act for we are 
attached to France and we will always be 
the enemies of those who declare war ... 
Furthermore, the Turkish Sultan does not 
know us. He is not our chief. He is a 
usurper. Nor did our ancestors have any 
relationship with him. They knew only 
the Sultan of Morocco. ... We are 
faithful to God, His Prophet and the 
Cherif of Mecca. This man is our only 
legitimate chief according to the 
witnesses of the hadith. (2)
This reference to the sole legitimacy of the Cherif 
of Mecca could not, however, have been altogether
(1) Ibid p. 107
(2) Ibid p.99.
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welcome. For the Ottoman alliance with Germany 
raised doubts once again in French minds about 
where the ultimate authority in the Islamic world 
lay. As we have seen Marty, Delafosse and Clozel 
had already done much to emphasise the particularity 
of African Islam and thus redress the wilder and 
more absurd universalist images of Islam that were 
the order of the day at the turn of the century. 
Nonetheless, the French administration, including 
Marty, were not at the end of 1914 absolutely 
confident that African Muslims would not at some 
stage follow the orders of a foreign Islamic 
authority. The Interministerial Commission on 
Islam decided that the French would be unwise to 
get involved in the issue of authority and obedience 
in the Muslim world. The Colonial Ministry reported 
to Ponty in December,
The Commission expressed its opinion that 
as much as possible we should keep away 
from questions of obedience in Islamic 
matters. It would be ... doubtful that 
we could achieve the desired aim if we 
appeared to recognise a claim to 
Mahometan orthodoxy from one of the 
elements who claim spiritual authority 
in Islam. ... It does not in any way 
appear desirable to spread in Muslim 
circles the notion of rallying around a 
religious centre. Our Islamised natives 
of AOF are for the most part ignorant 
about the questions of the Khalifate or
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or the Imamate and we can only benefit 
from maintaining this state of 
ignorance. (1)
The most obvious and the most important connection 
between Black Africa and the rest of the Muslim 
world was the pilgrimage to Mecca. Soon after 
the rupture of diplomatic relations with the 
Ottomans the French authorities in North Africa 
decided to forbid Muslims to go on the pilgrimage 
in order to lessen the possibility of pan-Islamic 
agitation in their colonies. The Colonial 
Minister wrote to Ponty to tell him of this decision 
and to urge him to do the same. The ban should, 
he stressed, be issued in such a way,
so as not to provoke unflattering comments 
or to upset the religious sentiment of 
the Muslims. It would perhaps be impolitic 
to stop the pilgrimage through a formal 
decree at a time when such a measure would 
appear to be motivated by fear of letting 
our subjects have contact with the Turkish 
empire. But the local administration 
could advise against departure for the 
pilgrimage by arguing that the boats normally 
used to transport the pilgrims have been 
requisitioned by the belligerent powers 
and that, therefore, the pilgrims run the 
risk of waiting indefinitely at the ports 
without ever having the opportunity to embark.(2)
(1) ANS 19 G 1 Min. Col. to Gov.IGen. AGF 21.12.1914.
(2) ANS 19 G 4 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 21.10.1914.
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The following year similar instructions were given. 
The Allies were helped in their task of dissuasion 
by a fetwa issued by the Grand Mufti of Egypt which 
strongly advised Muslims not to go on the pilgrimage. 
However, in both 1914 and 1915 Ponty reported that 
there were in any case no requests from would-be 
pilgrims for permission to leave AOF. (1)
The pilgrimage question became much more interesting 
the following year when the Cherif of Mecca supported 
by the Arab tribes of the west and central Arabian 
peninsula proclaimed their independence from the 
Ottomans. In June 1916 the Colonial Minister wrote 
to Angoulvant, the interim Governor-General with 
news of the Reuters report carrying details of the 
Cherif's proclamation. Angoulvant was asked to 
give wide publicity to the proclamation taking care 
not to mention the part played by the Allies in the 
Arab revolt nor the fact that the information came 
from Reuters rather than France's own information 
sources and finally to emphasise that the Sultan of
(1) ANS 19 G 9 Defranee (Plenipotentiary Min. in 
Alexandria) to Min. Aff. Et. 23.7.1915;
Gov-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 14.10.1915;
Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 25.8.1915.
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Constantinople no longer had the authority to act 
in the name of Islam. Angoulvant then issued 
these instructions in a circular to the colonies of 
AOF. The interim Lt.-Governor of Niger thought 
that the news was splendid and suggested 
celebrating the independence with extra festivities 
on 14th July which he thought would be a symbolic 
manifestation of the union between France and 
Islam. Angoulvant was not impressed with the 
idea which he thought would prove hard to square 
with the official line on the independence of the 
independent Cherif of Mecca, More serious
thoughts on the implications of the proclamation 
of independence came from the Foreign Ministries 
in Paris and London who both, for separate reasons, 
thought it wise on reflection not to give wide 
publicity to the proclamation and so decided against 
a formal publication of its contents. In London 
the Foreign Office was reported to be worried about 
the repercussions of the news in India, and the 
French were anxious not to encourage the idea of 
Muslim unity. (2)
(1) ANS 19 G 10 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. p.i. AOF
23.6.1916, Gov.-Gen. p.i. circular 28.6.1916.
(2) See file in ANSCM AP 907 bis 5 for correspondence 
Paris - Alexandria - Dakar in July 1916 and also 
IF Fds Terrier 5917 for good collection of press 
cuttings.
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The decision was taken instead to send copies of the 
proclamation to selected Muslim leaders in French 
colonies. From AOF the following were selected: 
Cheikh Sidia from Mauritania; El Hajj Malick Sy the 
leader of the Tivaouane Tijaniyya in Senegal;
El Hajj Sliman from Agades (U; Karamoko Dalenf a 
Fulbe Tijani from Timbo in the Futa Jallon who had, 
according to Marty, been Bokar Biro's eminence 
grise and who now helped the French with carrying 
out censuses, collecting local information and 
organising vaccinations;(2) Abdullabba Ahmed Baba, 
a Chorfa and Cadi of Timbuktu (3); imam Mohammed ben 
Essoyuti, also of Timbuktu who had formed part of 
the delegation of Timbuktu notables who had 
approached the Moroccan Sultan Mawlay Hassan in vain
(1) Lt.-Gov. Niger said that el Hajj Sliman was of 
'lukewarm' loyalty to France and was therefore 
an unsuitable person to receive a copy of the 
proclamation. The interim Governor-General
on the other hand thought that the proclamation 
would be a good influence. See ANS 19 G 10 
Lt.-Gov. Niger to Gov.-Gen. AGF 25.8.1916,
Gov.-Gen. p.i. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Niger 14.9.1916.
(2) P. Marty L'Islam en Guinee Paris 1921 pp. 248-49.
(3) Marty described him as 'l'un des meilleurs artisans 
de notre occupation' Etudes sur l'islam et les tribus 
du Soudan vol. II Paris, 1920 p. 12.
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for help against the French but who in 1911 was 
appointed by Clozel as a teacher in the medersa 
of Timbuktu and finally Imam Mohammed Kunandi 
Timitie from Bondoukou in the Ivory Coast, the 
almamy of the town's principal mosque and with a 
long record of pro-French activity spoilt only by 
a two month flirtation in 1914 with the British 
authorities in the Gold Coast who were apparently 
anxious to see the Kunandi settle in west Asante.^
At the beginning of August it was also decided - 
in Paris - that the French should send an official 
mission of pilgrims from French colonies in North 
and West Africa. The mission was due to catch 
a boat from Marseilles on the 1st September leaving 
very little time for the AOF authorities first to 
select a representative and then to send him on to 
Marseilles. The metropole would bear the cost of 
the mission from Marseilles onwards but AOF was 
expected to pay the boat fare from Dakar to 
Marseilles. Angoulvant, the interim Governor-General
(1) Ibid p.16
(2) Marty Etudes sur l'islam en Cote d'Ivoire Paris,
1922 p.222. See also ANS 19 G 10 Min. Col. to 
Gov.-Gen. ACF 4.8.1916. Gov.-Gen. AOF to
Min. Col. 28.7.1916 for list of chosen leaders.
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was not enthusiastic. He replied to the Colonial 
Minister that there were only two Muslim notables, 
Cheikh Sidia and El Hajj Malick Sy who lived close 
enough to Dakar to be able to catch the boat on 
time, but Angoulvant doubted that El Hajj Malick Sy 
who was old and nearly blind would agree on such a 
voyage and he felt that the presence of Cheikh Sidia 
in Mauritania was too important. He also feared 
that the sudden disappearance of the two men would 
cause confusion and might be seen as a deportation. 
He regretted, therefore, that AOF could not 
participate in the mission at such short notice. 
However, the Colonial Minister quickly replied that 
the mission had been postponed by two weeks and 
wondered if that might not be enough time to find 
a representative, not necessarily a marabout, he 
added, but any good Muslim, although in view of the 
possibility that he would miss the Marseilles boat 
and would have to travel to Alexandria by himself 
it would help if he could speak French. Perhaps, 
he suggested, a good loyal Senegalese chief? ^
(1) ANS 19 G 10 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AGF 4.8.1916.
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 17.8.1916, Min. Col. to 
Gov.-Gen. AOF 9.8.1916. See also R. Bidwell 
' The Bremond mission in the Hi jaz, 1916-17.
A study in inter allied cooperation' in Bidwell & 
anith (eds) Arabian and Islamic Studies London 
1983.
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Angoulvant wrote to the Governor of Senegal asking 
him if he could think of a suitable candidate and 
suggested himself the cadi of St Louis or Bouna 
N'Diaye the chief of Djollof. Six days later there 
was still no reply from the Senegalese Lt.-Governor 
so Angoulvant wrote again adding the somewhat loaded 
question, 'Do you see any inconvenience from the 
point of view of our Islamic policy in sending to 
the Cherif of Mecca delegates who even though chosen 
from outside the circle of influential marabouts 
might return from their voyage with a tendency to 
unify the diverse Islamic groups which exist at the 
moment?1 Angoulvant wrote to his superiors in 
Paris to explain the delay and to express his own 
misgivings about the project:
Without talking of the risk of torpedoes 
and of tendentious rumours that the 
delegates might pick up and be unable 
to interpret properly it is to be feared 
that they will bring back cherifian 
directives from Mecca intended to unify 
the present diverse groups of AOF, the 
multiplicity and contrary tendencies of 
which make it easy for us at the moment 
to restrict and to supervise Islam, 
whereas anything which favours unification 
inevitably creates a danger for us.(l)
(1) ANS 19 G 10 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Sen.
11.8.1916, same to same 17.8.1916,
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 18.8.1916.
399
Neither the Colonial Minister nor the Lt.-Governor 
of Senegal were, however, unduly worried by these 
thoughts. From Paris Angoulvant received a 
swift explanation of the official motives behind the 
mission:
It is not a question of either seeking 
to strengthen the Muslim faith of our 
subject peoples or of involving ourselves 
in Islamic controversies and internal 
dissensions but rather of elevating 
the prestige of the Cherif, whose attitudes 
coincide with the interests of the Allies ... 
The mission is being sent by and in the name 
of the French Government in the well- 
considered interests of the Nation. The 
mission should therefore be made up of 
political personalities who are devoted 
to our cause in preference to religious 
chiefs.
The Lt.-Governor of Senegal, seeing no objections 
to the mission, selected Abdou Kane, a jurist from 
Kaolack who had been nominated for, but had not 
received, the Legion d'Honneur several years before. 
Since the outbreak of the war he had helped with 
recruitment amongst the Tukolor and so, having been 
selected to go to Mecca, he was nominated again for 
the Legion d'Honneur which he was duly awarded towards 
the end of August 1916. On the 24th August he left 
Dakar for Marseilles in a first class cabin and 
with a personal cook provided courtesy of the AOF
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government. (1)
The mission was reported to have been a great 
success. Lt.-Col. Bremond who accompanied the 
pilgrims told Briand, the French Prime Minister 
and also Foreign Minister, that the Algerians gave 
proof of their French mentality and expected to get 
the vote after the war as a reward for their 
sacrifices, that the Tunisians were Turcophile and 
the least co-operative of the group, whilst the 
Moroccans had 'a good attitude although a bit 
simplistic'. As for Abdou Kane - 'this good old 
man with the finesse of a peasant' - Bremond reported 
that he had become increasingly pro-French as the 
journey had continued and was struck by the lack of 
racism on the part of the French officers with whom 
he ate at the same table. (2) The Colonial Minister 
rewarded him with another honorific title. &) The 
following year the Quai d'Orsay insisted that there 
should be more French pilgrims in order to avoid the
(1) ANS 19 G 10 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 19.8.1916,
Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 17.8.1916, same to
same 18.8.1916, Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col.
28.8.1916, Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 30.8.1916.
(2) ANS 19 G 11 Lt.-Ool. Bremond to Briand 19.10.1916.
(3) ANS 19 G 10 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 27.11.1916.
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impression that Germany still controlled the 
Mediterranean. Such an impression would, it was 
feared, weaken the French bargaining position with 
the King of Hedjaz at a time when a powerful lobby 
in Paris was already staking its territorial claims 
in the Levant. However, the French were not 
prepared to pay for the pilgrimage as they had done 
the previous year unless there were not enough 
pilgrims able to pay for themselves. (1)
The Caliphate question highlighted the dilemma that 
characterised much of French thinking on Islam. On 
the one hand, as we have seen, frequent claims were 
made that France was a Muslim power &) and, of course, 
it was true that the Ff-ench colonies contained many 
Muslims. But, on the other hand, France did not 
control any of the great world centres of Islam.
The degree of French obsession with and suspicion of 
Islam that continued right up until decolonisation 
cannot be adequately explained without reference to 
this fact. That they never controlled what were
(1) ANS 19 G 9 Min. Aff. Et. to Gov.-Gen. Algeria &
Res.-Gen. Morocco, Tunisia 3.4.1917. For Paris 
Levant lobby see Andrew & Kanya Forstner 
France Overseas passim.
(2) See, for example, ANSCM AP 907 bis/5 Min. Aff. Et. 
to Min. Col. describing France as 'la plus grande 
puissance musulmane arabe'.
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imagined to be the puppet strings of Islam seemed 
to many to be a terrible weakness.
General Lyautey was particularly sensitive to this 
weakness. As news of the Cherif of Mecca's 
proclamation reached him he wrote to the Foreign 
Minister with a long account of his views. His 
main theme was the desirability of the French 
sponsorship of an alternative western Caliphate that 
would act as a balance to the eastern Caliphate of 
Mecca which he said was tinted with pan-Islamic 
sentiments and was in the hands of the British. If 
the French upheld the idea of a unique Caliphate, he 
argued that they would put themselves at the mercy 
of the British, reliant upon their goodwill in order 
to participate in decision-making. Furthermore, 
he argued,
Even if we were always to encounter loyalty 
from our ally and all its agents we would 
still have to reckon with their clumsiness. 
The guant-^-soi of the English, their disdain 
for natives, their confidence in the all­
mightiness of Great Britain serve them ill 
for handling the moral forces of Islam ...
It is all the more important to recognise 
the clumsiness of the English when one 
compares it to the skill we possess in such 
matters. Thanks to the universalist 
character of the French genius and an 
experience of Islam we have at our disposal 
personnel who offer both a vocation and an 
infinitely superior suitability ...
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I am aware of the fact that in religion 
as in any political affair we have an 
interest in dividing rather than unifying. 
But it is not a question of knowing whether 
the religious unity of French Islam is good 
or bad but rather of knowing whether this 
unity isn't the only guarantee against a 
greater evil, namely the unity of all 
Islam, including our own, under the primacy 
of a foreign or enemy chief. It is also 
a question of whether within the limits 
of our African possessions the religious 
unity under a Khalifat docile to our 
wishes ... isn't the surest guarantee 
against dangerous excitation, notably 
against the actions of brotherhoods who 
are involved in all insurrections.
Lyautey, therefore, proposed backing the claims of 
the Moroccan Sultan for the spiritual suzerainty 
in north west Africa, Tunisia excluded - and for 
this country he preferred to recognise the 
Ottoman Sultan rather than the Caliph of Mecca.
The idea of opposing the Caliph of Mecca with a 
strongly backed Moroccan Caliph was not an original 
one. Felix Gaillard, the Secretary-General of the 
Cherifian government, had used a very similar 
argument early in 1915 but it is interesting to 
see it put forward so strongly by Lyautey. ^
(1) IF Fds Terrier 5917 Lyautey to Min. Aff. Et. 
16.6.1916 & see also in same file 'Note de 
M. Gaillard'. (Gaillard, the Sec.-Gen. of 
the cherif ian government also argued in favour 
of a western caliphate.
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However, to a certain extent this debate was of 
academic interest only in AOF where for some time 
increasing emphasis was being placed on the 
particularity of African Islam, a particularity 
that was so strong that African Islam was barely 
recognisable as 'orthodox' Islam. Marty for 
example had described the Mourides as being 'em 
pleine vagabondage islamique' (1) In addition 
to the spiritual heresy of African Islam there was, 
according to this same belief, an ethnic heterodoxy 
which made the idea of a unity of African Islam 
almost a contradiction in terms. So when in 
January 1916 the Colonial Ministry proposed as part 
of a package deal to reward Muslim loyalty, which 
included a mosque and a special hospital for 
Muslims in Paris (2), to elect some Muslim 
representatives onto the Interministerial 
Commission on Muslim Affairs, Clozel's response was 
swift and predictable:
Our Muslim populations understand and 
apply their Muslim faith only in the form 
of affiliation to maraboutic groups.
These groups almost always correspond 
to ethnic collectivities. One can state 
as a principle that West Africa is like
(1) Marty Mourides p.43
(2) Details of the plans for the mosque and 
hospital are to be found in ANSQM AP 907 bis/5.
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a chess-board where religious chapels 
and ethnic groups almost always coincide 
and where as a result maraboutic 
jealousies and polemics have attached 
themselves to the secular rivalries of 
peoples and races. This extreme division 
of Islam noir has been up until now the 
main factor in our policy. It is 
because of it that our action has been 
easy and effective. It is thanks to 
this that neither before nor since the 
outbreak of war have we had to fear 
any general uprising. ... It is because 
of this that all local incidents can be 
dealt with quickly and have no repercussion 
and that we are able to find in the next 
chapel, in the same way as in the 
neighbouring ethnic group, the most 
devoted and committed auxiliaries.
Should I myself attempt to bring together 
in one electoral college all the Serignes, 
Alfas and Karamokos ... to elect a Muslim 
counsellor? Will I myself be the artisan 
of a rapprochement of people who do not 
know each other and who are jealous of 
one another? Will I myself prepare the way 
for an agitator or simply an adventurer 
who will use Islam as his electoral 
springboard and perhaps even cause a 
pan-Islamic action? It is out of the 
question. For in this mosaic of peoples 
and brotherhoods no attempt at unification 
... should be risked. Such an action 
would amount to organising ourselves the 
Muslim dream and creating the lever which 
has always eluded the leaders of Holy War, 
to succeed in a general uprising of West 
African Islam. To ask us to prepare with 
our own hands the means of our eventual ruin 
seems to me to exceed all the limits of 
possible madness.
Clozel proposed nominating four men to represent 
some of the major strands of West African Islam - 
Cheikh Sidia, Aymin Seek (the cadi of St Louis),
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Ahmed Baba and Tierno Ibrahim Dalen - but if the 
Colonial Minister insisted on only one representative 
then Cloze1 would choose the last of the four 
mentioned. (1)
The Colonial Minister did not appear to insist and 
the scheme to co-opt West African Muslims onto the 
Interministerial Commission was, like many other such 
schemes of the time, still-born. Instead Clozel 
himself sanctioned the creation within AOF of a 
'Consultative Committee on Muslim Affairs' to be 
composed of the heads of the Department of Civil 
Affairs, the Department of Muslim Affairs, the 
Military cabinet and selected Muslim notables of 
AOF. In all 20 Muslims were nominated, including 
Cheikh Sidia, Cheikh Saad Bu, Serigne Ahmadu Bamba,
El Hajj Malick Sy and Karamoko Dalen.-(2) However, 
the Committee met with the disapproval of at least 
one local administration. Guinea feared that it 
would provide an alternative system of advancement 
for Muslims and would therefore undermine the 
colony's means of patronage. The scheme did not 
have a very illustrious history and it too quickly
(1) ANSCM AP 913/1 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 30.1.1916.
(2) ANS 19 G 1 Arrete 28.4.1916.
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faded into oblivion. (1)
So what then was the reality of French policy 
towards Islam during the First World War? The 
grandiose schemes of official missions to Mecca 
apart, the humdrum of everyday dealings was 
mundane and apparently undemanding. One task 
consisted of censorship, overall supervision of 
which was entrusted to Mary. In January 1915 
Antonetti,•the Lt.-Governor of Senegal, reported 
that Syrians were selling colour prints of the 
Italian and German royal families, the Sultan of 
Turkey and other political subjects 'which might 
have a bad effect on the mentality of our natives' (2) 
But Ponty assured the Minister of Colonies that 
there was little to worry about on that score.
A history book written by Enver Pacha on the 
Turko-Italian war which had been ordered by several 
Syrians before the war would, he said, be
confiscated as soon as the order arrived. (3)
(1) ANS 7 G 69 Lt.-Gov. Guinea to Gov.-Gen. AOF n.d.
(2) ANS 13 G 17 Lt.-Gov. Sen. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 21.1.1915
(3) ANS 19 G 1 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Cbl. 4.3.1915.
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In 1917 Delafosse, the Head of the Department of 
Civil Affairs, drew up a circular banning the 
Revue du Maghreb which he had been told by the 
Minister of Colonies was an instrument of German 
propaganda. Delafosse instructed the Head of 
Customs to allow Franco-Arabic dictionaries but to 
confiscate German printed editions of the Qur'an 
and a French textbook, L'Histoire moderne which 
had been published before the war and contained 
pictures of the Kaiser alongside portraits of Allied 
heads of S t a t e . T h e  French, of course, countered 
with their own propaganda and produced posters of 
their own showing portraits of the President of 
the Republic and various military chiefs. (2)
The Development of Scholarship
Apart from such vigilance there was no real alarm 
about Muslim loyalty once the initial shock of war 
itself was over. It is interesting to reflect that
(1) ANS 19 G 4 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AGF 1.7.1916, 
Delafosse 'Note pour m. 1'Inspecteur des Douanes'
7.7.1916, same to same 15.11.1917.
(2) ANS 5 G 63 M. Joseph (Chef Bureau Politique) to 
Marty 29.4.1916.
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it was precisely during the period of the war that
I
l
i Marty did the bulk of his research and writing on
Islam. A period that one might have expected to 
be intellectually barren turns out paradoxically 
to be the time when research on all aspects of 
I African culture actually flourished as it had never
I done before. In part this was due to the influence
! of Clozel who was delegated Governor-General
following Ponty's death in June 1915. As we have 
seen Clozel was a scholarly person and as Governor- 
General he continued to support scholarly activity. 
In 1915 he founded the Comite des Etudes Historiques 
et Scientifiques de l'AOF. The Comite had the 
specific aim of fostering scientific research in 
which Africans were also encouraged to participate. 
Clozel was to be its president, and Delafosse and 
Dr Bouet its two Vice-Presidents. The Comite 
published a regular Bulletin. For the last two 
years of the war Delafosse also occupied a senior 
position in the Dakar administration. On the 
invitation of his patron, Clozel, he was made 
head of the Department of Civil Affairs (SAC) 
early in 1916. Clozel had to work hard to secure 
the post for Delafosse whose articles under the 
pseudonym 'Broussard* in the Depeche Coloniale 
attacking Blaise Diagne and his party known as
i
i
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the Jeunes S6n£galais had earned him some powerful 
enemies in high places in Paris. Diagne was a 
central figure in France's recruitment campaign in 
AOF and the Rue Oudinot was anxious to retain his 
services. Clozel had to threaten to resign before 
Delafosse was finally appointed. Clozel himself, 
who had never actually been nominated as Governor- 
General but only 'delegated' for the duration of the 
was was sacked in May 1917 as a result of 
differences with the Rue Oudinot over recruitment.
He was replaced by the 'technocrat' Angoulvant 
who had 'pacified' the Ivory Coast and who was more 
sympathetic to military demands than were either 
Clozel or Delafosse. Delafosse survived Clozel's 
removal from office though he was later treated 
badly by both Angoulvant and Van Vollenhoven who 
blocked Delafosse's candidature for promotion to 
Lt.-Governor of a colony in West Africa.^ Marty, 
the good soldier, appeared never to be involved in 
the colonial politics of the war period. The 
scholarly triumvirate of Clozel, Delafosse and Marty
(1) A good account of the internal politics of these 
years is to be found in L. Delafosse Un Berrichon 
oonguis par la France pp. 264-341 - although it 
must be remembered that the author is Delafosse's 
daughter.
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which held the stage for much, if not all, of the 
war was an impressive one by any standards. As a 
result the war period was a far richer one in terms 
of research and publications than one would have 
expected.
Marty was the most prodigious of the wartime 
scribblers. L 1Islam en Mauretanie et Sendgal 
(1915-6), L 1Islam en Guin^e (1917-20) and L*Emirat 
des Trarzas (1917-8) all appeared in wartime 
volumes of the Revue du Monde Musulman (RMM).
In collaboration with Col. Mangeot he wrote in 1918 
a study of the Tuareg of the Niger bend which was 
published in the Bulletin du comite des etudes 
historiques et scientifiques de 1*AOF (1918). The 
first volume of Etudes sur L'islam et les tribus du 
Soudan appeared in volume 37 of the 1918-9 edition 
of the RMM, and the other three volumes appeared 
shortly afterwards in a separate collection. Les 
Brackna, a study of the other main political 
grouping in southern Mauritania to complement his 
earlier work on the Trarza was published in volume 42 
of the RMM in 1920. In 1921 he wrote a study of 
Islam in Niger which was not published until 1930-1 
('L'Islam et les tribus dans la Colonie du Niger 
(ex-Zinder)' Revue des Etudes Islamiques vols.
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4 & 5 1931). 1922 and 1925 saw the publication
respectively of his work on the Ivory Coast and 
Dahomey. In addition there were a number of 
other minor articles of lesser importance. With 
such a large corpus of writing it is not easy to 
generalise beyond certain basic statements. All 
the studies are essentially administrative and 
follow broadly similar layouts - an introduction 
to the history of the region and description of 
the main Muslim personalities followed by an 
analysis of the importance of Islam in the social, 
political and economic life of the indigenous 
population. All the studies are very specific 
either to one area or to one ethnic group, but 
between them they cover all the territories of AOF. 
Despite the variety of subjects it is still possible 
to identify certain key themes in Marty's description 
of Islam. We have already been introduced to these 
themes in Marty's account of the Mourides and we 
shall now attempt a more systematic analysis of them 
covering the whole of Marty's work on Islam in West 
Africa.
Marty's belief that the Mourides were a Muslim heresy 
was one which he extended to most other West African 
Muslims. In an article written in 1914 on the subject
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of the role of amulets in Senegalese society he 
declared, 'Here in West Africa Islam is not so 
much an adaption of persons and of characters but 
rather a deformation of doctrines4. ^  This 
judgement was not, however, rigorously applied to 
all Muslims in AOF. For example, Marty argued 
that the Muslim Mande population of the Ivory Coast 
were 'strictly orthodox as far as the rites are 
concerned, more orthodox even than in North Africa'.
The Mande, he said, did not practise saint worship 
and prayed directly to God. An exception was
also made for the Moors who were regarded as 
extremely orthodox Muslims and very accomplished 
scholars to boot: 'One must not forget that in the
Trarza we find ourselves in the presence of intelligent 
and well-educated people who resemble Europeans on 
many points'. (3) The Muslim communities of Timbuktu, 
Djenne and Nioro - all traditional centres of Islamic 
scholarship - were similarly respected by Marty who 
made no attempt to deny their orthodoxy or, indeed,
(1) Marty 'Les Amulettes musulmanes au Senegal' RMM 1914,
28 p. 319.
(2) Cote d'Ivoire p.455
(3) Tmrza p. 309.
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their relations with the wider Islamic world. (1)
Marty also acknowledg ed the scholarship and 
knowledge of Islamic doctrine of El Hajj Malick Sy 
'the most educated marabout in Senegal1. (2)
But such recognitions were exceptions. Writing on 
the subject of Cheikh Bu Kunta, an unscrupulous 
and uneducated marabout who exploited his family 
origins to earn his living near Tivaouane in Senegal, 
Marty declared that, 'The Moorish-Arabic mentality 
of Bou Kounta and the experience of a life spanning 
three quarters of a century caused him to see in the 
Blacks nothing more than birds good for eating. (3) 
Although the paternalist Marty did not approve of 
Bu Kunta's attitude to the blacks he nonetheless 
shared the belief in the low intellect of the black 
races. This was, as we have seen, very clear in 
Marty's attitudes to education, and was also 
reflected in his belief in the fundamentally different 
nature of 'African Islam' as opposed to 'Arab Islam'.
(1) Soudan vol. II passim, Soudan vol. IV p. 210
(2) ANS 4 E 6 'Le Goupement tidiani d'Al Hadj Malick Sy* 
(1915) reprinted in I*' Islam en Mauretanie et 
Senegal Paris, 1916.
(3) Mauretanie et Senegal pp. 413-42. Quote is fran 
p. 441.
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In May 1915 Marty was asked to give his opinion on 
the wisdom of distributing in AOF a pamphlet prepared 
by the British giving an account of the rupture of 
relations with Turkey. He considered that,
Our Black countries are scarcely Islamised 
and are not in the least up to date with 
the current events in the Orient. Since 
the beginning of the war our policy has 
been to maintain the Blacks in this happy 
state of mind and we have abstained 
from all communications that might change 
this state of affairs.
Marty agreed, however, to give copies of the document 
to 'a few Black marabouts and a larger number of 
Moorish marabouts'. ^  An example cited by Marty 
of the lack of interest and concern shown by African 
Muslims for the events in the Middle East was taken 
from the Muslim soldiers from the Muslimm community 
of the Ivory Coast. Marty reported that Muslims from 
the colony who had fought in the name of France against 
the Ottomans had no opinions on pan-Islamism and on 
their return to the Ivory Coast no-one was interested 
in the fact that they had been fighting against other 
Muslims. (2)
(1) ANS 19 G 4 Marty 'Note pour m. le chef du cabinet' 
11.5.1915.
(2) C6te d'Ivoire p. 444-45
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Marty continued Ponty's crusade against the use of 
Arabic in the administration. At the end of 1918 
the Lt.-Governor of Senegal decided to include 
compulsory oral and a written examination in Arabic 
for all interpreters. Marty considered this to be,
An affront to the Muslim policy 
inaugurated in 1908 by M. Ponty and 
methodically followedsince then by all 
the Governor-Generals. It is a clear 
backward step which, moreover, is in 
keeping with the tradition of the 
Senegalese administration which since 
Faidherbe has practised a constant 
policy of Islamophilia and which has 
endeavoured to arabise and Islamise 
populations which were almost all still 
fetishist in 1850. The Governor-General 
has eliminated Arabic, the vehicle of 
Islam, from all official institutions in 
AOF. To reinstate it officially and 
obligatorily in the interpreters' exam 
is to work towards Islamising in a short - 
space of time the corps of Senegalese 
interpreters and to transform them into 
marabouts who will be much more loyal to 
local pontiffs than to the order of the 
administrator. It would also result in 
eliminating numbers of young fetishist, 
Christian or religious independent young 
Senegalese who have not learned, and 
who have no need to learn, Arabic and the 
principles of the Muslim faith. It would 
obviously favour Arabic to the detriment 
of French, and the marabout to the 
detriment of the schoolteacher. (1)
(1) ANS 13 G 26 (17) Marty 'Ncte' 28.4.1919.
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Marty was in this case particularly strident in 
his criticism and uncharacteristically melodramatic 
in his warnings - but the use of Arabic was, like the 
use of Sidi Khalil something he felt strongly about.
He often returned to the idea of transcribing local 
languages into the latin alphabet. It is interesting 
to see Marty's views on the pro-Islamic tendencies 
of the Senegalese administration as these views seem 
to fly in the face of fact. As Marty himself had so 
well described, the conversion of the Wolof to Islam 
was caused by a process much more complicated than 
the simple use of Muslim intermediaries by the 
French. It might also be said that neither Cor nor 
Guy, two recent Lt.-Governors of Senegal, were noted 
for their love of Islam. Still the belief that the 
French were themselves mostly responsible for the 
development of Islam in Senegal was a strong one, 
another stereotype that proved itself to be a hardy 
perennial.
The reason why Marty felt that 'African Islam' was 
fundamentally different from 'Arabic Islam' was that 
Marty - like Clozel and Delafosse - believed that the 
indigenous pre-Islamic customs and traditions were 
a more powerful influence than the doctrines contained 
in the Qur'an, Hadith etc. As we have seen French
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knowledge of indigenous customs derived principally 
from studies commissioned for legal purposes, that 
is studies that were intended to provide French 
administrators with a corpus of customary law 
that was more suitable than either the Code Napoleon 
or the Sharia. At least a third of each of Marty's 
books was devoted to the question of customary laws 
and the influence of Islam upon them (and vice versa). 
Marty argued that,
Pure Muslim law has never governed the 
Senegalese communities. They have always 
retained their judicial customs, which 
are moie or less coloured by Islam, 
sometimes only very slightly. So it is 
not to the Koran or to the law of Islamic 
authors that one should refer in order to 
judge questions of civil law concerning 
our Islamised subjects. Notably for 
marriage one should not hasten to say that 
a union is 'natural' (i.e. rather than 
legitimate) because the couple has not 
appeared before a Cadi or because no 
marabout has recited a prayer. We should 
not demand these formalities because we 
would then ourselves be encouraging the 
Islamisation of the natives which, to say 
the least, is pointless. I believe 
that a union is legitimate if it has 
satisfied all the requirements of customary 
law: the consent of the parents or
guardians of the woman, the consent of the 
woman or, at least, a de facto acceptance, 
payment of dowry and the usual presents, 
publicity and celebration of the union.
The Senegalese natives, whatever society 
they belong to, ask no more than that,
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and only a very small number request 
the good offices of the marabout. (1)
In his study of the region of Kayes Marty stated 
that the population of 75,000 comprised one third 
fetishists, one third lapsed Muslims and one third 
1Islamised ... in the sense that one understands it 
in West Africa, that is to say coloured by Islam but 
above all anxious to pass themselves off as Muslims .(2) 
Marty's comments on the Islam of the Bozo - agroup of 
fishermen and boatmen on the Niger near Mopti - 
are revealing:
In African Islam so superficial as it is 
the Bozo seem to hold the record, but 
despite everything one cannot really 
laugh because their faith, although 
unenlightened, seems nonetheless to be 
strong and active. They also suffer from 
the need to believe and seem to be tending 
towards a more complete Islam. It is 
hardly necessary to add that the influence 
of Islam in their judicial institutions 
as well as in their social customs is 
almost nil. They are well able in their 
minds to amalgamate belief in the new 
religion and respect for all their former 
beliefs - tana, magic practices, witchcraft, 
supernatural therapy etc. - which are 
similar to Bambara customs. (3)
(1) ANS M 241 Marty 'L'influence de l'islam dans 
le droit coutumier des peuples sdndgalais' 
(1915)
(2) Soudan vol. IV p.l.
(3) Soudan vol. II p.221.
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In these two quotes we can see examples of Marty's 
cynical attitude to Islamic conversion. Africans 
became Muslims out of snobbery, 'to pass themselves 
off as Muslims' or because 'they suffer from a need 
to believe'. Another reason for conversion which 
Marty offered with reference to traders was one of 
sheer practicality. For example, in the Ivory Coast 
Islam was confined mainly to the Muslim dyula 
(traders) who, said Marty, prospered handsomely under 
the umbrella of the pax gallica. Wherever the dyula 
went they did not neglect to say their prayers for,
This simple yet grandiose religion 
practised by almost all the Blacks coming 
from the North, apart from its 
intrinsically seductive qualities, 
established itself as a veritable 
necessity, as an obligatory passport for 
native fetishists desirous in their turn 
of trading with the cities of the Soudan 
which have been described to them in 
marvellous terms. These fetishists 
leaving for the north, therefore make 
their salaam but without great conviction, 
motivated by more or less the same reasons 
as those which decide a traveller [in 
Europe] to become a member of a 'touring 
club' . (1)
Although there is an acknowledged connection between 
long distance trade and Islam, Marty's dry humour -
(1) Cote d'Ivoire p.94.
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one of his strengths as a writer - nonetheless 
betrays a superior and dismissive attitude towards 
African Islam.
So, if as Marty said, it was scarcely worth repeating 
that in most cases African Islam was heavily 
influenced by pre-Islamic customs and traditions, 
what then in Marty's eyes were the relative merits 
of Islam and animism? The answer is not entirely 
clear. An interesting insight into Marty's overall 
view of religion in general in Africa can be gleaned 
from some handwritten notes made by M. Deherain, 
keeper of the library of the Institut de France and 
secretary of the Journal des Savants, who had a long 
conversation with Marty about religion in Africa 
some time in 1921. Unfortunately the notes are 
barely legible but it seems that Marty likened Islam 
to a wolf and fetishism to a lamb. Although the 
notes do not explicitly ascribe the role of shepherd 
to the Christian missions, the implication is none­
theless there for it was suggested that they 
represented the best chance of keeping the lamb safe 
from the w o l f . ^  Marty certainly believed that the
(1) IF Deharain 5629 'Notes' July 1921.
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animist societies require some sort of protection 
from Islam. The only restriction that Marty 
believed necessary for Muslim Qur'anic teachers, for 
example, was that they should not be allowed to 
teach in animist areas. In his study of Islam in 
Bambara country he cited the incident which took 
place in July 1914 in the village of Sokolo when a 
Bambara Muslim called Salifu Traore attacked and 
wounded three gardes de cercle and then ran about 
the streets shouting 'La ilia ill1 Allah1. He was 
soon arrested and sentenced to twenty years 
imprisonment but he died shortly afterwards in 
Bamako jail. Marty commented that 'It is a curious 
example taken from many others of the nefarious 
results which Islamic preaching produces amongst 
its Bambara neophytes'.(1) The severity of the 
sentence suggests that the authorities agreed about 
the seriousness of the crime which was twofold; not 
only attacking the guards but also preaching Islam 
amongst the Bambara. In an essay on Islam in 
Casamance Marty again emphasised the importance of 
keeping Muslims away from the animists.
(1) Soudan vol IV p.183.
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In the aspect of our Muslim policy in 
West Africa which concerns the 
fetishist peoples there is an extremely 
delicate role to play. It is necessary 
that we safeguard this interesting and 
prolific diola people, great growers 
of rice and industrious workers ... 
from all Islamic influence. With the 
Sereres, whom they greatly resemble, 
they constitute two ethnic unities, 
the only two of importance who are left 
to us in Senegal on whom we can count 
to carry our civilising effort. (1)
Marty had been very impressed with the success of 
the Liberian Christian prophet, William Harris, in 
the Ivory Coast. In an area, the Gulf of Guinea, 
which he described as 'the paradise of magic' (2) 
Marty was astounded at the success of Harris in 
converting the animists to Christianity and at the 
same time encouraging them to work more and to 
drink less alcohol. W  Harrismwas, he said,
An almost unbelievable religious fact 
which has upturned all the ideas which
(1) Mauretanie & Senegal p.467
(2) Cote d'Ivoire p.7
(3) See Marty on coastal Agni '... forts 
intelligent^, mais paresseux au dela de 
tout ce qu'on peut imaginer, dans un 
pays prodigieusement riche elles n'ont 
qu'un besoin, 1'alcool' Cote d'Ivoire 
p.l.
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we had about the primitive and rustic 
Black societies of the coast and which 
along with our occupation will be the 
most considerable political and social 
event in ten centuries of history past, 
present and future of the Ivory Coast. (D
However, the war interrupted the Harris experience, 
and the authorities, worried by 'a multitude of 
imitators [of Harris], a scattering of little 
prophets of Yessas (Jesus) and sons of God, who show 
much less tact and disinterest than their master 
or model', 'invited' Harris to leave the colony. (2) 
Harris' success was thought to be surprising because 
it was widely believed that the sedentary forest 
dwellers were incapable of conceptualising a single 
and unique God. In his study on Dahomey Marty 
extended the lesson of the Ivory Coast experience to 
the Fon and Yoruba, two animist ethnic groups with 
a strong social structure who were both nonetheless 
according to Marty ' on the threshold of a religious 
crisis' and before long were likely to convert, 
depending on mission activity and government policy, 
either to Islam or to Christianity. Marty warned 
that, 'One must underline strongly the fact that
(1) Ibid p.13
(2) ANS 5 G 62 Gov.-Gen. AQF to Admin Cercle Lagunes 
12.4.1914, Lt.-Gov. I. Coast to cercles 16.12.1914, 
Marty Cote d'Ivoire pp.16-18.
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here, as elsewhere, our confessional neutrality is 
a great advantage to Islamic proselytism". (1)
Taken together with other evidence such as the wolf 
and lamb analogies this last warning about the 
dangers of religious neutrality would seem to 
suggest that Marty was more in favour of mission 
activity than were either Arnaud or Ponty.
However, it would be an oversimplification to argue 
that Marty held to a simple and dogmatic belief in the 
inherent wickedness of Islam and the innocence and 
perfectibility of animism. For, like all his 
contemporaries, Marty was struck by the superiority 
of Islamic over animist society. The same Diola 
population whom he had lauded for their industry 
and willingness to associate themselves with the 
French civilising mission were also described as 
having retained along with the other animist groups 
of Basse-Casamance 1 the most extremely barbarous 
customs" and he proceeded to catalogue an 
impressive list of vices which were compounded by 
the fact that 'No commandement exists, neither 
great nor medium ... This scattering
of authority makes administration almost impossible".
(1) Marty Etudes sur l'islam au Dahomey Paris, 1926, p.30
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It was for these reasons said Marty that the French 
had in the past preferred to make use of the 
minority Muslim Mandinka community as chiefs and 
intermediaries. (1)
In the Ivory Coast Marty spoke of the way in which 
Qur'anic education improved indigenous society:
However rudimentary the etication given 
by marabouts may be, however absurd its 
methods often are ... it still nonetheless 
represents a sort of development of the 
brain, an obligation for the native spirit 
to rid itself of its congenital torpor 
and laziness, an attempt at intellectual 
labour. It gives a rudiment of general 
knowledge which enables the Black to a 
certain extent to rise above his milieu, 
teaching him to glimpse and conceive a 
mentality which is different from their 
own and, since it is Arabic different 
from ours as well, it is true, but one 
which is certainly superior to the 
ambiance in which they vegetate. Finally, 
through desire to go to Paradise and 
through fear of going to Hell and respect 
of God it inculcates them with a primitive, 
but healthy and realistic morality.
It has become a commonplace to affirm 
that Islam constitutes a certain progress 
in the primitive mentality of the Blacks. 
There is no doubt about it. (2)
Marty also argued that women were better off in 
Islamic society than in an animist one. In the
(1) Mauretanie & S6n£gal pp. 467-68
(2) Cote d'Ivoire p. 273.
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region of Djenne and Macina Marty wrote that
The situation of women is certainly 
better amongst the islamised population 
of the Niger valley than amongst the 
fetishist societies. Islam gives her 
a certain personality, thanks to which 
she can acquire, possess and sell 
tmaterial goods] ... to a certain extent 
govern her own life and, above all else, 
she may pray. The fetishist woman, 
similar to the woman of pagan antiquity, 
takes no part in religion ... and if she 
is reasonably free physically to come 
and go as she pleases she is not 
by any means her own mistress. (1)
Although Marty admitted that some Muslims obstructed 
the physical liberty of women by imposing the veil, 
the preference for the Islamic mode is nonetheless 
clear. In view of the fact that the position of 
women in society was regarded by some contemporaries 
as the touch-stone of civilisation such a belief 
contained a more general comment on the relative 
merits of animist and Islamic societies than just 
the specific issue of the position of women in 
society might suggest.
The final theme running through Marty's books that 
we shall consider concerns the importance attached to 
personalities in his studies. As a brief glance at 
any of his published work will quickly show a large
(1) Soudan vol. II p.293.
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proportion is taken up with lists and character 
sketches of the main Muslim figures. The 
biographical bias of Marty's work is justified by at 
least two considerations. The first applies more 
particularly to the nomadic and semi-nomadic people 
of the Saharan fringes. As we saw in the study of 
Coppolani's attempt to win over the clerical tribes 
of Mauritania, personal diplomacy was, in the 
absence of a strong military commitment, one of the 
few tools of conquest available to the French.
This was true also of French relations with other 
societies similar to the Moors and to whose conquest 
the French were at best only reluctantly committed. 
Diplomacy was complicated by, amongst other things, 
the intense factionalism that characterised many of 
the societies involved. Much of Marty's work on 
these societies is simply concerned with suggesting 
possible chiefs. In the case of the Trarza where 
it should be remembered that the French protege 
Emir Ahmet Salum had had no successor following his 
assassination in 1905, Marty argued that since 1910, 
when the Emirate had been restored, French rule and 
French policy had been to create,
... a protectorate regime, a sort of 
very tight tutelage. We wanted to free 
the local authorities of the worries
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of the internal administration of 
the tribes ... We aimed at getting 
the Moors to administer the Moors, 
but a la francaise. that is to say with 
precision and without depradation. (1)
Marty attempted also to provide guidelines to help 
French administrators through 'the maquis of Muslim 
law' (2) and to warn them of,
The astuteness and perfidy of the Moor, 
and especially of certain maraboutic 
tribes. ... An administrator who 
arrives from Black Africa and who has 
never had to deal with such intrigue 
is far from being able to imagine such 
a state of mind and ends up by allowing 
himself to be duped by this structure 
of apparent simplicity and the honeyed and 
well-turned speeches of the Moors. Let us 
not forget that the Moors are white. (3)
What were the qualities that Marty emphasised as 
being the hallmarks of a good chief? Marty 
respected birth and for this reason tolerated the 
laziness of Eli Mahmud, the chief of the Mechdouf, 
whose main interest in life it seemed was in drinking 
calabashes of tea and milk in his tent.(4) But it 
was clear, nonetheless, that Marty's preferences
(1) Trarza p.289
(2) Ibid p.308
(3) Soudan vol. Ill p.263
(4) Ibid p. 148
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lay with Mokhtar ould Mohammed Mahmud, the second 
of Eli Mahmud's brothers. He was, said Marty
A fine man, cunning and energetic.
He has always shown proof of a certain 
independence and even in the beginning 
of an undisguised hostility towards us.
He is certainly the most intelligent and 
also perhaps the most warlike of the 
family ... His personality should hold 
our attention, and I would be inclined 
to see him as the best of the candidates 
for the Emirate from our point of view.(l)
Elsewhere Marty again made it clear that he did not 
necessarily hold someone's past against them. Thus 
the chief of the Labat tribe in Brackna who as a 
young man had fought an intermittent campaign 
against the French before finally submitting in 
1909 was described as an excellent chief:
This young and intelligent bandit of 
yesteryear understood that he had to 
come closer to the French in order 
to restore his tribe. So he came 
to live at Aleg at the beginning of 
1912 and for a few months attended 
lessons at school. Then ... he 
studied for ayear in the 'medersa' 
of St Louis and for four years in 
Boutilimit. Today he speaks and 
writes French reasonably well. He 
is an excellent chief who bears himself 
well. (2)
(1) Ibid pp. 150-51
(2) Brackna pp.121-22
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Another chief of whom Marty warmly approved was 
Salah ould Rachid Abd el Oualibouh, a marabout 
chief of the warrior Awlad Nacer. Marty said 
that he was one of the most influential Moorish 
chiefs of the western Sahel: 'He is an intelligent
man, learned and very sympathetic. As Cadi of the 
Oulad Nacer he exercises a great authority over 
these querulous namads. Many strangers come to 
obtain judgements and fetwa from him. His tent 
is a little nomadic zawiya where thirty-odd men and 
young people improve themselves in higher learning.(1)
Other chiefs were criticised for a variety of 
shortcomings: Cheikh Mohammed Djeddou of the Jouman
tribe was described as being 'more stupid than his 
camels' (2), Torad ould Cheikh Hadrami, Mohammed 
Fadel's grand-son and nominal chief of the Ahel 
Taleb Mokhtar, was suspected for having made too 
noisy a denunciation of Ma el Ainin and el Hiba, 
his uncle and cousin respectively, and for scorning 
'le menu peuple' (3). Cheikh Fall, a former porter 
at the masonic lodge in St Louis who had risen from
(1) Soudan vol. Ill pp.444-45
(2) Ibid p.270
(3) Ibid pp.253-54
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humble origins was sacked from his administrative 
post for corruption. (1)
I
i
The second justification for paying so much attention 
to biographical detail was that Marty believed 
African Islam to be governed by personalities. In
!
Senegal he said that,
: To be a Muslim is to obey the orders of
one1s marabout and to earn through one1s
gifts and devotion a share in the merits
of the saintly man. The study of the 
Islamised world is thus almost uniquely a 
study of maraboutic personalities. (2)
The idea of studying personalities was not, of 
course, a new one. After all Roume's 1906 circular 
was specifically intended to create a register of 
| marabouts, but it was Marty and the added urgency
of war that translated administrative intentions into 
| reality. In doing so not only did he contribute
hugely to the official understanding of 'Islam Noir'
i
but he identified a broader range of Muslim allies 
than hitherto the French had considered using.
Marty was enthusiastic about the results of the close 
collaboration with Cheikh Sidia:
(1) Brackna p.140
(2) Mauretanie & Senegal p.206
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Such a complete accord between the 
French authority and one of the 
representatives of Moorish Islam ... 
represents one of the most brilliant 
aspects of the French government in 
West Africa for Cheikh Sidia is not 
afraid of compromising himself at our 
sides. Nothing could better illustrate 
the leading principle of this policy: 
the channelling and utilisation of Islam 
in Muslim country [Marty's emphasis]. 
This utilisation involves nothing more 
than amicable collaboration. (1)
The 'amicable collaboration' between the French and 
Cheikh Sidia had, of course, existed for some time 
and it was until the First World War a fairly unique 
relationship. However, in the course of the war it 
lost much of its uniqueness. El Hajj Malick Sy 
became one of Marty's favourite Senegalese marabouts. 
Marty wrote that,
In this country where one has to be wary 
of tidjianisme which through its Omarien 
and Toucouleur branch has only ever showed 
itself as one of our most irreductible 
enemies, one is pleasantly surprised to see 
that this ouloff branch, under the 
inspiration of its chief has nothing but 
sympathetic sentiments and acts of devotion 
towards us. (2)
El Hajj Malick Sy's pro-French sentiments preceded 
Marty's arrival in the colony, but it was Marty who
(1) Ibid p.105
(2) Mauretanie & Senegal p.400
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did most to publicise them. The case of Ahmadu Bamba 
was particularly striking; although he remained 
under surveillance throughout the war, the French 
were prepared to make use of him for recruitment to 
an extent that would have been inconceivable 
beforehand. Marty was also prepared to criticise 
former attitudes to particular Muslim personalities, 
and the most obvious of such cases was his criticism 
of the French treatment of the Wali of Goumba and the 
Jakhanke community in Touba.
His willingness to recognise the pro-French tendencies 
of many marabouts and to criticise past actions were 
an important corrective to the wilder theories of a 
militantly xenophobic Islam. Fuelled by resentment 
of Lebanese and Moroccan traders (not all of whom . 
were Muslims'.) some sections of the European 
community in West Africa were still obsessed by the 
Muslim threat. An article in the AOF-Echo - a 
newspaper owned by Conakry traders - declared in 
October 1916 that,
All the Muslims of our colonies are 
entirely hostile to all 1europeanisation1 
... Certain of their books, besides 
the Coran, speak of Europeans ... with the 
greatest scorn 'dogs and sons of dogs, 
pork eaters, uncircumcised, etc. ... ' 
whose race should be destroyed. (1)
(1) ANS 19 G 2 'Politique et colonisation:
1'influence musulman' AOF-Echo 24.10.1916.
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Such attitudes died hard and it is doubtful that 
any amount of scholarship would have succeeded in 
reducing them to extenction. The newspaper article 
is cited as a reminder that attitudes towards Islam 
remained heterogeneous. Whilst the focus of this 
thesis is on shifting trends of perception one 
should not ignore the constancy of a number of gut 
prejudices in relation to Islam.
Marty could not hope to destroy such prejedices but 
he did make it less likely that senior administrators 
would share them. It is not possible to know how 
widely read his work was. In April 1917 Ernest 
Leroux, who published all of his major studies, 
offered the Governor-General 167 copies of L 1Islam 
au Senegal for 1,500 francs. I have found no
record that this offer was ever taken up, but it is 
interesting to note that three months later the 
Governor-General, Van Vollenhoven, suggested to 
the Governor of Senegal that each cercle should 
have two copies of the book. (1) As Van Vollenhoven 
recognised, Marty's studies were excellent guides for 
administrators who possessed little knowledge of
(1) ANS 13 G 67 Leroux to Gov.-Gen. AOF 2.4.1917,
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Sen. July 1917.
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Islam. They were written clearly and simply. 
Although there is at least one reference to 
Durkheim - in L 1Islam en Cote d'Ivoire, the most 
theoretical of all his studies (1) ~ Marty did not 
on the whole indulge in intellectual speculation 
in the way that Clozel was prone to do. His 
studies were empirical, based on personal 
observation, conversation with Muslims and French 
experts and on a selective use of local monographs. 
He would also send local administrators a series 
of very specific questions concerning aspects of 
Muslim life and culture in their cercles. For 
example, the commandant de cercle of Odienne in 
the Ivory Coast was asked nine questions about local 
Muslim culture. A measure of the preciseness of 
the questions can be gauged from the fact that of 
the nine questions four related to hairstyles, 
beards, moustaches and tatoos. (2) Marty's 
general conclusions and his message were likewise 
clear and simple: Islam in Africa should not be
assimilated to Arab Islam for it was strongly 
coloured by the indigenous pre-Islamic culture 
and traditions of the various ethnic groups.
(1) Cote d'Ivoire p.400
(2) ANS 5 G 64 hand-written questionnaire, cercle 
of Odienne n.d.
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The French should not encourage Islam through the use 
of Arabic or Qur'anic law, and animist communities 
should be offered some sort of protection from Muslim 
intrusion. Within Muslim areas, where the French had 
nothing serious to fear from Islam, the French task was 
principally of forging alliances with Muslim leaders. 
Marty was clearly not a particularly original scholar 
but he was much more thorough than any of his 
predecessors had been, and therin lies his strength 
and value, not only for his contemporaries but also 
for subsequent generations of scholars of Islam in 
Africa.
The Tuareg revolts of 1916 -17
In West Africa the years 1914-18 are normally 
associated with more momentous events than the 
development of French scholarship on Islam. And 
rightly so. It is no longer the case that, 'Few 
aspects of West Africa's colonial history have 
received such scant attention in relation to its 
importance as the impact of the First World War on
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French West Africa. (1) The war is now generally 
recognised as a turning point in West African 
history. (2) In all some 200,000 troops from AOF 
were recruited throughout the war, and it is 
estimated that of the pre-1918 recruits the 
casualty rate was about 30%. This was perhaps not 
so much as to be a major demographic blow to West 
African societies but it is clear that some groups 
suffered disproportionately as recruitment was 
concentrated along the Niger axis amongst Mandinka 
people. ^  The African soldiers were used on a 
number of fronts: in West Africa itself in the
joint Anglo-French campaigns in Togoland (August 
1914) and in Kamerun (August 1914 - February 1916),
(1) M. Crowder 'The First Wcrld W&r' in J.F. Ajayi 
& M. Crowder (eds) History of West Africa 
vol. II LOndon, 1971 p. 484.
(2) See 'Vforld War I and Africa' a special issue 
of JAH 1978 xix (1)
(3) M. Michel 'Le Concours de l'ACF a la France 
pendant la proniere guerre mondiale1 These 
de Doctorat, Paris 1979 ch. 19 gives a 
detailed breakdown of recruitment statistics.
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British African troops were also used in the 
East African dampaign, but the bulk of French West 
African troops - the Tirailleurs Senegalais - 
were used on the Western Front in Europe.
One of the indicators of the hardships created by 
the war is the number of revolts against the French, 
the most serious revolts taking place in Upper Volta 
(November 1915-July 1916), Dahomey (1916-17) and in 
Niger (1916-17). In addition many Africans voted 
with their feet - as many as 61,500 men were 
reckoned to have migrated to neighbouring British 
colonies in order to escape recruitment, the 
indigenat and prestation, the last two of which were 
used more vigorously than ever in order to coerce 
Africans into increased production for the French 
war effort. The political effects of Blaise
Diagne's role as 1Commissaire of the Republic 
for the Recruitment of Troops in West Africa' are 
well known. It was a role which led Van Vollenhoven 
to resign and which disgusted, amongst others, 
Delafosse, but which nonetheless ensured that
(1) Crowder 'First Vforld War' p.606
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politics in the Four Communes would survive and 
indeed prosper in a way that few Frenchmen could 
have forseen and even fewer wished.(1) Clearly 
these were momentous years, and we will return 
to some of the wider consequences of the African 
experience of war in Europe later in the thesis.
But to conclude this section on the war years we 
will take a closer look at the revolts of 
1916-17 in Niger.
J
Soon after war brokeout in Europe the administration 
in Dakar was remarkably sanguine about the possible 
consequences of the war on the stability and 
tranquility of the West African colonies. However, 
there was one colony, the 'Territoire Militaire du 
Niger', where the French were less complacent.
Ponty admitted to the Cblonial Minister in November 
1914 that the 'most vulnerable country is the 
military territory of Niger. It is there that 
we may fear fanatics preaching against us. (2)
(1) G. Wesley Johnson The Emergence of Black Politics 
in Senegal Stanford, 1971
(2) ANS 19 G 2 Gov.-Gen. AGF to Min. Col. Nov. 1914.
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The reasons for this belief are not hard to 
understand. As the fact that it was still under 
military command suggested, the colony was still 
a long way from being under full French control.
The traditional economy had been severely disrupted 
by the colonial intervention and by the insecurity 
of the trans-Saharan trade routes, the years 
1911-13 were ones of serious drought culminating 
in the very serious famine of 1913-14; (1) and 
finally, the proximity of the colony to the conflict 
between the Sanusiyya and the Italians in Cyrenaica 
and southern Tripolitania was another crucial 
element in the colony's political and economic 
position.
As we have seen in the history of the French 
conquest of Mauritania and Chad the 'Saharan 
confines', as they were called, posed enormous 
problems to the French. The harshness of the
(1) F. Fugelstad 'Les Revoltes des Tbuareq du Niger 
(1916-17)' CEA 1973 p.85 E. Bemus Tbuaregs 
nlqeriens. Unite culturelle et diversite 
regionale d'un peuple pasteur Paris, 1981 p.100
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climate and the terrain were compounded, in French 
eyes at least, by the fierce and warlike character 
of the people who lived there. In this respect 
the reputation of the Tuareg, the principle nomadic 
group in Niger, was similar to that of the Moors 
and the Arabs. The social structure of Tuareg 
society was broadly similar to that of other 
sahelian nomadic peoples. The Tuareg are 
essentially a linguistic group - the Kel Tamasheg, 
but Tamasheg, a Berber language, has often made way 
for Hausa as the lingua franca of the area. Tuareg 
society is divided into free men - ilellan - and 
slaves - iklan. The freemen have a number of 
castes headed by a warrior aristocracy - imashagan - 
with a subordinate clerical caste, the ineslemen. 
These are followed by other subordinate castes 
including vassals and tributaries (imghad), artisans 
(inadan) and mixed blood (iboghollitan) . Our
earlier warnings against belief in an over-rigid 
classification and distinction between warrior and 
clerical castes in Moorish society applies equally 
to the Tuareg. Norris has shown that "Sahelian 
societies do not operate a wholly static class 
structure whereby ineslemen cannot assume the role
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of imashagan. (1) It has been said, however, that 
social change within Tuareg society is very slow. (2) 
The Tuareg are divided into confederations of small, 
and generally endogamous, social units known as 
tiusatin (sing, tawsit) grouped together in an 
ettobal (an ettobal is a war-drum). The number 
and complexity of the various confederations and 
their sub-divisions are such that only the major 
ones can be mentioned here.
One of the earliest French accounts of Tuareg 
society was given by H. Duveyrier who travelled 
extensively (as a Christian but under the pseudonym 
of Sid-Saad ben Doufiry!) amongst the Tuareg of 
the northern Sahara between 1859 and 1861. He 
reported that
In their relations with the French, the
Tuareg have up until now shown themselves to
be very docile ... No European traveller
(1) H. Norris Shinquiti Folk Literature and 
Song Oxford, 1968; The Tuaregs - Their 
Islamic Legacy and its Diffusion in the 
Sahel Waminster, 1975; Bemus Touaregs 
nigeriens all contain good descriptions 
of Tuareg social organisation.
(2) J. Nicolaisen 'The Historical Change of 
Tuareg Social Organisation1 Ethnos 1973 
pp.271-99
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who has explored the interior of Africa 
has ever been the victim of an act of 
brutality or fanaticism either on Tuareg 
territory or at the hands of a targui.
This fact answers all the calumnies 
concerning their character which their 
enemies, the Arabs, have propagated. (1)
However, this image of Tuareg attitudes to Europeans 
was destroyed by the death of Flatters in 1881 for 
which Duveyrier was held partly responsible for 
having given the impression that Europeans could 
travel safely amongst the Tuareg. Duveyrier himself 
committed suicide in the face of public criticism. (2) 
However, his name was defended by Lt. Hourst who led 
a successful mission to the Niger in 1896. In his 
account of the mission he argued that the Tuaregs did 
not deserve their terrible reputation and he paid 
tribute to their qualities of courage and endurance 
and to the high esteem with which women were regarded 
in Tuareg society. He blamed all Tuareg violence to 
Europeans on one particularly fierce confederation, 
the Hoggar.(3) in 1911 Capt. Aymard in a 
Randauesque account of the ennervating and moralising
(1) H. Duveyrier Les Touareg du Nord Paris, 1864 p.453 
and see also his account, published posthumously, 
Journal de route: Sahara algerlen et tunisien
Paris, 1905.
(2) According to Lt. Hourst in La Mission Hourst 
Paris, 1898 p.253.
(3) Ibid ch.5.
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qualities of the privations of the desert fringes 
argued that, 'For all their faults the Tuareg are 
more sympathetic than their neighbours, the Moors 
and Arabs'. Amongst their faults he noted the 
habit of force-feeding rich girls in order to make 
them fat, fatness being considered a mark of 
beauty.(1) (All French accounts of Tuareg society 
dwelt at some length on the size of Tuareg women.) 
Aymard's account was (yet another) manifesto for 
the creation of a unified French empire in north 
west Africa and he was concerned to highlight the 
importance of French policy towards the Tuareg.
However, as was evident from the handling of the 
Djerma and Zinder 'conspiracies' official commitment 
to further expansion in the region was at best 
half-hearted. When the Italians decided to abandon 
the Fezzan to the Sanusiyya in January 1915 the 
French decided that it was no longer worth the cost 
and risk of maintaining small and isolated military 
garrisons in the desert. (2)
(1) Capt. Aymard Les Touareg Paris, 1911
(2) Fuglestad 'Les Revoltes' p.88
446
Political leadership of the Tuareg was highly 
fragmented, and their response to the French 
presence was, from the start, extremely divided.
The western Oulliminden under the chiefship of 
the amenokal Madidu attempted to ally with the 
French. (Madidu, for example, had promised to 
protect Lt Hourst.) Likewise in the east the 
Kel Owey confederation which was concerned about 
the caravan trade to Hausaland was also prepared 
to accept the French. On the other hand, the 
Imuzzuruq led by Musa, the Sultan of Damergu, 
were hostile and following their chief's death in 
1900, emigrated to Kanem rather than submit to the 
French. Bernus suggests that the Tuareg living 
in closest contact with sedentary societies were 
the ones who made the greatest attempt to resist 
the French because they were made to feel the reality 
of French domination much more acutely than were the 
more isolated and purely nomadic confederations. (1) 
However, in 1915 the combination of reduced French 
forces in the colony as a result of commitments in 
Europe and the success of the Sanusiyya against
(1) Bernus Touaregs nigeriens p. 99
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the Italians could be said to have widened the 
range of options open to the Tuareg leadership 
vis-a-vis the French. Although the Tuareg were 
not noted for particularly strong religious fervour 
the possibility of an alliance with the Sanusiyya 
became a very reasonable option.
Such then was the rough background of the situation 
in Niger at the start of the First World War. In 
the account which follows of the Tuareg revolts 
of 1916-17 no claim is made to add substantial 
new evidence to an episode in West African history 
which has already attracted a remarkably high amount 
of scholarly attention, d) My concern is simply
(1) In addition to works already cited of Bernus,
Fugelstad and Norris see A. Salifou 'Les Francais, 
Firhoun et les Kounta, 1902-16' Journal de la 
Societe des Africanlstes 1973 pp. 173-95;
'Kaoussan ou la r^volte senoussiste' Etudes 
Nlgeriennes 33, 1974; A. Bourgeot 'Les Echanges 
transahariens, la senusiyya et les revoltes twareg 
de 1916-17' CEA 1978 pp. 159-85. Interpretations 
of the revolt vary from Salifou's emphasis on the 
nationalist aspects of the revolt through to 
Fugelstad' s stress on the conjunctural factors of 
economic and political crisis and his view that 
the revolts are more accurately seen as part of 
the final stages of the decline of the nomadic 
lifestyle rather than as the first stirrings 
of an infant Nigerien nationalism.
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to describe the way in which contemporary French 
observers understood the revolt.
There were two distinct and independent poles of 
revolt. The first was in the west of the colony 
and was associated with Firhoun, the amenokal of 
the Oulliminden. Firhoun was chief of the Kel 
Ataram which formed part of the Oulliminden 
confederation and following Madidu's example he, 
too, had submitted to the French early in 1903.
In September and October 1914 he led a relatively 
minor and unsuccessful revolt but was soon arrested 
and imprisoned, d) In February 1916 he escaped 
from prison at a time when the authorities in Niger 
were worried by Tuareg unrest in the cercle of Dori 
and by reports of a worsening situation in the 
region of Timbuktu. Digue, the interim Lt.-Governor 
of Haut-Senegal et Niger did not see how the French, 
with their shortage of troops, could 'intervene 
effectively'. it is not entirely clear what
Firhoun's particular grievance against the French 
was. Later accounts suggested that he was inherently 
anti-French and had long been hatching a scheme
(1) Bernus Tbuaregs Nigerlens pp.87-90
(2) SHAT PDF Soudan IX/Ib Digue to Gov.-Gen. AQF 
25.2.1916.
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against them. According to these accounts his 
escape from prison was effected by seducing his 
jailers with his charm. However, at the time of 
his escape there was a bitter correspondence between 
Dique and Major Cauvin, the military commander of 
Timbuktu, concerning the accusation that Firhoun had 
been mistreated by his captors. Cauvin rejected 
these accusations, but his counter claim that at 
his trial in 1914 Firhoun had been the victim of 
false witnesses was an interesting one. Both 
accounts suggest that Firhoun had strong personal 
grievances against the French. (1) Having escaped 
Firhoun gathered his old followers and moved into 
the relatively prosperous region of Filingue.
Here he came up against a detachment of tirailleurs 
led by Capt. Loyer who routed Firhoun's forces 
at a battle in Anderanboukane on 13th May. The 
Tuareg casualties numbered several hundred, 
including women and children. Sixty-six of the 
dead were decapitated and their heads were sent 
for public display in a nearby town. Fifteen 
Tuareg captured on a patrol a few days later were
(1) See Dr Richer Les Oulliminden Paris, 1924 pp. 198,273 
for accounts of Firhoun's charm. Cauvin and Digte's 
correspondence is in SHAT AQF Soudan IX/lb.
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publicly executed, and a month later Firhoun, 
himself, was killed. The Tirailleurs lost two 
men. ^  Clearly Digue's doubts about the French
I
I
| ability to 'intervene effectively' were misplaced
| with respect to the revolt of the Oulliminden. The
I
| wholesale slaughter of Firhoun's followers and the
[
i acts of summary justice were sufficient to put the
!
[ Oulliminden revolt to an early and bloody end.
The second pole of the revolt was located in the 
north-eastern region of Air and on the town of
' Agades in particular. This was an area close to
Borku and Tibesti where the Sanusiyya had become 
increasingly active. In March 1916 the commandant 
de cercle of Agades received warnings of German and 
Turkish activity in Tripoli, but the warning was a 
general one designed as a spur to vigiliance rather 
than direct action. More specific warnings came
in June when the Agades commandant was told,
(1) SHAT AQF Soudan IX/lb Capt. Loyer 'Rapport d'ensemble 
sur les operations de repression oontre les 
Oulliminden de Firhoun' 20.6.1916
(2) SHAT AOF Niger III/3e Mourin to Ooirmt. cercle 
Agades 29.3.1916.
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The tribes of the west of your cercle 
are in constant relations with the 
Senoussists of Fezzan, notably with 
Kaossen, a dissident since 1903 who is 
affiliated to the Senoussia ... It 
is of the utmost importance that the 
Senoussist virus which has spread with 
such force in Tripolitania, Borkouf 
Tibesti and the desert region of Chad 
and Upper Egypt does not come and infect 
our possessions in AOF ... The Touaregs 
are generally affiliated to the Quadria 
brotherhood and until now they have had 
weak links with the Tripolitanians and 
have remained not very fanatical Muslims. 
It is important to preserve these happy 
and natural dispositions.
The preservation of the Tuaregs from the Senoussi 
virus was to be effected by rigorous control of all 
movements in Air and by reminding untrustworthy 
tribesmen of the fate of Firhoun and the Oulliminden. (1) 
Kaossen, to viiom specific reference was made, belonged to 
the Imezzureq who had emigrated to Kanem to escape 
French domination at the start of the century.
Between 1908 and 1912 he had moved from one Chadian 
state to another but was not well received by any 
of the leaders and he eventually submitted to the 
French in Wadai in October 1912. However, the 
following year he moved to the Fezzan where he was 
in close touch with the Sanusiyya whom he was said
(1) SHAT AOF Niger III/3e Mourin to cdirmt. cercle 
Agades 22.6.1916.
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to have joined in 1909. Early in 1916 Djanet 
fell to the Sanusiyya leaving the way open for 
Kaossen to move south to Air and Agades.
At this juncture Kaossen attempted to win the 
support of other Tuareg in Air. The Kel Dennek, 
part of the Oulliminden confederation who had not 
been involved in the earlier revolt were divided: 
the ineslemen tribes on the whole were prepared 
to support Kaossen but the imashagan were not.
The role of the Kel es Suq, one of the most important 
of all Tuareg ineslemen tribes, renowned for their 
scholarship throughout Tuareg society (2) was 
mysterious. One of their chiefs, Mohammed Ahmed, 
was said by Marty to have played a part in all the 
rebellions between 1880 and 1917 and that he 
provided the 'religious cement' for the Tuareg 
action in Firhoun's rebellion in 1916. &) Cauvin 
believed that the Kel es Suq and Mohammed Ahmed were
(1) Salifou 'Kaoussan ' pp. 55-58; Bernus Tbuaregs 
nigeriens pp.99-101
(2) Norris The Tuaregs pp.23-29
(3) Marty & Mangeot 'Les Touareg de la boucle du Niger' 
BCEHSAQF 1918 pp.435-39
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'the main causes of the state of spirit amongst 
the nomads. ... They are cunning and astute men, 
and although poorly educated their speeches and 
tricks greatly impress their listeners.' Cauvin 
recommended a definitive victory backed up by 
unequivocal punishment as the only way of 'pacifying' 
the Tuareg once and for all. He was backed up in 
this argument by Angoulvant who regretted that,
'Since our occupation of Tombouctou we have never 
pushed the repression of insurrection to the limit.
In a word we have never conquered Tuareg country.' 
Both Cauvin and Angoulvant agreed that religion was 
a minor element in the Tuareg unrest. (D However, 
Norris argues that a Kel es Suq faction had actually 
attempted to dissuade Firhoun from rebelling against 
the F r e n c h . (2) There is no doubt, however, that the 
most important of Kaossen's allies was Tegama, the 
Sultan of Agades, with whom Kaossen is said to have 
been in correspondence since 1913.(3)
(1) ANSCM AP 1418 Cauvin to Lt.-Gov. HSN 8.9.1916;
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. HSN 26.10.1916.
(2) Norris The Tuaregs p.163
(3) Salifou 'Kaou.ssan.' p.58
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As late as November 1916 the French authorities in 
Agades although aware of the widespread spirit of 
unrest were nonetheless almost wholly ignorant 
of either Kaossen's strength or his intentions. 
Agades, the main garrison for the second company 
of tirailleurs was not well defenced. Its 
commandant, Capt. Sabati£, reported that his 
predecessor had been lulled into a false sense 
of security by Tegama and had done nothing to build 
up its defences - armaments, money and food were 
all stored outside the blockhouse. On the 
1st November, the day on which Sabatie took over 
command, the second company of tirailleurs was 
scattered in six groups throughout the Air massif. 
Only 35 tirailleurs were left in Agades itself.
By early December Satatie realised that the 
situation was serious and attempted to recall some 
of his men. By the 13th December the garrison 
strength was up to nearer 100 men. The following 
day Kaossen, allied with Tegama, laid siege to 
Agades. (1)
(1) SHAT AOF Niger IV/1 'Rapport du Capt. Saba tie ...
sur le siege du 13.12.1916 & 3.3.1917';
SHAT AOF Niger IV/2 'Rapport du Lt.-Col.
Mourin' 8.3.1917.
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Reports of the siege reached the author!tes in Dakar 
at the same time as the news that an entire section 
of meharists from the second company had been wiped 
out in an ambush whilst escorting the afealai to 
Bilma. General Gouillet urged Clozel, recently 
returned to Dakar, to seek the British authority's 
permission to send reinforcement troops and 
armaments via Kano and also, if necessary, to appeal 
for the help of British troops stationed near to 
Zinder. On Christmas day a state of siege was 
declared in Niger. Clozel agreed to approach Lugard 
who himself declared a state of emergency in Northern 
Nigeria early in January. He also agreed to send 
a company of cavalry and infantry to help the French 
who had already gone to the extent of recalling an 
entire batallion of tirailleurs from Europe. It 
was also decided to reorganise the administrative 
structure for the entire Saharan region which was 
temporarily united under the command of General 
Laperrine. ^  Eventually sufficient forces - and
(1) ANS 1 D 218 Gen. Gouillet (Gcmmt. sup. des troupes 
en AGF) to Gov.-Gen. AGF 23.12.1916; Capt. de 
Jonquieres 'Rapport sur les evenements d'Agadez et 
sur la revolte touareg' 14.7.1917; ANSQM AP 1418 
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 22.9.1917; ANS 1 D 208 
'Decision interministerielle relative a la 
constitution d'un ocmmandement temporal re du 
territoire saharien' 12.1.1917. On British role 
see J. Qsuntokun 'The response of the British 
colonial government in Nigeria to the Islamic 
insurgency in the French Sudan and the Sahara during 
World War One' Bull. IFAN (B) 1974 pp. 14-24.
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and goat-skins to carry water - were assembled 
for a relief column to be sent from Zinder in 
February 1917. (1) The following month after 80 
days of siege Agades was finally relieved by the 
column led by Colonel Mourin. At the same time 
various other forces were sent out to defeat other 
centres of Tuareg resistance and annihalate the 
forces of Tegama and Kaossen. A decisive defeat 
was inflicted on Kaossen as early as July but, 
ominously for the Tuareg, the military were intent 
this time on 'going to the limit': 'Nomads respect
only the force of arms and only obey us as long as 
they feel we are stronger than they are. This 
principle should never be lost from sight .*(2) The 
French forces were helped by the Hoggar Tuareg 
under the command of Musa ag Amastane who had been 
signalled as a possible ally in June 1916. (3)
(1) SHAT ACF Niger IV/2 'Rapport Maurin' 8.3.1917.
(2) SHAT AOF Niger IV/1 'Rapport d'ensemble du Oomrtit. 
Berger sur la colonne de Tcmbouctou a Agades et de 
l'Air, Jan.-Aout 1917'. This file contains several 
other military reports of the 'mopping up' 
operations.
(3) SHAT ACF Niger III/3e Maurin to Ocmmt. cercle 
Agades 22.6.1916.
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After the revolt the commander of the section in 
which the Hoggar had been temporarily incorporated 
recommended that Musa, 'a proven partisan of peace, 
the head of the French party and a man whose 
superior qualities are uncontested by all Tuareg', 
should be backed by the French against other Tuareg 
chiefs and for a while Musa was, indeed, a favourite 
of the French military command.(1) The French 
continued to pursue Kaossen and Tegama; Kaossen 
fled to Fezzan in mid-1918 and died there the 
following year, Tegama was captured in May 1919 
and, according to the official account, 'committed 
suicide'. However, the 'pacification' of the Air 
massif continued until 1931. (2) The failure of
(1) SHAT ACF Niger V/l 'Rapport du Capt. Deponnier, 
carmt. le groupe mobile du Hoggar sur la conduite 
de Moussa ag Amastane' 20.10.1917. See also 
ANSQM AP 1418 Col. Lefebvre 'Rapport ... sur la 
situation politique du Territoire militaire du 
Niger' 6.8.1918 '... Le chef Hoggar s'est
montre digne de la confiance que lui a donnfe m. le 
Gen. aommt. sip. des Oasis sahariens.'
(2) ANSQM AP 1418 'Rapport sur les operations menses par 
les troupes de l'AOF contre Kaossen* 14.6.1918, 
unsigned; SHAT AOF Niger IV/1 'Rapport du Lt.-Col. 
Lef&bvre au sujet de 1'operation qui a mens a la 
prise de Tegama' 10.7.1919; Fugelstad 'Les 
Revoltes' pp. 114-20; Norris The Tuaregs pp. 166-67
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the revolt, described by some as the last 
desperate attempt of a warrior aristocracy to 
preserve its traditional way of life , was 
disastrous for everybody who lived in the region, 
and as many as 30,000 Tuareg are believed to have 
fled to Kano and Katsina. (2)
That the revolt was a major one with serious 
implications for colonisers and colonised alike, 
there can be no doubt. It obviously shook both 
the French and the British. It is interesting to
know what they thought caused the revolt. From the
first reports of Firhoun's revolt it seems clear 
that the initial reaction of the French was to blame 
the unrest on the lack of French soldiers in the 
region and as a reaction against French recruitment. 
In October 1916 Angoulvant argued that,
In the Tuareg uprising ... the religious 
question plays an entirely secondary role 
and for the most part of the time plays no
role at all. It is the decrease in our
numbers which giving rise to a belief in 
our weakness has caused the Tuaregs to 
shake off our yoke which they have only 
accepted against their will. (3)
(1) Bernus Touaregs nlgeriens p. 105; Fugelstad 'Les 
Revoltes' p.120
(2) Norris The Tuaregs p. 167
(3) ANSCM AP 1418 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. HSN
26.10.1916 and see similar argunents in Cauvin to
Lt.-Gov. HSN 8.9.1916.
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The correspondence between Mourin and Cauvin following 
Firhoun's escape reveals an awareness of the personal 
factors involved. Capt. Sabatie, in command of the 
post of Agades at the time of the siege was extremely 
critical of his predecessor for having added to France's 
manpower problems by insouciance and for having allowed 
himself to be lulled into a false sense of security.
So although religion, in the shape of the Sanusiyya, 
was recognised as having played a part in the Tuareg 
revolts, initial reactions were more inclined to look 
for immediate short term causes than to blame the revolts 
on larger, international and impersonal forces. The 
only long term cause that was allowed at this stage was 
related to a belief in the innate warlike and anarchic 
character of the Tuareg. (D
(1) cf. Dr Richer on Oulliminden revolt in Dori,
December 1915; ' ... Les causes de la revolte?
On crut, sur le moment, pouvoir les rattacher a 
des considerations purement locales, en vue de la 
guerre, un premier recrutement de tirailleurs avait 
ete fait en Juillet dans le cercle de Dori parni 
les peuples noires, un second recruitement etait 
commence sur la fleuve. ... Qi pensa d'abord que 
ce recrutement dont les Tbuareg se croyaient a 
tort menaces directement, etait la principale 
raison de la revolte.' Les Oulliminden p.273.
See also Laize 'L* Islam dans le Territoire militaire 
du Niger' BCEHSAQF 1919 for his view on 'La 
race conquferante des Toubbous ... au fanatisme 
puissant.'
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This contrasts very sharply with French reactions 
to unrest in Zinder in 1906 when at the first hint 
of trouble the local administration immediately 
leapt to the conclusion that they were the victims 
of a vast and sinister conspiracy.
Conspiracy - which undoubtedly did exist to a 
certain extent in the 1916-17 revolts - could not, 
however, be kept out of the reckoning for long.
Once Kaossen's revolt had been squashed Lt.-Col. 
Lefebvre, a veteran of the 1906 Zinder 'conspiracy', 
gave dramatic warnings of the danger represented 
not just by the Sanusiyya but by Muslims generally:
The marabout is our principle enemy 
in the Military Territory. He exploits 
the prestige gained from his pseudo­
knowledge to lead against our authority 
a silent campaign which is all the more 
dangerous as he has taken care not to 
show his hostility openly. (1)
However, the most explicit conspiracy argument came 
several years later in a book written by Dr Richer who 
argued that 'world-wide Austro-German activity' lay 
behind the Tuareg r e v o l t . B u t  in view of the 
fact that the revolts were themselves so serious and
(1) ANSQM AP 591/18 'Rapport politique, 3eme Trimestre, 
Territoire militaire du Niger' 1919.
(2) Richer Oulliminden pp. 261, 273
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that they actually took place at a time when France 
was at war with Germany the accusations of 
conspiracy and German involvement were remarkably 
mild. Whether this was because everybody took 
it for granted that the 'Bosch' were behind it all 
cannot be said, but it seems unlikely.
It would be tempting to argue that the more down 
to earth attitudes of Marty and the growing influence 
of ethnologists in administrative practice were in 
part responsible for the general consensus that the 
revolts were a local manifestation of Tuareg 
grievances rather than part of a more generalised 
and well-orchestrated conspiracy of German or Islamic 
fanaticism. But there can be no firm evidence of 
such a causal link. Marty's own explanation of the 
revolts was an interesting one which remains 
influential to this day. He argued that there was 
a combination of 'profound causes which alienated 
us from the nomads of the Niger bend and which 
predisposed them ... to seize all opportunities to 
revolt' and of incidental causes. Amongst the 
first group he placed French destruction of the 
political hegemony of the Tuareg in the region and 
the suppression of slavery. The incidental causes 
related to the problems posed by the war in Europe
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and rumours that the French intended to abandon 
their colonies. ^  However, later in his study 
of the Tuareg Marty devoted a lengthy passage to 
the responsibility of the clerical Kel es Suq 
for having encouraged others to revolt. He 
argued that,
Religion is not in the minds of the 
tribes one of the real causes of the 
insurrection. Were the Touaregs 
fetishist, their attitudes towards us 
would still be the same, as religion 
has nothing to do with the reasons why 
they find our domination so objectionable.
But he went on to say that although religion 
could be discounted as a cause of the revolt the 
same could not be said of the role of the marabout. 
The marabouts, he said, impressed the Tuareg with 
their ability to perform - or at least to 
promise - miracles. The reputation of the 
marabout might spread beyond his own tribe and 
then, Marty said, 'He appears as the political 
link which joins the different tribes, and 
sometimes he is even their leader. For nomadic 
society, which is essentially anarchic in
(1) Mangeot & Marty 'L'Islam dans la boucle du Niger' 
p.278.
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character, [he represents] a possibility of 
cohesion, if only temporary, which should worry us 
and needs to be closely watched.' He concluded 
that French policy in the future should lie in 
encouraging purely 'Tuareg' qualities through such 
means as the creation of nomadic schools and that 
finally,
It is not from their imrad that one should 
try and detach the Touareg but rather from 
their marabouts who exploit their simple 
and superstitious nature and supply them 
with explanations and commentaries which 
are always hostile towards us and which ... 
encourage suspicion and hatred. (1)
This analysis of the causes of the revolt was 
reinforced in the 1940s and 1950s by the monoqraphs 
written by the students at CHEAM on the subject of
i
| the Tuareg. In these monographs there is a
| consensus that French policy had consistently
I
| favoured the clerical against the warrior tribes.
| One quoted a 1909 circular from Gao stating that|
| 'It is the clergy who will help the Third Estate
| against the Nobility.' &) The result of this
; (1) Ibid pp.433-35, 469
i
(2) P. Bataillon 'L'Islam et 1'organisation 
politique des Touaregs du Niger*
CHEAM (R) 937, 1946.
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preference for the 'progressive' ineslemen tribes 
was, according to the CHEAM consensus, a transform­
ation of Tuareg society:
Whilst the former society was doted with 
a very strong framework, in perfect harmony 
with its environment, drawing its strength 
from the political and economic laws and 
needs, the present society dating from 1900 
is a magma in which inassimilable and 
untransformable maraboutic elements 
gravitate. (1)
In this Sahelian magma the most important maraboutic 
influence was that of the Kel es Suq. In Dori 
they were said to have succeeded in transorming 
'the luke-warm Muslim Touareg' into fanatics and 
thus to have caused the revolt in 1916. &)
A more recent exponent of this argument has been 
Finn Fugelstad who states that 'The maraboutics (sic) 
lacked the sense of duty and social obligation which 
are the characteristics of a 'functional' nobility, 
such as the former targui nobility ... The tuaregs 
underwent a 'fanaticisation' on the religious level 
as the marabouts exploited religious sentiments
(1) M. Nicholas 'L'Islam et les confreries en pays 
tuareg nigerien' CHEAM - Questions Saharlennes 
1009, 1946.
(2) Capt. Bourgeot 'Les Toureg de 1'Oudalan' CHEAM 
120 (2664) 1957.
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for socio-political purposes,' (1) However, the 
Marty-CHEAM-Fugelstad argument is not entirely 
convincing. For whilst it is true that the 
1916-17 revolts cannot be explained without 
reference to the political, social and economic 
changes in Tuareg society resulting from the 
colonial intervention it is by no means clear that 
the most important of these changes was a notional 
preference (expressed, for example, in the 1909 Gao 
circular) to deal with the ineslemen rather than 
the imashagan. A far more serious blow to the 
warrior aristocracy was dealt by the disruption of 
the Transsaharan trade from which the Tuareg chiefs 
derived most of their wealth through exaction of 
protection money, passage rights and pillage. It 
is curious also that Marty et al have chosen to 
minimise the role of the Sanusiyya whose importance 
in Kaossen's revolt, at least, would appear to have 
been considerable and of much greater consequence 
than that of the Kel es Suq. (2) Lastly, the idea 
of a 'functional' aristocracy imbued with a strong 
sense of social duty seems to be an over-idealised
(1) Fugelstad 'Les Revoltes' p.93
(2) Bemus, Gourgeot, Norris & Salifou all insist on 
the Importance of the role of the Sanusiyya.
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and romantic view of pre-colonial Tuareg society 
and reflects a sentimentality towards a bygone age, 
evocative of noble warriors, which French 
administrators and contemporary social scientists 
are liable, for their separate reasons, to be unduly 
nostalgic.
The nostalgia of French administrators, many of whom 
had a military background, is of particular relevance 
to this thesis. As in Mauritania there was in Niger 
a strong reaction against the supposedly pro-Islamic 
tendencies of the first generation of colonisers and 
in favour of the warrior aristocracy. The reasons 
for this reaction are manifold: partly early hopes
of a grand Islamic policy k la Coppolani raised 
expectations too high, partly it reflects a 
preference to deal with soldiers and partly, too it 
reveals thevery high degree of anxiety - amongst 
civilians and military alike - that the French were 
actually encouraging Islam by their actions. This 
was an anxiety shared by Marty and this should be 
borne in mind when reading Marty's account of the Tuareg 
revolts. (Furthermore, Marty's account was co-written 
with one of the great colonial military heroes,
Col. Mangeot, a 'Saharan' soldier who had led the 
meharist section which occupied Walata for the first 
time in 1912.) Finally, it should be stressed that
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changes in chiefship amongst the Tuareg is a 
complex issue which requires further research 
before the fears of the French administration that 
they had unwittingly engineered the usurpation of 
Tuareg leadership by the marabouts can be proven 
to be based on reality.
Other changes, however, besides those that were 
taking place within Tuareg society resulted from 
the experience of the first few decades of colonial 
rule and of the particular pressures and tensions 
which the First World War brought to bear on that 
system. The world which Delafosse, Clozel and 
Marty had documented in such detail, and it must be 
said with such affection, was changing. The final 
section of this thesis will deal with the French 
response to the changing circumstances of the 
inter-war years.
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PART THREE: 1920-1940: THE FRENCH STAKE IN
ISLAM NOIR
J'ai eu a administrer au cours de 
ma carri&re des tribus algeriennes 
et des peuplades noires. Je dois 
reconnaltre que j'ai rencontre /
beaucoup plus de gens'comprehensifs /
chez les noirs que chez les 
berberes. Les nigeriens acceptent, 
l'africain du nord refuse.
R. Randau and F. Abdelkader 
Les Compacrnons du iardin
(1933)
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Introduction
Advertisements appearing in the monthly journal 
l'Afrique fran^aise remained virtually unchanged 
in the first twenty years of the journal's existence: 
champagne with corks for tropical climates, special 
tents and pills to cure constipation (and worse) 
were all constant features of the curious epoch of 
French colonialism in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. However, by the early 1920s the 
tents and pills had made way for banks, theodolites 
and drawing boards. (The champagne, however, 
survived.) This change clearly reflected the 
increasing popularity of the idea of La mlse en 
valeur des colonies associated particularly with the 
post-war Minister of Colonies, Albert Sarraut. The 
use of colonial soldiers during the First War had 
indicated the economic potential of the colonies, 
and the financial ruin and social hardship which 
France experienced immediately after the war gave 
added urgency to the need to exploit the economic 
potential of her overseas empire. The war had 
helped France both to understand and to define her
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colonial mission - and the itinerant adventurer 
with his tents and pills was transformed as a result 
into the rather more permanent figure of draughtsman 
and engineer planning the rational exploitation of 
Africa's wealth. ^
During the 1920s the development of new and improved 
transport systems helped to integrate the colonies 
to the metropole. Airplanes flew between Dakar 
and Algiers at least as early as 1920 and in 1927 
there was the first direct crossing by air between 
Africa and South America. Air travel reduced not 
just the isolation of empire but also the risks and 
hazards of tropical climates: in June 1922 an
administrator bitten by a rabid dog in Bamako was 
flown in less than twelve hours to Dakar for 
hospital treatment.
(1) On the war see special edition of JAH 'World War I 
and Africa' especially R. Rathbone's 'Introduction' 
and C. Andrew & A.S. Kanya Forstner 'France Africa 
and the First Vforld War' JAH XIX (1) 1978;
M. Michel Le concours. On hone and mise en valeur 
see R. Girardet L'Id£e coloniale en France Paris, 
1971; C.R. Ageron France coloniale ou parti 
colonial? Paris, 1978; BCAF passim.
(2) 'L'Age de l'air en Afrique' BCAF Oct-Dec 1922,
-see also BCAF Oct 1927.
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In many ways it must have seemed that the colonies 
were about to embark on a glorious new era of 
economic development.
However, other changes had to be taken into 
consideration. The First World War had been fought 
by the Allies in a spirit of mutual distrust and it 
was only their shared hostility to Germany which 
prevented the alliance from breaking up. Once 
Germany had been defeated it took several years 
before the need to restore financial stability and 
to rebuild the European economies brought the Allies 
into a semblance of agreement. In the meantime 
they fell apart over the shareout of the spoils of 
victory with Anglo-French squabbles over the division 
of the Ottoman empire and a much more serious 
disagreement between the French, British and Americans 
over German reparations. France, which had suffered, 
in the war more than any of the Allies, claimed huge 
reparations from Germany. 'L'Allemagne paiera' 
was the single answer of all walks of Frenchmen to 
their country's economic problems. As it became 
obvious through the series of conferences held in the 
early 1920s to determine the extent and nature of 
German reparations that Germany would not and could
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not pay for all of the damage sustained by France 
during the war, an accusing finger was pointed by 
French nationalists, led by Poincare, at an Anglo- 
Saxon conspiracy against France. One of the
effects of these tensions was to heighten French 
sensitivity to international criticism but 
particularly American criticism of French colonial 
practices. For example, an article in L 1Afrique 
francaise in 1930 attacked countries without 
colonies (i.e. the United States) and who were unaware 
of the 'psychological or material realities of the 
native populations' but who used the League of 
Nations to criticise colonial powers. (2)
(1) See Andrew & Kanya Porstner France Overseas 
chs. 8 & 9; P. Bertrand La Fin d'un Monde 
Paris, 1973 pp. 131-78; C.S. Maier Pecastincr, 
Bourgeois Europe Princeton, 1975, ch.4 'The 
politics of reparation'; A. Tbynbee Survey 
of International Events 1920-3 London, 1924.
(2) A. Lebrun 'La France coloniale devant le monde' 
BCAF April 1930 pp. 159-62; see also M. Lakroum 
Ls travail inegal; paysans et salaries devant 
la crise des ann6es 30 Paris, 1983 pp. 23-27
on French suspicions of International Labour 
Office.
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Suspicion of Anglo-Saxon intrigue was, however, 
greatly exceeded by fear of Bolshevism. The Russian 
October Revolution had introduced a new factor into 
the political calculations of Western Europe. The 
success of the Bolshevik Revolution caused European 
governments to fear for their ability to preserve 
the status quo not only in Europe but also in the 
colonies. Although Marxist theory towards pre­
capitalist societies was somewhat unclear, 
nonetheless the beliefs in the internationalism of 
the revolution and in the notion that imperialism 
represented the highest form of capitalism were 
sufficiently strong for the Bolshevik government to 
make a muddled offer of support to the peoples of 
Africa and Asia. The Second Congress of the 
Comintern in July 1920 discussed the issues of 
nationalism and colonialism and was attended by 
delegates from India, Turkey, Persia, China and 
Korea. At the instigation of the Turkish delegates 
the commission charged with considering the colonial 
question specifically insisted on the need to pursue 
the struggle against pan-Islamism. However, later 
the same year the First Congress of Peoples of the 
East which met in Baku decided to make a greater 
appeal to the tradition of Islam and declared a
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jihad against capitalism. Another development in 
1920 which signalled the Bolshevik interest in the 
'Orient' was the foundation of an Institute of 
Oriental Studies which along with the Communist 
University of Toilers of the East and the Scientific 
Society of Russian Orientalists (both founded in 1921) 
was intended to train people for political activity 
in Asia. ^  Thus within three years of coming to 
power the Bolshevik regime was actively courting the 
support of its neighbours who were ruled by colonial 
powers.
The possibility of an alliance between the Bolsheviks 
and the Muslim subjects of colonial powers was made 
all the more real by the growing force of nationalism 
throughout the British and French colonies. 
Nationalism was, of course, by no means a post-war 
invention but it is clear that the war had altered 
the position of the colonial nations in the world 
sphere and that the political experience gained by 
African and Asian soldiers combined with the spirit 
of Wilsonian rhetoric had contributed to an increase
(1) E.H. Carr The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23 
vol. Ill Hamondsworth, 1966 pp. 253-71.
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in nationalist activity throughout the world. The 
rise of nationalism in India, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco is well documented and does not 
need to be described here. It came as no surprise 
to either French or British governments that 
increasing nationalist demands were made.
Successive French governments recognised France's 
need to repay her colonial populations for the 
sacrifices made during the war. Millerand, 
elected as Prime Minister in the autumn of 1920 
stated that:
Our Algeria, our countries of the 
Protectorate and our colonies whose 
admirable growth attests to the genius 
and tenacity of republican men of state 
have paid fully and in all kinds their 
debt to the metropole. The metropole 
will in its turn recognise what she owes 
them and will associate them ever more 
closely in her political and moral life.(l)
Colonialists who spent much of their life physically 
isolated from the metropole had always been sensitive 
to domestic criticism of their activity. Whereas 
before the war such criticism had been largely (but
(1) BCAF Sept.-Oct. 1920, p.261.
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not exclusively) based on the cost of imperial 
expansion, after, the war criticism of colonialism 
acquired a sharper political edge as socialist and 
communist intellectuals, artists and politicians 
championed the cause of African nationalists. In 
1921 Rene Maran, a West Indian and former French 
colonial administrator, was awarded France's most 
prestigious literary prize - Le prix Goncourt - for 
his novel, Bataouala. The novel is set in a French 
colony in central Africa and is heavily critical of 
the violence involved in the 'civilising mission' of 
colonialism. In his preface Maran cited a Hindu 
poet's view of 'civilisation': 'You build your
Kingdom on corpses. Whatever you may wish, whatever 
you will do, you will die away in untruth (tu te 
meurs dans le mensonge)'. In the course of the 
novel Maran turns traditional African 'vices' into 
'virtues' and accuses whites amongst other things of 
hypocrisy, prudery and impotence. Today the novel 
may strike the reader as merely an exotic catalogue 
of sensationalist and racist cliches but in 1921 it 
represented a sharp departure from mainstream 
colonial novels. The award of the Prix Goncourt 
outraged the editorial committee of L'Afrique francaise 
who cited Maran as an alarming example of what could
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happen if education for colonial populations was 
not restricted to French, elementary science and 
artisanal training* Any more advanced education 
would not, they said, create French citizens but:
...vainglorious, declasses and rootless 
peoples who lose their native qualities 
and acquire only the vices of their 
educators. It is through this system 
that we have created such people as 
Rene Maran and that one fine day a novel 
appears like Bataouala which is very 
mediocre from a literary point of view, 
infantile in conception and unjust and 
pernicious in its tendencies. It 
needed only a handful of idiotic 
litterateurs who know of Africa nothing 
more than the jazz band and negro art to 
recommend to everybody this work as the 
finest French novel of the year. (1)
However, Maran was not to remain out of favour with 
the colonial establishment for long. In 1934 his 
novel Le Livre de la Brousse, which in many ways 
was very similar to Bataoula (2) was given a very 
different review in L !Afrique francaise. The
(1) BCAF Jan 1922, p.43
(2) It tells the story of Rossi's passage through
a violent life which ends in a violent death,as, 
escaping from a horde of cannibals, the hero 
juirps into the jaws of a hungry crocodile.
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reviewer, Robert Delavignette, who had been taught 
by Delafosse and who was the rising star of the 
French colonial administration, wrote enthusiastic­
ally that the book was a 'masterpiece' and that the 
central character, Kossi, was the most realistic 
portrait of a pre-colonial African that had ever 
been made. (1) That Maran was accepted into the 
colonial establishment reflects the influence which 
men such as Delafosse had on developing what may be 
called the colonial consciousness of the twenties 
and thirties. The creation of an Institute of 
Ethnology in the Sorbonne in 1927 and the creation 
in London of the International African Institute, 
with its journal Africa, were measures of both 
the increasing sophistication of Europeans' 
perception of Africa and of the realisation by 
colonial powers of the need to show greater method 
in their colonial administration. Yet 'Science' 
and the 'Practical Man' - to borrow again the 
characters of the Malinowski/Mitchell debate in 
the pages of Africa in 1929 (2) - sometimes proved
(1) BCAF Jun 1934, p. 353
(2) See above p. 9 See also Talal Asad (ed) 
Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter Iondon, 
1973 especially Asad's 'Introduction' and 
Vfendy James 'The Anthropologist as Reluctant 
Imperialist' pp. 41-70.
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unhappy bedfellows, despite the fact that 'Science' 
wooed the 'Practical Man' with tales of her cost 
effectiveness I
The need to exploit the economic potential of the 
colonies had long been the principal justification 
for the expenditure on the colonial army. Reading 
general accounts of the colonial era in West Africa 
it is easy to gain the impression that the role of 
the army had come to an end by the 1920s but whilst 
it is obviously true that the era of grand colonial 
conquest belonged to the late nineteenth century it 
should not be imagined that the 1920s saw no military 
action. Neither Morocco nor Mauritania were 
finally 'pacified' until the mid-1930s. d )  The 
colonies, even in years so close in memory to the 
European battlefields of the Great War, were still 
an arena in which military glory could be gained and 
paraded: in 1921 two colonial soldiers - Lyautey
and Gallieni - were promoted to the rank of marechal, 
and the fact that Galieni's promotion was 
posthumous does not detract from the fact that of 
the seven Frenchmen ever to be made marechal four
(1) Morocco in 1934, Mauritania in 1935.
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were colonials. (1) The close identity between the 
colonies and the military remained strong.
This brief and impressionistic survey of some of 
the main themes that run through the two decades 
that we shall cover in the last three chapters of 
this thesis serves to indicate the complexities and 
paradoxes of the interwar years. Many of the 
themes are old ones: the need to exploit the
economic potential of the colonies, resentment of 
international conspiracies, fears of nationalist 
movements, the increasing sophistication of European 
knowledge of Africa and the eternal presence of 
soldiers are all very familiar. However, they 
were almost all given a new twist: economic develop­
ment was to be undertaken not so much in the brave 
new world of technological development but in the 
climate of economic retrenchment associated with 
the Depression (2) conspiracy was not the conspiracy 
of exotic sultans but of former comrades-in-arms,
(1) BCAF June, 1920
(2) On timing of French investment in Africa see
C. Coquery-Vidrovitch (ed) 'L'Afrique et la crise de 
1930 (1924-38) Actes du Oolloque Paris, Universite VII, 
9-10 Avril 1976 in RFHCM LXIII, (232-3) 1976.
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nationalism was made much more frightening after 
the October Revolution and although Europeans were 
coming to know more about Africa, Africa itself 
was changing. (1)
(1) The paradoxes of colonialism in the interwar 
period are most eloquently and suggestively 
stated in J. Berque Le Maghrib entre deux 
guerres Paris, 1962 (trans. French ISbrth Africa 
Iondon, 1967).
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ATTITUDES TO ISLAM AFTER THE WAR
As far as French attitudes towards Islam were 
concerned there was one major thread of continuity 
with the pre-war situation, at least in the years 
immediately following the war: Paul Marty remained
in Dakar until 1921. At one stage it seemed as 
though he was to be posted to Lebanon, but this 
project was abandoned at the last minute. On 
learning of this change of plan Marty wrote, 'I 
am delighted and am packing my cases with joy to 
return to my dear Moors and blacks in A.O.F.' (1)
One of the people with whom Marty had become 
acquainted in the course of his research into West 
African Islam was the colourful figure of 
Cheikh Ibra Fall. In October 1921 Cheikh Ibra Fall
(1) ANSCM AP 1418 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 15.10.19; 
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 21.10.1919; Min. Col. 
to Gov.-Gen. AOF 29.10.1919; Marty to Directeur 
de L'Afrique (rue Oudinot ) 22.10.1919.
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came to Dakar to profess both his and his master 
Serigne Ahmadu Bamba's continued loyalty to the 
mere patrie and to show their respect to the new 
Governor-General, Merlin. He had been meaning 
to do this for a long time, but he explained that,
My visit has always been delayed on account 
of the fact that that noble phalange of 
good old Africans who brought us up in the 
love of France and who guided us in our 
dealings with our white and enlightened 
chiefs have now almost all disappeared and 
have made way for unscrupulous politicians 
in whom we can have no confidence. (1)
Whilst Cheikh Ibra Fall's regrets about the passing 
of the era of 'good old Africans' should be taken 
with a pinch of salt, it was certainly true 
nonetheless that the key personalities in France's 
Islamic strategy were all approaching the end of 
their lives: El Hajj Malick Sy died in 1922,
Cheikh Sidia in 1924 and Ahmadu Bamba in 1927.
As a result of these deaths the French administration 
was forced to look for new intermediaries to act on 
their behalf. In the last two chapters we shall see
(1) ANS 17 G 239 (180) Ch. Ibra Fall to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
21.10.1921. I owe this reference to Jim Searing 
(Princeton).
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how the gaps were filled. But 'the passing of the 
good old Africans' can be taken to mean more than 
the demise of a few personalities for it suggests also 
the changing political climate of emergent mass 
politics in Senegal.
Delafosse, another link with the pre-war past, was 
acutely aware of the need to accommodate these 
changes. In the last year of the war he wrote a 
series of articles in Depeche Coloniale in which he 
argued that Africans needed to be given more authority:
After all the natives of Africa did not ask 
us to come. Since we have come, sometimes 
in spite of them and always without at least 
consulting them, and since we are going to 
stay it is important that in front of the 
people who observe us and who compete with 
us and in front of , posterity who will 
judge us, that we should be able to justify 
our presence here and to show that in coming 
here we had other interests than in filling 
our pockets and then leaving. (1)
Angoulvant, who did not often see eye to eye with 
Delafosse, agreed that the war had created an entirely 
new situation and that it had upset the comfortable
(1) ANSCM AP 170/3 M. Delafosse 'De la participation 
des Indigenes de l'AGF a 1'administration locale' 
Depdche Coloniale 3/5/9/11/16.4.1918.
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predictions in the gradual evolution of African 
society. Angoulvant argued that the French would 
have to be more careful to recruit colonial 
administrative personnel equipped to meet the new 
situation. (1) However, whilst some improvements 
continued to be made in the training of administrators 
in Paris, hopes of either a much larger or a much more 
suitably qualified administration fell foul of 
economic recession.(2)
The intellectual response to the general sense of the 
need for change was to reaffirm the underlying thesis 
of the earlier work of Clozel, Delafosse and Marty 
that the French should base their administration on 
ethnic and religious particularism. It is particularly 
interesting to follow Delafosse's development in these 
years. Delafosse's criticisms of colonial policies 
and practices became increasingly explicit. In 1921 
he wrote that:
(1) ANSCM AP 170/3 Gov.-Gen. ACF to Min. Col. 16.5.1918.
(2) See W. B. Cohen Rulers of Bnpire, ch. 6 'Era of 
lost opportunities.
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In no case can I see as the motive for our 
colonial expansion in Africa the real and 
reasoned desire to contribute to the 
happiness of the populations whom we went 
to subjugate. That is only an excuse that 
we can give ourselves after the event, it 
was never our design. In effect we feel 
the need to excuse or at least to justify 
acts which ... on our part have consisted 
of dispossessing peoples of their 
independence for the profit of our country. (1)
This level of soul-searching does not appear to have 
spread throughout the colonial establishment and 
should be seen in the context of the immediate 
aftermath of the war. (2) However, even if the rue 
Oudinot did not change overnight into a ministry of
(1) M. Delafosse ' Sur 1'orientation nouvelle de la 
politique indigene' PCBCAF June 1921 p. 146.
(2) Delafosse's proposals for reform and the 
willingness of the colonial establishment to 
listen have been dismissed by Marc Michel as 
constituting 'seulement un manent priviliegie 
consecutif a la guerre et a la prise de conscience 
d'une Afrique nouvelle.' Marc Michel 'Un programme 
reformiste en 1919: Delafosse et "la politique
indigene" en AGE1' CEA, 1975 pp. 313-27.
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repentant imperialists, an evolution in the way in 
which African society was regarded was nonetheless 
underway. For central to Delafosse's argument was 
his conviction, expressed before the war in 
Haut-Senegal et Niger, that African civilisation
deserved respect and that this had to be the starting 
point for any successful 1 native policy'. This 
assertion was to be repeated in various guises and 
in several different contexts throughout the interwar 
years: it was an argument which was attractive both
to radicals, anxious to emphasise the value of African 
culture, and to conservatives, fearful of what might 
replace the traditional virtues of 'primitive' society.^
(1) See Camille Guy's enthusiastic review of an exhibition 
of African art in Marseilles in 1925 '... Nous ferons 
mieux connaitre au public ces indigenes dont on ne 
souptponne guerre ni 1' intelligence ni la faculte 
d'adaption ni les sentiments de belles choses. De leur 
cote ils apporteront a nos artistes at & nos artisans 
une note nouvelle, une autre forme de vision, et de tout 
cela resulteront sans doute d'harmonieuses combinaisons, 
une alliance insoupconnee de formes et de couleurs par 
lesquelles la genie fran<pais et 1'ideal artistique des 
noirs seront profondement modifies ...' BCAF May 1925 
pp. 226-7; on the political level see H. Tabouret 
'la politique indigene en Afrique' BCAF June 1930- 
April 1931; J. Brevie Circulaires sur la politique et 
1'administration indigenes en AOF Goree, 1932. These 
are discussed in Ailsa Auchnie's Ph.D/ thesis 'The 
conmandement indigene in Senegal, 1919-47' London 
1983 passim.
i
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By African society Delafosse meant not only pre­
colonial but also, in many cases, pre-Islamic society. 
The argument that animism constituted a much more 
systematic and sophisticated mode of belief than 
was usually credited had, of course, been advanced 
before the war, and in a sense it is as much the 
timing as the content of the post-war rehearsal of 
this argument that is of interest. Delafosse argued 
that official statistics over-estimated the number 
of Muslims in AOF and that 'negroes' were inherently 
hostile towards Islam for three main reasons; firstly, 
he suggested that 'The collectivism of Blacks naturally 
estranges them from Islam. The Black's notion of 
hierarchy turns Islam when it does manage to introduce 
itself into a religion that is good for the great and 
noble, but not for the mass of proletarians'; secondly 
he argued that Africans who were primarily agricultur­
alists could not accept and could not afford the time 
to study a religion which did not include the earth, 
sky, rain, rivers and other natural elements in its 
cosmology; and, finally, that animism was a deeprooted 
religion which in its accent on ancestor worship 
corresponded entirely to the needs of Africans. (1)
(1) M. Delafosse 'L'animisme negre et sa resistance a 
1' islamisation en Afrique occidentale' EMM 1922 
pp. 143-60.
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Delafosse explained any recent conversion to Islam 
in terms of French preference for Muslim 
intermediaries. (1) He admitted that he was
worried by the possible effects of conversion to Islam 
both on indigenous society and on French rule in 
Africa. (2)
Delafosse summed up his misgivings about Islam in
his preface to the curiously titled book of
Jules Brevie, Director of the Department of Political
(1) Ibid pp. 139-41
(2) 'Bien que professant pour l'islamisme un 
respect que merite ... cette religion, je 
ne puis concevoir qu'il reponde a 1'ideal 
normal des societes noires, et je suis 
oblige de tieflechir aux difficulties qui 
pourraient resulter pour les puissances 
europeennes de l1 extension a 1'ensemble 
de l'Afrique noire d'une religion qui, 
quoique derivant des memes sources que
la notre, en est trop eloignee 
historiquement pour ne pas etre une rivale1 
Delafosse 'L'orientation nouvelle' p.151.
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and Administrative Affairs in Dakar, L 1Islamisme 
contre "Naturisme" au Soudan franqais: Essai de
Psychologie politique coloniale (Paris, 1923). (D 
Delafosse explained that:
It is not at all my intention, nor that 
of M. Brevie to organise a new crusade 
against Islam for which on the contrary 
both I and he have great sympathy. We 
merely believe that the lessons of the past 
and of the present have shown us that the 
muslim civilisation meets neither the 
aspirations nor the needs of black 
societies, and that these societies possess 
a civilisation of their own which suits 
them better than any other because it is 
the logical product of their normal evolution 
and that it is as much in their interest as it 
is in our own to let this indigenous 
civilisation continue and achieve its 
development in the direction given to it by 
nature and determined by circumstances. (2)
(1) 'Naturisme' was used by Durkheim to refer to 
religions based on nature as opposed to 'animism' 
based on spirits - although he admitted that in 
practise both types of religion existed side by 
side, see E. Durkheim Les formes elemental res
de la vie religieuse Paris, 1912 p. 68.
Brevid intended 'naturism' to be descriptive 
of a period in time in the development of 
society. For him 'naturism' is 'Cette enfance 
des societes qui va de l'epoque ou l'hcmme 
vivait isole dans la brousse a celle ou se 
constituent les premiers groupements;
famille pa triarchale et ma triarchale, clan, tribu etc.- 
ce que nous appelerons 'naturisme'. Brevie L1 Islamisme
p.6.
(2) Delafosse preface to Brevie L*Islamisme p.ix.
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This heavily deterministic view of African religious 
practice suggests that to the innate humanism which 
characterised the three volumes of Haut-Senegal et 
Niger Delafosse had added a large dose of 
Durkheimian sociology.
This latter influence is even more apparent in the 
main text of Brevie with its long passages from 
Levy-Bruhl's Les Fonctions mentales dans les societes 
inferieures (Paris, 1910). Brevie's first chapters 
outlined his belief in the universality of his 
'naturist' model of religious belief and civil 
administrative structure amongst primitive peoples 
of the world, past and present:
Primitive collectivities ... all appear to 
be conceived on the same model and to obey 
a superior command. Within the great 
human orchestra they seem to play a part 
to which it is forbidden for them to add 
the slightest original note. The impulse 
of this collective determinism is so strong 
that they seem devoid of personality, d)
Brevie's 'great human orchestra' follows a Hobbesian 
conductor:
(1) Brevie L'Islamisme pp. 38-9
Il
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The history of societies is no more in sum 
than the struggle of the social instinct 
which tends to draw men together against 
the egoistic and anarchic tendency of the 
individual. When man has understood 
the advantages that the collectivity can 
bring to his preservation and well-being 
he accepts his participation without 
either recrimination or regret. (1)
This stage is the 'naturist' system of social 
organisation which Brevie defined as:
A collection of prescriptions and 
prohibitions born of collective and 
generally mystic representations by 
which the social instinct reacts against 
the egoism of the individual and obliges 
him to cooperate in the development of 
the collectivity. (2)
Brevie then went on to describe Soudanese Islam.
He deplored the confusion, which he said dated back 
to Faidherbe, of Islam north and south of the Sahara 
and denied the applicability of the Algerian model 
to the Soudan. In the Soudan Islam had had great 
difficulty in overcoming what he called the 
'impermeability of religion based on national and
(1) Ibid p. 110
(2) Ibid p.iii. cf. Durkheim's description of religion 
as an expression of a collective social morality. 
See Anthony Giddens Durkheim Glasgow, 1978 ch. 5 
'Religion and theIheoryof Knowledge'.
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ethnic character'. What success it had had, he 
claimed, was solely due to conquest, (1)
Whatever the reason for it, Brevie had some dramatic 
words about the effects of conversion to Islam on 
the individual African:
The infantile gaiety, the exuberance and 
the ioie de vivre which are the hallmark 
of the fetichist give way to a profound 
sadness, an overwhelming seriousness, a 
lack of sexual appetite ... The eye is 
dull, the brain empty, the gestures become 
mechanical and the body moves only as if 
in a hypnotic sleep broken only by painful 
awakenings when in the course of the 
repeated prostrations the head ,*. strikes 
the ground over violently. (2)
We have spoken of the physical and moral 
tribulations of the new convert and we 
have found part of the cause in the sadness, 
and perhaps, the disappointment which he 
experiences in substituting for his own 
dear beliefs a religion in which his native 
sensibility cannot be satisfied. But this 
explains only his despondency and his 
profound exhaustion, not the access of anger 
and the sudden movements which reveal the 
desire in his troubled soul to execute some 
action pleasing to God and thus acquire the 
right to the celestial delights. It is 
these new morbid manifestations which 
complete the diagnosis of individual 
fanaticism. The subject then assumes 
disgust for his previous life and avoids 
his fellows with whom contact is for him
(1) Brevid L 1 Islamisme pp. 125,146
(2) Ibid p. 181.
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odious and sometimes painful. He walks, 
bent under the weight of a nagging 
obsession, his fevered fingers telling 
his beads. As if chewing in his sleep 
he constantly mouths his prayer La illah 
ill'Allah which he repeats at first with 
a stubborn wish and then mechanically in 
the torpor of his vacant brain ... (1)
Brevie then listed the five pillars of the faith and 
various Muslim institutions such as the Sufi orders 
and Qur'anic schools. None were portrayed in a 
particularly flattering manner.
The third part of Brevie's book covered French 
policies towards 'Naturism' and Islam. Brevie made 
it clear that he considered that Islam had thrown down 
the gauntlet to the French - 'West Africa is a closed 
field in which the Arab civilisation is challenging 
French influence for the moral conquest of some twelve 
million naturists'. After a false start in an
Islamic policy which was based on the Algerian 
experience, the French led by Cloze1 had embarked, 
Brevie noted approvingly, on a more sensible course 
which emphasised the importance of secular education 
given in African languages. The purpose of such 
education was 'to reveal to this powerful, but dumb,
(1) Ibid p. 184
(2) Ibid p. 293
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people of Africa their own strength and to give 
them the means of expressing their own thought'« (1) 
Factory work was also suggested as an important part 
of the curriculum as a means of inculcating Africans 
with work discipline &) _ a measure, perhaps, of how 
flexible the notion of specific ethnic education could 
be!
L 1Islamisme contre 'naturisme' is a curious book on 
several counts and deserves to be taken seriously not 
the least because Delafosse wrote the preface and 
Brevie was to become the longest serving and most 
influential of the interwar Governor-GeneraIs.
Brevie clearly belongs to the 'bookish' tradition of 
Governor-Generals in AOF (3) and it is clear from 
reading this book that he was a man of considerable 
learning. However, the really striking feature 
of the book is the deterministic theories used to 
explain 'naturist' society. Clozel had argued that 
'animism' deserved respect but he had done so on the 
basis of close observations of societies in the
(1) Ibid p. 304
(2) Ibid p. 307
(3) A nice example of this aspect of his character is his 
circular on the importance of the upkeep of libraries 
in each cercle '... II faut rappeler qu'il n y a pas 
disaccord entre 1'action la plus immediate et la 
culture la plus en plus profondie, que c'est un devoir 
de developper en soi une rigueur intellectuelle ...
ANS 17 G 335 Gov.-Gen. AOF to colonies 28.8.1931.
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Ivory Coast. Brevie's account of 'naturism' was 
also based on the first-hand observations of both 
the author and his fellow administrators, but these 
are all tied into the sweeping generalisations of 
Levy Bruhl about the pre-logical thought of 
'primitive' societies. Levy Bruhl, whose work was 
published in the journal Annales Sociologigues that 
had been founded by Durkheim, based his theories on 
a wide and somewhat indiscriminate range of accounts 
of 'primitive' life throughout the world, though 
chiefly from Australia and South Africa.(D 
'Naturism' is portrayed as a powerful and entirely 
systematic mode of belief - and as such it should be 
treated by us with suspicion. (2) Brevie's account 
of Islam is more straightforward, founded as it seems 
to be on a profound dislike of the religion. No 
reference is made to Marty, and instead Brevie quotes 
extensively from the local reports on Islam 
commissioned in 1911. Quite apart from the fact 
that these reports were already ten years out of date,
(1) Durkheim also based his theories on religion
on the v-ork of British and American anthropologists 
in Australia and Polynesia.
(2) See Vincent Monteil's ironic caiments on Griaule's 
cosmology of the Dogon for a good example of applied 
scepticism L'Islam Noir (3rd edn) Paris, 1980 p.30.
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it should be remembered that the standard was very 
variable and they cannot be taken as a reliable 
source. However, what is perhaps more interesting 
to note is that having described 'naturism' as the 
natural religion of the Soudanese Africans who are 
'impervious' to all other religions Brevid went on 
to talk of the challenge thrown down by Arabic 
civilisation for control of West African souls.
If what Brevie had written about 'naturism' was true 
then the Arabic challenge should not have been a 
serious one. Yet clearly Brevie was not entirely 
convinced by his own arguments. Here again we come 
back to the element of uncertainty that characterised 
so much of French writing on Islam in West Africa in 
the early twentieth century. In 1923 Islam seemed 
to the French to be as much as ever the joker in the 
pack.
Delafosse, I believe, was more concerned about Islam 
at this time than he had ever been since his flirtation 
with Lavigerie. In his preface to Brevid's book he 
stated that 'Amongst African Blacks islamisation is 
synonymous with social breakdown'.(1) This was
(1) Delafosse preface to Brevid L'Islamisme p. xi.
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the most serious accusation that Delafosse could 
level against Islam and represents something of a 
shift from his earlier position in which Islam's 
place in African society was seen as less disruptive. 
It was serious on two counts. Firstly, there can 
be no doubting Delafosse's intense personal 
commitment to the idea of indigenous African 
civilisations. His commitment was a form of what 
might be dubbed radical paternalism, and it is 
interesting to see the important part he played in 
the 'Ligue de la Defense de la Race Negre', an 
organisation founded in 1927 which drew on studies 
of African art and history to affirm the existence 
of African civilisation as an alternative to the 
model of French civilisation. Although the 'Ligue' 
was a metropolitan and mainly white organisation, it 
was to be of importance in shaping the distinctive 
cultural nationalism of francophone Africa in the 
1940s and 1950s. (1) Thus, in Delafosse's personal 
terms, if Islam was a destructive agent in these
(1) See J.S. Spiegler 'Aspects of Nationalist thought 
amongst French-speaking Vfest Africans, 1919-39' 
Unpublished D.Fhil. thesis, Oxford, 1968, ch. 6 
esp. pp. 144-52.
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African civilisations, then that was a very serious 
criticism indeed. Secondly, and more generally, 
one did not have to be as sincere an admirer of 
African civilisation as Delafosse was in order to 
have regrets about its breakdown. For the 
preservation of the old order - whatever that was - 
was widely regarded as the best safeguard against 
nationalist political disorder. Delafosse was very 
concerned about the development of pan-africanism 
and he wrote angrily about American policy in Liberia 
which he believed encouraged it. (1) He also admitted 
to being concerned by pan-islamism which, he said, was 
something that had never worried him unduly before. 
However, he believed that it should now be taken 
seriously because of 'The new situation throughout the 
Muslim world created as a result of European, but 
above all English policy in the Orient. This has 
encouraged amongst mahometans of all races and 
nationalities a complex sentiment in which nationalism.. 
predominates over the purely religious idea1. (2)
(1) M. Delafosse 'Les points sombres de 1'horizon en 
Afrique occidentale* BCAF June 1922 pp. 279-83.
(The French were very suspicious generally of 
British ambitions in the Middle East and of its 
relations with the Cherif of Mecca.
(2) Ibid p. 278.
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It should be remembered that across the Sahara in 
Morocco similar arguments about the 'foreignness' 
of Islam were being advanced in respect of the 
Berbers. From 1914 until the early 1930s French 
policy in Morocco was based largely on the premise 
that the Berbers should be isolated as much as 
possible from Arab Muslim influences and that the 
French should take care not to encourage Islam by 
instituting a legal educational system based on 
Islam. More attention was to be paid instead to 
the preservation of indigenous Berber laws and 
traditions. Paul Marty, during his time in 
Morocco, was one of the most enthusiastic supporters 
of this 'politique berbere' which culminated 
disastrously in the Berber dahir of 19 31. (1) 
Delafosse's arguments should then be taken in the 
context of their day for it was the spectre of 
i  nationalism more than anything else which seems to
| have caused his views on Islam to have become so
hostile.
(1) See C.R. Ageron Folitiques coloniales au Maghreb 
Paris, 1972, Part II, ch. 2 'La politique berbere 
du Protectorat marocain de 1913 a 19341.
i
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The Porto-Novo incidents of 1923
Apart from the Four Communes of Senegal the colony 
in AOF where political life was most advanced and 
where fears of nationalism seemed most justified 
was Dahomey, and in particular Porto-Novo on the 
coast close to the Nigerian border.
Since the mid-eighteenth century the town of Porto- 
Novo had been an important Yoruba slaving post both 
during the era of the Oyo empire and after its 
decline. It accommodated itself well to the move 
to legitimate trade in the early nineteenth century 
with its economy now based on palm oil. Competition 
between British and French merchants for this trade 
on the Bight of Benin led to increasing European 
involvement in local politics and rivalries along 
the coast. Various treaties were signed with local 
chiefs but it was not until the Anglo-French treaties 
of 1889 and 1890 that the spheres of influence were 
finally delimited. The 1890s were dominated 
firstly by the French military campaign against 
Behanzin, King of Abomey, and then by French 
exploration and subjugation of the interior. In an 
administrative reorganisation of the colony in 1896
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the old kingdoms, including Porto-Novo, were 
classed as ’protectorates' and retained their 
traditional chiefs.
The two main ethnic groups in Porto-Novo - the Fon 
and Yoruba - were almost entirely animist but there 
were also Christian and Muslim communities. Mission 
activity in Dahomey was remarkably cosmopolitan: 
French, British and German missions, catholic and 
protestant, were all active in the late nineteenth 
century. In addition Dahomey's links, through the 
slave trade, with Brazil had led to the establishment 
of a Brazilian community made up initially of traders 
but later predominantly of 'creoles' - a group which 
included freed slaves. The 'creoles' followed 
several different religious beliefs. Many of the 
freed slaves had reverted to traditional beliefs but 
there were also substantial numbers of Christians 
and Muslims amongst them. One of the oddities of 
Porto-Novo was that many of its leading Muslim 
families still bore the Catholic Brazilian names of 
their former owners. There was also a small 
indigenous Muslim community. The final point to 
note in this brief introduction to the history of 
Porto-Novo is that the royal house was divided into
503
two rival branches, De Hakpan and De Messe, and 
succession was supposed to alternate between the two 
branches. (D
From this brief survey it can be seen that the 
potential for political intrigue in Porto-Novo was 
enormous: a divided royal house ruling in a notional
protectorate close to the border of a foreign colony 
and presiding over an urban community comprising a 
relatively large number of mission-educated creoles 
and freed slaves, but which also included indigenous 
animists, Christians (catholic and protestant) and 
Muslims were all ingredients calculated to ensure that 
political life in Porto-Novo was never dull!
(1) This account is based on R. Comevin La Bepublicrue 
populaire du Benin Paris, 1981 pp. 273-410;
P. Marty Etudes sur l1 Islam au Dahcmev Paris, 1926 
pp. 15-19; P. love joy Transformations in 
African Slavery Cambridge, 1983 p. 80; D. Ross 
'Dahomey' in M. Crowder (ed) West African 
Resistance: the military response to colonial
occupation Iondon, 1971 pp. 144-69; J.M. Ballard 
'The Porto-Navo Incidents of 1923: Politics in
the Colonial era' Univ. of Ife Journal of African 
Studies 2 (i) 1965.
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In 1908 King Toffa from the Messe branch of the 
royal house died but the Hakpan candidate, Sohingbe, 
was not made king as the French suspected him of 
intriguing with the neighbouring British. (1)
Instead, Toffa's son, Adjikji, became king and 
Sohingbe moved across the border to Nigeria. The 
following year the imam of the principal mosque in 
Porto-Novo, el Hajj Moutarou, died. The mosque 
had been built in c.1885 and even before its 
completion there had been disputes about who should 
be imam as both the creole and the indigenous Muslims, 
led respectively by Paraiso and Monteirou, had their 
own favoured candidates. El Hajj Moutarou who had 
been elected imam in 1899, however, had managed to 
reconcile both camps and his death, following so 
soon after the controversy surrounding the royal 
succession, was a blow to political stability in the 
kingdom. Moutarou was replaced by a creole 
candidate, Bissirou. However, in 1913 both 
Bissirou and the king, Adjikji, died. Sohingbe's 
name was again put forward and again it was looked 
over in favour of another of Toffa's sons, Agoba.
(1) This paragraph is based on Marty Dahomey pp. 53-83.
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Trouble ensued and Sohingbe was arrested only to be 
released shortly afterwards. Another creole was 
chosen as imam but he appears to have at least 
attempted to keep a balance between the two 
communities - so much so that he was accused by the 
creole Muslims of being anti-creole. In addition 
to the disputes over the royal succession and the 
choice of imam there was a third quarrel concerning 
the construction of a new mosque after the French 
decided to demolish the old mosque in 1910, partly 
because of complaints about the noise of the muezzin 
from some nearby European trading houses but also 
because it was part of their plans for the 
reconstruction of Porto-Novo*s European quarter.
The French donated 5,000 francs towards the 
construction of a new mosque and another creole 
Muslim, Gonzalo Lopez, was put in charge of the fund­
raising in order to complete the building but by 
November 1912 after being accused of embezzlement, 
the Lopez-Paraiso group ran out of money. The 
indigenous Muslims, the Monteirou group, took over 
control, but they were hardly any more successful 
and their money ran out after only six weeks. The 
Lopez-Paraiso partnership took over again but by
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July 1914 their money had again run out before the 
minarets were built or the walls plastered. Such 
then was the situation in Porto-Novo at the start 
of the war.
During the war Paraiso identified himself very 
strongly with the French and was duly awarded the 
Legion d'Honneur in 1919.(1) The Monteirou group, 
on the other hand, were equivocal in their loyalty 
to France. They accused Paraiso of being a lax 
Muslim and made much of the fact that he had allowed 
his son to become a catholic. In August 1916 over 
one hundred Monteirou Muslims staged a demonstration 
in Porto-Novo in which they waved British flags. 
Marty considered that although the demonstration 
was not 'subversive' it was nonetheless in 'bad 
taste' . (2)
The French were much weakened in Dahomey during the 
war and the local elites were able to enjoy 
considerable power. In 1917 a Senegalese creole 
lawyer, Germain Crespin, who had family ties with
(1) ANS 8 G 51 (23) 'Nate du Lt.-Gov. Dahorrey' 17.1.1920
(2) Marty Dahomey P. 61.
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Blaise Diagne, succeeded on behalf of a Dahomean 
pressure group, led by a local plantation owner 
Toualou Quenum, in getting the Governor of the 
colony, Charles Noufflard, sacked. (1) One of 
the people involved in this campaign was Louis 
Hunkanrin, a Dahomean who had been educated in 
St Louis and who had worked as a teacher in Ouidah 
for three years before he was sacked in 1910.
For two years he campaigned to get his job back, 
but in vain and he ended up serving a year's prison 
sentence in Dakar on a charge of theft. On his 
release he worked with Blaise Diagne before 
returning to Dahomey where he founded a local branch 
of the 'Ligue des Droits des Hommes' and wrote 
newspaper articles before being forced to flee 
across the border to Nigeria. In 1918 he was back 
in Dahomey where Blaise Diagne persuaded him to join 
the army in Dakar, and the following year, again 
through the offices of Diagne he was posted to 
Paris. (2) At some stage during the war a branch 
of the North African 'Comite franco-musulman' was 
founded in Dahomey and although little appears to be
(1) Ballard 'Porto-Novo incidents'
(2) On Hunkanrin see Spiegler 'Aspects of Nationalist 
Thought', ch. 2 and Ballard op cit pp. 64-8.
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known about the Dahomean group it appears to have 
had good connections with France for in October 1919 
the Minister of Colonies was questioned by a Dr. Doizy 
the depute for the Ardennes concerning the 'Comite's' 
accusations of colonial abuses in Dahomey. The Comite 
accused the local administration, in general, of brutal 
recruitment practices during the war and the Governor 
Fourn and one of his officers, in particular, of 
speculation on the Porto-Novo market, by requisitioning 
food which they subsequently resold at inflated prices. 
Fourn was asked about these accusations and denied 
them all categorically. He added that he was 
surprised to note that the accusations and complaints 
came from a Muslim group as he had expected the Muslims 
to be thoroughly pleased by his gesture the previous 
year of awarding Paraiso the Legion d'Honneur. If 
this latter protestation was an innocent one it reveals 
a remarkable ignorance of the state of Muslim politics 
in his colony. (1)
In June 1920 the imam of the mosque died. Immediately 
both groups resumed their campaigns on behalf of their
(1) ANS 8 G 51 (23) Doizy to Min.Col. 21.10.1919,
Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 25.11.1919, 'Note
du Lt. Gov. Dahomey' 17.1.1920.
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candidates and in July the king announced that the 
Paraiso candidate, Lawani, had been chosen. A few 
months later the French decided to shut down 
construction of the mosque which had been restarted 
after the war but since then animosity between the 
two groups had grown ever more bitter. (1) At 
the same time Marty was sent to investigate and he 
arrived early the following year. Marty met all the 
leaders and reported pessimistically that 'Five long 
days of palavers permit me to conclude that there is 
total stalemate and no solution'. However, he noted 
that as long as the mosque remained unfinished the 
problem was lessened as both groups simply held 
Friday prayers in a mosque of their choice. Marty, 
therefore, suggested that the best solution would be 
to allow both groups to build their own mosques as 
this arrangement had appeared to work well in settling 
differences between different Muslim groups in Lagos. 
Marty noted that the Paraiso group was not very 
numerous and that the lifestyle of its members was 
not typical of most African Muslims. The leaders of
(1) Marty Dahomey p. 74.
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the Mouteirou group, on the other hand, he said were 
'incontestably in the African tradition and ambiance1 
and the fact that their candidate for imam,
Alfa Sarakou, was illiterate did not prevent him 
from being both pious and venerated. Marty, none­
theless, regretted the fact that the only French 
connections of this group were with 'indigenophile 
Associations in Paris'. (1)
The situation seems to have remained much the same 
throughout 1921 and 1922. Governor Fourn reported 
gloomily to Dakar in April 1922 that:
In Porto-Novo the two Muslim parties - 
one full of devotion to the French 
cause and the other aiming to entangle 
the whole of the Muslim church (sic) 
with the sincere but imprudent support 
of the Comity Franco-Musulman - are 
\ continuing their internecine struggle.
The apparent reasons for the struggle 
t are religious ones such as the nomination
| of the new imam and the condition of
j attendance at the principal mosque, but
j fundamentally the struggles are intended
I to support certain elements of disorder. (2)
!j
j
i
| (1) ANS 8 G 51 (23) Marty to Lt. Gov. Dahomey
[ 7.2.1921.
(2) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Lt. Gov. Dahcmey to
Gov.-Gen. AOF 8.4.1922.
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In May 1921 Hunkanrin had returned to Dahomey, once 
again as a prisoner of the French. In Paris he had 
forfeited Diagne's patronage by making immediate 
contacts with anarchist and left-wing circles.
In 1920 he was court-martialled for having absconded 
temporarily from the army and was sentenced to a 
three year prison sentence. However his imprison­
ment did not prevent him from maintaining his 
contacts with like-minded friends in Paris and 
Dahomey. (1)
Early in 1923 the government announced its intention 
to increase the capitation tax in Porto-Novo, and 
immediately there were demonstrations. On the 
12th February groups claiming to represent the 
'Ligue des Droits des Hommes' and the 'Comite Franco- 
Musulman' made a public protest in Porto-Novo and on 
the following day there were calls for strikes. On 
the 18th the police were sent in to break up a 
meeting, but the arrest of the leaders provoked a 
further and much larger demonstration in which the
(1) See Spiegler 'Aspects of nationalist thought' & 
Ballard ' The Porto-Novo incidents'.
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demonstrators besieged the town hall. Fourn decided 
to use the army to free the town hall and at the same 
time requested more troops from Dakar and permission 
to declare a state of siege. Governor-General Merlin 
agreed to send more troops but was reluctant to 
declare a state of siege for fear of adverse reactions 
in France. Fourn replied that the situation was 
getting worse all the time and explained that he did 
not believe that the ostensible pretext for the 
demonstrations, the tax increases, was the real 
reason for the revolt. 'In reality', he wrote 'the 
agitations are due to the actions of subversive 
milieux whose propaganda is being followed by the 
Colonial Ministry'. Three days later, suitably 
impressed with the urgency of the situation Merlin 
gave in to Fourn's request and on the 26th February 
he declared a state of siege. (1)
In the rue Oudinot, however, Sarraut was far from 
happy about the measures taken and thought that 
Fourn*s description of the agitators was much too 
vague. Merlin informed Sarraut that although the
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Lt.-Gov. Dahomey to Gov.-Gen. AOF
19.2.1923, Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Dahomey
23.2.1923, Gov.-Gen. AOF to Lt.-Gov. Dahomey
26.2.1923,
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dock-workers in Cotonou had now gone on strike, the 
situation was under control. Extra troops from 
Togo had been sent for and he expected these to be 
in Porto-Novo in ten days. The reinforcements had 
been called for on the basis of the principle that 
'the show of imposing force makes it unnecessary 
to use force*. Merlin agreed with Fourn's diagnosis 
of the troubles and dismissed claims that tax 
increases and hardships caused by recruitment were 
responsible. Raher, he wrote, the real reasons lay 
firstly in the succession dispute and Sohingbe's 
Continuing scheming and secondly, and 'more deeply', 
in the fact that since 1892 the population of Porto- 
Novo had been treated with 'excessive sweetness and 
have never had to accept the firm discipline which 
follows a conquest'. Until they were forced to 
realise that the French had the means to enforce 
obedience their 'undisciplined and rebellious 
character' made unrest more or less inevitable.(1) 
Early in March the local Administrative Affairs 
inspector reinforced Merlin's comments and added 
that both local and international trouble-makers 
were at work. Amongst the indigenous agitators 
he singled out the Mouteirou group of Muslims:
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Min. Ool. to Gov.-Gen. AQF 28.2.1923,
Gov.-Gen. AQF to Min. Col. 1.3.1923.
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The Muslims seem to form an elite in the 
country. Consequently their number has 
increased greatly and many attach themselves 
to the Muslim Party for no other reason 
than to distinguish themselves from the 
crowd ... These newcomers have not wasted 
any time in founding a veritable political 
party. Finding the first generation Muslims 
too subservient to the French authority 
they took the first opportunity to separate 
from them. The Muslims of Porto-Novo are 
today divided into two groups - the old 
Muslims, reasonable men, concerned about 
their religion and respectful of the 
established order - and the young Muslims, 
restless, rebellious and more preoccupied 
with political action which they hope will 
lead to the acquisition of material 
advantages, than they are with religious 
beliefs.
The inspector also claimed that the Dahomean section 
of the 'Comite Franco-Musulman' had been founded with 
neither the permission of the local authorities nor 
with the blessing of the North African secretary of 
the Comite. The rebellious elements had all exploited, 
he said, the visit to Porto-Novo of a delegate of the 
Conseil Superieur des Colonies to stage demonstrations 
in order to embarrass the government.(1)
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) M. L'Inspecteur des Affaires 
administratives de cercles du Bas-Dahaney 
'Mamoire introductif d'enquete sur les 
incidents de Porto-Novo en Fdvrier-Mars1
7.3.1923.
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By this stage Sarraut was satisfied that the unrest 
was serious and that international agitators were 
involved for he had received evidence from Nigeria 
of the international connections and activities of 
communists in the Hunkanrin affair. (1) At the
beginning of the year the Colonial Ministry had 
circulated a note with details of Bolshevist 
propaganda in the colonies. Izvestia of the 
22nd November 1921 had carried an article stating 
that:
The most violent blow to the international 
bourgeoisie will be delivered when a 
liberation movement ignites among the 
blacks of whom a tenth live in America.
Such a movement will not only affect 
capitalist America it will also reach 
England and France in Africa, where we have 
to propagate Bolshevism through the channel 
of American negroes. (2)
And, indeed, it was not long before the Porto-Novo 
incidents were splashed across the headlines of the 
French communist party paper, L 1Humanite. Early 
in March the #Comite Franco-Musulman# had sent a 
telegram to Carpot, an influential creole lawyer
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AQF
7.3.1923.
(2) ANS 19 G 22* 1 Extrait d'une note de renseignenent 
du Ministere du 23.1.1923 sur la propagande 
bolchevique aux colonies'.
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in Dakar, denouncing police brutality against 
demonstrators protesting against tax increases.
The text of the telegram was published amonth later 
in L'Humanite which commented:
Here are the beauties of French 
civilisation in Dahomey, in a colony 
whose population is distinguished by 
its great faculty for assimilation!
And, moreover, everywhere else its the 
same story. The working class of the 
metropole must struggle to relieve the 
oppression and the misery with which 
these unfortunate people have to 
struggle. Only Communism will 
assure the emancipation of blacks, just 
as much slaves of capital as workers of 
the white race. (1)
However, by the time this exhortation was being 
read by French workers in the working-class suburbs 
of Paris the struggle in Porto-Novo was already 
over. The troops from Togo arrived in Cotonou on 
the 11th March and a combined administrative and 
military action, first in the town of Porto-Novo 
and then in the other subdivisions of the cercle 
had led to an immediate payment of the capitation 
tax. Fourteen men considered as the principal 
agitators were in prison awaiting trial, and, in 
addition, Fourn requested permission to intern
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Ccznite d'action franco-musulman 
d'Afrique du Nord to Carpot, avocat a Dakar 
2.3.1923; L'Humanite 9.4.1923.
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Sohingbe and Hunkanrin.(1) In the course of April 
the agitators were all sentenced to varying lengths 
of imprisonment in Mauritania, Niger and Soudan.
Fourn related the details of how through a system 
of different postal addresses Hunkanrin and his 
comrades had kept in touch with communists in Paris 
and concluded that it was el Hajj Mouterirou who had 
played the leading role: 'Even though it is
impossible to give material proofs of his 
participation in recent events, his previous conduct, 
his state of mind and his close connections with the 
principal agitators all point to him as one of their 
best confederates.' In June the interim Governor- 
General, Olivier, suggested imposing a collective 
fine on the entire population of Porto-Novo, and the 
following month the state of siege was lifted. (2)
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Lt.-Gov. Dahomey to Gov.-Gen. AQF
14.3.1923, same to same 25.3.1923.
(2) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Lt.-Gov. Dahomey to Gov.-Gen. AQF
11.4.1923, Gov.-Gen. AQF to Min. Qol. 14.2.1923, 
Lt.-Gov. Dahomey to Gov.-Gen. AQF 21.4.1923,
Gov.-Gen. AQF to Lt.-Gov. Dahomey 23.4.1923, same 
to same 28.4.1923, Gov.-Gen. AQF to Min. Ool.
27.5.1923, Gov.-Gen. AQF to Lt.-Gov. Dahomey 
22.6.1923; arrete 23.7.1923 lifted state of siege.
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A week after the article in L 1Humanite Delafosse gave 
his reaction to the Porto-Novo incidents in an article 
in Depeche Coloniale. He argued that the unrest 
could be explained firstly by the proximity of Porto- 
Novo to Lagos where a spirit of unrest was 'constantly 
fuelled by the excitations of a few chestnut-coloured 
(i.e. of mixed race) lawyers' and where the impression 
of the existence of autonomous native states caused 
'brains, exalted by a hasty education, to form notions 
of independence too vague to be healthy' and secondly 
(and this disturbed Delafosse greatly) by the 
activities of so-called philanthropic organisations 
in France who went out of their way to discover abuses 
in the colonial system: 'The wind which will unleash
the tempest in Africa often blows from the metropole. 
It is a very small wind, I know, because the great 
majority of the native population is imbued with a 
solid good sense ... But all the same one should not 
forget that little streams sometimes create great 
rivers'. (1) It is an interesting comment on the 
nature of francophone nationalism that Delafosse, 
here mixing metaphors in a virulent denunciation
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) M. Delafosse 'Considerations sur les 
causes lointaines de certaines manifestations de 
m^contentement de la part d'indigenes' Depeche 
Coloniale 16.4.1923.
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of nationalism, should nonetheless have been a major 
influence in the development of nationalist thought 
in francophone Africa.
Amongst all the correspondence between Cotonou and 
Dakar there came an instruction from the Governor- 
General on the 5th April to ask Capt. Andre, who had 
just been appointed as the Governor-General1s 
chief adviser on Islamic affairs, to make a study 
of Islam in Dahomey. (1) Five days later the 
report was on its way to Dakar - a sign that Marty's 
successor was to be another fast and industrious 
worker. In reality, however, Marty and Andrd had 
little in common. It is not at all clear from the 
archives exactly when Andre appeared in Dakar and the 
first sign of his presence in West Africa was a 
report to the Governor-General dated the 5th January 
on 'The present tendencies of Islam and practical 
measures for keeping Islamic propaganda under 
surveillance'. (2) His qualifications for writing 
this report were questionable for although he had 
published several studies on Cilicia and on the 
Berbers the only evidence that he knew anything
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Gov.-Gen. AQF to Lt.-Gov. Dahomey
5.4.1923.
(2) m  ANS 19 G 5*
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about Islam in West Africa comes from a few pages 
in his two volume study of L 1Islam et les races 
(Paris, 1922) - which was a survey of contemporary 
Islam throughout the world in which he demonstrated 
that all the upheavals in the Islamic world stemmed 
from the difficulties for settled societies of 
adopting the laws of Islam which had been created 
by and for nomads. His few pages on Islam in 
sub-Saharan Africa (1) appears to have been based 
on two books only - 0. Meynier's L'Afrique noire 
(Paris, 1911) and Delafosse's Les Noirs de l'Afrique 
(Paris, 1922). In both L 1Islam et les races and 
in his report it is clear that Andre's interest 
lay more in attempting to understand and document 
the broad sweeps of history rather than the 
minutiae of Islamic practices and institutions 
in West Africa.
Andre argued in his report in January that events 
throughout the world since 1913 showed that Islam 
in itself was incapable of uniting Muslims against 
European powers. Nevertheless, and this was a 
familiar caveat, exterior forces could exploit Islam
(1) P. J. Andre L1 Islam et les races vol. II, pp.160-7.
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to the disadvantage of the colonial powers. Andre 
regretted the impact of President Wilson's Fourteen 
Points but he singled out the Russians as the major 
disruptive influence in the world:
The Russians, who come from a country 
which is much more asiatic than European, 
have adopted the old German ambitions, 
but with much surer methods, as a result 
both of their personal intimacy with the 
oriental soul and of the presence amongst 
them of educated and astute Muslims such 
as the Turco-MongoIs ... At the instigation 
of Berlin the men of Moscow are attempting 
to cause difficulties all over the world 
for both the British and the French.
In keeping with his country's interest in the Levant 
Andre went on to argue that as long as France held 
Syria, a barrier between East and West, then AOF was 
reasonably safe. However, the situation was com­
plicated in West Africa by the influence of 
Garveyism which, he claimed, the British in their 
anxiety to recruit African regiments with which to 
replace untrustworthy Hindus in India, were making 
little or no effort to stop. Both 'xenophobic 
Islam' and Garveyism had to be closely watched for 
both were 'possible means of political emancipation 
or resistance for Blacks against European supremacy'. 
Andre concluded by urging the French authorities in 
West Africa both to continue with the studies under­
taken by Marty and to create what he called
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'listening posts' at strategic places in AOF so 
that the administration should never be caught 
by a surprise attack from Islam - or any other 
anti-European force. A final consideration which 
Andre suggested was to vulgarise existing scientific 
studies of Islam and produce a handbook for all 
types of government agent. (1)
By now the themes of this report should seem familiar 
enough. Islam, such as it existed, was not a threat 
but care needed to be taken to prevent third parties 
from disturbing the present tranquility of relations 
between the French administration and their Muslim 
subjects. Andre also more than hinted that the 
administration would do well to employ him as an 
additional safeguard against Islamic unrest - yet 
another instance of how career-building and 
colonial policy-making were inextricably linked.
Andre was duly rewarded, and in March an 'Intelligence 
and Muslim Affairs Department' with Andre in charge, 
was attached to the Federal Political Affairs Office 
in Dakar. (2) Quite how this department differed
(1) ANS 19 G 5* Capt. P.J. Andre 'Rapport a M. le 
Gov.-Gen. de L'AQF ...' 5.1.1923.
(2) 'Arrete instituant a la Direction des Affaires 
politiques et administratives un service de 
Renseignement et des Affaires musulmans'
JQAOF 15.3.1923 pp. 241.2.
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from the Service des Affaires Musulmanes is 
difficult to say. Its brief was contained in 
Articles II and III of the arrete and was almost 
identical to that of its predecessor instituted 
in 1913 and reconfirmed as recently as July 1920.^
It is interesting to note also that the 'reorganisation' 
of the Service des Affaires Musulmanes coincided with a 
similarly obscure 'reorganisation' of the department 
which bore the same name in the Ministry of Colonies 
in Paris. In 1920 the ministerial Service des Affaires 
Musulmanes was the subject of a minor administrative 
reshuffle. In February 1923 its director was granted 
an annual supplement of 12,000 francs to his regular 
salary, a sign, perhaps, of the importance attached 
to the job. (2)
Eleven days after the arrete 'creating' the Service des 
Affaires Musulmanes in Dakar had been signed Andre 
reported to the Governor-General on the activities of 
the 'Service' in the first quarter of 1923. This 
long report rehearsed many of the points that Andre 
had made in January and included strongly-worded and
(1) 'Arrete constituant les services du Gov.-Gen.*
JQAOF 1.7.1920 p.391.
(2) 'Arrete ministeriel reorganisant le service special 
des Affaires musulmans' 1.8.1920 JQAOF 1920 p. 541; 
'Arrete accordant un supplement annuel au chef du 
service des Affaires musulmans au Ministere des 
Colonies' JQAOF 1923 p.150.
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even longer attack on the work of the 'germano- 
bolsheviks'. It was to counter such forces that 
the 'Service' had been created and Andre reported 
that since it had been inaugurated the 'Service' 
had investigated the Arab press received in AOF, 
British recruitment, Garveyism and pan-Islamism.
Andre said that he was not unduly worried by signs 
of a revival of mahdism across the border in Sokoto 
at the tomb of 'the great Toucouleur conqueror Othman 
Fodie' for like his predecessor Arnaud, Andre adopted 
a fatalistic attitude towards mahdism 'the endemic 
sickness of Islam, the boil which can burst anywhere 
at any time.' Later in the same report he argued 
that the prevalence of mahdism in AOF was a sign that 
Africans could lay as good claim as any others to be 
true Muslims. It is interesting to note Andre's 
ignorance of the ethnic origin of Usuman dan Fodio, 
one of the key figures in the development of Islam 
in West Africa, and this ignorance was typical of the 
cavalier attitude to detail which characterised much 
of his writing on Islam. Andre's preoccupation was 
rather with the world forces that had come into play 
since the war: 'The problem is a world one and in
Black Africa a drama is being enacted which is the 
same one that is being played out in the Ruhr and in 
the Orient'. The Service des Affaires Musulmanes,
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with its staff of a typist, an interpreter, an 
arabic writer and Andre himself all crammed into 
one office of the Direction des Affaires Politiques 
et Administratives, was a part of this world drama 
and its modest role, said Andre citing the decidedly 
unglamorous words of Gallieni, was 'to know which dog 
has urinated in which corner' . (1)
One of the first scenes of the world drama which Andre 
was called upon to investigate was, of course, the 
Porto-Novo affair. It will be recalled that Andre 
produced his report on the events in less than five 
days and in view of the speed with which the report 
was produced it is not surprising that Andre's 
analysis added little to the facts that were already 
known. Bearing in mind Andre's interest in world­
wide trends it is equally not surprising that he 
focussed on the international aspects of the Porto- 
Novo incidents:
It would not be exaggerated to hypothesise 
after studying the events of Porto-Novo 
that the propaganda which is delivered from 
Moscow via Paris and Ankara could well have 
completed the circle in Lower Dahomey.
We have just witnessed the Communists at 
work and from an Islamic point of view the 
following incident should be reported:
(1) ANS 19 G 26* Andre 'Rapport a M. le
Gov.-Gen. ...' 26.3.1923.
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thirteen kilometres east of Porto-Novo 
on the British frontier is the customs 
post of Meridjonou. The French 
brigadier there has reported that the 
native customs officer who has now 
moved to Ouidah pronounced the 
following prophecies: 'The whites
won't be commanding you much longer, 
arm yourselves, be patient and await 
the order that will come from Mecca.
Andre concluded:
Muslims tend to create a worldwide 
Islamic milieu and to form states 
within states. This accounts for 
the complexity of the Dahomean problem for 
besides the local rivalries ... the 
situation is such that any dissident move­
ment allies itself to worldwide movements.
We already have communism and pan-Islamism 
and now we have Africanism. Such questions 
go beyond Dahomey and even AOF. Local 
measures can be taken but they cannot 
prevent the continuation of outside 
propaganda. General decisions must be 
taken in the metropole to develop the sort 
of policies which are necessary to deal 
with the trouble that has arisen through­
out the world as a result of the Great 
War. (1)
It should be recognised that international forces 
were, of course, at play in Porto-Novo. The Somite 
Franco-Mu sulman', for example, showed itself able 
to mobilise political opinion in France, and to
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Andr6 'Rapport a M. le Gov.-Gen. ...'
10.4.1923.
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this extent Andre and other commentators were quite 
right to argue that the world was changing. However, 
it is impossible to avoid the conclusions that 
1Germano-Bolshevism', or whatever one chose to call 
the new world force, was also an excellent scapegoat, 
and it is particularly remarkable in the case of 
Dahomey how local causes of unrest were apparently 
never investigated although initially Sarraut, the 
Minister of Colonies, had thought that these were 
the main reasons for the unrest. (1)
In this tendency to prefer analyses of local unrest 
which laid the blame on international trouble-makers 
Andre and the other administrators involved in the 
Porto-Novo incidents were following a well-worn 
tradition that, of course, continues to this day.
A more interesting aspect of the Porto-Novo events 
was the way in which the Muslim community was 
divided so rigidly in French minds into two distinct 
camps: one, moderate and pro-French, the other
fanatical and anti-French. That the Muslim 
community of Porto-Novo was divided and that it had 
been divided for a considerable period of time 
there seems little doubt. But what were originally
(1) ANS 8 G 52 (23) Min. Ool. to Gov.-Gen. AOF
28.2.1923.
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fluid divisions and alliances had been frozen by 
French decisions consistently to support one group 
against the other. Given the complexity of 
Porto-Novoian politics as a whole and the wider 
political options available in Porto-Novo as a 
result of its proximity to the Nigerian border it 
is not surprising that the Mouteirou group acted 
in the way it did, for the French left them little 
choice. In the past internal rivalries in Porto-Novo 
appearedto have been resolved, however anarchically, 
by the alternating kingship but this mechanism was 
destroyed in the early colonial period when the 
de Hakpan line was repeatedly overlooked in favour 
of the de Messe candidates. Marty understood the 
nature of local politics better than most and his 
tolerance of the apparent pro-British tendencies of 
the Mouteirou group and his prescription of a policy 
of 1 live and let live1 as the only one likely to 
ensure a minimum of peace in what he admitted was a 
particularly intense rivalry are further signs of 
the maturity of his judgement and of his under­
standing of West African politics. It is a maturity 
and understanding that very clearly was not shared 
by Andre nor indeed by many others of his 
contemporaries. As we shall see in the next chapter 
the characteristic political calculation made by the
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French in their dealings with Islam was one of 
extreme simplicity: Muslims were either pro-French
or they were not.
Andre left Dahomey in April and crossed the border 
to Nigeria where he intended to investigate the way 
in which the British organised their intelligence 
service. He was not put off by acting Governor 
Cameron's assertion that the British had no such 
organisation; the British, he reported, employed 
a number of different officials varying from 
Residents to Touring Officers disguised as members 
of scientific and ethnological missions, to maintain 
an intelligence service that was 'infinitely supple'. 
Andre's visit coincided with increasing British concern 
about Mahdism in the North. Palmer, the Resident 
of Borno had discovered the existence of a Mahdist 
plot and had arrested a certain Mallam who was said 
to be in correspondence with Abdu Rahman, the son of 
the Sudanese Mahdi. A police tour of the region was 
sufficient to restore calm, and Andre was pleased to 
note that 'This time the English have acted the part 
of policeman in our favour'. (1)
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Andre 'Rapport a M. le Gov.-Gen. ...'
29.4.1923 & 8.5.1923.
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Andre1s mission continued back into AOF through 
Niger and Upper Volta. In Niger Andre reported 
that there was widespread expectation that the 
Mahdi would come three months after the close of 
Ramadan. The local Tijani and Qadiriyya were 
on the best of terms and equally enthusiastic about 
the imminent coming of the Mahdi. Andre went on 
to explain:
Let us note that in the east of AOF 
the Tidjania chiefs are the descendants 
of one of our strongest enemies, the 
peuhl Cheikh Oumar and that they have 
taken refuge in Nigeria, and that the 
Qadriya chiefs are equally the 
inheritors of the great peuhl 
conqueror Othman dan Fodie and have 
been dispossessed of their paternal 
empire by the English and the French.
It is therefore not in the least 
surprising that these inheritors of 
ancient bitterness are disposed to 
listen to bad and xenophobic advice. (1)
Although on this occasion Andre managed to get 
Usuman dan Fodio's ethnic origins correct he failed 
with the Tukolor el Hajj Umar Tall, here wrongly 
described as a Fulbe. But quite apart from such 
points of detail Andre's comments reveal an 
exceptional ignorance of basic facts of West African
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Andre 'Rapport a M. le Gov.-Gen. ...
sur les musulmans a la colonie du Niger' 26.5.1923.
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history. Whilst it was true that al Hajj Umar Tail's 
mid-nineteenth century empire was destroyed by the 
colonial intervention the same could not be said of 
the Sokoto caliphate of Usuman dan Fodio of which 
the basic administrative structure was preserved 
rather than destroyed by the British authorities.
The loyalty of the northern Emirs of northern Nigeria 
to the colonial authority has already been noted 
in the context of the Satiru revolt of 1906 and the 
situation was essentially the same in 1923. However, 
such matters were of no concern to Andre for by now 
he was hard on the trail of the Mahdi. On his way 
from Niamey to Bamako in June Andre summarised the 
situation:
The descendants of the Qadria Mahdi of 
Qmdurman is trying to reorganise the 
active and xenophobic party of his 
fathers. The British authorities have 
uncovered this attempt but the would-be 
Mahdi has tried and is still trying to 
win to his cause the descendants of the 
great conquering families of West Africa 
who have been dispossessed of their 
power by the English and the French. (1)
In Bobo Dioulasso in Upper Volta Andre claimed that 
Martin, the local commandant de cercle, had reported
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Andre 'Rapport a M. le Gov-Gen. ...'
16.6.1923.
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that Islamic agitation was one of the factors which, 
along with exposure to xenophobic propaganda in 
Europe, explained the restlessness of the 7,000 
anciens tirailleurs in the colony and which had 
resulted in massive exoduses to the Gold Coast. 
However, on reading this account of his conversation 
Martin was surprised to see these views imputed to 
him. He wrote to the Lt.-Governor of the colony 
to complain that he had been misrepresented.
Martin's version was that he had said that animism was 
a much more powerful influence than Islam amongst the 
anciens tirailleurs, of whom in any case there were 
only 4,000 and not 7,000 as Andre had claimed. 
Furthermore, Martin had made no reference to massive 
exoduses to the Gold Coast but instead had told Andre 
of more limited movements to the Ivory Coast, d)
If Martin is to be believed then these were major 
distortions on Andre's part and constitute a severe 
indictment of Andre's professional credibility. 
However, we have only Martin's word against Andre's 
and perhaps one should not attempt to make too much 
of the discrepancy between the two stories. Andre 
left Upper Volta with his usual recommendations for
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Admin. Martin to Lt. Gov. Haute-Volta
21.7.1923.
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organising an intelligence service and claimed 
(again how plausibly one cannot tell) that all the 
commandants de cercle were in favour of writing a 
monthly intelligence bulletin, d)
Following Andre's warnings about the likelihood of 
the appearance of a Mahdi the Governor of Niger 
instructed one of the colony's administrators,
M. Chatelain, to make an investigation. Chatelain 
spent several weeks in Nigeria and Niger trying to 
find further evidence of preparations for a Mahdist 
revolt. He reported that 'Neither the local 
commandants with whom I have been in touch nor the 
native chiefs who I have asked to make declarations, 
nor the English authorities in Katsina and Kano nor 
even myself have unearthed the slightest evidence 
of preparation for a revolt or the least symptom of 
unrest ... In all the regions through which I 
have travelled ... the population are absolutely 
calm.' Nor was Chatelain impressed with the accuracy 
of Andre's account of British attitudes towards Islam. 
He did not believe that 'the English authorities 
attach a special importance to Islamic affairs'.
(1) ANS 19 23* Andre 'Rapport a M. le Gov.-Gen. ...'
15.6.1923.
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Chatelain found no evidence of any military 
preparations in either Katsina or Kano to counter 
a Mahdist revolt and explained the reason for the 
British calmness:
It must be said that the large 
protectorates shelter the English 
from many surprises. The Emirs of 
the Muslim provinces would doubtless 
think twice before following commands 
given by anybody from the Orient ...
As for the possibility of a popular 
movement prepared without the knowledge 
of the sultans, it is unimagineable as 
through the actions of the twin police 
forces of the English authorities and 
the Emirs ... the slightest beginning 
of agitation would immediately be 
surprised, and without doubt repressed.(1)
Chatelain was able to back up his arguments with a 
much more thorough and detailed knowledge of local 
personalities than Andre had been capable of doing.
He showed that the Qmarien section of Sokoto led by 
Maradi, the grandson of el Hajj Umar and nephew of 
the Emir of Sokoto, had no interest in rebelling against 
either the British or the French, whatever these powers
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Chatelain, charg£ du service de
Renseignement au Niger 'Rapport a M. Le Lt.-Gov. 
Niger' 22.8.1923. In fairness to Andre it 
should be said though that many of the British, 
but especially Palmer, were worried by Mahdism 
at this time, see Letham & Tcmlinson files in 
Rhodes House.
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might have done to his forefathers.
Meanwhile Andre was coming to the end of his six 
month mission throughout AOF and Nigeria. Andrd 
concluded that apart from Mauritania (which he had 
not visited) AOF had lost its former 'creative 
faculty' in the matters of Islam and that now the 
main foyers of Islam were in British territories.
The British, he said, were very worried by 
''Qadirisme ... the brotherhood of the great 
toucouleur conqueror Othman dan Fodie' and had 
placed three companies of the Nigeria Regiment on 
stand-by to deal with any problems. Andre's 
thoroughly confusing discussion of the Tijaniyya 
moved rapidly to a survey of the 'Khelouatia' in 
Asia Minor and the Sudanese Sayeed Abd el Rahman el 
Mahdi. Andre urged particular vigilance in the 
ports of Dahomey, Gold Coast and Nigeria and hoped 
that the British and French would continue their 
willingness to co-operate 'against the common enemies 
of the Orient'.
(1) ANSOM AP 591/15 'Rapport en fin de mission du 
Capt. P.J. Andr£' 25.9.1923.
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However, the Governor-General1s confidence in Andre's 
ability was severely shaken by Chatelain's report on 
the situation in Nigeria and Niger. He sent a copy 
of the report to Paris along with a note of the 
conclusions he had drawn up:
Capt. Andre, whose competence I do not 
deny, envisages Muslim affairs under 
a rather special light. He has a 
tendency to consider the different 
manifestations of the Islamic doctrine 
in profoundly Muslim countries and then 
extend and generalise the effects that 
these might have. He seems to lose 
sight of the fact that in this part of 
Black Africa the religious question is 
not the same as in countries which for 
a long time have been entirely ruled 
by coranic law ... I would like to add 
that Capt. Andre appears to deny our 
administration any competence in these 
matters and I have had to disabuse him 
of this belief. We have very well informed 
administrators who have been familiar with 
Islam for a long time and who ... follow 
with vigilance the evolution of our 
subjects, their tendencies and their 
aspirations and who draw appropriate, 
practical and sensible conclusions from 
their judicious observations. (1)
The Minister of Colonies agreed that Chatelain was 
the more reliable judge of Islamic matters in AOF and 
that his report 'reduced to their just proportions 
incidents which Capt. Andre in his imperfect under­
standing of Islam in AOF has unconsciously exaggerated'.
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Gov.-Gen. AQF to Min. Col. 18.10.1923.
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However, the Minister warned that in the future the 
administration could not be so confident that Muslims 
in West Africa would be untouched by developments in 
the Arab world as in an era of better communications 
and improved educational standards contact within 
the Muslim community was bound to increase. (1)
All in all Andre did not emerge very favourably from 
his six month mission as he seems to have managed 
not only to discredit himself intellectually but also 
to have antagonised a large number of colonial 
administrators. His name disappears from the 
archives around this time but the reason for this was 
probably not so much that he had been retired in 
disgrace but rather that he was preparing his notes 
for a book that he published the following year, 
L'lslam noir; contribution a l 1etude des confreries 
religieuses islamiques en Afrique occidentale Paris 
(1923). That he was not entirely out of favour is 
suggested by the fact that Governor-General Carde 
agreed to write the preface for the book. The book 
itself rehearsed all the arguments that Andre had
(1) ANS 19 G 23* Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AQF 19.11.1923.
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made during his mission (and, incidentally, repeated 
his confusion about Usuman dan Fodio who appeared as 
a Fulbe on page 22 and as a Tukolor on page 23). 
Andre's most important argument concerned the growing 
internationalisation of Islam:
Muslim questions, like most other 
political and economic questions 
of the present time, cannot be 
followed within the narrow frame­
work of a colony, nor even a group 
of colonies. The growing 
importance of communications, 
increasing frequency of travel and 
the development of education are all 
abolishing the old frontiers. (1)
These were opinions which accorded will with the 
Minister of Colony's opinions expressed in his letter 
to Carde who, it seems from his preface to Andre's 
book, was also of a like mind. Andre's actual 
description of Islam Noir was divided into discussions 
of the various Sufi orders. The chapters were short 
and unremarkable with the exception of the chapter 
devoted to the Ahmadiyya, an order which originated 
from Pakistan and which had just started to gain 
a foothold in West Africa. (2) With fifteen pages
(1) Andre L'Islam noir p. 58
(2) see H. J. Fisher Ahmadiyyah: a study of
contemporary Islam on the West African 
Coast Oxford, 1963.
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it was the longest chapter in the book even though 
by any account the order itself was probably the 
least typical form of Islam in West Africa. It was 
of interest to Andre, however, because having 
arrived on the West African coast with Indian 
traders it epitomised the new internationalism of 
Islam. It was a brotherhood of the sea-routes par 
excellence, and Andre believed it was a sign of things 
to come. Furthermore, the order's origins in the 
Indian sub-continent gave Andre an excuse to 
introduce Gandhi, Indian nationalism and the Non- 
Cooperation Movement into his discussion of African 
Islam. (1)
(1) The AOF administration was itself interested in 
Indian nationalism. See ANSCM AP 518/19 
Gov.-Gen. p.i. AGF to Min. Col. 10.8.1922 
enclosing a copy of a Hindu newspaper which 
had been intercepted but which no-one in 
Dakar was capable of translating. The 
Gov.-Gen. was worried by the fact that 'the 
name of the agitator Gandhi' appeared several 
times in the paper which suggested that it was 
'an Indian nationalist pamphlet'. Min. Col. 
replied (n.d.) that the paper was merely 
a ccnmercial Sunday supplement of a local 
Indian paper and that it was entirely 
apolitical.
i
I
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With the publication of L 1Islam noir Andre ended 
his brief encounter with West African Islam. His 
departure from West Africa seems as mysterious as 
his arrival but it appears that he went on to have 
a successful military career, rising to the rank 
of General. It is interesting to see in 1952 that 
he was still publishing works on global studies of 
Islam in a changing world. (1) His failure to 
come to grips with West African Islam does not seem 
to have done his career any harm at all.
(1) Gen. P.J. Andre & Gen. J. Buhrer 
Ce que devient 1' Islam devant le 
monde modeme Paris, 1952.
I have been unable to trace Andre's 
records in the military archives at 
Vincennes.
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CHAPTER NINE: THE FRENCH STAKE IN ISLAM
Andre does not appear to have had any successor as 
advisor on Islamic affairs to the Governor-General 
until 1943 when Henri Martin, the first of a 
succession of CHEAM graduates was appointed to the 
newly created 'Bureau des Affaires Musulmanes' in 
Dakar. (1) Indeed, on the whole the French 
administration in Dakar during the 'twenties and 
'thirties saw less cause for alarm in Islam than 
they had done in previous eras. The same could not 
be said of the Colonial Ministry in Paris which 
watched events in the Middle East with considerable 
apprehension. The optimism of Paris' hopes for an 
alliance with Turkey soon gave way to traditional 
fears about nationalism. In October 1924 the 
Colonial Minister wrote to the Governor-General, 
Carde, in Dakar with a warning about nationalism 
in the Middle East:
(1) ANS 19 G 1* has details of various appointments. 
Martin's colleagues included Lt. Riehl, Capt. 
Rocaboy, Lt. Aune, Carmt. Borricand, Destaing 
and Michelangeli.
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The Muslim world such as it has appeared 
throughout the centuries with its rigid 
fanaticism, its theocratic basis, its 
explosion of Mahdism, its cult of saints 
and the influence of religious 
congregations seems to be wanting hence­
forward to evolve towards new destinies 
under the impulsion of a superficially 
secular ruling class.
The leaders of the neo-nationalism have 
perfected the theory of pan-Islamism. 
They have used it to give a sense of 
direction to the vaguely formulated 
wishes for a renaissance in Islam as 
a reaction against western domination.
| He reminded Carde that the first ever meeting of
I Muslim delegates from all over the world was to take
place in March to discuss the Caliphate. He noted 
that although 'the conservatism of our African 
subjects keeps them outside the neo-Muslim movement' 
nonetheless the French could not be confident that 
this would always be true and he urged Carde to 
organise a central intelligence service. Carde
I copied the Minister's letter to the colonies of AOF,
I
all of whom replied that there was no cause for
!
| alarm but promised to make immediate enquiries,
I
| (1) ANS 19 G 26* Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 17.10.24;
i Gov.-Gen. AGF to colonies 10.11.24; Lt. Gov.
! Senegal to Gov.-Gen. AOF 20.11.24; Lt. Gov.
Soudan to Gov.-Gen. AOF 25,11.24; Lt. Gov. Guinee 
to Gov.-Gen. AOF 4.12.24; Lt. Gov. Cote d'Ivoire 
to Gov.-Gen. AOF 8.12.24; Lt. Gov. H, Volta to 
Gov.-Gen. ACF 5.12.24; Lt. Gov. Niger to 
Gov.-Gen. AOF 14.1.25.
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Nonetheless Carde insisted again on the importance 
of keeping influential marabouts and Arab traders 
under surveillance. (1) In February 1925 the 
Colonial Minister asked Carde whether or not AOF 
should send official delegates to take part in the 
elections for a new Caliph but Carde replied, 
predictably, that there was no point in this 
suggestion as Muslims in AOF were not interested 
in the election. However, Muslims were free to 
go privately if they so wished. (2) This sort 
of correspondence between Paris, Dakar and the 
colonies of AOF falls into a common pattern, and 
for all the talk of 'neo-nationalist' and 'neo- 
Islam' it was really no different to the 
correspondence during the war about the wisdom of 
sending African delegates to the Interministerial 
Commission on Muslim Affairs. (3)
(1) ANS 19 G 22 Gov-Gen. ACF to colonies 13.1.25
(2) ANS 19 G.22 Gov-Gen. ACF to Min. Col. Feb 25.
(3) See above chapter 7.
545
Although fears of nationalism were genuine and, as 
the Porto-Novo incidents and Andrefs career 
demonstrate, a source of considerable anxiety to 
the French administration in Dakar, one should not 
exaggerate. For throughout the years covered in 
this thesis fears about the development of Islam 
in the Middle East were always counterbalanced by 
the belief in the innate docility of Africans, 
Indeed, so confident were the French in the loyalty 
of African Muslims that the tirailleurs senegalais 
were specifically recommended as the best troops to 
use in other Muslim countries. A report dated 
January 1923 stated that:
As a result of their numbers and their 
bravery the Blacks constitute for France an 
admirable reserve of men who should be used 
without limit, without restrictions and 
without reservation. The Algero-Tunisians 
and the Moroccans being Muslims must always 
be treated with caution ... The use of 
Blacks is for us a means of gaining respect 
in the Muslim world by the show of 
disciplined and loyal force ... The 
Senegalese [are not fanatics ] ... and are 
the best elements for use in any colonial 
expedition to Muslim countries. (1)
(1) IF Terrier 5917 'Rapport presente par le 
Gen. Aubert au ccmit£ consultatif de 
defense des colonies sur la propagande 
musulmane dans les troupes indigenes' 
Jan. 1923.
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However, by the late 'twenties the French had 
progressed from complacency towards an active 
realisation that they had acquired a considerable 
stake in Islam in AOF, a stake which was both 
economic and political and which was so important 
that it had to be carefully protected. It is 
difficult to precisely date the realisation of 
the existence of this community of interest between 
the French and the Sufi brotherhoods (for that was 
where the French stake was invested) but it became 
most obvious at the deaths of such people as 
el Hajj Malick Sy, Cheikh Sidia and Amadu Bamba.
For their deaths gave the French the chance to 
try and fragment their respective followings and 
divide the various Sufi orders into their component 
parts. However, the reverse of this policy was 
followed and the 'twenties and 'thirties witnessed 
instead an unprecedented degree of French 
intervention in the internal affairs of the Sufi 
orders in order to maintain a strong and unified 
command. This chapter is concerned with French 
relations with the Mourides and Tijaniyya in an 
attempt to show how exactly the French went about 
protecting their stake in Islam,
- o 0 o -
547
The doubts held by the French at the start of the 
war about Muslim loyalty were, as we have seen, 
soon dispelled. Attitudes towards the Mourides 
in particular were transformed, and the 1920s 
saw the start of the symbiotic relationship between 
the state and the Mouride brotherhood that has 
survived by and large to this day. The 'Rapport 
politique' for Senegal in 1925 noted that the 
deference of all the religious leaders towards the 
state continued and commented on Cheikh Amadu Bamba1s 
request for permission to build a mosque in Touba:
Monsieur, the Administrator of Baol ... has 
pointed out that this construction project ... 
will help to attract and to fix a large 
number of natives in the region of Touba whose 
commerce and agriculture is just beginning 
to grow but whose population is insufficient. 
As a result of their work habits which are 
encouraged in the talibes by the Mouride 
cheikhs [ these natives ] will contribute to 
the economic development of this part of 
Diourbel. (1)
Permission to build the mosque was duly given at the 
end of April 1926. Around this time Amadu Bamba
(1) ANSQM AP 598/2 'Rapport politique' Senegal: 1926.
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contributed 500,000 francs to a fund designed to 
help stabilise the French franc. This was a huge 
amount of money for an individual African and 
amounted to a quarter of what the whole of the 
Senegalese colony had been asked (but refused) 
to donate as a 'voluntary contribution1. (1)
The economic potential of the Mourides was by now 
far too tempting for the French. The 'Rapport 
politique' of 1926 acknowledged Bamba's contribution 
of 500,000 francs and continued:
Although it is possible to regret the fact 
that we have allowed this Mouride power 
to establish itself because it might one 
day be a source of difficulties, it must 
be admitted that from an economic view 
the action of the Mourides has contributed 
enormously to the so marked development 
of agricultural production in the region 
of Baol. This beneficial action is clearly 
a serious counterbalance to the possibility 
of future difficulties. (2)
(1) In June 1926 the 'conseil colonial' debated 
the suggestion that Senegal should make this 
contribution but rejected it partly because 
it was felt that Senegalese individuals such 
as Amadu Bamba had already made substantial 
contributions. See ANS 4 E 17 (135) 'proces- 
verbal du seance du Conseil Colonial'
12.6.26. I owe this reference to
Jim Searing (Princeton).
(2) ANS 19 G 1* 'Extrait du Rapport politique, 
Senegal: 1926',
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By this time it was clear that Amadu Bamba did not 
have long to live and that there would be several 
possible contenders for his successor. The French 
believed that they had to decide between a policy 
of encouraging divisions within the brotherhood and 
of choosing a successor of whose loyalty they could 
be confident and who could be expected to maintain 
'all the members of the brotherhood in the strictest 
discipline towards our authority', ^
They chose the second policy, and Amadu Bamba's 
eldest son, Mamadou Moustapha M'Backe, became the 
Khalife of the Mourides. The French backed him 
heavily against challenges to his leadership. With 
over one hundred files on Mouride marabouts in a 
special Mouride dossier (2) the French were 
particularly well-informed about the brotherhood 
and felt very confident about intervening in its 
political struggles. In his annual report for 
1928 the Lt.-Governor of Senegal stressed the 
importance of this fact and contrasted it with the 
lack of knowledge and understanding of the animist 
societies of Senegal:
(1) Ibid
(2) See ANS 4 E 3 for these files.
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The influence of the chiefs of the Mouride 
sect is characterised by the fact that it 
is exercised in the open and in accordance 
with the representatives of the 
Administration. The same is not true of 
the fetishists about whom we know nothing 
at all - neither about their rites and 
customs nor about their chiefs - for with 
a few rare exceptions the fetish priest 
has nothing in common with the village or 
canton chief. And it is because we have 
never been able to identify the true 
leaders of men and thus penetrate the 
mysteries of the different sects that 
in Casamance we have never touched the 
soul of the Diolas, Floups and Balantes 
who are as foreign to us now as they were 
when we first met them. (1)
Although the Mourides were probably the closest 
observed of all the various groupings in AOF, the 
same contrast between French knowledge of Muslim 
societies and ignorance of animist societies 
applied elsewhere. It was a contrast that applied 
in the days of Faidherbe and it is interesting to 
see it being restated here as late as 1928.
The most serious challenge to Mamadou Moustapha 
M'Backe's leadership came from Cheikh Anta. 
Cheikh Anta had been discounted by the French as 
a possible successor to Amadu Bamba because it 
was felt that he was too much of a modern
(1) ANSQM AP 598/3 'Rapport politique' Senegal: 1928.
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businessman to be trusted. Relations between 
Anta and the French worsened in the late 'twenties. 
By July 1929 oppostion to Cheikh Anta was a clearly- 
stated policy: Governor-General Carde whilst on
leave in Paris heard that the commandant de cercle 
of Diourbel had given permission to Cheikh Anta 
to keep a piece of land which he had seized 
illegally. Carde wrote to his interim that he 
would be furious if this story was true - 'I have 
a policy and nobody ... has the right not to 
follow it exactly. I forbid anybody to grant 
Cheikh Anta who is my avowed enemy a concession 
of land which he intends to use for speculation.'
The Lt.-Governor of Senegal immediately instigated 
an investigation into the behaviour of the 
commandant of Diourbel from which it emerged that 
the commandant, faithful to Carde1s policy, was 
doing all in his power to obstruct Cheikh Anta.
He believed that the stories that had reached 
Carde had been spread by Cheikh Anta himself in 
order to discredit the new administration.
Cheikh Anta was reported to be attempting to 
extricate himself from an obligation to pay 
1.2 million francs towards the construction of the 
new mosque in Touba. M  In February 1930 he was
(1) ANS 13 G 12 (17) Carde 'Note pour m. le Gov.-Gen.
p.i. ACF' 23.7.29.
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arrested and imprisoned for infringing emigration 
regulations on a recent trip to Gambia (1) and he 
was kept under surveillance outside Senegal for 
the next three years. In July 1932 a M. Cruel, 
a school-teacher in Aix-en-Provence and whose link 
with Cheikh Anta is not clear in the sources, 
approached the Minister of Colonies asking for 
Cheikh Anta's release. The authorities in Dakar 
were, however, adamant in their opposition to such 
a move. The Service de Surete in Dakar discovered 
that Cruel's action was merely the first part in 
an orchestrated campaign (by• unnamed anti-colonial 
pressure groups) in France and in Senegal and 
alerted the Governor of Senegal who took steps to 
ensure that circulars and petitions on behalf of 
Cheikh Anta in the metropole did not reach the 
colonies. (2) in July 1933 the administration in 
Dakar still insisted that Cheikh Anta should not 
be allowed to return to Senegal. Groundnut prices 
had fallen sharply between 1931 and 1932 and this 
had resulted in a drastic cutback in production 
so that exports standing at 450,000 tonnes in
(1) ANS 13 G 12 (17) 'Rapport sur 1'incident de 
Diourbel: Affaire Cheikh Anta M'Backe'
14.2.30; see also ANSQM AP 598/3 'Rapport 
politique' Senegal: 1930.
(2) ANS 21 G 48 (17) 'Note au sujet de 1'affaire 
Cheikh Anta' ^pril 1933.
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1931 had sunk to 190,000 in 1932. The 
administration, acutely aware of Senegal's total 
dependence on groundnuts, were anxious to increase 
production to nearer 500,000 tonnes and in order 
to do this, in the face of understandable peasant 
scepticism about the point of growing groundnuts at 
all, the administration was dependent on the 
co-operation of the Mouride leadership. To allow 
Cheikh Anta back to Senegal would risk alienating 
Mamadou Moustapha 'whose help' it was noted 
in July 1933 'is assured and which in the present 
circumstances is indispensable'. (1)
Another component in the complex relationships 
between Mamadou M'Backe, his uncle Cheikh Anta and 
the state was the political allegiance of the two 
Mouride protagonists. The Khalife backed, and 
was in turn backed by, Blaise Diagne whose arch 
rival, Galandou Diouf, had close links with 
Cheikh Anta. The release of Cheikh Anta did not 
come until Galandou Diouf was elected as Deputy 
for Senegal. The intrigue, corruption and
(1) ANS 13 G 12 (17) 'Note' 28.7.1933.
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vigour of Senegalese political life - which makes 
it read like an episode of Trollope in the tropics - 
has been fully chronicled by others (1) and little 
can be added to this story here. In 1939 
Mamadou Moustapha M'Backe patched up his quarrel 
with Cheikh Anta. A special celebration was 
organised in Darou Mousty to which the Khalife 
travelled in a convoy of four cars. Cheikh Anta, 
for his part, travelled in a car that had been sold 
to him by Galandou Diouf for 45,000 francs (2) - 
another small illustration of the interplay between 
politics, religion and commerce that has made 
Senegal a favoured hunting ground for political 
scientists!
It was not just the politicians who were attracted 
to the Mourides' money. In 1926 the funds 
available for the construction of the new mosque in 
Touba ran to several million francs. (3) However,
within months much of this money had found its way
(1) Notably Donal Cruise O'Brien The Mpurides of Senegal 
Oxford, 1971 Saints and Politicians Cambridge, 1975 
and Christian Coulon Le Marabout et le Prince Paris, 
1982.
(2) ANS 21 G 143 (108) 'Renseignements' 27.2.1939.
(3) ANS 19 G 1* 'Extrait du Rapport politique'
S^ndgal: 1926.
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into other people's pockets, principally those of 
M. Tallerie, the administrator of Thies who had been 
charged with supervising the financing of the mosque. 
According to Balia M'Backe's bank statements 
916,529 francs were paid into Tallerie's account 
between the end of August 1926 and the beginning of 
February 1927. M. Brumauld, another French official 
received 153,500 francs and on Tallerie's instructions 
Galandou Diouf yas paid 70,000 francs. (1) The 
embezzlement was soon discovered, and the subsequent 
investigation showed that Tallerie had been tempted 
as a result of the illness of his wife in Senegal.
He had intended to make a quick fortune out of the 
Mourides and then to return to France with his wife. 
Brumauld claimed that he had been tricked by Tallerie 
who had said that the authorities had approved all 
the payments. (2) This incident was another 
illustration of the extent to which the Mourides 
had imposed themselves on the Senegalese political 
scene.
(1) The bank statements are filed in ANS 13 G 12 (17)
(2) ANS 13 G 12 (17) M. Spitz, 'Directeur du Cabinet 
du Gov.-Gen. AOF, to Gov. -Gen. AOF 24.7.27;
Brumauld to Tallerie 25.7.27.
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The relationships which tied them to their peasant 
constituency, to the Senegalese urban elite and to 
the colonial state were now of such complexity that 
French perceptions of the tariga had increasingly 
little to do with religion. In January 1930 the 
commandant de cercle of Baol noted approvingly 
that since Amadu Bamba's death 'the general spirit 
of the sect is becoming less mystical, less fanatical 
and the sect is slowly but surely developing into a 
mutual aid religious association with economic 
aims'. As far as the French were concerned the 
commandant argued that the tariga was 'a considerable 
economic force which the Administration should use 
to spread new forms of cultivation and to develop 
the southern part of Djolloff and the north of 
Sine-Saloum'. (1) The French countenanced what has
been described as 'le grand rush Mouride' to new 
lands in the interior. (2) The expansion of Mouride 
cultivation (concentrated mainly in the two periods 
1934-7 and 1942-5) brought them into conflict with 
the Fulbe who lived in the areas claimed by the 
Mourides, and fights were common. Although the
(1) ANS 4 E 3* 'Note' canmt. cercle Baol 20.1.30.
(2) Lt Nekkach 'Le Mouridisme depuis 1912' (typescript) 
St Louis, 1952 to be found in IFAN Monteil 1. This 
is a very useful study.
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administration deplored, and sometimes punished 
the violence, no action was taken to prevent the 
displacement of the Fulbe. For example, in 
June 1936 a fight occurred between Mourides and 
Fulbe over some land which the Fulbe were 
cultivating. The Mourides were held responsible 
for causing the violence, their action was 
immediately disowned by Mamadou Moustapha M'Backe 
and their local leader was imprisoned for two 
months. However, their legal right to cultivate 
the land was upheld. (1)
Some doubts were raised about the degree of French 
support for and reliance upon the Mourides, but 
even dissenters agreed that in practice the French 
had little choice. (2) On the whole the 
administration was confident that its close 
relationship with the Mouride leadership was 
sufficient to ensure that French interests would 
not be overlooked. A CHEAM monograph, written in
(1) ANS 13 G 19 (17) Lt. Gov. p.i. Senegal to 
Gov.-Gen. AOF 20.7.1936.
(2) See, for example, Jean de Belvert 'L'Exode d'une 
race' Outre-Mer 1937, pp. 331-8. De Belvert 
admitted that the rights of the Fulbe vrould have 
to be overlooked in the interests of following 
'a realistic and unsentimental policy' in 
Senegal.
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1948 but based on the author's experiences in 
Senegal between 1936 and 1938, suggests that some 
of the administrators also believed in certain 
positive virtues of the brotherhood. Capt. Chansard 
recalled that:
One felt that there existed among the 
Mourides a solid organisation, which 
was accepted by all, a well-defined 
hierarchy and obedience to orders 
given by both religious and 
administrative chiefs, and an ardour 
for labour which one seldom came 
across elsewhere. In the villages the 
Mouride "squares" were distinguished by 
their cleanliness, their prettiness even, 
with their yards and borders swept and tidy, 
their well-maintained and carefully 
cultivated fields.
At the time of assemblies the men led by 
their chiefs presented themselves in an 
orderly and silent fashion, disciplined, 
correcte, robust in their appearance and 
having in no way the appearance of people 
reduced to servitude, on the contrary 
they showed a certain pride. They were 
clean and adequately dressed. The same was 
not true of the Serers and in certain 
other villages where there were no 
Mourides. (1)
These virtues of order and discipline, which 
recommended themselves so strongly to the intensely 
hierarchical structure of colonial administration, 
were the ones that the French had always been looking
(1) Capt. Chansard 'Les Mourides du Senegal' CHEAM (R) 
no. 1301, 1948.
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for in the Sufi brotherhoods of sub-Saharan Africa. 
They were the same virtues that Coppolani had 
argued would make the task of administering Muslim 
territories so simple but which, as we have seen, 
in practice often proved illusory. In this respect 
the history of French relations with the Mourides 
represented an undoubted success story for an 
Islamic policy a la Coppolani. But the Mourides 
were a special case.
French relations with the Tijaniyya, a tariga whose 
following, unlike that of the Mourides, was spread 
throughout West and, of course, North Africa were 
rather more complex. It will be recalled that the 
French conflict with al Hajj Umar Tall in the 
mid-nineteenth century had left the French with a 
firm belief in the fanatical and militant nature of 
Tijani doctrine. This was generally contrasted 
with the tolerant and peaceful nature of the 
Qadriyya. (1) However, in the early twentieth 
century the French stereotypes of the Tijaniyya had 
been substantially revised, mainly because of the 
excellent relations between the French and
(1) See above chapter 3
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el Hajj Malick Sy, the leading Tijani marabout 
in Senegal. The most dramatic example in the 
change in Franco-Tijani relations emerged in 
the interwar years in the person of Seydou Nourou 
Tall, the grandson of al Hajj 'Umar Tall.
After the French conquest of the Futa Toro the 
leadership of the Umarian Tijaniyya was divided 
in its response to the French. Some moved east 
to Sokoto and beyond in order to escape from the 
French completely, and others stayed. Of those 
who stayed some - notably al Hajj 'Umar's son,
Aguibu - allied themselves with the colonial 
power whilst others retreated into a reclusive 
life of contemplation.(1) It was in these years 
that Seydou Nourou Tall grew up. He received a 
traditional education studying with Tijani 
marabouts in Khayes, Boghe and, finally, St Louis.^) 
In St Louis he established close relations with 
el Hajj Malick Sy, cementing the relationship by 
marrying one of Malick Sy's daughters. From an
(1) See Brenner Vfest African Sufi chs 1-2 for a good 
suirmary of Tijani reaction to French conquest.
(2) These biographical details taken from 0. Kane and 
S.M. Cissoko 'Une grande figure africaine: Tiemo 
Seydou Nourou Tali' Afrique Histolre (2) April- 
June, 1981.
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early stage it seems that Seydou Nourou Tall 
followed his father-in-law's example of cultivating 
friendly relations with the French. However, he 
does not initially appear to have met with much 
success. Marty, for example, dismissed him as 
someone who 'exercises absolutely no influence in 
Senegal and who tries through his tours and journeys 
to give his baraka sufficient prestige to allow him 
to live comfortably'.(1) During the war Seydou 
Nourou Tall joined the army and returned an officer.
His career did not take off properly until the death 
of el Hajj Malick Sy in 1922. It was in this year 
that the French administration began to use him as 
an ambassador of French civilisation and international 
trouble-shooter. The transformation of the nonentity 
described by Marty into one of the most important 
figures in West Africa was a dramatic one. More 
research is needed before we can know exactly how 
this transformation came about. The archival 
sources, such as they are, are not very helpful.
A collection of documents in the Federal archives in 
Dakar nonetheless provides an interesting testimony
(1) Marty L'Islam en Mauritanie et au Senegal p.357.
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both to the wide-ranging nature of Seydou Nourou 
Tail's tasks and the extent of French appreciation 
of his work. In 1938 de Coppet, the Governor- 
General, arranged for a collection of several 
hundred letters and reports about Seydou Nourou 
Tall written by various administrators between 
1923 and 1938 to be retyped and bound together in 
book-form and offered to the grand marabout as a 
present. Without exception the reports and 
letters sung the highest praise of this loyal servant 
of the French. The collection contains letters from 
all over AOF and even some parts of AEF praising 
Seydou Nourou Tall for actions which ranged from 
encouraging cultivation of cash crops and higher 
standards of personal hygiene to adjudicating in 
local disputes and urging loyalty to France. The 
essence of French satisfaction was summed up by the 
Governor of Mauritania, Brunot, in 1935:
It is moving to think that the grandson 
of the greatest of our enemies is the 
greatest of our friends. When I told 
him that my father, under Faidherbe, 
had taken part in all the battles against 
his grandfather his face lit up with joy, 
doubtless at the thought of the great work 
that we have achieved in this our common 
country. (1)
(1) ANS 19 G 43* 'L'Oeuvre de Seydou Nourou 
Tall en Afrique franchise', typescript.
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The collection is indeed a remarkable one. The 
itinerary of Seydou Nourou Tall that it reveals was 
an exhausting one that must have made him the best 
travelled man - French or African - in West Africa.
The fact that he was frequently sent on missions to 
non-Muslim countries did not escape criticism.
M. Cau, for example, an administrator in Senegal 
for ten years drew up some notes for use in training 
administrators on Islam in Senegal in which he argued 
that the Dakar authorities had made excessive use of 
Seydou Nourou Tall and that by sending him to non- 
Muslim countries they were encouraging the spread of 
Islam. (1) However, the symbolism of al Hajj 'Umar's
grandson appearing as the most enthusiastic of French 
supporters was understandably too tempting for the 
French. What Frenchman could have resisted giving 
as wide publicity as possible to an African who could 
outdo the French themselves in his awareness of the 
glory of the civilising mission? On Bastille Day 
1939 Seydou Nourou Tall broadcast to the whole of 
AOF:
(1) M. Cau 'L'Islam au S&ndgal1 CHEAM (R) no. 949 
1945.
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Today is the opportunity for we overseas 
Frenchmen to affirm our attachment to the 
mother-country which unceasingly introduces 
more happiness and well-being among its 
coloured children. The French Republic 
which has won its liberty and brought 
it to the rest of the world has liberated 
ourselves from disease, poverty, servitude 
and cruel traditions which prevented Black 
Africa from flourishing ...
My ancestors fought against France and as a 
child I followed them until the day I 
realised that France not only came to the 
native with her hand held out in friendship 
but that she also knew how to bend over 
towards him, not to exploit him but to 
comfort him and make him aware of his 
dignity as a man, respectful of his 
legitimate traditions and beliefs ... 
Whatever the circumstances, France, our 
country, will find African populations 
prepared for all eventualities even to the 
supreme sacrifice. (1)
Seydou Nourou Tall cannot be dismissed as an 
unthinking stooge of the French. In terms of Islamic 
doctrine his response to colonial rule was a perfectly 
acceptable position which had already been taken by 
many other Muslim leaders in colonised countries. 
However, it was by no means the only possible response 
and other Tijani marabouts adopted a different 
strategy. Of the alternative strategies open to all 
Muslims the possibility of withdrawing from political
(1) ANS 17 G 260 (108) 'Message radiodiffus£ en AQF'
14.7.1939.
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life altogether and attempting to restrict contact 
with the colonising power to a minimum was more 
common than outright hostility. However, such a 
strategy was not an easy one to pursue successfully 
as the career of Cheikh Hamallah, a Tijani marabout 
from Nioro illustrates. Cheikh Hamallah was one 
of the most controversial figures in West Africa 
between the wars, and over the years the facts of 
his life have been obscured behind the slurs and 
myths of both his detractors and his followers. 
Recent scholarship has done much, however, to 
uncover the reality. (D
Cheikh Hamallah was born in 1886 of a Moorish father 
and a Fulbe mother. In the course of his education 
he acquired a reputation for learning and pietism. 
The environment in which he grew up was a tense one 
in which the French having successfully destroyed 
the Umarian hegemony were unable to replace it with
(1) A. Traore 'Contribution a l'etude de 1'Islam: 
le mouvement Tijanien de cheikh Hama houllah1 
These de 3eme cycle, Dakar, 1975 (now published);
L. Brenner West African Sufi pp. 45-59. The 
following paragraph is based largely on these 
two sources and also Marty L* Islam et les tribus 
du Soudan t.IV Paris, 1920. Pt. Ill 'Le Sahel 
de Nioro'.
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a comparable power. The fragmented Tijani leader­
ship was incapable of preventing the recently 
Islamicised Bambara of the region around Nioro from 
reverting to their traditional religious beliefs. 
Nevertheless, Nioro remained one of the principal 
Islamic centres of West Africa. Marty described it 
as 'the boulevard of African Islam in the region of 
Upper Senegal' and ranked it with Djenn6 and 
Timbuktu in terms of the vigour of Islamic life and 
the influence through the network of Dyula merchants 
that it had on surrounding areas. (1)
Around the turn of the century an Algerian Tijani 
marabout called al-Akhdar appeared in Nioro.
According to the Hamallist versions he had been sent 
by the caliph of the Tlemcen zawiya in Algeria to 
identify a successor as caliph who would also be 
capable of reviving the Tijaniyya south of the 
Sahara. Cheikh Hamallah, it was claimed, was the 
person revealed to him through a number of esoteric 
signs as being the person who had been chosen to lead 
the Tijaniyya. This version, however, is contested
(1) Marty Soudan IV pp. 210-11. He also wrote:
'Nioro est a mon sens le pole de 1'Islam 
soudanais'.
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by other Tij ani leaders who do not recognise the 
validity of al-Akhdar's mission and who consequently 
reject the claim of Hamallah's followers that 
Hamallah was the caliph of the Tijaniyya. (1)
What is clear is that al-Akhdar preached a purified 
form of Tijani doctrine whose most distinctive 
feature, though scarcely the most important, was 
the practice of repeating one of the Tijani prayers 
known as 'The Jewel of Perfection' eleven times 
instead of the usual twelve. Cheikh Hamallah 
adopted the practice of repeating the prayer eleven 
times, and as a result of this all his followers 
were frequently referred to in the colonial 
literature as 'Tidjania onze grains' (after the 
number of prayer beads on the Muslim rosary) as 
opposed to the supposedly orthodox 'Tidjania douze 
grains'. The awe with which the authorities were 
to view the practice of repeating the prayer eleven 
times was in many respects every bit as superstitious 
and mysterious as the respect of the West African 
Muslim for the esoteric sciences of his maraboutI
(1) Brenner West African Sufi pp. 47-50 provides 
the best summary of these versions.
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By 1910 Cheikh Hamallah had begun to attract a 
significant following. At the same time local 
Tijani leaders became increasingly suspicious and 
fearful of Hamallah's growing reputation and, in an 
atmosphere marked by a serious drought in 1913, 
relations between Hamallah - or more particularly 
his followers - on the one hand and the old guard 
of the Tijani leadership on the other, were tense.(1) 
Nonetheless there is little indication that at this 
stage the French were unduly concerned by Hamallah. 
Marty's account published in 1920 recognised the 
importance of Cheikh Hamallah but it did not suggest 
that he was a danger:
[He] is the most curious figure in Nioro 
and one of the leading Muslim personalities 
of the Sahelian-Moorish borders. At the 
moment he is no more than a bubbling spring 
but a spring which one can see from the 
growing force of its current, the virtue 
which everybody attributes to its waters 
and the convergence of neighbouring streams, 
will become a great river. (2)
This picturesque metaphor hardly suggests the extreme 
hostility with which Hamallah was later to be 
regarded. Marty continued:
(1) Traor^ 'Contribution' pp. 18-52
(2) Marty Soudan IV p. 218.
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i
I
i
!
| Cheikh Hamallah is above all a mystic and
j it is upon this that his reputation is
based ... His attitude to us is correct 
but reserved and he only comes to the 
; office of the cercle if he is formally
called to do so. It seems that with a 
bit of skill we could co-opt him very 
! quickly. (1)i
iI
!
! Marty noted that his influence was already very
| great with the Moors of Nioro (not only with the
clerical groups but also with Hassanic groups such
|
as the Awlad Nacer) and that he also had some Moorish
I
| followers in the region of Kayes and some Soninke
followers in villages some way away from Nioro.
Marty acknowledged that Hamallah had some powerful 
local enemies but stressed that he had not got 
involved in any of the various intrigues caused by 
this emnity. Finally, Marty was pleased to note 
that the Moors who were in his obedience were the 
ones who were 'the most docile to our orders'. (2)
However, not for the first time Marty's balanced and 
perceptive judgement was ignored and within five 
years of the publication of Marty's report Hamallah 
had been transformed in French eyes into a sinister
(1) Ibid p. 220
(2) Ibid p. 222
fanatic: the 'bubbling spring water' had been
badly poisoned. This transformation can in part 
be explained by the death of al Hajj Malick Sy in
1922 which removed a moderating influence from the 
authorities in Dakar. (1) But the major factor 
appears to have been the accusation that Hamallah 
was implicated in a series of violent disputes in
1923 and 1924. The violence was investigated by 
a French administrator, Descemet, and it was his 
report which more than anything else seems to have 
sealed Hamallah*s fate. It is interesting to note 
that as late as May 1925 the Governor of Soudan, 
Brevie, made no mention of Hamallah's supposed role 
in the violence of the previous two years. In his 
report to the Governor-General on the state of Islam 
in the colony Brevie simply noted that,
In Nioro, a marabout, Cherif Hamala, 
living as an ascetic and distributing 
almost all of the numerous presents 
which are given to him as alms, is 
trying to regroup the Tidjania and is 
using the eleven bead rosary as the 
rallying signs. (2)
(1) Brenner stresses the importance of Malick 
Sy's death West African Sufi p. 54.
(2) ANS 19 G 26* Lt. Gov. Soudan to Gov.-Gen.
AOF 11.5.1925.
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Yet by the end of the year Hamallah had been arrested 
and sentenced to ten years exile in Mauritania.
Alioune Traore who has been able to see more of the 
colonial archival material than anybody else is in 
no doubt that Descemet's report was the key factor.
The report was a damning one and concluded that although 
Hamallah was not personally involved in anti-French 
agitation that he had done nothing to prevent it. 
Descemet described Hamallah as 'a sly and hypocritical 
enemy of the French colonial regime1. (1) The case 
has many parallels with the Wali of Goumba: Hamallah
like the Wali in his later life attempted to restrict 
his relations with the French to a minimum and was the 
victim, as was the Wali, of a campaign of insinuation 
inspired in part by other Africans but championed by 
a French administrator, with Descemet playing the 
part that Mariani had done in the Futa Jallon.
However, it would be a mistake to ascribe Hamallah's 
punishment entirely to individual caprice, for the 
international situation must also be taken into 
account.
(1) Cited in Traore 'Contribution' p. 145.
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Hamallah was exiled to Mederdra in Mauritania but the 
continuation of disturbances associated with 
Hamallah's followers convinced the authorities that 
he was still able to exert an anti-French influence.
It must be remembered that the French were still 
engaged in the military conquest of Mauritania and 
that vast areas in the north of the country were 
beyond their control. In addition across the Sahara 
in Morocco they were facing fierce resistance.
Towards the end of the 1920s there were growing signs 
of impatience in the French administration at their 
lack of progress in Mauritania. In September 1928 
Governor-General Carde noted with regret that French 
policy of trying to win the submission of the northern 
nomads through peaceful means had failed to achieve 
anything. This policy was associated in particular 
with Lt.-Governor Gaden, and Carde claimed that it had 
outlived its usefulness. He quoted from a recent 
book written by a French officer in Mauritania - 
'Why delude ourselves with the vain hope of leading 
dissidents to submit voluntarily when they are secure 
and out of our reach?' (1) Henceforward, Carde urged
(1) Gorrmt. Gillier La Penetration francaise en 
Mauritanie Paris, 1926.
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that allies should be made to show positive proof 
of their loyalty and that enemies should be strictly 
punished. Gaden and his supporters were ousted in
a change of regime in Mauritania and were replaced 
by hardliners led in St Louis by the Lt.-Governor 
Chazal and, in command of the army in Adrar,
Commandant Dufour who was noted for his 'energetic 
temperament' - a military euphemism for his thirst 
for battle. However, Dufour*s lack of courtesy to 
just about everybody earned him hostility in Dakar
i
and Mauritania, and he was soon replaced. (1) One 
i of the most embarrassing incidents to the French,
which highlighted their weakness in the area, occurred 
in 1928 when two French airmen who had had to make a 
forced landing in the desert were taken hostage by 
anti-French Moors. The French sent a negotiating 
[ team (which included the Emir of Trarza) and were
I forced to make concessions to their enemies in order
i
| to secure the release of the two pilots, Reine and
| Serre. Carde's worries were twofold: locally in
l
! Mauritania he had been forced to admit the weakness
I of the French position but he could not risk a
i
i
| military expedition for fear of a hostile reaction
(1) ANSCM AP 1415/4 Carde 'Note au sujet de la politique 
suivie en Mauritanie' 20.9.1928.
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in the metropolitan press which by and large agreed 
with Gaden that the conquest of Mauritania was not 
worth the loss of French lives - especially civilians 
like the two pilots. This delicate situation was 
reflected in the ambiguous nature of Carde's 'Note' 
on French policy in Mauritania from which we have 
quoted above, in which although Carde clearly did 
not approve of Gaden's reluctance to
fight he was unable to condone the 'energetic* policy 
of Dufour. However, what is more directly relevant 
to the discussion here is that Cheikh Hamallah was 
included in the list of twenty prisoners whose 
release was demanded by the Moors in exchange for 
releasing the two French hostages. (1) This 
particular demand was not, of course, met by the 
French, and Hamallah remained their prisoner. This 
incident is an important reminder of the political 
context within which French attitudes to Hamallah 
must be understood. That Hamallah's name was now 
so explicitly linked to forces resisting the French 
in Mauritania (and in southern Morocco) was bound to 
convince the French that they were right to see
(1) ANSCM AP 1415/4 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 25.9.1928.
The voluminous correspondence concerning Heine and
Serre is in this file.
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Hamallah, not as an otherworldly ascetic, but as 
a dedicated opponent to French colonial rule.(1)
It is important to emphasise this aspect as a 
corrective to the impression in Traor^'s account 
that French hostility to Hamallah was founded on 
the personal animosities of certain influential 
French administrators. For the French - not a 
collection of individuals but rather a colonial 
power with strategic interests on both sides of the 
Sahara - had reason to fear Hamallah who was as 
much the victim of the dictates of imperial strategy 
as he was of the slurs and innuendoes of individuals, 
both French and African.
The next major event connected with Hamallah occurred 
towards the end of 1928 when disturbances and fighting 
broke out in the region of Kaedi in Mauritinia. The 
central figure in these events appears to have been 
a Soninke disciple of Hamallah called Yacoub Sylla. 
Yacoub Sylla was said to have exacerbated already 
existing divisions within the Tijani community of 
Kaedi by, amongst other things, ordering women to 
adopt a Moorish style of dress, to give away their
(1) See ANSCM AP 1054/1 'Rapport de mission dans les
territoires du Sud de l'Algerie' 1928. The author 
had been sent on the mission by Carde to investigate 
Tijani links across the Sahara and concluded that 
'Nothing which happens in Southern Morocco should 
leave ACF indifferent'.
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gold jewelry and to make public confessions of 
their adultery - all of which led to a great deal of 
bitterness, not to mention a dramatic fall in the 
local price for gold. The commandant ordered every­
body to follow the 'orthodox' Tijani prayer formula 
and forbade Yacoub Sylla to return to the area. He 
further noted that "The credulity of the Sarakoles 
is well-known and it is necessary to shelter them 
from the charlatans of Islam'. (1) However, tension 
remained high and in December 1929 and February 1930 
violence broke out. On the latter occasion the 
French opened fire on a crowd of Yacoub Sylla's 
supporters killing between 25 and 80 people. The 
official report blamed the deaths on the Hamallists 
who were described as constituting a phenomenon of 
'a collective and mystical madness'. (2)
Although it was admitted that no direct blame could 
be attached to Hamallah himself it was nonetheless 
decided that he should be sent further away from 
Mauritania to spend the remaining years of his exile 
in Adzope in the Ivory Coast. In March 1930 Carde
(1) ANSCM AP 2258/3 Ccmmt. de cercle Charbonnier 
'Ccxnpte rendu du cercle de Gorgol, Mauritanie' 
5.9.1929.
(2) Traore 'Contribution' pp. 164-78.
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issued a circular note on the subject of the 
Tijaniyya in AOF. He recalled the division between 
what he called the xenophobic and anti-French 
Moroccan branch of the order and a more tolerant 
Algerian branch. He reminded his administration 
that it was the Moroccan branch that had spread to 
the colonies of AOF, and continued:
This historical insight indicates that 
the Tidjanisme practised in the colonies of 
the group [i.e. AOF] is impregnated with 
a xenophobic political character and that, 
transposed unchanged, the Moroccan doctrine 
inevitably presents the fanatical and 
anti-French aspect which characterised the 
teaching of el Hadj Omar and his son 
Ahmadou Cheikou.
The loyal attitude of the majority of the 
leading cheikhs of local Tidjanisme ... 
naturally reassures us. However, one 
should not lose sight of the fact that 
beyond these cheikhs who are personally 
won over to us, other cheikhs, or even 
simple moqaddem, may suddenly appear who 
are more attached to the cause of religion 
than to our own.
Movements of reformist Tijani (and Carde cited 
in this context the example of Aly Yoro Diaw in 
Dagana in 1908) always, he said, attracted the 
youngest and most troublesome elements of society. 
'Cherif Hamallah's success can only be understood in 
the light of these considerations', and continued:
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The question is one of psychological 
rather than truly doctrinal causes.
The action of the reformist marabout 
was quickly appreciated because it 
revealed the sectarianism that is latent 
in the minds of all tidjani and because 
it offered an opportunity for the 
surviving disciples of the Toucouleur 
Prophet to come out of their disenchanted 
retirement. The significance of his 
propaganda was above all that it rallied 
the latent oppostion forces of Islam ... 
The eleven-beaded rosary threatened to 
become the rallying sign of Muslim 
xenophobia. (1)
With this warning to all the colonies of AOF Hamallah 
was firmly implanted in French minds as a dangerous 
enemy, and henceforward administrators were expected 
to keep a close look-out for that outward sign of 
Islamic resistance - the eleven -beaded rosary. The 
fear expressed in the Carde's circular that Hamallah 
might be capable of playing the same role that 
al Hajj Umar had played in the Futa Toro some 
seventy years ago was particularly significant, for 
it was the experience of the resistance led by al Hajj 
Umar which more than anything else coloured 
subsequent French attitudes towards Islam in the 
early twentieth century.
(1) ANSQM AP 2258/3 Gov.-Gen. AOF
circular 3.3.1930.
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In 1933 the French claimed to have uncovered a 
'veritable conspiracy1 centred on Yacoub Sylla's 
brother, Fode Sylla in the cercle of Koutiala in 
Soudan. Brevie, the Governor-General reported to 
Paris that Fode Sylla had proclaimed himself mahdi 
and had preached that the French would be powerless 
against Africans in an imminent war. By chance an 
African guarde de cercle overheard a discussion about 
the war which he reported to the commandant. An 
enquiry was instituted and in April/May Fode Sylla 
together with thirteen of his followers were arrested 
and given prison sentences varying from ten to twenty 
years. Brevie reported that the plan had been to 
massacre Europeans on the night of the Tabaski (the 
feast of al kabir) on 6th April and that in view of 
the fanaticism involved it was likely that 'the worst 
and most odious crimes' would have been perpetrated.(1) 
However, the seriousness of this conspiracy and, indeed, 
of the anti-French nature of the Hamallists in general 
was not universally accepted. Beyries, a future 
Governor of Mauritania, argued that,
(1) ANSQM AP 2258/3 Gov.-Gen. AOF
Min. Col. 31.8.1934. (Ertphasis added.)
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The "way" of Cherif Hama allah is no 
more xenophobic than any other Muslim 
mystic "way". Circumstances must 
lend themselves in order to make these 
"ways" into machines to combat Europeans ... 
The conspiracy is reduced simply to the 
speech of some fanatics whose importance 
has been greatly exaggerated. (1)
Nonetheless, such a view was a minority one.
Meanwhile Hamallah was finishing his sentence in 
the Ivory Coast. The administrator of the cercle
in which he was kept reported in March 1935 that 
'Since [Hamallah] arrived in Adzope he has made no 
conciliatory advance which would allow us to 
believe that he has modified his sentiments'.
Because of this he recommended that Hamallah should 
be made to serve the full length of his sentence and 
not be granted any remission - even though he would 
have been glad to expel from Adzope a person whom 
he called 'a living example to the native of 
opposition to the French cause'. Brevie agreed 
with this judgement and reported to Paris that, 
like the Bourbon court, in exile Hamallah 'had 
learnt nothing and forgotten nothing'. (2)
(1) ANSCM AP 2258/3 J. Beyries 'Note' 14.12.34.
(2) ANSCM AP 2258/3 Admin de cercle Agneby to 
Lt. Gov. Cote d'Ivoire 11.3.1935;
Gov.-Gen. ACF to Min. Col. 23.4.1935.
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Hamallah returned to Nioro after serving out his 
full ten-year sentence in January 1936. On his 
return he adopted the practice of abridging his 
prayers, an option that was open to Muslims only 
when they were travelling, felt threatened or were 
at war. The significance of this act was not lost 
on either fellow Muslims or on the French 
administration. Hamallah's presence in Nioro
attracted large numbers of visitors who returned 
to their homes also abridging their prayers. This 
new development worried the French. In an 
influential report on the spread of this practice 
in the region of Adrar, Lt. Long, a French 
military interpreter in Mauritania, argued that 
the shortened prayer was of 'exceptional 
seriousness1 and proceeded to spell out for French 
benefit its significance in Islamic doctrine.
Lt. Long warned that the greatest danger to the 
French lay in localised unrest in which the 
Hamallists could be expected to gain new martyrs 
for their cause. He regretted that in Adrar, where 
at least twenty-five leading Moors had recently 
returned from visiting Hamallah, the French could 
not count on any marabouts of sufficient stature to 
counter Hamallah's influence and he argued that
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France's best hope lay in 'buying off' the local 
chiefs and making them 'prisoners of honour'. (1)
The use of the shortened prayer worried the French 
greatly. In February 1937 de Coppet, the new 
Governor General circulated details of Long's 
report, adding that,
The verses on which the "abbreviators" based 
themselves must be considered as manifestly 
bearing the sign of combatant Islam and 
one is justified in fearing that these 
people will gradually acquire a somewhat 
anti-French orientation in the course of 
the exercise of their religious practices.
De Coppet stressed furthermore that Hammallah was 
ultimately responsible for all that his followers 
did:
Even if he does not himself go so far as 
to indulge in specifically criminal activity 
that would justify a sanction, he makes use 
of indirect means, which superficially bear 
the marks of detachment and disdain but 
which are carefully thought out and adapted 
to achieve the required aim. This silent 
aggression not only may encourage the 
"differenciated" Tidjaniyans - who are 
already too inclined towards ecstatic 
excitation and xenophobic reactions - to 
show disaffection to the protecting nation 
but also it bears within itself the seeds 
of discord and sharp doctrinal quarrels 
between Muslims themselves.
(1) ANSCM AP 2258/3 Admin de cercle Agneby to
Lt. Gov. Cote d'Ivoire 11.3.1935; Gov.-Gen.AOF 
to Min. Col. 23.4.1935.
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All administrators were consequently urged to keep 
a close watch for the appearance of the abbreviated 
prayer formula. This message was repeated in a
further circular issued in September:
The use of exceptional formulas reserved 
'in case of alert' is all the more serious 
because the writings and especially the 
poetry which are of a xenophobic nature 
and which are being circulated clandestinely 
by the followers of 'hammalisme' leave little 
doubt about the underlying intention of the 
leader of this religious movement.
De Coppet agreed with the analysis of the Governor • 
of Mauritania which linked the popularity of 
Hammalism with the aspirations of the poorer and 
disadvantaged elements of society and with his 
conclusion that although this made the French more 
sympathetic to Hamallism that, 'There can be no 
question of encouraging the movement for to do so 
would alienate the followers of the old Islam'.
For de Coppet who owed his position to the election 
of the Popular Front government in France the 
association of the Hamallists with the poorer 
elements of society placed him in an ideological
(1) ANSCM AP 2258/3 Gov.-Gen. AGF
circular 27.2.1937.
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dilemma. He did not want to be seen to be 
persecuting a religious movement which might be 
labelled as 'progressive1 in metropolitan circles 
but neither was he prepared to give the movement 
total freedom. The dilemma was resolved by 
distinguishing between the 'justifiable aspirations 
of the poor1 and the selfish political and material 
motivation of their leaders. The French task then 
was to intercede to protect the poor from their 
'bad shepherds' - language and sentiment that 
was entirely in keeping with the colonial policy of 
the Popular Front. The administration were to try 
and persuade the mainstream Tijani to be more 
tolerant and understanding of the desires of 'the 
humble mass of the dispossessed'. The attack on 
the 'bad shepherds', however, was to be firm and 
comprehensive, and de Coppet went on to list a 
number of measures that could be used against 
Hamallism. On a psychological level, first of 
all, the aura of ascetic and other-worldly 
mysticism surrounding Hamallah was to be destroyed 
by broadcasting stories of how Hamallah had mocked 
and mistreated elderly marabouts; doubts about the 
theological soundness of Hamallah's doctrine were 
to be encouraged (and de Coppet noted with some 
satisfaction that in 1937 for the first time in
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twenty-five years numerous leading Qadiri and 
'orthodox' Tijani marabouts had made tours in 
Mauritania to collect ziara and had all taken the 
opportunity to preach against Hamallah); and 
lastly the French could themselves make use of 
superstition and fear - 'The counter propaganda 
of the old brotherhoods could even take place at 
time of drought, local famines, plagues of locust 
and other calamities when public opinion is alert 
and anxious to know the hidden reasons for the bad 
luck that has temporarily hit them'. On the more 
conventional level of police action de Coppet 
reminded his administrators that the legislation 
already existed which would enable them to punish 
speeches and the sale of books and pamphlets which 
denigrated the French with prison sentences of up 
to two years and to punish the more serious crime 
of conspiracy and organising against the French 
with prison sentences of up to twenty years. (1)
It seemed for a while as if the 'counter offensive' 
of the established marabouts was to be successful. 
In September 1937 Seydou Nourou Tall persuaded 
Hamallah that he need fear nothing from the French
(1) ANS 17 G 60 (17) Gov.-Gen. AGF
circular 6.8.1937.
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and that, therefore, he should revert to the normal 
prayer formula. However, this brief reconciliation 
between the two branches of the Tijaniyya was short­
lived and broke down in the tension which quickly 
resurfaced between Hamallah and his supporters on 
the one hand and the 'establishment1 Tijani on the 
other. (1) Hamallah was unable to prevent further 
violence from breaking out in 1938 in the region of 
Nioro. His eldest son, in particular, was humiliated 
by a hostile Moorish tribe and resolved to exact his 
revenge. According to Traore he made clandestine 
preparations against his enemies swearing his allies 
to secrecy, even from his father. His efforts 
culminated in a bloody battle in the village of 
Mouchgag in 1940. Hamallah protested his innocence 
of these events and condemned the violence used by 
the followers of his son. The Vichy authorities 
were convinced, however, that he was implicated and 
he was arrested in June 1941 along with several 
hundred of his followers who were all sent to prison 
camps in AOF. Inevitably, perhaps, given the way 
in which Islamic unrest was always regarded as being 
in part at least caused by enemies of metropolitan
(1) Traore 'Contribution' p. 193-4.
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France, it was suspected that a Free French agent, 
a certain M. Montezer who had arrived in West 
Africa shortly before the war and who had published 
a small handbook on Islam, had had a part in the 
violence. (1) Hamallah himself was deported to 
Algeria and thence to France where he died of 
pneumonia in the military hospital of Montlu<j:on in 
January 1943.
Hamallah was the victim of the narrowness of the 
French vision of Islam. Throughout the period 
discussed in this thesis but particularly during 
the 'twenties and 'thirties the French divided 
Muslims into two categories: those who actively
supported the French and those who did not. This 
narrowness of vision was compounded by the essentially 
ahistorical understanding of African society which 
characterised almost all colonial thinking on 
colonised societies. The French arrived in West 
Africa at a specific juncture in the development of 
West African societies and believed that 'the Africa'
(1) ANS 19 G 7* Haut Ccmmissaire de l'Afrique franqaise 
(Boisson) to Gommt. superieur de Troupes en AOF 
(Barrau) 17.2.1941; Barrau to Boisson 8.3.1941. 
Montezer's pamphlet was called L'Afrique et l'islam 
Dakar 1939.
(2) See Traore 'Contribution' pp. 194-216 for details 
of Hamallah' s imprisonment and death.
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they had encountered was the product of an unchanging 
past, a 'primitive' society that had not changed in 
centuries. Hamallah was forced into this 
ideological straightjacket: he inevitably revived 
memories of al Hajj 'Umar and, in the end, the French 
were never able to believe that he did not cherish 
exactly the same ambitions as the Tukolor leader.
This misconception was encouraged by the 
representatives of 'le vieil Islam' whom de Coppet 
was not prepared to alienate. For the authority 
of the old guard depended to a large extent on the 
trick which the colonial authorities had played 
with history. The 'orthodox' Tijani leaders and 
the ulema of Nioro had a vested interest in 
reminding the authorities that the leopard (i.e. 
reformist Islam) can never change his spots, and 
Hamallah paid the price. It is these sorts of 
factors along with the sort of strategic interests, 
that we have described above, that must be taken 
into account if the degree of French hostility to 
Hamallah is to be properly understood. Even so, 
the French probably would have been prepared to 
call off their campaign against Hamallah had he 
been willing to intervene actively in all areas of 
life on behalf of the French, but this for his own 
deeply-held religious convictions he was not
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prepared to do. (1) A CHEAM monograph written in 
19 41 detailed the French reasoning:
Cherif Hamallah is more than an important 
religious personality, he is also a political 
force as a result of the enormous influence 
and obedience which he commands. Therefore, 
we can at least reproach him for not having 
used this influence to stop the exactions 
and brutalities of his disciples, who are 
generally at the origin of these quarrels:
11 a laisse faire, voila pourqoui sa 
responsabilit6 est lourde. (2)
The experiences of the relations between the French, 
the Mourides and the Tijaniyya in the 'twenties and 
'thirties show some interesting similarities.
(It should be said that some of the following 
remarks apply equally to the experience of the Muslim 
communities in Porto Novo).
The first remark to be made is that the French 
intervened very directly in the internal affairs of 
the brotherhoods, and this was a policy which 
contrasted with the pre-war consensus according 
to which the French should remain aloof as much as 
possible from internal disputes. The reasons for
(1) Brenner West African Sufi passim.
(2) Lt d'Arbaumont (La confrerie des Tidjania en 
Afrique francaise' CHEAM no. 1411, 1941 p.24
(my emphasis) cf. Brenner 'Hamallah was punished 
not for what he did but for what he failed to do' 
West African Sufi p.54.
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this change of policy towards intervention were 
firstly that after the work of Marty and the 
continued build-up of files on Muslim individuals 
the French were much better informed about Muslim 
politics and, therefore, more confident of their 
ability to intervene and, secondly, that they now 
increasingly had vested interests in certain sections 
of the Muslim community. The most striking example 
of this vested interest was their economic stake in 
the Mourides but equally they had a substantial 
political stake in Seydou Nourou Tall. By the 
1920s the French had made very real political and 
economic investments which they were naturally very 
anxious to safeguard. Thus when these investments 
were threatened either directly as in the case of 
Cheikh Anta or indirectly as in the case of Hamallah
| the French were obliged to intervene.
[
j
I
f
I The second general remark is that the French were
I
seen now to be anxious to preserve the monolithic 
structure of the Sufi tariga in West Africa whereas 
before the war the conventional wisdom was that 
French interests were best served by a policy of 
'divide and rule' based on encouraging religious 
and ethnic particularism.
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The third and final remark concerns the fossilisation 
of French relations with the brotherhoods. Before 
the war relations between the French and the Mourides, 
for example, were very fluid - so fluid in fact that 
the French policy shifted from a position of out­
right hostility to one of cautious support. The 
same was true to a lesser extent of the Tijaniyya. 
However, in the 'twenties and 'thirties the French 
stake in the two brotherhoods was such that not only 
could the French not challenge the brotherhoods but 
also that they could not afford to let anyone else 
challenge them either. There were, in these terms, 
only two possible positions - either for or against 
the officially-sponsored leadership. Two factors, 
however, were able to qualify these rigid divisions 
and categories: elections and the influence of the
metropolitan press. Cheikh Anta would not have 
been rehabilitated were it not for the fact that 
the Senegalese voters of the Four Communes elected 
Galandou Diouf. Likewise all administrators had to 
keep half an eye open to the possibility of adverse 
comments in the metropolitan press.
The metropolitan factor was an increasingly 
important one in the interwar period though its 
precise importance is not easy to quantify.
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There were a number of different pressure groups who 
took an interest in colonial affairs of which the 
most significant were the Union Intercolonial 
(f. 1921) , Licrue de la defense de la race negre 
(f.1926) and the Ligue contre l 1oppression coloniale
et 1 1 imperialisms(f.1927, President Albert Einstein).
\
In addition both the Communists (PCF) and the 
Socialists (SFIO) together with their respective 
trade union allies were broadly anti-colonialist in 
their orientation, though the nature of their 
anti-colonialism requires some comment. Until 
19 36 the PCF followed the Moscow line in denouncing 
colonialism itself whereas the SFIO denounced only 
the abuses of colonialism and not the system. The 
PCF moved towards the position of the SFIO as it 
became clear that priority should be given to 
opposing the rise of fascism in Europe. Individuals, 
such as Andre Gide, were sometimes able to bring 
conditions in the French colonies to the attention 
of the French public. It is, however, very difficult 
to gauge the effect of the various types of anti­
colonial activity on public opinion. The inter-war 
years were after all the years in which the 
'colonial idea' achieved its greatest popularity 
with the French, and it would probably be more 
realistic to emphasise the lack of interest shown by
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the political parties in criticising colonialism 
and in campaigning on behalf of France's colonial 
subjects. In any case little attention was paid 
to black Africa in comparison to North Africa and 
Indo-China. So, in describing the metropolitan 
factor as it affected West Africa's Muslim 
population we must recognise the fact that some 
West Africans were able to get access to 
politicians and to newspapers but that the avenues 
for doing so were rather haphazard and that the 
effectiveness of the various groups and individuals 
who lobbied on their behalf was very uncertain. (U
The willingness of the French to intervene in Muslim 
affairs is a useful corrective to the notion that 
the interwar years marked a shift towards 
'indirect rule' or in French terms a policy of 
'association'. Such labels serve little purpose 
in aiding our understanding of the mechanics of 
colonial rule and were, in any case, designed chiefly
(1) For a discussion of the impact of colonialism 
on metropolitan politics see R. Girardet 
L'idee coloniale enFrance del871 a 1962 
Paris 1972 dhs. 7-9; C. Liduzu Aux Origines 
des tiers-mondismes: colonises et
anticolonialistes en France 1919-1939
Paris 1982.
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for metropolitan consumption to win support for 
budget allocations in the Chamber of Deputies or 
the House of Parliament. In the next chapter we 
shall discuss another form of interventionism 
associated with a very particular era in French 
history, the Popular Front (1936-8) .
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CHAPTER TEN: DE COPPET AND THE REDISCOVERY
OF ISLAM
In the previous chapter we saw how the French had 
developed a very firm and somewhat inflexible idea 
of the structure of Franco-Islamic relations in West 
Africa. By the 1930s the French had identified their 
stake in Islam and were prepared to go to considerable 
lengths to protect it. Throughout this study we have 
seen how a consensus had developed regarding the very 
nature of Islam itself: namely a religion which bore
little resemblance to the 'orthodox' model seen in 
the Arab world but which was much closer to the prer 
Islamic 'traditional African' beliefs and which was 
held together almost solely through the agency of the 
Sufi brotherhoods. In this final chapter we shall 
consider more closely the attitudes of the Popular 
Front Governor-General, de Coppet. We have already 
noted his attitude towards Hamallah, and this attitude 
should be kept in mind in this chapter. However, 
there was another side to de Coppet, and there were 
signs that he and some of his colleagues no longer 
accepted all the ideas regarding Islam that had become 
so dominant in French thinking over the previous
597
decades. De Coppet was not unfortunately in power 
for enough time for us to draw very firm conclusions. 
Furthermore, the declaration of war in Europe in 1939 
and the advent of the Vichy regime in Dakar in 1940 
heralded such abrupt changes that it is doubly 
difficult to place de Coppet in his correct context. 
His attitude to education, however, provides a useful 
way of comparing him with his predecessors and so it 
is largely with education that this chapter will be 
concerned.
- o 0 o -
French attentiveness to the needs of the Muslim elite 
of West Africa was no accident: it belonged to a
tradition whose origins go back to the early days of 
the French presence in Senegal and which emphasised 
the possible gains to be had from sponsoring an 
'official' form of Islam. (D Such a view stemmed 
from the realisation that the Islamic presence in 
Senegal was both permanent and hugely important to 
the colony's prosperity and security. At times, 
as we have seen in this study, this fundamental truth
(1) See above chapter 1 for a discussion of the 
nineteenth century origins of such a policy.
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was lost from sight, obscured by a host of 
misconceptions concerning the nature of West African 
society and France's status within it,
French attitudes to education serve as a barometer 
of the reality of their expectations. Throughout 
the nineteenth century mission education and in the 
early twentieth century the enthusiasm for secular 
education both contributed to a hope in some quarters 
of the French community that traditional African 
societies could be transformed into something 
approximating to provincial French society. By the 
end of the first decade of the twentieth century such 
expectations seemed increasingly unrealistic ,(1) 
but in the brief period of optimism that followed 
the end of the First World War there is some evidence 
that such hopes were being resurrected. In 
September 1921 the Governor-General reported to the 
Minister of Colonies:
Primary education is making a great and 
very conscientious effort to fulfil its 
dual mission of instruction and education.
Those who understand the importance of 
[primary education ] in the metropole will 
realise how much greater is its significance 
in countries on the verge of civilisation.
(1) See above chapter 4.
599
To give natives the habits and taste of 
the essential rules of hygiene unknown 
in their ancestral traditions, to strengthen 
their bodies by physical exercises adapted 
to the needs of these populations, to sow 
and cultivate in their souls the principles 
of human morality, to try and make of these 
great children men of conscience and will-power, 
to give them the rudiments of indispensable 
knowledge and, above all, to teach them to 
understand and speak French, to infuse them 
with the taste and the method of work in 
such a way as to enable the most gifted of 
them by a progressive selection to raise 
themselves intellectually and gradually form 
an elite through whom we can exert our 
policies on the masses - such in its broad 
lines is the task which falls to our colonial 
schoolmasters. When one can see this work 
at close hand one realises that there is no 
other task more difficult, more useful, more 
noble or more thrilling. (1)
The Governor-General continued with the claim that as 
a result of the success of the colonial schoolmasters 
the Qur'anic schools were being forced out of business 
as parents came to recognise the superiority of the 
education offered by the French. However, the 
glorification of the role of the schoolmaster should 
perhaps more realistically be seen as a reflection not 
so much of the strength of French education in AOF but 
of its weakness: even on the calculation of the
Governor-General the 24,000 pupils attending primary
(1) ANS 0 28 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 9.4.1921
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schools represented no more than one in fifty of the 
school-age population. (1)
Official admission that the French could not provide 
for all of West Africa's educational needs followed 
less than three years later. Amongst a series of 
reforms intended to decentralise the education system 
was a specific provision for the inclusion of Qur'anic 
education within the French system. Articles 47, 48 
and 49 of the Decree of 1st May 1924 gave Lt-Governors 
of Islamised colonies the authority (providing they 
had the Governor-General's approval) to establish 
medersas whose 'essential aim is to establish a point 
of contact between literate Muslims and our 
administrators by the training of interpreters, judges 
and secretaries of native tribunals'. (2)
(1) Ibid
(2) 'Arrete fixant 1'organisation gdndrale de l'enseigne- 
ment en AOF 1.5.1924 in Textes portant sur la 
reorganisation de l'enseignement en AQF, Gor6e, 1924. 
See also the circular of the same date printed in 
this collection: 'L'enseignement primaire sup£rieur
musulman a pour but de canaliser, au profit de la 
politique francaise, 1'influence exercee par
les musulmans lettres sur leurs coreligionnaires.
II se propose de dissiper les preventions du monde 
musulman contre notre civilisation. H  developpe 
les etudes supdrieures coraniques tout en dormant des 
vues justes sur le role civilisateur de la France en 
Afrique'.
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In view of some of the misgivings expressed before 
the war about the benefits of the medersa system it 
is perhaps not surprising that there was no rush of 
Lt-Governors eager to take advantage of the new law. 
Indeed, it was not until 1930 that the first medersa 
was established as a result of the new law.
Conditions for admission to the Boutilimit medersa, 
established by Chazals, the Lt-Governor of Mauritania, 
made it plain that entry was to be limited to the sons 
of the nobility. (1) Clearly the confusion between 
the medersa and the Ecole des Fils des Chefs, which 
had been evident in the early history of the St Louis 
medersa, had still to be resolved. (2)
The old formula for a medersa of a school which 
provided education in a vaguely Islamic idiom for sons 
of chiefs appealed to the authorities. In 1932 
Brevie wrote to the Lt-Governor of Soudan urging him 
to establish an institution along the lines of the 
Boutilimit medersa that would contribute effectively 
to the training of the commandement indigene of the 
Moors and Tuaregs of Soudan. The Lt-Governor obliged 
with a medersa at Timbedra in the Hodh region. The 
first year's report explained that the local admin­
istrator had been firm with the chiefs in getting them
(1) ANS 0 82 'Decision' 27.12.1930; see especially 
Article 2.
(2) See above chapter 4.
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to send their sons to the medersa. The problem of 
recruitment thus dealt with, the staff were now 
seeking to teach their young Moorish charges the 
elementary rules both of hygiene and of football and 
to get them used as soon as possible to eating from 
individual plates.(1) The following year it was 
reported that great care was being taken to provide 
good food for the pupils so that 'Parents could never 
cite the mediocrity of the food given to their children 
as an excuse to refuse to entrust them to us'. Despite 
this very French consideration recruitment of sons of 
important chiefs was a problem, and the author of the 
annual report, M. Assomption the head of the Education 
Department of the Soudan, was forced to conclude that 
'true chiefs were very rare in the Sahel'. He further 
believed that the senior Moorish teacher, Mohammed 
Moctar Dicko the brother of the chief of the Awlad 
Nacer (and 'our only collaborator amongst the Moorish 
race') was purposely obstructing the French. The 
Senegalese teacher, Ahmadou Ba, however, was reported 
to be honest and hard-working. Assomption proposed 
replacing Mohammed Dicko with the wife of the French
(1) ANS O 92 Gov.-Gen. AQF to Lt.-Gov. Soudan; Lt.-Gov.
Soudan to Gov.-Gen. AOF 6.10.1932; 'Arrete' 12.9.1931;
'Bulletin d'inspection 30.1.1934 - 2.2.1934.'
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director of the medersa, Mme. Follenfant. She would, 
he said, not only be able to supervise catering and 
laundry but would also be able to provide for the 
younger boarders 'a point of affection and devotion 
of which women alone are capable'. (1)
M. Assomption appeared to have applied criteria which 
were more suited to a provincial French boarding 
school than to a training school for future chiefs 
and civil servants in West Africa. His assertion, 
too, that Mohammed Moctar Dicko was the 'only' Moorish 
collaborator either betrays an appalling ignorance 
of France's position in Mauritania and Soudan or, 
perhaps, it suggests a more general dislike of the 
non-black indigenous population. Without any further 
evidence, however, one should reserve judgement on his 
qualifications to inspect the medersa.
In any case it is clear that other administrators did 
not share the generally negative view of the medersa
(1) ANS 0 92 'Bulletin d'inspection: £tude sur la medersa
des fils des chefs et notables maures de Timb£dra, 
20.3.1934 - 12.1.1935' Ihe concern about food was 
entirely serious and probably justified. In 1939 five 
pupils were reported to have left the St Louis medersa 
because of the unusual food, see ANS 0 122 Gov. 
Mauritania to Gov.-Gen. AOF 8.3.1940.
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which is suggested in Assomption1s report. The 
Lt-Governor of Soudan considered establishing a 
similar institution in Bamba, a town some 150 miles 
east of Timbuktu on the Niger Bend, to cater for 
the colony's Tuareg population but considered it 
unlikely that the success of the Timbedra medersa 
could be repeated because of 'the profound difference 
which separates Arab and Berber mentalities' . The 
Tuareg, he said, had no taste for intellectual work 
and most of them 'have not yet abandoned hope of 
seeing us leave their country and of resuming their 
life of pillage and plunder'. Previous attempts, 
he noted, to recruit Tuareg pupils to French schools 
had led to 'a dangerous restiveness'. (1)
The creation of a medersa in Atar (Mauritania) in 
January 1936 suggested that the administration was 
now convinced that the medersas had a vital role to 
play in their recruitment and training of a 
commandement indigene. (2) The issue was very much 
at the forefront of the administration's thinking in 
the 19 30s. Brevie, as Governor-General, had argued 
that special attention should be given to the training
(1) ANS 0 92 Gov. Soudan to Gov.-Gen. AOF 10.12.1935
(2) ANS 0 82 'Decision' 13.1.1936.
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of traditional chiefs who should be integrated more 
fully into the administrative structure. (1) It was 
mot an original argument - Ponty and Carde, for 
example, had both argued in this way - but it does 
seem to have been applied with greater conviction 
and sophistication by Brevie.(2) it is in the 
context of French policies towards chiefs rather than 
Itowards Islam that the medersa programme in the years 
3L924 to 1936 should be judged.
By 1936, however, there were signs of a shift in 
emphasis. Article 2 of the 'Decision' creating the 
Atar medersa, for example, stipulated that the medersa 
hiad two functions: firstly, 'to ensure the maintenance
of classical Arab culture in Upper Mauritania' and, 
secondly, 'to train an indigenous elite, educated by 
contact with us'. (3) The order in which these two 
functions were listed is instructive in itself but 
ft is the idea that medersas should be servants of 
Arab culture that deserves special attention. It was 
one of the first signs that the French believed that
(1) J. Br^vi^ Circulaires sur la politique et 1'administration 
indigene en AOF Goree, 1932.
(2) For a discussion of these issues see A. Auchnie 'Hie 
"ccmmandement indigene" in Senegal, 1919-1947' PhD 
thesis, University of London, 1983.
(3) ANS 0 82 'Decision' 13.1.1936.
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the medersa should revert to its pre-colonial role 
as a centre of Islamic scholarship. Although the 
Atar medersa was reserved exclusively for sons of 
chiefs and notables (see Article 3) it made no 
provision for teaching French. This gap was soon 
spotted and commented upon by Brevie who wrote to 
the Governor of Mauritania, de Coppet, urging the 
inclusion of French in the curriculum. De Coppet 
replied that neither he nor his Inspector of Native 
Affairs, Beyries, were in favour of this as they 
both believed that the overtly 'French' nature of 
the education provided in previous medersas was the 
main obstacle to recruitment of pupils. Furthermore, 
de Coppet argued, French control of the northern 
reaches of Mauritania was still not completely 
assured (el Hiba's submission, it should be remembered, 
had taken place in 1935) and that therefore, the Atar 
medersa should be used as a way of encouraging the
loyalty and confidence of the grands nomades of the 
north. De Coppet did not rule out the eventual 
inclusion of French but stressed that this would have 
to be postponed until France's position was more 
secure. Brevie agreed to this postponement only on 
condition that it should be for a maximum of two years 
after which French was to become obligatory regardless
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of any other considerations, d)
This controversy is evidence of the fact that the 
received wisom of men such as Clozel, Delafosse and 
Brevie regarding Islam, its place in West African 
society and French attitudes towards it was being 
abandoned. Just as Clozel and Delafosse could be 
said to have 'discovered' animism in the Ivory Coast 
at the turn of the century so too could it be said 
that de Coppet and Beyries had 'rediscovered' Islam 
in Mauritania in the 1930s. Islam appears in their 
writing to be a much grander and more dignified 
religion than is suggested by Clozel, Delafosse and 
Brevie. It is a view which seems closer to the 
nineteenth-century romantics than the sociologically- 
inspired views of several of the commentators 
discussed in this study.
In September 1936 de Coppet was promoted to Governor-
General and was thus able to encourage his admin­
istration to show greater respect towards Islam.
Of course respect for the leaders of the principal
brotherhoods was nothing new but the originality
(1) ANS 0 82 Gov. Mauritania to Gov.-Gen. AOF 24.3.1936; 
Directeur des Affaires Bolitiques et Administratives 
'Note pour m. 1'Inspecteur General de 11 Enseignement1
10.4.1936.
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of de Coppet's policy lay in the importance he 
attached to other senior personalities of the Islamic 
community - notably the cadis and imams. One of the 
most characteristic aspects of this policy was 
expressed in a circular to all the colonies of ADF 
in February 1937:
On the occasion of tabaski I would ask all 
cercles to transmit the good wishes of the 
Governor-General to the whole of the Muslim 
population and to give them assurances of our 
favourable attention. Please organise a 
reception for Muslim notables at your 
Government houses and expound further on 
these sentiments. (1)
These instructions were carried out throughout AOF 
and appear to have created a very favourable 
impression amongst the Muslim population. The Governor 
of Senegal, Lefebvre, held a reception for St Louis' 
Muslim dignitaries who, he reported to de Coppet, had 
been very appreciative of the gesture: 'It is the
first time, I was told, that the administration through 
an official action has associated itself with the 
intimate life of Muslim society, and the impression 
produced was profound.' (2) The imam of the principal
(1) ANS 19 G 1* Gov.-Gen. AOF circular 15.2.1937. Tabaski 
is the Vfolof name for the Muslim feast, generally 
known as al kabir. celebrating the start of the new 
year.
(2) ANS 19 G 1* Gov. Senegal to Gov.-Gen. AOF 23.2.1937.
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mosque of Abidjan wrote personally to de Coppet with 
words of praise and thanks for the fact that 'For 
the first time we have recorded such an act from a 
Governor-General.' d) De Coppet himself held a 
reception at his residence for Dakar's Muslim 
dignitaries at which the imam of the principal mosque 
of Dakar, al Hajj Moustapha Diop, made a speech of 
considerable interest:
All the inhabitants of Senegal rejoice in 
the arrival in their country ... of the 
Governor, M. de Coppet after the natives 
have endured suffering, poverty and fatigue. 
May Allah protect the supreme chief against 
calamities, may He preserve him against 
misfortune. Muslims should be content to 
have in him a Governor whose like cannot be 
found anywhere in the world. His good 
policy has been proved by the preparations 
for our splendid celebration on our very 
important day. [ De Coppet and his advisers] 
were all in full dress, wearing very 
expensive clothes to go to the place of 
prayer and were surrounded by cavalrymen 
to show publicly ... the honour which they 
attach to Islam and to those who practise 
this religion. (2)
The President of the recently-founded Fraternite- 
Musulmane - a Dakar-based organisation of black 
Senegalese Muslims which, according to official sources,
(1) ANS 19 G 1* Imam, Grande Mosquee d'Abidjan to 
Gov.-Gen. ADF 4.3.1937.
(2) For full text of speech see ANS 19 G 1*
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aimed to restore Islam to its former purity but which 
was also pro-French and had sided with the authorities 
against Hamallah (1) - wrote to M. Perrin, depute for 
Nievre to ask him to draw de Coppet's action to the 
attention of the Colonial Minister, Marius Moutet. (2)
At first sight many of these speeches and letters 
seem no different from, for example, the effusive 
declarations of loyalty to France during the First 
World War, but to see them as no more than this would 
be to underestimate the impact of de Coppet's gesture. 
All accounts of Muslim reactions report that Muslims 
were struck by the novelty of the action. Al Hajj 
Moustapha Diop's speech also contains veiled criticism 
of previous administrations implicitly held responsible 
for the hardships of previous years.
De Coppet followed the official celebrations of tabaski 
with another gesture of goodwill towards Muslims in the 
form of a donation of 1,000 francs to the Muslims of 
St Louis at the time of the mawlud festival celebrating 
the birth of the Prophet. The money was distributed
(1) ANSCM AP 598/4 'Rapport politique' 1937.
(2) ANS 19 G 1* President, Fratemite Musulman to Perrin
26.2.1937. It is not clear from these sources why 
M. Perrin was chosen to receive this letter.
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by Seydou Nourou Tall to the chiefs of the five 
districts of the town and the donation appears to 
have been gratefully received. (1) In January 1938 
Abd el Kader Diagne, a member of the Fraternite 
Musulmane suggested that de Coppet donate three sheep 
to the imams of the three principal mosques of Dakar,
St Louis and Kaolack in time for the forthcoming 
tabaski celebration. De Coppet noted in the margin, 
'Excellent idea! How much does a first class sheep 
cost? Send the necessary money, charged to my 
personal account, to the three imams.' Lefebvre 
reported that the price of a good sheep in Kaolack was 
125 francs, 200 francs in Dakar and 250 francs in 
St Louis. De Coppet replied to Abd el Kader Diagne 
thanking him for the suggestion and explaining that 
he had arranged for the sheep to be donated. He 
would not himself be in Dakar during tabaski as he 
would be on tour in Soudan, but he assured Diagne 
that he would take part in the celebrations there.
The following year neither the interim Governor-General, 
de Boisson nor the new Governor of Senegal, Ponzio,
(1) ANS 19 G 143 (108) Cadi, President Tribunal Musulman 
de St Iouis to Gov.-Gen. AOF.
(2) ANS 19 G 1* Abd el Kader Diagne to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
19.1.1938; Gov. Senegal to Gov.-Gen. AOF 7.2.1938; 
Admin, p.i. Dakar and Dep. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 9.2.1938; 
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Abd el Kader Diagne 21.2.1938.
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attended the tabaski celebrations. In 1940, although 
the Governor-General did not himself attend, the 
administration was strongly represented at the 
celebrations at which the Grand Imam prayed for French 
victory over the impious Germans. French participa­
tion in the celebrations ceased under the Vichy regime 
but in 1944 tabaski was an occasion of great pomp and 
splendour as the Governor-General rode in procession 
to the mosque. (1)
There were, of course, sound political arguments for 
de Coppet's gestures. The French stake in Islam 
required protection not just from other Muslims (such 
as Hamallah) but also from politicians (such as 
Galandou Diouf). It is interesting to note that one 
of the main motives behind de Coppet*s apparently 
most generous gesture of all - the sponsorship of the 
construction of a new principal mosque in Dakar - was 
decided upon partly in order to pre-empt Galandou 
Diouf. In March 1937 de Coppet wrote to the colonial 
Minister that Galandou Diouf had suggested the need 
for a new and larger mosque for Dakar and that he 
thought it would be an excellent piece of propaganda
(1) ANS 19 G 1* Admin p.i. Dakar & Dep. to
Gov.-Gen. AOF 17.1.1940; 'Note' 21.1.1940; 
for 1944 celebrations see reports in same 
file.
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if the French government could appear to have 
spontaneously developed the same idea. De Coppet's 
argument was approved and in February the following 
year in a ceremony of great pomp he and Cheikh 
Alwali Cherif, a grandson of Cheikh Sidia, laid 
the first stone of the new mosque in a symbolic act 
of Franco-Muslim solidarity. Most of the speakers 
at the ceremony were appropriately fulsome in their 
praise for de Coppet. One exception was Wagane 
Diouf, a deputy mayor of Dakar who thanked all the 
initiators of the scheme - including M. Goux the 
mayor of Dakar and Galandou Diouf. According to 
intelligence reports of the day's events, 'The 
evocation of [Goux and Diouf] provoked whispers 
and protests that were noticed by everybody. The 
speech was not applauded*, d)
De Coppet clearly thought that the ceremony had been 
a success and made personal arrangements for an 
article on it to be published in the metropolitan 
press. Writing informally to the Director of the 
*Agence Economique de l'AOF' in Paris he said:
(1) ANS 19 G 6* Gov.-Gen. ADF to Min. Col. 2.3.1937;
'Renseignements' 20.2.1938.
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You know the importance which I attach 
to Islamic questions and I believe that 
AOF has not always been given the place 
it deserves in the Muslim world. In 
connection with this I want you to know 
that next year I would like you to present 
me personally, in my role as Governor- 
General of AOF, to the Feast of A'id el Kebir 
which takes place at the Paris mosque. (1)
De Coppet's gesture was no doubt a sincere one, the 
wish to outdo Galandou Diouf notwithstanding. Other 
examples of his keenness that Islam should be 
respected can be seen in the following examples.
The first concerns the construction of another mosque, 
this time in Kaolack. In March 1937 el Hajj Ibrahim 
Niasse wrote to de Coppet requesting help in the 
construction of a new mosque in Kaolack and 
suggested specifically that special rates might be 
charged for the transport of building materials. The 
head of de Coppet's cabinet noted that 'From a 
political point of view it would be useful if we 
could give satisfaction.' However, the Inspector 
of Public Works, to whom the request was passed, 
refused on the grounds that a similar request for 
help in the construction of a church in Bobo Dioulasso
(1) ANS 19 G 6* Gov.-Gen. AGF to Besson 3.3.1938.
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had been turned down. De Coppet was not impressed 
with this excuse:
One cannot liken the construction of a 
mosque, which meets the needs of the 
majority of the population of a Muslim 
town like Kaolack, with a church destined 
to be frequented mainly by Europeans and 
a small number of newly-converted natives.
The Dakar-Niger Railway Company was instructed to 
give reduced rates, and by February 1938 the mosque 
was finished. El Hajj Oumar Kane, Ibrahim Niasse's 
representative in Dakar thanked de Coppet for 
arranging the 50% reduction in freight charges and 
invited him to the opening ceremony. De Coppet 
declined the invitation but offered reduced party 
rates on the railway for any Muslim who wanted to 
travel from Dakar to the ceremony at which the 
Governor-General was to be represented by the 
commandant of Sine-Saloum. (1)
(1) ANS 19 G 6* El Hajj Ibrahim Niasse to Gov.-Gen. AOF 
27.3.1937; Directeur du Cabinet 'Note1 2-.3.1937; 
Inspecteur Travaux Publiques 'Note' 3.5.1937;
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Inspecteur 12.5.1937;
El Hajj Oumar Kane to Gov.-Gen. AOF 18.2.1938; 
Directeur das Affaires Folitiques et Administratives 
'Note' 22.2.1938; Gov.-Gen. AOF to El Hajj Oumar 
Kane 23.2.1938.
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The second example was somewhat different, but it 
also involved el Hajj Oumar Kane. In July 1938 
de Coppet received a letter from the Muslim 
residents of the Ave. El Hadj Malick Sy complaining 
about the lack of respect shown by the patrons of 
the Cafe de la Patrie to their mosque situated next 
to the cafe. They claimed that patrons of the 
cafe urinated against the wall of the mosque and 
asked if it would be possible to rent the premises 
which the cafe occupied for use as a hostel for 
Muslims. De Coppet immediately replied to the 
leader of the Muslims - el Hajj Oumar Kane - that 
he would order greater respect to be shown to the 
mosque and would see what he could do about their 
request to lease the building. At the same time 
he wrote to the administrator of Dakar with orders to 
ensure that holy places were respected and requested 
more information on this particular case. The 
administrator replied that the whole street had an 
unpleasant smell as a result of its proximity to a 
refuse site and that he believed the mosque was 
relatively respected and that the Muslims were 
complaining mainly because of the sale of alcohol 
on the premises. Whatever the truth, no further
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action seems to have been taken. (1)
A further insight into de Coppet's concern that Islam 
should be respected can be gleaned from his scheme to 
include a medersa in the plans for the new Dakar 
mosque. (2) The medersa, it was stressed, was to be 
paid for by the French in order, on the one hand, 
to guard against begging and unqualified teachers and, 
on the other hand, to ensure better French control.
The education was intended to fulfil at least four 
functions: (i) to 'purify' Islam noir and 'give new
life to its rites'; (ii) to fight against 
superstition and magic; (iii) within the framework 
of the Qur'an to improve the condition of women and 
children; and, (iv) to train 'literate and erudite' 
teachers. However, there were serious doubts amongst 
the upper echelons of the educational administration 
about the wisdom of creating such an institution.
The Deputy Inspector argued that those graduates 
whom the administration could not employ as
(1) ANS 19 G 6* Habitants musulmans de l'Ave, 
el Hajj Malick Sy to Gov.-Gen. AOF 5.7.1938;
Gov.-Gen. AOF to El Hajj Oumar Kane 8.7.1938;
Gov.-Gen. AOF to Admin. Dakar & Dep. 9.7.1938; 
Admin. Dakar & Dap. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 2.8.1938.
(2) ANS 0 92 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min, Col. 13.6.1937.
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interpreters and court assessors would probably turn 
to Qur'anic education as a means of earning their 
living. He argued that they would be able to do 
this very successfully as a result of the prestige 
they would gain from holding a diploma from the 
medersa. The Inspector feared that a thriving and 
dynamic system of Qur'anic education would be a 
very serious challenge to French secular schooling 
and, consequently, he was far from happy about the 
proposed medersa. (1)
De Coppet believed that the medersa had a wider role 
than the training of administrators and interpreters:
A Muslim intellectual foyer will help to 
maintain West African Islam in its present 
mood which renders it much more malleable 
and open to our administrative action than 
in any other region with a coranic influence.
Specifically he thought that a medersa would help 
greatly in combatting Hamallism:
(1) ANS 0 92 'Rapport a m. le Directeur des Affaires 
Politiques et Administratives' 10.8.1937.
619
I believe that the sly dealings of 
Cherif Hamallah like those of his 
present followers and those of his 
possible future imitators, will be 
much easier to overcome and to 
neutralise the day when the elite of 
our Muslim subjects have tangible proof 
of the sympathy of the colonising nation 
which will be seen to be as active on 
behalf of its own religion as it is 
on behalf of any other religion which 
does not offend either the principles 
of public order or our sentiments of 
humanity.
De Coppet believed that the problem of employment for 
graduates of the medersa had been exaggerated by the 
Inspector and he requested permission to make an 
immediate start on the building.^) The immediate 
support for the project was not, however, forthcoming, 
and with de Coppet's departure in 1938 the scheme 
lost its chief advocate.
In all these cases it is clear that de Coppet had to 
overcome misgivings and open hostility from senior 
administrators in order to fulfil his policy of 
being seen to help Muslims. In case it should be 
felt that he had transformed the state overnight into 
a gravy train for Muslims it should be noted that
(1) ANS 0 92 Gov.-Gen. AOF to Min. Col. 28.8.1937.
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several requests for assistance were refused. (1) 
Equally it should also be noted that in two of the 
cases examined above an important Islamic personality 
was involved, namely Ibrahim Niasse. Niasse was the 
head of a major branch of the Tijaniyya and although 
at this stage his influence was not as great as it 
was to become - he was very soon to be recognised 
by the North African Tijani as the khalifa of the 
West African Tijaniyya and had close relations with 
Muslim leaders in Ghana and Nigeria - nonetheless 
by 1936/7 he was unquestionably a very important 
figure, and de Coppet was wise to treat him well.
Relations between de Coppet and Ibrahim Niasse had 
been greatly improved after, with French assistance, 
Niasse had made the pilgrimage not just to Mecca but 
also to various Tijani shrines in North Africa during 
the hajj of 1937. ^  De Coppet saw Niasse's fulsome
(1) See correspondence in NAS 19 G 6* concerning mosques 
in Medina (Dakar), Dagana and Guinguineau (Sine-Saloum) 
for examples of refusal of assistance beyond a token 
donation.
(2) ANS 4 E 8 See 'Dossier Ibrahim Niasse (1937)1 and 
'Dossier: Impression de voyage' for French records
of Ibrahim Niasse's appreciation.
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praise for the French organisation of the haj j as 
vindication of his policy. He quoted large sections 
of the letter which Niasse wrote to him on his return 
from the hajj in a circular to the governors of AOF. 
Of particular interest in Niasse's letter was a 
suggestion for a possible reform or modification of 
Qur'anic education. Niasse wrote:
I regret that too large a proportion of our 
Muslim population make no effort to understand 
our moral duties and as a result acquire the 
skills which would enable us to contribute 
to the revival of the country. Of these 
skills the most neglected but also the most 
important, are those concerned with 
agriculture.
I would therefore like to see the creation of 
medersas where the Muslim child will learn 
the Coran, Muslim duties, to speak and write 
Arabic and then also a manual skill which 
will enable him to earn his living. (1)
This was a very significant proposal and one which 
ran counter to all the earlier beliefs in the 
hostility of Muslims towards a westernised form of 
Qur'anic education. It is probably best understood 
in the context of the changing economic and labour 
situation in Senegal during the 19 30s, a decade 
which witnessed increased migrant labour together
(1) ANS 0 94 Ibrahim Niasse cited in Gov.-Gen. AOF
circular 24.5.1937.
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with urban growth and unemployment. (1) It can 
perhaps be seen as Niasse's alternative to 
Mouride expansion into new uncultivated land.
De Coppet was very sympathetic to the suggestion 
and asked for comments from the Governors of 
individual colonies. The response was mixed.
The Governors of both Guinea and Ivory Coast were 
enthusiastic, the Governor of Dahomey thought the 
suggestion 'irrelevant' to Dahomey's population and 
Beyries, now the interim Governor of Mauritania 
thought it - no doubt wisely - 'inappropriate* in 
view of the Moorish caste system in which artisans 
occupied the lowest rank. (2) The Governor of Niger,
(1) See M. Lakroum Le Travail inegal for a 
full analysis of changing labour patterns.
(2) See replies from Governors and their interims to
Governor-General: Guinea 21.9.1937; I. Coast
21.7.1937; Dahomey 21.10.1937; Mauritania 14.6.1937. 
Beyries wrote; 'Les hautes classes, que nous avons 
du manager pour des raisons politiques et de 
securite, admettraient difficilement dans l'etat 
actuel des choses, que les adolescents d'origine 
guerriere ou maraboutique instruits dans les 
medersahs soient astreints a un apprentissage 
manual qu'elles jugent degradant.' It is interesting 
to note the enthusiasm of the Governor of the Ivory 
Coast. In reply to de Coppet he spoke at length
of the superiority of Islam over animism. See also 
ANSCM AP 957 'Rapport politique: AOF' 1937 which 
Garmented on the conversion of the Mande and Mossi 
of Ivory Coast to Islam in this way: '... leur
conversion ne les eloigne point de la civilisation 
fran<paise. Ils representent au contraire les 
elements les plus avides du progres de la 
population ...'
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however, was pleased to note that at last 'something 
was being done' against 'the state of neglect in 
which we have left the Muslim schools.' He 
compared French policy unfavourably with British 
policy in Nigeria where he particularly admired the 
recently-created secondary college in Zaria at which 
teaching was conducted not just in English but also 
in Hausa. In Niger he said that he and his 
administration were making an effort to ensure that, 
with the approval of the marabouts, manual skills and 
agriculture would be taught to the 4,000 or more 
children attending the colony's 1,350 Qur'anic 
schools. (1)
However, there is no evidence of any further action 
towards a reform of Qur'anic education along the 
lines proposed by Niasse. Niasse's proposal 
coincided with another debate concerning the reform 
of Qur'anic education, but the proposed reforms 
were of an altogether different nature. In January 
1937 de Coppet was sent a major report carried out by 
M. Kleinschmidt on the condition of Muslim education 
in Senegal. The report was very critical both of 
the begging by talibes and of the low level of 
academic achievement within the schools. It
(1) ANS 0 94 Niger to Gov.-Gen. AOF 20.9.1937.
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concluded that some system of control to ensure a 
higher standard of teaching was necessary. The 
Deputy Inspector of Education was broadly 
sympathetic. According to the most recent (1933) 
statistics available he said that in Senegal there 
were 8,981 Qur'anic schools attended by 65,416 
pupils. However, none of the schools visited 
by the Inspectorate merited, he said, the name of 
'school' - 'The teaching which is given there lacks 
any form of method and creates by its monotony this 
universal laziness of spirit which the pupils bring 
with them later to the public school.' However, 
he was less sure than Kleinschmidt had been that 
any controls other than a restriction of the hours 
in which the school could open were possible.(1) 
Geismar, de Coppet's interim as Governor-General, 
sent copies of the Kleinschmidt report and the 
Deputy Inspector's assessment of it to the Governors 
of Senegal, Niger, Soudan, Guinea, Mauritania and 
to the Administrator of Dakar and asked for their 
comments on this 'particularly delicate' question.
(1) ANS 0 94 Min. Col. to Gov.-Gen. AOF 8.1.1937; 
Kleinschmidt 'Les Ecoles coraniques dans les 
villages indigenes du S^ndgal'; Bemadou,
Inspecteur Adjoint de 1'Enseignement 'Note 
pour m. le Directeur des Affaires Politiques' 
5.2.1937.
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He suggested that they also read Marty's earlier 
report on Qur'anic education in Senegal. When the 
various Governors had all replied de Coppet reported 
back in turn to his superiors in Paris. It is 
perhaps not surprising that he was very firmly 
against any form of control, an opinion which it 
seems was shared by all the Governors with the 
exception of the Governor of Senegal and the 
Administrator of Dakar. De Coppet argued that 
Marty's verdict on previous attempts at legislation 
was still valid and that the French should continue 
to make an effort to understand Qur'anic education - 
including such activities as begging - from a Muslim 
rather than from a European perspective. He quoted 
the reply of the Governor of Soudan:
Muslim education exists in conditions which 
do not appear to require any intervention 
on our part. Its very nature, its aims, 
the calm in which it is carried out, the 
paternal action of the schoolmasters and 
the docility of the pupils - all suggest 
that the Coranic school still meets certain 
needs which touch the very heart of hative 
societies. It would be very dangerous 
in the present state of evolution of our 
subjects to prejudice the satisfaction of 
these needs, even if this were done with 
the best of intentions.
The only exception which de Coppet was prepared to 
make was to consider stricter control of the hygiene
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of Dakar's schools - but he stressed that this too 
required a sense of pragmatism and an awareness of 
political priorities. (1)
It is interesting to note that in North Africa, 
too, the issue of legislation for Qur'anic schools 
was a very contentious one. The French 
administration in Morocco introduced a law in 
December 1937 requiring all Qur'anic schools to 
obtain official authorisation and to keep a 
register of pupils and teachers. The following 
year in Algeria a decree established the principle 
of inspecting the schools from the point of view 
of 'Morality, hygiene and salubrity.' Schools 
found wanting in any of these three virtues could 
be closed down. However, concerned opinion was 
sceptical about the wisdom of such legislation.
An article in the Bulletin du Comite de l'Afrique 
Fr.ancaise argued that Muslim complaints about such 
legislation were to a certain extent justified and 
that the French should show a greater awareness of 
the contribution which Qur'anic schools had made 
towards the promotion of literacy in Algeria.
(1) ANS 0 94 Gov.-Gen. AOF bo Min. Col. 12.10.1937.
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In AOF the Inspector of Education did not think that 
it was an 1 opportune' moment to introduce the 
Moroccan legislation south of the Sahara.(1)
De Coppet's obvious wish to be seen to be according 
Islam official respect and his reluctance to transform 
Qur'anic education into a disguised form of French 
education should be recognised as an original 
contribution to the development of French policy 
towards Islam. Both as Lt-Governor of Mauritania 
and as Governor-General of AOF de Coppet showed clear 
signs of departure from the near consensus of the 
previous twenty-five years according to which the 
faith of African Muslims was thought, to be closer 
to the precepts of some undefined 'traditional' 
'African* cosmology than to the doctrines revealed 
in the Qur'an and in the hadith. However, the
'novelty' of de Coppet's contribution requires
(1) ANS 0 92 Inspecteur General de 1' Enseignement
'Note pour m. le Directeur des Affaires Politiques 
et Administratives' 7.4.1938. This 'Note' also 
contains an analysis of the Moroccan legislation.
See also Anon ' L ' Enseignement elementaire des 
indigenes en Alg^rie et la question des 6ooles 
coraniques' BCAF July 1938 pp. 303-8.
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qualification. In the previous chapter we saw how 
his behaviour towards Hamallah belonged very clearly 
to a tradition of support for the 'establishment' 
leaders of the brotherhoods, a tradition which goes 
back to the about-turn in French attitudes to Serigne 
Ahmadu Bamba in 1912. De Coppet was as anxious to 
preserve the monolithic structures of the brotherhoods 
as any of his predecessors had been. Cheikh Seydou 
Nourou Tall, as can be seen from his exhausting 
itinerary was one of the leading figures in de Coppet's 
Islamic strategy, and Ibrahim Niasse was clearly able 
to make his voice heard in the Presidential Palace.
Another aspect of continuity in de Coppet's 
administration was the surveillance and censorship 
of Arabic literature. The Central Intelligence 
Bureau (Service Central de Surete et de Renseignements 
Generaux) was increasingly active and vigilant.
The fact that it surveyed all forms of political 
activity should not be allowed to hide the fact that 
a lot of its time was taken up in surveying Arabic 
literature. The staff of the Bureau increased 
steadily from 87 in 1933 to 115 in 1938. (1)
(1) ANS 17 G 174 (28) 'Rapport annuel sur le fonctionnement 
du Service Central de Surete et de Renseignements 
Generaux* 1938. The statistics above are taken from 
this report.
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In 1936 its officers seized 503 Arabic periodicals 
and advised that a further 2,040 were 'dubious'; 
in 1937 these figures were respectively 124 and 
1,056 and in 1938, 384 and 4,730. Particular 
attention was being paid to the Lebanese and Syrians 
for whom stricter immigration controls were 
introduced in 1938. The effectiveness of the 
controls - a larger money payment and extra 
documentation - can be seen in the dramatic drop in 
arrivals from the Levant: 1,936 in 1937 to 979
in 1938. In both years over a thousand were 
deported.
The concern of the authorities probably stemmed 
more from Arab nationalism than from Islamic unrest: 
for example, two of the publications banned in 1938 
were banned because they carried poems glorifying 
the Arab revolt in Palestine. However, their 
sensitivity to this issue was founded as much on 
the fear that it would encourage non-Arab Muslims 
to challenge colonial authority as on the restless­
ness it caused amongst the Levantine population of 
AOF.
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In short, the colonial state during the years of 
the Popular^ Front was growing increasingly vigilant 
over its subjects of whom more than 50,000 by the 
end of 1938 were the subject of files in the 
archives of the Intelligence Bureau. In two years 
alone - 19 36 and 19 37 - a further 10,000 files were 
added. (D Such statistics and the knowledge of 
de Coppet's attitude to Cheikh Hamallah serve to 
qualify any temptation to portray de Coppet as simply 
a benevolent and liberally-minded paternalist. 
Nonetheless, the fact that de Coppet had conventional 
responsibilities as the most senior colonial 
administrator in the Federation to ensure law and 
order should not blind us to the evidence that he 
was prepared to go along new and untested paths. 
Furthermore, although it is clear that the Popular 
Front government was broadly 'reformist' or 
'progressive' in colonial policy - witness the 
Blum-Violette proposals in Algeria - it seems that 
the initiative for de Coppet's Muslim policy in AOF 
came from himself and from the impression of Islam 
that he had gained in Mauritania.
(1) ANS 17 G 174 (28) 'Rapport annuel sur le
fonctionnement du Service Central de Surete 
et de Renseignements Generaux' 1937.
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Something of a paradox, De Coppet would probably 
have been quite at ease with the later ambiguities 
and uncertainties of official French thinking that 
were to become so evident in the concept of the 
Union francaise of the 1950s. But such------------ j-----
considerations lie beyond the scope of this study.
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CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the years discussed in this thesis Islam 
featured prominently in French preoccupations.
At the turn of the century as the era of overt 
military conquest drew to a close, French attitudes 
and policy towards Islam were informed by the 
experience of the conquest itself, by a number of 
travel accounts and a much smaller number of 
scholarly studies on Islam but above all by the 
knowledge that had been gained over the past seventy 
years in Algeria. These various influences 
combined to paint a somewhat confused portrait of 
Muslims: the fiercest adversaries of the French
had been Muslim leaders, but it was with an army 
comprising large numbers of Muslim soldiers that 
the forces of al hajj Umar Tall and Samori Ture 
were defeated; in travel accounts European 
adventurers (often disguised as Muslims!) had 
testified both to the generosity and to the cruelty 
of West African Muslims; the scholars in Algeria 
had warned of well-organised secret Islamic 
brotherhoods but south of the Sahara, Le Chatelier,
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one of the foremost French experts on Islam, argued 
that such organisations were the product of French 
imagination; in Algeria Mgr. Lavigerie emphasised 
the relationship between Islam and slavery but in 
West Africa, Louis-Gustave Binger doubted that the 
unemployed in France were as well looked after as 
the house slaves of African Muslims. What then in 
French eyes were the essential characteristics of 
African Islam? At the turn of the century you 
paid your money and took your choice.
I have argued that although many of these views 
persisted throughout the colonial period that 
nonetheless there was a recognisable evolution of 
thought, and that this evolution can only be. 
understood by taking into account the cultural and 
intellectual environment of early twentieth century 
France as well as by looking closely at the specific 
circumstances of colonial scholarship and policies 
in West Africa. Intellectual and political 
developments are seen to be inextricably linked in 
the evolution of thought and policy. Three distinct 
phases are identified in this evolution.
The first phase comprised the years between the 
military conquest and the start of the First World War.
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They were years in which conspiracy theories dominated 
both French domestic politics and international 
diplomacy. French understanding of Islam was 
muddled and veered between on the one hand the 
views associated with the Algerian school of thought 
(and Xavier Coppolani in particular) according 
to which Islam represented a monolithic structure 
which, if the French could control it, offered 
the key to cheap and efficient French domination 
of the whole of north-west Africa to views, on 
the other hand, which stressed the irrational, 
unpredictable, fanatical and intrinsically 
'untameable' nature of African Islam. When 
Coppolani was himself killed by a Muslim opponent 
in 1905 the latter view came to dominate and at 
a time of widespread millenarian expectations 
amongst African Muslims the French were particularly 
fearful of Mahdist activity. In addition, the 
Muslim leaders - the marabouts - were identified by 
the French as being the allies of a slave-owning 
'feudal' aristocracy which used religion as a pretext 
for exploiting the rest of society. The image of 
the marabout was further worsened by its association 
in the minds of some Frenchmen with that of the 
metropolitan clergy and at a time when anti­
clericalism was one of the strongest political
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passions this was a particularly unfortunate 
association. Seen in these lights Islam presented 
itself as the major obstacle to the advancement of 
French 'civilisation' and to the imposition of 
French rule. When to these views a combination of 
ethnic and racial stereotypes were added a situation 
was created in which conflict between some Muslims 
and the French was almost inevitable. I have 
suggested that French 'Islamophobia' reached a peak 
in the years 1909-11 and that the events that took 
place on the edge of the Futa Jallon in which 
hundreds of Africans lost their lives was the tragic 
denouement of these perceptions of religion and race.
The second part of the thesis describes how during 
the years 1913 - c.1920 the French came to revise 
their understanding, not just of Islam but also of 
African society generally. I argue that the 
influence of ethnology and later also of Durkheimian 
sociology led to a radical reappraisal of the 
relative merits of animism and Islam in West Africa: 
animism hitherto despised for its 'primitive' and its 
localised nature, its superstitions and its lack of 
either a written doctrine or any other easily 
discernible moral code was now seen by some as a 
relatively rational and sophisticated system of
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universalist beliefs which responded well to the 
needs of African societies. Islam, by contrast, 
was seen increasingly as an alien and disruptive 
force from which animist societies required some 
protection. These views were associated in 
particular with Francois Clozel and Maurice Delafosse, 
two very senior administrators who took a keen and 
active interest in ethnology. However, it was the 
work of a third scholar-administrator, Paul Marty 
appointed head of the Governor-General's Service 
des Affaires Musulmanes, which above all contributed 
to a change in official perceptions of Islam. In 
his multi-volume study of Islam in AOF Marty 
described a religion which was distinguished by its 
wholesale adoption of pre-Islamic African customs.
Marty was not in the least hostile to this 'distortion' 
(as he saw it) of Islamic doctrine: on the contrary,
he suggested that African Islam - Islam noir - was 
a relatively docile, and from the French point of 
view, harmless religion. He demonstrated how the 
French could gain from a more tolerant attitude 
towards its leaders and through his very thorough 
documentation of personalities, of legal practices 
and of the history of Islam in West Africa he 
succeeded in painting a detailed and coherent picture 
of Islam that has dominated informed European
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European perceptions almost until the present day.
The third part of the thesis describes what I have 
called the French stake in Islam. During the 1920s 
and 1930s the French developed very strong alliances 
with certain leaders of the Muslim community on whom 
the French were reliant for a number of political and 
economic services. Relationships between the French 
and Muslim leaders became fossilised and there was 
little scope for flexibility in the choice of allies. 
The initiative for the alliances came as much from 
the Muslims themselves as it did from the French, for 
the French could offer their allies help and protection 
against challenges to their leadership from factions 
within the Muslim community or from the increasingly 
powerful Senegalese politicians. This pattern of 
mutual support between the French and Muslim leaders 
appears to have been as true in coastal Dahomey with 
its minority Muslim population as it was in the mainly 
Muslim societies of the Sahel.
In 1956 Capt. Cardaire, in charge of Muslim 
intelligence in Bamako, complained, 'AOF is not Dakar - 
when will we understand that? - and Islam in AOF is not 
Abdullah ould Cheikh Sidiya or Seydou Nourou Tall1. (1)
(1) ANSCM AP 2258/1 Cardaire 'Ncte' 26.4.1956.
Cardaire was justifiably complaining about the 
inflexible and highly personalised nature of Franco- 
Islamic relations and their strong bias towards the 
needs of the administration in Dakar. Such 
perceptions, stemming from the evolution of thought 
described in this thesis, should not be relegated to 
a secondary status in any analysis of the colonial 
situation. The very different fates of Tierno Aliou, 
the blind old wali of Goumba, on one extreme and of 
Seydou Nourou Tall, the jetsetting grandson of 
al hajj Umar Tall, on the other, were largely 
determined by the way in which the French authorities 
understood Islam. Colonial 'realities' - the burning 
huts of the missidi in Goumba, the bulging files of 
the Service des Affaires Musulmanes, the pomp and 
ceremony of the foundation celebrations for the new 
mosque in Dakar - all these demand an understanding 
of the way in which colonial governments thought about 
the people they ruled.
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Appendices; The Ponty circulars on Muslim Policy 
Appendix I
Circular to administrators and commandants de cercle 
of Haut-Senegal & Niger on action to be taken against 
itinerant marabouts, 1.7.1906
... As soon as the presence in any part of your cercle 
of one of these beggar marabouts is brought to your 
attention, you should not hesitate to have him 
arrested immediately so that he can be brought to you. 
You should then interrogate him, and if it is 
established that under the pretext of religion, he 
has asked for and obtained presents from the natives, 
you will charge him with fraud and defer him to the 
native tribunal of your circonscription. Once he has 
served his sentence he should be expelled and 
conducted back ... to his country of origin where he 
should be brought to the attention of the local 
authorities. If it is discovered that this person 
is provoking, or has in the past provoked, disorders, 
either in this or in a neighbouring colony, you will 
capture him as soon as possible and send me a report
640
concerning the means and the object of his preaching 
along with your own suggestions as to how to prevent 
him from continuing his preaching in the future. If 
firstly it cannot be established that this marabout 
has been responsible for unlawful acts but that 
nonetheless he possesses no other means of 
subsistence than begging ... you should please detain 
him and send me a personal report suggesting what 
administrative measures you judge suitable.
And in any case, whether the marabout is a peaceable 
man or if he is considered as a dangerous individual, 
you should immediately open up a file on him and send 
it to me: in this document should be included all
information about his identity, place of birth, age, 
antecedents, the brotherhood to which he belongs, 
his family etc ...
... Of course the measures outlined above are in no 
way intended to inhibit the free practice of the 
Muslim religion. (ANS 15 G 103)
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Appendix II
Circular to administrators and commandants de cercle 
of Haut-Sdndgal & Niger concerning Qur'anic schools, 
18.4.1907
... Information collected by my administrators leaves 
me in no doubt about the organising effort currently 
being undertaken by the Muslim brotherhoods in AOF 
or about the political and religious role of 
preachifying marabouts who circulate throughout the 
country and who appear to carry to the sedentary 
marabouts instructions from the chiefs of African 
Islam.
... It is important to be informed not only about the 
number of coranic schools, which aid the diffusion 
of religious doctrines and political suggestions and 
which are disseminated behind our back by the more 
or less secret agents of the religious orders, but 
it is also important to know something of the 
personality of the marabouts who teach in these 
schools, of their origin, their degree of learning, 
their means of instruction, of the influence they 
enjoy in the country and of any relations they may 
have retained with their former teachers. (ANS J 85)
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Appendix III
Circular to Lt-Governors of colonies of AOF outlining 
the Politique des Races1, 22.9.1909
[Ponty regretted the fact that in the period of 
colonial conquest the French had been obliged to 
impose chiefs on Africans and warned of the dangers 
if nothing was done to rectify the situation ... ]
... In Many parts of our colonies a veritable social 
malaise may develop, at first rather vague and 
difficult to discern but which will become acute and 
which will be manifested in local complications that 
may disorient the mass of the population.
This malaise is growing and sometimes assumes 
proportions of real misunderstanding, when in the 
zone commanded by a chief there exists both 
fetishist and Muslim groups. More scrupulous and 
more familiar with our manner of conceiving the 
principle of authority ... Muslims quickly manage 
to acquire political hegemony in a country where 
fetishists are often in a majority. It happens then 
that without ourselves gaining any advantage ... we 
are encouraging the extension of Muslim clericalism. 
Now, the action of Islam if it is conducted by
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ambitious or fanatical chiefs quickly takes on the 
character of a more or less disguised pressure 
against all European innovations. (ANS 19 G 1)
Appendix IV
Circular to Lt-Governors of colonies of AOF 
concerning the use of Arabic in judicial and 
administrative proceedings, 8.5.1911
. . . Everything we do in the government and 
administration of the native races whould have, 
from a political point of view, a single objective: 
to obtain from our African subjects and proteges 
an increasingly exact comprehension of the French 
mentality and of the concept of colonisation which 
are the honour of the government of the Republic.
Now that the occupation of the country has been 
definitively accomplished, it is certain that 
conflicts between the natives and ourselves are 
generally caused by misunderstandings. Now it will 
not escape your notice that in giving an official 
character to the use of the Arabic language, a 
language foreign to the country, we are creating
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occasions from which misunderstandings may arise.
We even tend to mislead the natives about the 
principles of our policy with regard to groups who 
are not themselves Muslim.
Arabic only enters into African countries with 
Muslim proselytism. For the black it is a sacred 
language. Even indirectly to oblige those under 
our jurisdiction to learn it in order to maintain 
official relations with us comes to the same as 
encouraging the propaganda of the votaries of Islam. 
It is not my concern here to examine whether this 
propaganda is always exercised in a way that 
corresponds with our interests. In any case we 
must not appear to take sides in religious questions 
which can only interest us inasmuch as they assume 
a political character. Furthermore, most of our 
clerks cannot speak Arabic and are consequently 
incapable of exercising control over documents 
written in this language. ... The few Arabic- 
speaking natives are most commonly religious persons, 
marabouts often under surveillance, and people 
moreover who have sometimes a very mediocre 
understanding of the language in question. We 
should not tolerate having to rely on such 'scholars1 
for the honest communication of our intentions,
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orders and the sentences of the tribunals to those 
whom it may concern.
On the other hand it cannot be denied that the French 
language, a language that is much easier than Arabic 
for the native to learn and to pronounce, has made 
notable progress in West Africa as a result of 
increased commercial transactions, the extension of 
the railway network, the increasingly intimate 
contact between native groups and our administration 
and the beneficial influence of school. Our language 
is spreading and, in some regions, it is becoming the 
common language between blacks of different races. 
These are tendencies which sould be encouraged.
[Ponty then ordered all judgements, administrative 
correspondence and native requests to the French 
administration to be made in French. Exceptions 
were made for the Muslim Tribunals of Dakar, Kayes, 
Goree and Rufisque, but these were also ordered to 
deliver judgement in French in a circular dated
18.9.1911 ] (ANS M 241)
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Appendix V
Circular to Lt-Governors of colonies of AOF 
concerning the Arabic press in AOF, 15.11.1911
... I have noticed that for some time already,
Syrians and Moroccans have been importing abnormal 
quantities of publications of all kinds printed in the 
Arabic language and which systematically denigrate 
all our acts and our highest principles of 
colonisation. They are also importing vulgar colour 
engravings representing scenes of Muslim religious 
life. Newspapers, brochures and various other works 
are intended for marabouts, talibes, masters of 
coranic schools, scholars or would-be scholars who 
sell them on behalf of the Syrian and Moroccan middle­
men who take an extortionate cut from this lucrative 
trade.
Now even though the political situation in the bulk 
of our West African possessions doesn't present any 
worrying symptoms from the Islamic point of view,
I believe that we should not neglect any opportunity 
to combat maraboutic activity which is hostile to 
our influence and to European domination in general 
and which tends more and more to find its principal
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nourishment in publications from abroad. All these 
periodical journals, works of theology and assorted 
colour prints whilst often superficially 
inoffensive ... all tend through an exaltation of 
the Prophet to favour the development of Islam. 
Experience shows how fertile is the imagination of 
the illustrator of the Coran when it comes to 
winning the conversion of the infidel or rekindling 
the zeal of the neophyte.
[Ponty requested all customs officers to subject all 
literature in Arabic to a 'rigorous surveillance' 
and to destroy anything 'presenting a hostile character 
or which is simply liable to favour maraboutic action' ] 
(ANS 19 G 1)
Appendix VI
Circular to Lt-Governor of colonies of AOF concerning 
the creation of a register of Muslim preaching,
26.12.1911
... Maraboutic propaganda is increasingly developing 
in a sense which if not aggressive is at least 
clearly unfavourable to our domination. ...
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... Maraboutic propaganda - the hypocritical facade 
behind which are sheltered the selfish hopes of the 
former privileged groups and the last obstacle in 
the way of the complete triumph of our civilising 
work based on the respect of justice and human 
liberty - will disappear completely when all its 
activitists, identified and closely watched, are no 
longer able to pass through the gaps in the vast 
network which surrounds them throughout the 
entirety of our West Africa. (ANS 19 G 1)
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1. Archives Nationales de la Republique du
Sene'gal (ANS) ,
Building Administratif, Avenue Roume, Dakar
Archives du Gouvernement Gdndral de l'AOF
Series D - Affaires militaires 
F - Affaires etrangdres
G - Politique et administration gdnerale
Subseries 2 G - Rapports pdriodiques 
5 G - Cote d'Ivoire
7 G - Guinee
8 G - Dahomey
9 G - Mauretanie 
11 G - Niger
13 G - Senegal
15 G - Soudan
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19 G - Affaires musulmanes
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(Senegal)
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These are the archives of the federal 
government of AOF. Classification of 
documents has been in two stages: the
first containing all documents prior to 
1920 has been indexed by J. Charpy 
(Repertoire des Archives 7 vols,
Rufisque, 1954-55) and has been micro­
filmed. The second stage of documents 
from 1920 to 19 40 follows the same system 
of classification but the detailed list 
of contents can only be consulted in 
the library of the archives in Dakar.
To date only the sub-series 2 G has been 
microfilmed. In the footnotes to this 
thesis the post 1920 classification codes 
can be recognised either by an asterisk or 
by the presence of a second figure in 
brackets (e.g. ANS 19 G 23* or 
ANS 8 G 51 (23) ).
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